Marshall Dennehey provides comprehensive defense representation to insurance companies, their insureds, and self-insured corporations across the full spectrum of casualty liability matters. With a deep bench of experienced litigators practicing throughout our 19 offices, our Casualty Department is well positioned to manage cases of any size or complexity—from routine slip-and-fall claims to high-exposure, multi-party litigation.
Our casualty defense practice encompasses 20 distinct areas of law, reflecting the breadth and depth of our experience. We regularly defend clients in matters involving automobile liability, product liability, premises and retail liability, and general liability—practice areas that have formed the foundation of our casualty litigation work since the firm’s inception.
What sets Marshall Dennehey apart is the scope of specialized defense services offered within our Casualty Department. In addition to core liability matters, our attorneys provide focused representation in niche and emerging areas, including amusement, sports, and entertainment liability; fraud and special investigations; maritime litigation; and trucking and transportation. Attorneys in these practice groups bring extensive experience and are widely recognized as leaders in their respective fields.
Each year, the highly skilled attorneys in our Casualty Department handle thousands of matters nationwide, consistently achieving favorable outcomes for our clients through strategic advocacy and efficient case management.
Casualty Practices
Results
Delaware County Jury Awards Only $500 Each to Plaintiffs Seeking Over $500,000
Defense Verdict Returned After Short Jury Deliberation in High-Exposure New Jersey Trucking Case
Christopher Block and Paul Lanza (both of Roseland) successfully obtained a defense verdict in a trucking accident in New Jersey. The plaintiff claimed that our client merged into her lane at the George Washington Bridge toll plaza causing her to sustain neck and back injuries for which she underwent two spinal surgeries. Our client testified that both of their lanes ended and, because they were required to merge, he had the right-of-way since the front of his truck was ahead of the front of her vehicle. Our accident reconstruction expert confirmed that our driver had the right-of-way and opined that plaintiff was the sole cause of the accident. We also disputed the causation of plaintiff’s alleged injuries based on the very limited property damage to her vehicle, as well as the fact that she had prior, similar injuries. After a little more than an hour of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding that our driver was not negligent. The trial team was assisted by associate attorney Haleigh Catalano and paralegal Kelly Dermody who provided critical support with motions in limine and trial management.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Appellate Division Upholds $250K Verdict, Rejects Challenges to Exemplar Video and Summation Conduct
July 20, 2026
In a personal injury case, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court's decision, including the jury's verdict awarding $250,000 in damages and the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial. Lekhal v. Depasquale, No. A-3024-23, 2026 LX 223242 (Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 30, 2026). The case stems from a rear‑end collision in which the defendant struck the plaintiff’s stopped vehicle at a traffic circle. Liability was admitted before trial, leaving damages as the only issue for the jury. At trial, the plaintiff’s medical expert used an exemplar video of a cervical discectomy performed on another patient, and during closing, plaintiff’s counsel referenced defense expert reports that were not in evidence. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by: (1) allowing use of the undisclosed exemplar surgery video involving a different patient; (2) giving an inadequate curative instruction after plaintiff’s improper summation remarks; and (3) denying a mistrial. The court held that although the video should have been disclosed in discovery, its admission was not unduly prejudicial. The video was brief, silent, and used only to illustrate the expert’s testimony, and it accurately depicted the procedure the plaintiff underwent. The court distinguished cases like Rodd and Macaluso, finding no risk of misleading the jury. As to counsel’s improper summation comments, the court agreed the remarks were inappropriate, but concluded that the jointly‑approved curative instruction sufficiently mitigated any prejudice. Overall, the court found no miscarriage of justice, and the verdict was supported by credible evidence.
Defense Digest
PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated
June 30, 2026
Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.
