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Personal Injury Protection (PIP) Litigation

Personal Injury Protection (PIP) litigation requires careful and constant attention by any insurance company that provides such coverage. Small changes in the statute or regulatory framework can have a significant impact on the function and practice of PIP coverage and claims processing for an insurance company. Additionally, each day brings about new issues that plaintiffs' bars in PIP states are developing and pursuing in an attempt to gain additional leverage.

Marshall Dennehey recognizes that PIP litigation is as much dependent upon an innovative, efficient and intelligent approach to handling such claims and litigation as it is upon implementing solid and dependable claims practices company wide. We strive to protect our clients' interests and act as a primary resource our clients turn to when questions regarding PIP arise in their regular day-to-day claims processing practice.

Our PIP practice is comprised of attorneys who are familiar with PIP laws and who have experience handling all facets of PIP litigation. These attorneys also devote a portion of their individual practices to insurance fraud and special investigation practice. Together, these groups provide practical solutions for all types of claims arising out of the use and operation of automobiles.

Marshall Dennehey currently defends clients in PIP matters throughout three major states with mandatory PIP coverage including New Jersey, New York, and Florida and act as national and regional coordinating counsel for major insurance carriers.

The areas of primary concern in PIP litigation include:

  • General PIP Practice
  • Permissive fee schedule litigation
  • Medicare Part B statutory compliance (upcoding, physician's fee determinations, NCCI edits, modifiers)
  • Application of the reserve provision for emergency services or hospital inpatient care
  • Deductible application issues
  • Requests for additional documentation
  • HCFA form compliance
  • Demand letter compliance
  • Commercial motor vehicle right of reimbursement
  • Licensure issues/lawfully rendered medical services issues
  • Exhaustion of benefits issues
  • Usual and Customary Reduction
  • In permissive fee schedule cases, application of UCR to emergency services and care
  • Peer review litigation
  • Provider discovery of billing practices and existing billing agreements with insurance carriers
  • Medical Necessity
  • IME cut-offs and opinions on absence of injury
  • Peer review and medical film review
  • Pre-suit discovery
  • EUO investigation of prior medical history
  • Litigation discovery of claimant's medical history and accident facts through subpoena power

Results

Arbitration Win Secured in a Case Involving Allegedly Unpaid Medical Bills

We secured an arbitration win, slashing a $83,000 claim to $625. The applicant, a major medical provider, filed an arbitration matter in the total amount of $83,625, alleging our client owed it for the claimant’s unpaid medical bills following a major motor vehicle accident. The claimant had been involved in the motor vehicle accident and sought payment for a series of medical treatments rendered post-accident. Counsel for the medical provider argued that the medical billing was never properly paid, therefore, payment of the claims was overdue. However, we successfully argued at the arbitration hearing that the applicant’s demand amount was greatly over exaggerated and that the amount in dispute must be limited to the appropriate fee schedule limit of $625.82. After arguments were heard, the arbitrator ruled in our client’s favor.

Successfully Fully Discontinued a New York No-Fault Action

We were successful in having a New York No-Fault (PIP) action fully discontinued, with prejudice. The plaintiff, a major medical provider, filed suit in Kings County Civil Court in the total amount of $25,805.85, claiming our client owed it for the claimant’s unpaid medical billing. The claimant had been involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought payment for medical treatment. Counsel for the medical provider argued that, since the billing was never paid by the insurer, it was due in full—despite the fact that the same matter had previously been fully exhausted and was processed/handled in full compliance with the applicable medical fee schedule(s). While there were evidentiary issues in our client’s case, our arguments and position were strong. After negotiations and arguments, plaintiff’s counsel acquiesced to a full discontinuance of the matter, with prejudice.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Fifth Circuit Enforces Deception Fraud Sublimit in Email Spoofing Loss Case

November 3, 2026

In Blue Compass RV, L.L.C. v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co., No. 25-10894 (5th Cir. June 5, 2026), the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a policyholder's suit seeking full crime-policy coverage after it wired $1,251,068.34 to a fraudster who had spoofed an email from its contractor with revised banking instructions. Blue Compass argued the loss should fall under its policy's higher-limit Computer and Funds Transfer Fraud provisions ($2,000,000), rather than the narrower Deception Fraud Insuring Agreement ($100,000, subject to a $25,000 retention), on the theory that the fraudster wasn't impersonating a "Vendor" as the policy defined that term. The court disagreed, holding the scheme fit squarely within Deception Fraud — an email impersonating a known business relation to induce payment — and that the policy's exclusion barring recovery under other insuring agreements for losses "resulting directly or indirectly from Deception Fraud" controlled, capping recovery at the $100,000 sublimit the insurer had already paid; the insurer's early tender of that amount, paired with a clean denial of the balance, left the insured without a viable bad-faith claim once the court read the policy's defined terms literally, and the case is a useful reminder for carriers to keep Deception/Social Engineering Fraud definitions and their cross-referenced exclusions tightly drafted, since that precise interplay is what defeated both the coverage and bad-faith claims here.

Case Law Alerts

Minnesota Court of Appeals Upholds Insurance‑Fraud Conviction, Validating Industry Fraud‑Impact Testimony

July 20, 2026

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed Mark Jenni's insurance fraud conviction, which arose after he certified a Park Rapids property as his primary residence on a Liberty Mutual homeowner's policy and then filed an $80,000-plus burglary claim he never reported to the sheriff—on a property where he had previously submitted denied claims through a different carrier. On appeal, Jenni argued prosecutorial misconduct, contending the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that roughly 10% of claims are non-meritorious and that fraud costs run into the "billions" ultimately borne by consumers. He also claimed that closing arguments improperly appealed to Hubbard County jurors' financial self-interest. The court rejected both arguments, holding the investigator's testimony was relevant to establish his background and context, finding that the prosecutor's "cost to consumers" framing explained why application misrepresentations are criminalized rather than urging conviction on community-interest grounds. For the industry, the decision is favorable to SIU and fraud-prosecution efforts: it endorses carrier fraud-investigator testimony about industry-wide fraud prevalence and cost as admissible context, and it gives prosecutors latitude to argue the downstream consumer-cost rationale without crossing into impermissible community-conscience appeals. The practical takeaway for carriers and SIU referrals is that the "fraud drives up everyone's premiums" narrative—long a staple of fraud-bureau messaging—has now been validated as proper evidentiary and argumentative framing, at least in Minnesota.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.