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Personal Injury Protection (PIP) Litigation

Personal Injury Protection (PIP) litigation requires careful and constant attention by any insurance company that provides such coverage. Small changes in the statute or regulatory framework can have a significant impact on the function and practice of PIP coverage and claims processing for an insurance company. Additionally, each day brings about new issues that plaintiffs' bars in PIP states are developing and pursuing in an attempt to gain additional leverage.

Marshall Dennehey recognizes that PIP litigation is as much dependent upon an innovative, efficient and intelligent approach to handling such claims and litigation as it is upon implementing solid and dependable claims practices company wide. We strive to protect our clients' interests and act as a primary resource our clients turn to when questions regarding PIP arise in their regular day-to-day claims processing practice.

Our PIP practice is comprised of attorneys who are familiar with PIP laws and who have experience handling all facets of PIP litigation. These attorneys also devote a portion of their individual practices to insurance fraud and special investigation practice. Together, these groups provide practical solutions for all types of claims arising out of the use and operation of automobiles.

Marshall Dennehey currently defends clients in PIP matters throughout three major states with mandatory PIP coverage including New Jersey, New York, and Florida and act as national and regional coordinating counsel for major insurance carriers.

The areas of primary concern in PIP litigation include:

  • General PIP Practice
  • Permissive fee schedule litigation
  • Medicare Part B statutory compliance (upcoding, physician's fee determinations, NCCI edits, modifiers)
  • Application of the reserve provision for emergency services or hospital inpatient care
  • Deductible application issues
  • Requests for additional documentation
  • HCFA form compliance
  • Demand letter compliance
  • Commercial motor vehicle right of reimbursement
  • Licensure issues/lawfully rendered medical services issues
  • Exhaustion of benefits issues
  • Usual and Customary Reduction
  • In permissive fee schedule cases, application of UCR to emergency services and care
  • Peer review litigation
  • Provider discovery of billing practices and existing billing agreements with insurance carriers
  • Medical Necessity
  • IME cut-offs and opinions on absence of injury
  • Peer review and medical film review
  • Pre-suit discovery
  • EUO investigation of prior medical history
  • Litigation discovery of claimant's medical history and accident facts through subpoena power

Results

Arbitration Win Secured in a Case Involving Allegedly Unpaid Medical Bills

We secured an arbitration win, slashing a $83,000 claim to $625. The applicant, a major medical provider, filed an arbitration matter in the total amount of $83,625, alleging our client owed it for the claimant’s unpaid medical bills following a major motor vehicle accident. The claimant had been involved in the motor vehicle accident and sought payment for a series of medical treatments rendered post-accident. Counsel for the medical provider argued that the medical billing was never properly paid, therefore, payment of the claims was overdue. However, we successfully argued at the arbitration hearing that the applicant’s demand amount was greatly over exaggerated and that the amount in dispute must be limited to the appropriate fee schedule limit of $625.82. After arguments were heard, the arbitrator ruled in our client’s favor.

Successfully Fully Discontinued a New York No-Fault Action

We were successful in having a New York No-Fault (PIP) action fully discontinued, with prejudice. The plaintiff, a major medical provider, filed suit in Kings County Civil Court in the total amount of $25,805.85, claiming our client owed it for the claimant’s unpaid medical billing. The claimant had been involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought payment for medical treatment. Counsel for the medical provider argued that, since the billing was never paid by the insurer, it was due in full—despite the fact that the same matter had previously been fully exhausted and was processed/handled in full compliance with the applicable medical fee schedule(s). While there were evidentiary issues in our client’s case, our arguments and position were strong. After negotiations and arguments, plaintiff’s counsel acquiesced to a full discontinuance of the matter, with prejudice.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Minnesota Court of Appeals Upholds Insurance‑Fraud Conviction, Validating Industry Fraud‑Impact Testimony

July 20, 2026

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed Mark Jenni's insurance fraud conviction, which arose after he certified a Park Rapids property as his primary residence on a Liberty Mutual homeowner's policy and then filed an $80,000-plus burglary claim he never reported to the sheriff—on a property where he had previously submitted denied claims through a different carrier. On appeal, Jenni argued prosecutorial misconduct, contending the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that roughly 10% of claims are non-meritorious and that fraud costs run into the "billions" ultimately borne by consumers. He also claimed that closing arguments improperly appealed to Hubbard County jurors' financial self-interest. The court rejected both arguments, holding the investigator's testimony was relevant to establish his background and context, finding that the prosecutor's "cost to consumers" framing explained why application misrepresentations are criminalized rather than urging conviction on community-interest grounds. For the industry, the decision is favorable to SIU and fraud-prosecution efforts: it endorses carrier fraud-investigator testimony about industry-wide fraud prevalence and cost as admissible context, and it gives prosecutors latitude to argue the downstream consumer-cost rationale without crossing into impermissible community-conscience appeals. The practical takeaway for carriers and SIU referrals is that the "fraud drives up everyone's premiums" narrative—long a staple of fraud-bureau messaging—has now been validated as proper evidentiary and argumentative framing, at least in Minnesota.

Case Law Alerts

Second Circuit Narrows Insurers’ Ability to Deny No‑Fault Claims Based on Provider Misconduct

April 1, 2026

This dispute centered on GEICO’s attempt to recover millions of dollars in New York no-fault reimbursements from acupuncture and chiropractic clinics that allegedly engaged in illegal "kickback" schemes to procure patients. The Second Circuit vacated a lower court's ruling in favor of the insurer, determining that a provider’s violation of New York’s professional misconduct or anti-kickback statutes does not automatically render them "ineligible" for reimbursement under the no-fault regulatory framework. The court clarified that unless the misconduct involves a "licensing" failure—specifically where a non-physician exercises actual ownership or control over the professional corporation—the services rendered remain reimbursable. For insurance carriers, this decision serves as a warning that proving "unethical behavior" or "illegal referrals" is no longer a shortcut to denying PIP or no-fault claims. Carriers must now meet a higher evidentiary burden by proving "de facto" illegal corporate structure or control to justify non-payment. Practically, carriers should pivot their litigation strategies to focus on documenting the lack of medical necessity or the fraudulent nature of the services themselves, rather than relying solely on the provider’s underlying professional misconduct.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.