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Fraud/Special Investigation

Insurance fraud costs insurers and consumers more than $300 billion dollars annually. Backed by decades of SIU experience, our Fraud/Special Investigation Practice Group is built for one purpose: to identify, confront, and eliminate fraud at every level. As fraud schemes become more sophisticated and organized, our team delivers an aggressive legal strategy and courtroom strength required to meet that challenge head-on.

We do not take a passive approach. We partner with insurers and self-insured entities to investigate aggressively, litigate decisively, and pursue recovery wherever fraud is uncovered. From inflated claims to large-scale fraud rings, wherever fraud is identified, we act swiftly, strategically, and without compromise.

Our trial attorneys are seasoned litigators with a deep understanding of how fraud schemes operate and how to dismantle them. We routinely initiate affirmative litigation and secure judgments against claimants, insureds, and medical providers engaged in fraudulent conduct.

Our involvement extends beyond the courtroom. Through active participation in leading organizations such as the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB), the International Association of Special Investigation Units (IASIU), the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud and others, our attorneys stay ahead of emerging threats and evolving tactics. That knowledge translates into stronger, smarter strategies for our clients.

Our vast experience includes matters involving:

  • Medical provider fraud
  • RICO
  • Staged accidents
  • Trucking losses
  • New York Labor Law and premises actions
  • Claimant fraud
  • Workers' compensation fraud
  • Vehicle "give ups"
  • Insurance claim inflation
  • Arson and water damage

We believe the most effective fraud defense is an aggressive, offensive strategy. Our team leverages data-driven insights, advanced investigative techniques, and streamlined claims processes to detect fraud early, before losses escalate. We also consult nationally to help clients reduce claim leakage, strengthen internal protocols, and build more resilient anti-fraud programs.

Insurance fraud is not the cost of doing business; it is a direct attack on our clients’ bottom line.  At Marshall Dennehey, we treat it that way.

Results

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Legal Update for Fraud/Special Investigation

SIU Gets a Boost: NJ Supreme Court Affirms Insurers' Right to Litigate, Not Arbitrate, Fraud Claims

July 21, 2026

In a significant win for insurers' Special Investigation Units, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that statutory insurance fraud and racketeering claims may proceed in court rather than through PIP arbitration. At issue was whether insurance fraud claims brought under New Jersey's Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA) and the state's Anti-Racketeering Act (NJ RICO) are subject to mandatory arbitration under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act’s (AICRA) PIP dispute-resolution framework. Allstate had sued a network of medical practices, physicians, and related corporate entities, alleging a scheme to extract more than $1.7 million in PIP benefits through fraudulent and misleading billing. The trial court dismissed Allstate's complaint and compelled arbitration, reading AICRA's arbitration clause — which covers "any dispute regarding the recovery of... benefits" under PIP coverage, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) — as sweeping in fraud and racketeering claims along with routine benefit disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal, adopting Judge Gilson's opinion below (480 N.J. Super. 566 (App. Div. 2025)) as its own reasoning. The Court held that IFPA and RICO claims fall outside the scope of AICRA's PIP arbitration mechanism because that "streamlined and specialized" process cannot grant the relief those statutes contemplate — treble damages, injunctive relief, broad discovery, and joinder of third parties — and because arbitrators lack authority to award compensatory or treble damages to an insurer. The Court also rejected the argument that Allstate's own Decision Point Review Plans independently compel arbitration, finding those plan provisions no broader than AICRA's own arbitration clause. Notably, the Court expressly disagreed with the Third Circuit's contrary holding in GEICO v. Mt. Prospect Chiropractic Center, 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024), concluding it is not bound by that federal interpretation of New Jersey law. Insurers retain the right to pursue IFPA and RICO claims in the Law Division, with a jury trial. For SIU units and NJ insurance carriers, this decision is a significant win: it forecloses defense clinics' primary procedural tool for shunting fraud investigations into limited-scope PIP arbitration, where treble damages, RICO relief, and meaningful discovery were never realistically available. Carriers building cases against fraudulently structured clinics, straw-owned practices, or coordinated billing networks can now proceed with confidence that a well-pleaded IFPA/RICO complaint stays in the Law Division rather than being diverted to arbitration on a motion to compel. Practically, this strengthens SIU's leverage in settlement negotiations, preserves civil discovery tools (subpoenas, depositions, joinder of related corporate entities) critical to unwinding complex ownership and referral schemes, and resolves the split with the Third Circuit in favor of NJ insurers — at least as a matter of state law. Expect increased reliance on IFPA civil actions, rather than PIP arbitration demands, as SIU's primary enforcement vehicle going forward.

Defense Digest

A Tale of Two Departments: Can a Motor Vehicle Defendant Assert Counterclaims Sounding in Fraud in Actions Involving Staged Accidents in Matters Venued in the Second and First Departments of the New York Appellate Division?

June 30, 2026

Key Points: The Second and First Departments of the New York Appellate Division have recently issued divergent decisions affecting a defendant’s entitlement to leave to amend its answer to assert counterclaims sounding in fraud where it appears that the accident at issue was staged/intentionally caused by the plaintiff depending on where the matter is venued. Based on these recent decisions, a defendant in a matter venued in a court in the Second Department is entitled to leave to amend its answer to assert counterclaims sounding in fraud based on mere allegations that the accident at issue was staged/intentionally caused by the plaintiff, the plaintiff knowingly made false representations to assert claims against the defendant, and that the defendant suffered damages consisting of its costs and fees incurred in investigating and litigating plaintiff’s claims.  However, a defendant in a matter venued in a court in the First Department is only entitled leave to amend its answer to assert counterclaims sounding in fraud where it submits prima facie evidence that the plaintiff staged/intentionally caused the accident and made false representations, and where the defendant alleges damages beyond those associated with its costs and fees incurred in investigating and litigating plaintiff’s claims. The Second and First Department of the New York Appellate Division both recently issued decisions addressing a defendant’s entitlement for leave to amend its answer to assert counterclaims sounding in fraud arising from an accident that is apparently staged and/or intentionally caused by a plaintiff. Specifically, despite the underlying similarities between Gimenez v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of New York, Inc., 225 N.Y.S.3d 691 (NY 2d Dept. 2025) and Anguisaca-Morales v. St. Paul and St. Andrew United Methodist Church, 234 N.Y.S.3d 42 (NY 1st Dept. 2025), the respective decisions of the Second Department and First Department substantially diverged. As a result of these contrasting decisions, the venue of a matter will affect a defendant’s ability to successfully obtain leave to amend its answer to assert counterclaims sounding in fraud against a plaintiff.   Both Gimenez and Anguisaca-Morales involved plaintiffs whose alleged injuries resulted from accidents where liability would normally and presumably be decided against the defendants. In Gimenez, the plaintiffs allegedly were injured due to their vehicle being rear-ended by the defendants’ vehicle. In Anguisaca-Morales, the plaintiff allegedly fell from an unsecured ladder while working at a construction site. Both actions involved appeals from lower court decisions on the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on liability and the defendants’ corresponding motions for leave to amend their answers to assert counterclaims for fraud against the plaintiffs based on allegations that the accident was staged/intentionally caused by the plaintiffs. With respect to the motions for summary judgment on liability, the Second and First Department both found issues of fact resulting in the plaintiffs not being entitled to summary judgment on liability. In Gimenez, the Second Department found that the defendants raised issues of fact as to the existence of a non-negligent explanation for the alleged accident and whether the plaintiffs staged the accident. In Anguisaca-Morales, the First Department found there were issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff intentionally fell and was the sole proximate cause of his alleged accident. Turning to the respective motions for leave to amend their answers filed by the defendants in Gimenez and Anguisaca-Morales, the defendants in both actions submitted proposed amended answers that asserted similar allegations of fraud in support of their respective counterclaims, including that: 1) the respective plaintiffs staged/intentionally caused the accidents; 2) that the respective plaintiffs knowingly made false representations against the respective defendants; and 3) that the respective defendants suffered damages as a result, consisting of incurring investigation and legal costs and fees. In both cases, the Second and First Department also reviewed evidence that they respectively determined had been sufficient to raise a question of fact as to whether the respective plaintiffs intentionally caused their accidents. However, despite the above similarities, the reasonings in these decisions regarding the respective defendants’ entitlement to leave to amend their answers diverged. In Gimenez, the Second Department held that the defendants were entitled to leave to amend their answer because the allegations asserted in their proposed amended answer were sufficient on their face to plead a counterclaim for fraud. However, in Anguisaca-Morales, the First Department held that the defendants were not entitled to leave to amend their answer because their proposed amended answer failed to sufficiently plead a counterclaim for fraud. In doing so, the First Department held that the counterclaim asserted in defendants’ proposed amended answer was premised on unproven allegations and the defendants failed to plead justifiable reliance or resulting damages. Thus, based on the Second Department’s decision in Gimenez, a defendant in an action venued in any of the lower courts in the ten counties that comprise the Second Department (Kings, Queens, Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Dutchess, Orange, Rockland, and Putnam) is entitled to leave to amend its answer to assert a counterclaim for fraud against a plaintiff in an action based on mere allegations that the plaintiff staged and/or intentionally caused the accident at issue. Conversely, pursuant to the First Department’s decision in Anguisaca-Morales, a defendant in an action venued in any of the lower courts in the two counties that comprise the First Department (New York and Bronx) is not entitled to leave to amend its answer to assert a counterclaim for fraud against a plaintiff based on similar allegations. Even when the defendants submits evidence that that the plaintiff intentionally caused the accident that is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment on liability. Instead, in order to be entitled to leave to amend its answer to assert a counterclaim for fraud against the plaintiff in a matter venued in the First Department, a defendant is effectively required to make a prima facie demonstration that the plaintiff staged/intentionally caused the accident and that the defendant sustained damages. In doing so, the damages must be in addition to what the defendant incurred in relation to investigating and litigating the plaintiff’s claims. The decisions in Gimenez and Anguisaca-Morales have not yet been cited in any subsequent decisions involving cases where the plaintiff allegedly staged/intentionally caused the accident. Instead, these decisions have only been discussed in multiple decisions by one judge in the New York Supreme Court, Kings County, in cases that do not involve allegations of staged accidents. This judge has inserted identical language in five decisions that appear to be a concerted attempt to limit the application of Gimenez to cases where there is “concrete evidence” that the accident was staged. Ian works in our Melville, NY office. He can be reached at (631) 227-6389 or ILGlick@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.