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Insurance Services – Coverage & Bad Faith Litigation

Marshall Dennehey's Insurance Coverage/Bad Faith Litigation Practice provides full-service insurance litigation solutions for national and global insurance carriers. Far beyond coverage and bad faith litigation counsel, our Insurance Services practice has developed a full suite of innovative services designed to meet the needs of our insurance carrier clients.

From Florida to New York, we use creative strategies to effectively control exposure, avoid litigation and transfer risk, while protecting our clients' brands and industry position. Our legal services include counsel and defense of issues arising from commercial, personal, and specialty property and casualty policies, professional liability policies, health/life policies and workers' compensation policies.

The Insurance Services Practice is led by Todd Leon, as the northeast head, and Michael Packer, shareholder in our Fort Lauderdale office, overseeing the south. While the group’s 20 attorneys provide continuity in legal services across the board, Mike and the southeast team have a keen understanding of the unique coverage issues inherent to the state of Florida. Supported by a network of outstanding associates, paralegals and support staff, we are adept at helping clients navigate all aspects of the most complex coverage disputes, first-party property and automobile litigation.

We have successfully represented and defended insurance companies in first-party and bad faith litigation in both state and Federal courts. We are experienced in issues concerning institutional discovery, corporate designee/apex/employee depositions and the tactics utilized by plaintiffs to leverage settlements. By providing strategic advice both before and during litigation, we assist clients in analyzing available coverage and minimizing future risk. When it is in the client's best interests to proceed to trial, our experienced trial attorneys are prepared to rigorously defend the most complex insurance coverage and bad faith cases.

Our services include:

  • Coverage Consultation
  • Third-Party Coverage/Litigation Services
  • First-Party Property Coverage/Litigation Services
  • First-Party Automobile Coverage/Litigation Services
  • Bad Faith Litigation Services
  • SIU/Fraud Coverage/Investigation/Litigation Services
  • Indemnification Risk Transfer Strategies
  • Coordinating Counsel Services
  • CAT Operation Coverage Strategies
  • Bad Faith Strategic Evaluation
  • Policy Language Review
  • Administrative/Insurance Department Representation and Strategies
  • Claims Practices Consultation and Services
  • Institutional Discovery Consultation and Services
  • Development of Guidelines and Best Claims Practices Strategies
  • Training and Educational Development from commercial, personal and specialty property and casualty policies, professional liability policies, health/life policies and workers' compensation policies

The Insurance Services Practice serves clients from our 19 offices located throughout Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Delaware, Florida, Ohio and Connecticut, and in neighboring jurisdictions in Maryland, West Virginia and Kentucky.

Results

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Appellate Victory Secured in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

Appellate Victory Secured in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

Defense Verdict Received in an Insurance Exclusionary Clause Dispute

We received a defense verdict after bench trial in an insurance exclusionary clause dispute. The plaintiff’s personal property in a storage unit was damaged when a municipal water main broke outside the storage facility. The claims representative offered the full policy limits before trial. However, the plaintiff sought recovery of the full claim amount for her damaged property. We argued that her recovery was specifically excluded by the water damage exclusion provision within her insurance policy. The judge agreed and concluded that the water main was part of a containment system for water and the exclusionary clause was applicable.

Thought Leadership

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Case Law Alerts

Public Policy Alone Will Not Negate an Insurer’s Duty to Defend and/or Indemnify an Insured Accused of Facilitating Sex Trafficking

November 3, 2026

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, upon certification from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, determined that, though sex trafficking is criminalized under Pennsylvania law, neither an insurer’s duty to defend nor its duty to indemnify are abrogated solely upon public policy grounds. Four women had alleged that they were sex trafficked when they were minors at a number of Philadelphia-area hotels including the Roosevelt Inn. They sued the hotel among other parties. The hotel was insured through various insurers at the time of the alleged sex trafficking. After defending the hotel in the underlying lawsuits brought by the women pursuant to reservations of rights, the insurers sought declaratory judgment that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify the hotel because if the allegations were proven to be true (i.e., the hotel aided or facilitated sex trafficking), it would be against public policy to defend or indemnify the hotel. The Supreme Court declined to extend a holding of its previous plurality decision that, based on public policy grounds, an insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured who had provided heroin to an individual who died as a result of taking the drug. The court refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” It further stated that it did not believe that “it is within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code.” As a result, the court invited the insurers to ensure their policies included exclusions which would prevent coverage for the type of criminal actions that had been alleged against the insureds. Finally, the court reiterated that the duty to defend under an insurance policy is analyzed solely from the comparison of the allegations within the complaint to the terms of the insurance policy.

Case Law Alerts

Ohio Supreme Court: Binding Appraisal Awards May Be Challenged Only for Fraud or Manifest Mistake Pleaded with Particularity; Bad Faith Claim Fails

November 3, 2026

The insured (One Church) sustained windstorm damage to its property and submitted a claim to Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company (its property insurer). The parties disagreed as to the scope and amount of necessary repairs. The parties invoked the policy’s binding appraisal clause to resolve the dispute. The appraisal process was completed, and a binding award was issued. Brotherhood Mutual paid the appraisal award, and One Church accepted the payment. Several months later, contractors at One Church discovered "hidden damage" to the roof which had not been identified or addressed during the appraisal process. One Church demanded Church Mutual make an additional payment of approximately $206,000 for the new repairs. Brotherhood Mutual refused on the basis of the completed appraisal. One Church then filed suit, asserting claims for breach of contract and bad faith. The issue in the case were the standard by which a party is able to set aside or reopen a contractually binding insurance appraisal award in Ohio. A secondary issue was whether the discovery of previously undiscovered property damage after the conclusion of a binding appraisal constitute a "manifest mistake" sufficient to invalidate the award (and if so, the level of specificity is required under Ohio Civil Rule 9(B) when a party alleges fraud or mistake to overturn an appraisal). The Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio ruled in favor of Brotherhood Mutual – reversing the court of appeals and reinstating the trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit. The Court held that contractually agreed-upon appraisal awards are highly favored and final. They cannot be set aside or reopened unless a party proves fraud, partiality, or a "manifest mistake." As to the definition of “manifest mistake,” the Court clarified that a manifest mistake must be an obvious, clerical, or mathematical error evident on the face of the award (e.g., an incorrect calculation). The mere fact that additional, hidden property damage was discovered after the appraisal process does not qualify as a manifest mistake. The Court further emphasized that any allegation of fraud or mistake must be pled with particularity under Ohio Civil Rule 9(B), and One Church failed to meet that high standard. The decision’s impact on bad faith claims in Ohio is that the Court held an insured is unable to assert a bad faith claim on the basis that the insurer relies on an appraisal award. Since the award is valid and binding, the insurer’s reliance on the award cannot constitute a breach of contract. As a result, the dependent claim for insurance bad faith was also properly dismissed.

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Firm Highlights

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Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

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Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Marshall Dennehey Shareholders Recognized as Florida Trend Legal Elite Notable Women Leaders in Law

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Marshall Dennehey Shareholders Recognized as Florida Trend Legal Elite Notable Women Leaders in Law