.

Allison L. Krupp

Co-Chair, Insurance Services Practice Group

Portrait of Allison L. Krupp

Allison is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she concentrates her practice on insurance coverage and bad faith litigation.  She routinely represents national/global insurance carriers in insurance coverage disputes and first-party automotive claims brought against them.  Allison is experienced in many types of coverage issues, including: policy cancellation, policy reformation, phantom vehicle cases, and a variety of policy exclusions.  She also defends clients in the area of bad faith litigation. She practices in Pennsylvania state and federal court, as well as before arbitration panels and appellate courts.

For two years prior to joining the firm, Allison served as a judicial law clerk for the Honorable Judge Donald R. Totaro in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas.  During her final year of law school, Allison served as a legal extern for the Honorable Justice J. Michael Eakin of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  She also served as a certified legal intern for the Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission in the Hearings and Appeals Department. 

In 2006, Allison graduated magna cum laude from York College of Pennsylvania.  She then attended the Widener University School of Law and graduated cum laude in 2009.  During her time in law school, Allison served on Widener’s Law Journal and was the president of the Moot Court Honor Society from 2008 to 2009.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2009)
    • York College of Pennsylvania (B.A., magna cum laude, 2006)
    • Pennsylvania, 2009
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, “Lawyer of the Year,” Harrisburg, Insurance Law (2025)
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Insurance Law (2024-2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2019)
    • American Inns of Court
    • Cumberland County Bar Association
    • Dauphin County William J. Lipsitt Inn of Court, Associate
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Bad Faith 2022, Pennsylvania Bar Institute CLE, September 2022
    • Exploring Bad Faith – Practical Discussion of Bad Faith Law in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud 360 Seminar, Lafayette Hill, PA, June 2022
    • All things UM/UIM & Bad Faith in PA, Marshall Dennehey Virtual Client Presentation, February 2021
    • An Overview of Pennsylvania Law for Auto Law & Premises Claims, Marshall Dennehey Virtual Client Presentation, February 2021
    • Proper Handling of UM/UIM Claims:  The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, June 17, 2016
    • Regular Use Exclusions in Pennsylvania -- Coverage Issues and Practical Applications, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, June 2015
    • Recent Pennsylvania Trial and Appellate Case Law, Cumberland County Lunch and Learn, March 2015
    • "'Regular Use Exclusions' Stand: Pa. Supreme Court's Latest Ruling Post-'Gallagher',"The Legal Intelligencer Insurance Law Supplement, August 20, 2024
    • "Federal District Court’s Discretionary Jurisdiction Over Declaratory Judgment Actions: Recent Trends and Developments," Pennsylvania Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (PAMIC), Winter 2022 Edition
    • "Pa. Ruling Leaves Auto Policy Stacking Questions,"Law360, November 10, 2021
    • “Just How Hard Does Gallagher Hit the Household Vehicle Exclusion?,” Defense Digest, Vol. 25, No. 2, June 2019
    • "Airbnb and Insurance Coverage: Is It Up in the Air?" The Legal Intelligencer's Insurance Law Supplement, page 7, August 29, 2017
    • “A Perfectly Imperfect Process: Dauphin County’s First Post-Koken Jury Trial: Oaks v. Erie Insurance Exchange and Austin,” Defense Digest, Volume 20, No. 3, September 2014 
    • “Where to Sue Since Summy,” Defense Digest, Volume 20, No. 3, September 2014
    • Legal Updates for Coverage and Bad Faith, Editor, 2014-present
    • "Reservations Over Reserving Your Rights," Defense Digest, Volume 19, No. 4, December 2013
    • "Predicting the Future of Predictive Coding," Defense Digest, Volume 18, No. 1, March 2012
    • Assisted with obtaining summary judgment in favor of the insurer in federal court on all 7 counts of the complaint, including breach of contract, insurance bad faith, misrepresentation, negligence, deceit, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair trade practices.
    • Assisted with obtaining a decision from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirming the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the insurer on counts of insurance bad faith and violations of the MVFRL.
    • Assisted with obtaining a decision from the Commonwealth Court affirming the Insurance Commissioner’s decision in favor of the insurer, where the policyholder had challenged a homeowner’s policy cancellation.
    • Assisted with obtaining summary judgment in favor of the insurer in Pennsylvania state court on counts of breach of contract and insurance bad faith.
    • Worked on multiple cases regarding the validity and applicability of stacking waivers on Pennsylvania auto policies, and obtained summary judgment in several of those cases.
    • Assisted with successfully opposing a Motion for Class Certification in a Philadelphia County TCPA case.
    • Obtained a defense verdict from a Philadelphia County arbitration panel, where the underlying issue was permissive use of a vehicle.
    • Obtained defense verdicts from Lancaster County arbitration panels in two separate property damage cases involving a neighbor dispute.
    • Obtained a defense verdict from a magisterial district judge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    • Second-chaired and received a defense verdict in a high-profile casualty case, where the plaintiff sustained serious injury in a sprint car accident. 

Results

Achieved Dismissal of an Appeal of Our Defense Verdict

We won dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal of a defense verdict. Our client issued a professional liability insurance policy to the plaintiffs. When the plaintiffs were sued for legal malpractice, they notified our client of the suit and asked them to provide counsel to defend the matter. However, the plaintiffs never agreed to counsel proposed by our client. The plaintiffs then proceeded to mediation in the legal malpractice action and settled the matter without notifying our client. As a result, our client denied the plaintiffs’ request for indemnification. The plaintiffs then brought suit against our client for breach of contract and bad faith, alleging they wrongly denied indemnification and failed to provide counsel. The matter went to jury trial from April 8–11, 2024, where we successfully defended our client as the jury returned a defense verdict. The plaintiffs filed post-trial motions and then appealed the decision to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, arguing the trial court erred in allowing the jury to see a copy of the insurance contract during their deliberations. The Superior Court dismissed the appeal and found that the plaintiffs waived their argument by failing to cite relevant legal authority in their appellate brief. The Superior Court also stated in a footnote that, should the court have reached the issue on appeal, it would have found it meritless because the insurance contract was a central piece of evidence to which the plaintiffs did not object during trial.

Jury Verdict Received in a Breach of Contract Action

We secured a jury verdict in a breach of contract/statutory bad faith action that arose under a legal malpractice policy issued to a law firm by our insurance company client. The plaintiffs settled a malpractice claim set forth against them without our client’s knowledge or consent. The insurance company then denied coverage for that claim, and the plaintiffs filed suit. Because the case included a bad faith claim, if the plaintiffs prevailed on both counts, the damages could have been seven figures or more. We took the case to trial before Judge Patrick in Philadelphia County. The jury returned a verdict on the breach of contract claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their damages by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge then dismissed the statutory bad faith claim.

Thought Leadership

‘Regular Use Exclusions’ Stand: Pa. Supreme Court’s Latest Ruling Post-’Gallagher’

August 20, 2024

After the Pennsylvania Superior Court determined in 2021 that “regular use exclusions” in UM/UIM policies violate the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), and in a post-Gallagher legal landscape, some were ready to put the regular use exclusion to rest for good. Now, however, in Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 308 A.3d 780 (Pa. Jan. 29, 2024), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a lengthy majority opinion, has confirmed that the regular use exclusion remains very much alive.

Legal Updates for Coverage & Bad Faith

New Jersey Legislature Passes Bad Faith – What’s Next??

January 14, 2022

New Jersey is on the brink of its first insurance bad faith statute after clearing both the Senate and Assembly by vote on January 10, 2022. While the New Jersey Legislature website does not indicate when it may happen, it is anticipated that Governor Murphy will sign this Bill into law. The Bill is titled “New Jersey Insurance Fair Conduct Act.” The statute provides “claimants” with a private cause of action for conduct deemed “unfair and discriminatory,” as delineated in the Act, N.J.S.A. 17:B29-4. The earliest version of the Bill applied to all lines of insurance. However, the Assembly and Senate Committees pared the initial legislation down, and the current form of the law applies only to underinsured and uninsured motorist claims.  Per the language of the statute, a claimant may file a civil action against an automobile insurer for “(1) an unreasonable delay or unreasonable denial of a claim for payment of benefits under an insurance policy; or (2) any violation of the provisions of section 4 of P.L. 1947, c.379 (C.17:29B-4) [The New Jersey Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act].” It is important to note that in New Jersey, a private right of action did not exist under the Act. Instead, the state could take administrative action against the insurer for violations of the Act, but only if the violations constituted a “general business practice.” This Bill not only creates a private cause of action under the Act, but (unlike the state) a private claimant is not required to prove that the insurer’s actions were of such a frequency as to indicate a general business practice. If the claimant establishes that a violation has occurred, he/she “shall” be entitled to actual damages caused by the violation and prejudgment interest, reasonable attorney’s fees and all reasonable litigation expenses. Thus, the Bill turns a law designed to deter “general business practices” into a sword to punish violations on a case-by-case basis, which was never its original intent.  It is unclear at this point how the courts will interpret “unreasonable delay” and/or “unreasonable denial”; however, they are certainly issues that will generate a great deal of litigation in the coming years.  The attorneys in Marshall Dennehey’s Insurance Services Practice Group are highly experienced in handling such litigation and stand ready to answer questions and help you defend these cases once the Bill is signed into law.  Click here to view the Bill: https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bill-search/2020/S1559 or contact us for a copy.   Legal Updates for Insurance Services – January 14, 2022, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

Events

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.