Harrisburg
Marshall Dennehey established its first office in Harrisburg in 1984. The office is comprised of civil litigation attorneys who maintain practices in all four of our litigation departments: Casualty, Health Care, Professional Liability and Workers' Compensation. In addition to the longstanding professional relationships in the practice of defense litigation our Harrisburg attorneys also provide our clients with educational lectures and risk management seminars.
Located in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, the office is strategically located less than five miles from the Capitol and has ready access to Interstate 81, Interstate 83 and other major highways, which allows the office to efficiently access its service regions.
Harrisburg courts serve as the focal point of law in Central Pennsylvania and include the United States District Court for Central Pennsylvania, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Dauphin County Common Pleas Court, the State Capitol Building and Pennsylvania Administrative Courts.
The Harrisburg office provides services throughout Central Pennsylvania including the following counties: Adams, Centre, Clinton, Cumberland, Dauphin, Franklin, Fulton, Huntingdon, Juniata, Lancaster, Lebanon, Mifflin, Northumberland, Perry, Snyder, Union and York. Some of the office's attorneys are barred in neighboring West Virginia and Maryland as well, and handle matters in the state and federal courts of those states.
The Harrisburg office provides our clients with a dedicated defense litigation team of professionals backed by the intellectual property and broad-based experience of the entire firm, permitting localized and economical representation of insurers and self-insured clients.
Thought Leadership
Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability
Limiting Agent Liability in Pennsylvania: Knowledge, Reliance, and the E&O Landscape
May 7, 2026
Errors & Omissions (E&O) claims against real estate professionals in Pennsylvania frequently arise from allegations of nondisclosure or misrepresentation. However, Pennsylvania law provides meaningful guardrails for defense counsel, particularly where plaintiffs attempt to impose duties on agents that exceed statutory and common law obligations. A key principle, often dispositive at summary judgment, is that a seller’s agent does not owe an independent duty to investigate or discover latent defects. Under Pennsylvania law, a real estate agent representing a seller is not required to inspect the property for defects or to disclose conditions of which the agent has no knowledge. This principle aligns with the statutory framework governing licensee conduct, including the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act (RELRA), which imposes duties of honesty and good faith, but does not create an affirmative obligation to uncover unknown defects. As a result, liability exposure in E&O claims often turns on whether the agent had actual knowledge of the alleged defect and whether the buyer’s reliance was justifiable. The Gordon v. McManus decision illustrates these principles in practice and remains a useful tool for defense practitioners. No. 972 EDA 2013, 2014 WL 10917627, at 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 30, 2014). In Gordon, the plaintiffs asserted claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement against real estate agents, alleging that the agents were aware of a recurring water infiltration issue and failed to disclose it. The plaintiffs further contended that the agents negligently misrepresented the condition of the property when questioned directly about potential water issues. The factual record, however, undermined these claims. The defendant agents maintained that they had no knowledge of any water infiltration problem. Critically, the plaintiffs had been informed by a neighbor that the basement had flooded on multiple occasions prior to closing. They also conducted their own inspection of the property and observed conditions – including the presence of a sump pump – that could reasonably signal potential water concerns. Despite these indicators, the plaintiffs did not pursue additional investigation or specialized inspection. The Superior Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the agents, emphasizing two key points that frequently arise in E&O defense. First, the absence of actual knowledge was fatal to the plaintiffs’ fraud claims. Without evidence that the agents knew of the defect, there could be no intentional misrepresentation or concealment. Second, and equally important, the court found that the plaintiffs’ reliance was not justifiable. Having been placed on notice of potential water issues, the plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence in investigating the condition. Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that where a buyer is aware of facts that would prompt further inquiry, reliance on generalized or informal assurances is insufficient to sustain a fraud claim. The Gordon court also disposed of the plaintiffs’ claim under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, reinforcing that such statutory claims cannot survive where the underlying fraud theory fails. For defense counsel, this linkage provides an additional pathway to narrow or eliminate exposure early in litigation. From an E&O perspective, Gordon highlights several recurring themes. Plaintiffs frequently attempt to recast nondisclosure claims as affirmative misrepresentation, particularly where there are informal communications between agents and buyers. Yet, absent proof of knowledge, these claims often collapse under scrutiny. Moreover, the decision underscores the importance of the buyer’s own conduct. Evidence that a buyer received notice of a potential defect, whether through third parties, inspection findings, or observable conditions, can significantly weaken claims of justifiable reliance. Practically, this framework offers clear guidance for both litigators and real estate professionals. For defense attorneys, early case assessment should focus on developing the evidentiary record regarding the agent’s knowledge and the buyer’s pre-closing awareness. For agents and brokers, risk mitigation remains centered on disciplined communication practices and encouraging independent inspections without offering definitive assurances about property conditions. Ultimately, while E&O claims in Pennsylvania continue to test the boundaries of agent liability, decisions like Gordon reaffirm a consistent judicial approach: liability cannot be imposed where knowledge is absent and reliance is unreasonable. In an environment where plaintiffs increasingly rely on hindsight to construct claims, these principles remain a critical line of defense.
Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers
Misrepresentations of the Next Degree: Expanding Broker Liability After Penn Outdoor
May 7, 2026
Services v. Harleyville Insurance Co. There has been a noticeable increase in claims against insurance brokers over recent years, with plaintiffs beginning to frame coverage disputes as actions sounding in negligence and negligent misrepresentations. In this ever-shifting world, disputes regarding coverage have devolved into claims that brokers failed to secure, explain, or accurately advise as to coverage. Such claims, requiring no proof of intent, allow insureds facing scrutiny to look beyond the spoken word of brokers and into the text of standard transaction documents. Pennsylvania’s Superior Court’s decision in Penn Outdoor Servs., LLC v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of New Jersey, 323 A.3d 231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024), reargument denied (Sept. 6, 2024), highlights the evolution of the misrepresentation claims against brokers. There, Penn Outdoor Services, LLC subcontracted for snow removal services at an apartment complex it owned with Longford Landscape and Excavation. The contract between Penn and Longford included a hold harmless clause in favor of Penn with respect to the services to be provided by Longford, which specifically stated: Subcontractor agrees to indemnify and save and hold harmless Penn and Penn's clients/customers from and against all claims for damages arising out of the performance of Subcontractor's duties under this Agreement and agrees to, at Subcontractor's expense, defend any suit or action brought against Penn or Penn's clients/customers on account of such claim or damage. Consistent with the parties’ agreement, Longford’s insurance broker, Wharton, Lyon & Lyon provided Penn with a certificate of insurance, naming Penn as an additional insured under Wharton’s insurance policy with Harleysville Insurance Company. Specifically, the subject policy included an endorsement relating to Penn’s coverage as an additional insured, endorsement CG-7524, which provided, If specifically required by the written contract or agreement referenced in Paragraph A above, any coverage provided by this endorsement to an additional insured shall be primary and any other valid and collectible insurance available to the additional insured shall be non-contributory with this insurance. While the contract between Penn and Longford was in effect, a woman was injured in a slip and fall at the complex where Longford provided snow removal services. The woman filed suit and named Penn as a defendant. With the impression it was an additional insured under Longford policy, Penn sought a defense in the matter from Longford and Harleysville; a request that was denied because, as per Harleysville, the coverage provided under Penn’s policy was excess coverage, not primary. After settling the underlying action and incurring extensive legal fees in the course of the same, Penn filed an action against Harleysville and Wharton, including a claim for negligent misrepresentation against Wharton. After a jury verdict was rendered in favor of Penn, Wharton filed a motion for j.n.o.v. arguing that the evidence established that it made no negligent misrepresentation. The trial court disagreed, pointing out that the contract between Penn and Longford required Penn to be named as an additional insured, however, it did not specify that such coverage be primary as required by the applicable endorsement to the Harleysville policy. Wharton’s representative testified that she did not review the complete language of the endorsement in question, thus creating the negligent misrepresentation. By providing the COI naming Penn as an additional insured, Wharton represented that to be the status of insurance extended to Penn. The endorsement of the Harleysville policy provided that “if specially provided” by the contract between the parties, the coverage afforded would be primary, correlating with the text of the COI. The contract in question, however, did not specifically call for the coverage to be primary. Therefore, it was not. While reading like a choose your own adventure novel, Penn Outdoor highlights the need for attention to detail in the issuance of COI’s by brokers. In a world where a broker’s spoken word can get them into hot water, the case casts a light on a new potential pathway to broker liability. While the COI in the present matter contained the necessary buzz words, i.e. “additional insured,” that language alone could not carry the day. Penn Outdoor evidences how critical it is for brokers to choose their words wisely, but also carefully ensures the text of the COI, policy language, and other transaction documents provide the coverage reasonably expected by the insured. By making it ones practice to always reconcile the policy language with the COI, and any applicable contracts, brokers can avoid potential liability in an increasingly litigious world.
Results
Summary Judgment Won in a Premises Liability Action
We obtained summary judgment on behalf of two homeowners in a premises liability action. One of the homeowners called his father, the plaintiff, asking him to come to his house because he was having his roof replaced and had concerns about the work being done. The plaintiff arrived at the home and observed nails and other debris strewn about the entire property. Nonetheless, he entered the property to assess the roofing work and took care to avoid stepping on any nails. As he was leaving the property, he stepped on a nail, which went through his foot. The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence against both homeowners and also attempted to assert that, because his son requested that he come to inspect the roofing work, he was a business invitee rather than a licensee. We argued that the plaintiff was a licensee as he was a social guest who was merely providing advice to his son. They further argued that the homeowners owed no duty to the plaintiff as he knew the nails were strewn about the property and he understood the risk involved in walking there. We also argued that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by assumption of risk because as he was aware of the nails on the property and, nonetheless, voluntarily proceeded to walk onto the property. The court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners.
Successfully Denied Claim and Penalty Petitions Related to the Timing of the Alleged Injury
We successfully had the claimant’s claim and penalty petitions denied by proving the alleged injury occurred much later than claimed. The claimant, a technical operator responsible for shaping and packing cheese, alleged that he suffered a left shoulder tear with internal derangement, requiring surgery, as a result of using a long stick-like tool to dislodge cheese that had gotten stuck in a machine during the production process. The claimant asserted that he provided timely notice of his work-related injury to his supervisor; within a few days after the injury occurred. Through cross examination, the claimant admitted that he provided notice of his injury four or five months after the alleged injury occurred. Through employer witness testimony, we were also able to show that, while the claimant did leave early on the day of the alleged injury, the reason was because he was sick, and there was no written documentation to support notice being provided in a timely manner. Through medical expert testimony, we were also able to establish that the claimant’s injury likely occurred on a later date than the one alleged, based upon the medical evidence showing that the bicep did not show any signs of retraction 10 months after the alleged injury date. The workers’ compensation judge found the defendant’s expert testimony more credible than the claimant’s medical expert. The claimant’s claim petition seeking temporary total disability benefits and his penalty petition were denied, resulting in a successful outcome for the defendant.
News
Marshall Dennehey Again Earns Recognition in Distinguished Chambers USA
June 4, 2026
Marshall Dennehey Secures Four Finalist Honors in the 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards
April 15, 2026
Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Andrew W. Norfleet in Harrisburg as a Shareholder in the Professional Liability Department
January 29, 2026
Events
Conference
25th Annual Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Conference
May 28-29, 2026
Hershey, PA
Kacey C. Wiedt, Shannon Fellin, Perry D. Merlo, and Ryan A. Hauck
Speaking Engagement
2026 Pennsylvania Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (PAMIC) Claims Summit
April 8, 2026
Jeffrey G. Rapattoni, James H. Cole, Alec N. DelConte, and Allison L. Krupp
