.

Christopher M. Reeser

Portrait of Christopher M. Reeser

With 29 years of litigation experience in a diverse range of practice areas, Chris represents and defends clients in matters involving motor vehicle, premises liability, construction defect and pharmacy liability. His deep understanding of these areas and breadth of experience is a valuable asset to his clients. Chris also serves as the Casualty Supervisor and Managing Attorney of the Harrisburg office. In this capacity, he oversees the day-to-day operations for the entire office and team of attorneys ensuring that client matters are handled promptly, professionally and effectively.

Chris has represented several large and small automobile insurance carriers and their insureds, numerous hotels, conference centers, and hotel chains as well as grocery store chains, convenience stores, retail stores, pharmacies, and industrial facilities. Chris has defended a number of significant and catastrophic cases involving injuries on building and roadway construction sites. He has also handled a number of underinsured motorist arbitrations and has extensive experience with mediation and arbitration. 

Chris also defends fraternal organizations, schools and universities in matters involving contractual disputes, indemnity, dram shop and general negligence. He has counseled and represented clients in matters related to insurance coverage and professional liability. Additionally, he handles cases involving elevators, escalators, moving walkways, electronic doorways, cranes and lifts representing clients in alleged elevator, escalator malfunctions and negligent maintenance.

During his career, Chris has had significant experience handling several hundred motor vehicle matters involving third-party liability, uninsured and underinsured motorist claims along with several hundred premises liability cases. He has litigated jury trials to verdict in 15 different counties in state from South Central Pennsylvania to the Northern tier as well as in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Chris has also been appointed by the President Judge of Dauphin County on multiple occasions to serve as an arbitrator, including a two-year term in which he was asked to serve as the Chairman of an arbitration panel. 

Chris is a graduate of Albright College in Reading and the Widener University School of Law in Harrisburg. Chris started practice in Williamsport, working with a small litigation firm. He joined the Williamsport office of Marshall Dennehey in 1997 as an associate and he was elected a shareholder in 2002. In 2004, Chris returned to his hometown of Harrisburg to work in our Harrisburg office.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1994)
    • Albright College (B.A., 1991)
    • Pennsylvania, 1994
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 1995
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2007
    • Maryland, 2016
    • U.S. District Court District of Maryland, 2020
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, “Lawyer of the Year,” Harrisburg, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2027)
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, “Lawyer of the Year,” Harrisburg, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2025)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2022-2025, 2027)
    • Central Penn Business Journal "Power List For Law" (2025)
    • Dauphin County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • Fundamentals of Personal Injury, June 2014
    • Pennsylvania's Fair Share Act - PAMIC Claims Summit, March, 2012
    • Basics of Auto Law – Defense Perspective, September 2012
    • Handling the Auto Injury Claim: Settle the Case Without Going to Court, National Business Institute, August 2008 
    • Releases and Settlements - Tactics, Tips and Techniques, 2007 PAMIC Summit 
    • Tort Claims Act, Pennsylvania Association of Township Supervisors 
    • Two Scoops: Superior Court Allows UM/UIM Claimants to Double Dip Workers' Compensation Benefits, Defense Digest, Vol. 11, No. 3, September, 2005
    • Superior Court Holds New Trial is Warranted Whenever Jury Seeks Own Expert Opinion, Defense Digest, Vol. 9, No. 3, September, 2003
    • A defense verdict in a toxic tort case in which the plaintiff claimed neuro-cognitive deficits as a result of exposure to pesticide which was applied in her home.  The plaintiff had called preiminent experts from around the country in the fields of industrial hygiene, occupational medicine, neurotoxicology and pesticide application in support of her claim.  The jury found that our client, a large pest control company, was not negligent. 
    • Successful defense of a subrogation claim brought against the manufacturer of a lighting fixture in which it was claimed that the design of the light caused the fire to occur.  We were able to establish that the fire was not caused by the design of the light but instead by the misuse of the product by the homeowner, who did not follow the warnings contained on the light regarding its use in conjunction with a salt water aquarium. 
    • Successfully obtaining the dismissal of a fraud claim against a client during trial in the Middle District of Pennsylvania which greatly reduced the insured's exposure in a fire loss case at a commercial facility.  The dismissal of the fraud claim insulated our client, a small company, from uninsured exposure. 
    • Successfully defending a large tree cutting company in a case in which it was alleged that an employee of the company was negligent in assisting a mechanic who was performing repairs to the hydraulic system on a boom truck resulting in a crush injury to the mechanic in which he lost a portion of bone in his forearm following contraction of MRSA.
    • Successfully defending a nail salon in a fall down case in which the plaintiff claimed that she was improperly escorted to a chair following a pedicure and had to undergo a multi-level cervical fusion as a result of her fall. 
    • Successfully defended a claim against a pharmacy in which the plaintiff, a physician, was dispensed an antipsychotic medication instead of his usual beta blocker. As a result, the plaintiff claimed post traumatic stress disorder and a permanent loss of income as a result of suffering stroke-like conditions requiring him to be life flighted to a hospital. The jury concluded that the plaintiff did not sustain post traumatic stress disorder and suffered no permanent physical injury and awarded only a nominal amount of money. 
    • Successfully defended a fraternal organization which was sued as a result of an alleged assault by a security guard against an animal rights protestor outside of a circus. The jury concluded that the assault did not occur and the case resulted in a defense verdict. 
    • Gandhi v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 2020 WL 7769776
    • Marks v. The Reserve at Hershey Meadows, LEXIS 47325 (U.S. Dist. 2007)
    • Calhoun v. Prudential General Ins. Co., LEXIS 44302 (U.S. Dist. 2005)
    • Allstate v. Leiter, 306 F.Supp. 2d 488 (M.D. Pa. 2004)

Results

Summary Judgment Won in a Premises Liability Action

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of two homeowners in a premises liability action. One of the homeowners called his father, the plaintiff, asking him to come to his house because he was having his roof replaced and had concerns about the work being done. The plaintiff arrived at the home and observed nails and other debris strewn about the entire property. Nonetheless, he entered the property to assess the roofing work and took care to avoid stepping on any nails. As he was leaving the property, he stepped on a nail, which went through his foot. The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence against both homeowners and also attempted to assert that, because his son requested that he come to inspect the roofing work, he was a business invitee rather than a licensee. We argued that the plaintiff was a licensee as he was a social guest who was merely providing advice to his son. They further argued that the homeowners owed no duty to the plaintiff as he knew the nails were strewn about the property and he understood the risk involved in walking there. We also argued that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by assumption of risk because as he was aware of the nails on the property and, nonetheless, voluntarily proceeded to walk onto the property. The court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners.

Summary Judgment Obtained in a Premises and Product Liability Case

We won a motion for summary judgment in Schuylkill County, PA, in a premises liability and product liability case. We represented the manufacturer of a concrete railroad crossing that was installed at an intersection in 2005. In 2021, the plaintiff was riding his bike across the crossing when his bike tire allegedly became stuck in a gap in the concrete. There was ample evidence that the railroad was responsible for inspecting and maintaining the crossing while our client did nothing other than supply the prefabricated crossing. We argued the gap that developed in the crossing was not the responsibility of the crossing manufacturer and that the statute of repose barred the lawsuit. The court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.