.

Trucking & Transportation Liability

Trucking and transportation is one of the oldest practice areas at Marshall Dennehey. Our group handles cases in the state and federal courts of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Ohio, Florida, New York and Connecticut. The Trucking & Transportation Practice represents clients and their carriers in complex tort and coverage litigation involving all types of common and private carriers. The members of this group include shareholders and associates who have handled cases for large common carrier transportation fleets engaged in interstate trucking, railroads, waste hauling, taxicab, shuttle and bus operators, rental vehicle fleets and ambulance services. These attorneys have represented insurers and self-insureds in personal injury, cargo, environmental, hazardous materials, indemnification and insurance coverage issues, and are keenly aware of the impact of the sophisticated issues and interrelationships of the parties.

Staged Trucking Accidents: A Growing Threat

Staged accidents have become a serious concern in the trucking and transportation industry. These deliberate collisions are orchestrated as part of elaborate insurance scams, with individuals seeking substantial payouts through false claims. These schemes can result in significant financial losses and legal challenges for trucking companies.

Our skilled defense attorneys help organizations combat staged accident fraud by providing early fraud detection guidance, preserving key evidence, and developing strategies to expose fraudulent claims. We work with state and federal authorities as well as the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) to ensure that claims are appropriately referred to the proper authorities for potential restitution. In certain circumstances, we offer pre-suit solutions to stop litigation before it begins—saving legal and indemnity spend. When litigation arises, we provide a vigorous defense to protect our clients' financial stability and reputation. Our attorneys have several decades of experience in this space to effectively and comprehensively combat this growing threat.

From the inception of our firm, we have handled complex litigation involving the shipping of goods over waterways, highways and rail. With today's emphasis on the proper handling of hazardous materials during shipment, many of our transportation attorneys have also cross-trained in environmental and toxic tort matters. In addition, we have the full support of our appellate and toxic tort environmental sections to draw upon in the handling of any transportation matter.

In conjunction with the firm's Insurance Coverage/Bad Faith and Appellate Advocacy and Post-Trial practice groups, we represent insurance carriers in coverage matters that arise from underlying transportation cases.

The members of the Trucking & Transportation Practice are active participants in a number of the major transportation law organizations including the Trucking Industry Defense Association, ATA Litigation Center, ABA Transportation Megaconferences, RIMS, Defense Research Institute and Association of Transportation Practitioners.

We are aware of today's focus on securing sound legal services at reasonable fee levels. Our firm has grown because of our sensitivity in this area. This is especially true in the transportation industry where many of our clients have large, self-insured retentions that necessitate close control of legal costs and expenses. Our trial lawyers take a practical, results-oriented approach to their cases. The firm maintains competitive rates through task-appropriate delegation which is consistent with the overall close supervision and client responsiveness required in transportation matters. We are willing to discuss, develop and implement alternative billing formats wherever possible.

Results

Defense Verdict Returned After Short Jury Deliberation in High-Exposure New Jersey Trucking Case

Christopher Block and Paul Lanza (both of Roseland) successfully obtained a defense verdict in a trucking accident in New Jersey. The plaintiff claimed that our client merged into her lane at the George Washington Bridge toll plaza causing her to sustain neck and back injuries for which she underwent two spinal surgeries. Our client testified that both of their lanes ended and, because they were required to merge, he had the right-of-way since the front of his truck was ahead of the front of her vehicle. Our accident reconstruction expert confirmed that our driver had the right-of-way and opined that plaintiff was the sole cause of the accident. We also disputed the causation of plaintiff’s alleged injuries based on the very limited property damage to her vehicle, as well as the fact that she had prior, similar injuries. After a little more than an hour of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding that our driver was not negligent. The trial team was assisted by associate attorney Haleigh Catalano and paralegal Kelly Dermody who provided critical support with motions in limine and trial management.

Trial Court’s Denial of Motions Reversed Before the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

We convinced the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania to reverse the trial court’s denial of motions for post-trial relief and to direct entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of our client. The plaintiff was injured while standing unsupported on a moving bus. He lost his balance when the bus accelerated away from a bus stop, grabbed an overhead bar to keep from falling, and injured his arm. The video showed that only the plaintiff lost his balance when the bus started moving. At trial, our client moved for nonsuit and directed verdict, arguing the evidence was insufficient to overcome the jerk-and-jolt doctrine that applies when a passenger is injured on a moving bus. To merit the submission of a jerk-and-jolt case to the jury, a plaintiff must establish a sudden stop or jerk so unusual and extraordinary as to be beyond a passenger’s reasonable anticipation. The Honorable James Crumlish denied the motions for nonsuit and directed verdict and also denied our client’s motions for post-trial relief. Judge Crumlish determined the video evidence presented a jury question under the jerk-and-jolt doctrine and mirrored the plaintiff’s counsel’s characterization of the video evidence in doing so. The Commonwealth Court disagreed. After independently reviewing the video evidence, the Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court and granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict to our client. In doing so, it pointed out that various observations of the trial court “were not supported by the video or testimony.”

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

May 19, 2026

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Case Law Alerts

Court Limits UIM Recovery to Named Insured After Plaintiff Seeks Additional Household Coverage

April 1, 2026

The plaintiff, a resident of Erie County, New York, was legally traversing a four-way stop intersection when his vehicle was struck by a tortfeasor after she ran a stop sign. As a result, the plaintiff sustained extensive and severe injuries requiring medical care for the rest of his life. This medical care was valued far in excess of the tortfeasor’s auto insurance policy, as well as the plaintiff’s own underinsured motorist coverage. After settling with the tortfeasor for her New York State minimum policy limits, the plaintiff attempted to collect underinsured motorist coverage under both his own auto policy and his parents’ auto policy, as he still lived in their home, despite that the vehicle involved in the collision was being insured only under his own policy. The defendant insurance company argued that the plaintiff was only entitled to the remining funds under his own underinsured motorist policy. Upon the refusal to pay out funds pursuant to the parents’ underinsured motorist policy, the plaintiff brought an insurance bad faith claim against the defendants. After extensive discovery, the plaintiff dropped his bad faith claim and accepted the funds remaining under his own underinsured motorist policy, thereby avoiding a trial and additional exposure of more than triple the ultimate settlement amount.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.