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Paul W. Lanza

Co-Chair, Trucking & Transportation Practice

Portrait of Paul W. Lanza

As an experienced member of the Casualty Department, Paul concentrates his practice primarily on trucking/transportation liability, premises/retail liability, and construction injury litigation. Additionally, he handles cases in the fields of condominium/community association law, automobile liability,  products liability and malpractice claims against real estate professionals. Paul is frequently retained by clients to handle the pre-suit investigation of high exposure cases involving complex issues of fact and law, including fatal commercial vehicle accidents.  

Paul handles all aspects of civil litigation up to trial, including pleadings, depositions, expert discovery, dispositive motion practice, mediation and non-binding arbitration. He has obtained numerous favorable results for his clients, which range from individuals and small businesses to large-sized insurance companies. He has appeared on behalf of his clients in both New Jersey and New York state and federal courts. Paul has also argued before the New Jersey Appellate Division, where he successfully defended an appeal to affirm an order entering summary judgment on behalf of his client. Additionally, prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Paul worked at a defense firm where he specialized as regional counsel for a Fortune 50 transportation company. 

Paul attended Seton Hall University School of Law where he was a recipient of the Chancellor's Scholarship. While in law school, he completed over 200 hours of pro bono work in the Immigrants' Rights/International Human Right Clinic.  Paul also worked as a judicial extern in the Superior Court of Essex County, Civil Division for the Hon. Paul J. Vichness, J.S.C. (Ret.) and as an intern in the Newark Public Defender's Office.

Prior to law school, Paul graduated from the University of Notre Dame, with a B.A. in Political Science and Spanish. He was a member of the Dean's List and Sigma Delta Pi (National Collegiate Hispanic Honor Society).

    • Seton Hall University School of Law (J.D., 2014)
    • University of Notre Dame (B.A., 2011)
    • New Jersey, 2014
    • New York, 2015
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2015
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2015
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2015
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants; Transportation Law (2021-2024)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New Jersey Super Lawyers Rising Star (2022-2024)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
    • Trucking Industry Defense Association (TIDA)
    • Dude Where’s My Driver? Regulatory Concerns of the Automated Delivery Vehicle and Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Client Event, June 2017
    • Cyber Liability, Client Event, August 2016
    • "Guide to Expert Testimony in Malpractice Cases Against Real Estate Professionals,"New Jersey Law Journal, October 21, 2019
    • “The Implementation of Cyber Security Legislation: An Overview of the NYFDS and NAIC Model Laws,” Claims Litigation Management, November 2017
    • “How Secure Is Your Vendor? Protecting Yourself from Third-party Cyber Risks,” Claims Litigation Management, July 2017
    • “Preventative Cyber Defenses: Laying the Foundation to Minimize the Risk of Breach,” Claims Litigation Management, April 2017
    • “The Evolution of Cyber Insurance:  How Did We Get Here and Where Are We Headed?,” Claims Litigation Management, January 2017
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a trucking accident in New Jersey. The plaintiff claimed that our client merged into her lane at the George Washington Bridge toll plaza causing her to sustain neck and back injuries for which she underwent two spinal surgeries. Our client testified that both of their lanes ended and, because they were required to merge, he had the right-of-way since the front of his truck was ahead of the front of her vehicle. Our accident reconstruction expert confirmed that our driver had the right-of-way and opined that plaintiff was the sole cause of the accident. We also disputed the causation of plaintiff’s alleged injuries based on the very limited property damage to her vehicle, as well as the fact that she had prior, similar injuries. After a little more than an hour of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding that our driver was not negligent.   
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of our client. The plaintiff was injured when she fell from a 25-foot rock-climbing wall at our client's facility.  After reaching the summit of the wall, plaintiff, a certified climber, pushed off to begin repelling down, only to realize that she forgot to connect to the auto-belay system.  She proceeded to fall to the ground and fractured both ankles for which she underwent open reduction internal fixation surgery.  Plaintiff had previously visited the client's facility approximately 35 times and had executed a liability waiver on each occasion, including the date of the accident.  We moved for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint based on the fact that the liability waiver was enforceable.  Plaintiff argued that the liability waiver was only enforceable as to her claims of ordinary negligence and that the issue of whether the defendant was grossly negligent was a triable issue of fact.  However, we successfully argued that no reasonable jury could find that the client was grossly negligent based on the client's testimony of the safety procedures, protocols and equipment in place at the rock-climbing gym. Accordingly, the Court granted our motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's Complaint, in its entirety, against the client.
    • Successfully defended plaintiff's appeal in the New Jersey Appellate Division of an order granting summary judgment in favor of the client by arguing that plaintiff's claims were barred pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act because plaintiff was a "special employee" of the client. Holmes v. Zayas, No. A-0591-15T2, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2568 (App. Div. Oct. 13, 2017).
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of the client, a non-profit charitable organization, by arguing that it was immune from liability under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act and there was no evidence of gross negligence against the client.
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of our clients, a residential real estate agent and company, by arguing that expert testimony was required because a jury could not be reasonably expected to discern the nuances of the standard of care owed by the clients to the plaintiff on its own. Therefore, because plaintiff did not produce a liability expert report during discovery, he could not satisfy his burden of proof and the Court granted summary judgment in favor of our clients.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in favor of the client in a case involving plaintiff's allegations of negligent automobile repairs by proving that our client's repairs were performed in accordance with the industry's customs and standards.
    • Negotiated a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, without any monetary contribution, in favor of a local college in a premises liability matter. Plaintiff claimed that, as a result of her fall on snow and ice on the sidewalk, she sustained severe injuries including a fractured ankle and she underwent open reduction internal fixation. However, using video surveillance, we were able to dispute the location of the accident and the condition of the sidewalk and obtain this favorable result for the client.

Results

Defense Verdict Returned After Short Jury Deliberation in High-Exposure New Jersey Trucking Case

Christopher Block and Paul Lanza (both of Roseland) successfully obtained a defense verdict in a trucking accident in New Jersey. The plaintiff claimed that our client merged into her lane at the George Washington Bridge toll plaza causing her to sustain neck and back injuries for which she underwent two spinal surgeries. Our client testified that both of their lanes ended and, because they were required to merge, he had the right-of-way since the front of his truck was ahead of the front of her vehicle. Our accident reconstruction expert confirmed that our driver had the right-of-way and opined that plaintiff was the sole cause of the accident. We also disputed the causation of plaintiff’s alleged injuries based on the very limited property damage to her vehicle, as well as the fact that she had prior, similar injuries. After a little more than an hour of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding that our driver was not negligent. The trial team was assisted by associate attorney Haleigh Catalano and paralegal Kelly Dermody who provided critical support with motions in limine and trial management.

Summary Judgment Obtained in Three Consolidated Cases Involving Multi-vehicle Accident

We secured summary judgment for our client, a tow truck company, in three consolidated cases venued in Essex County Superior Court arising out of a fatal motor vehicle accident caused by an illegal left-hand turn by a tow truck driver. The plaintiffs alleged that our client was liable under a theory of respondeat superior as the tow truck driver’s employer. The plaintiffs further alleged that our client negligently hired, trained, supervised and entrusted the vehicle to the driver. However, we established that our client sold the subject tow truck to a co-defendant tow truck company two weeks before the accident. The court found that the co-defendant’s deposition testimony did not suffice to create a genuine issue of material fact and granted our motion, dismissing all claims against our client.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Florida Court Affirms Summary Judgment Based on Unrebutted Testimony of Phantom Vehicle in Rear-End Collision

July 1, 2025

This case arises out of a multi-vehicle accident in which the operator of the rearward vehicle claimed that she was rear-ended by a phantom vehicle, causing the chain of rear-end collisions.  The other parties in the lawsuit testified, in general terms, that they did not see a phantom vehicle and had no recollection of a vehicle passing them immediately after the crash.  The court held that their scant negative testimony was insufficient to overcome the unequivocal positive statement of the rearward driver, that there was a phantom vehicle, and affirmed the order for summary judgment. The court also noted that summary judgment could have been avoided by the opposing parties if there was evidence from a witness that “I looked where I should have been looking and there was nothing to see.”    Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Case Law Alerts

NY Appellate Division Reverses Trial Court, Grants Summary Judgment to Middle Vehicle in Rear-End Collision

July 1, 2025

The owner and operator of the middle vehicle in a three-vehicle accident moved for summary judgment. The moving defendant argued that it was stopped 5 to 10 feet behind the plaintiff’s vehicle for approximately 5 seconds when their vehicle was struck from behind by co-defendant and pushed into the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle.  Their motion was denied at the trial court level. However, the Appellate Division reversed after finding that the plaintiff and the co-defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact and because the motion was not premature, as the opposing parties failed to demonstrate why further discovery was necessary.    Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.