The Premises and Retail Liability Practice is experienced in the handling of all aspects of retail liability claims, including but not limited to:
- Premises liability and its various subtypes (sidewalk defects, ice/snow, spilled substances, employee negligence, etc.)
- Professional liability within the retail industry and specific to individual retailers. Examples include pharmaceutical malpractice, automobile mechanical malpractice, service station malpractice and sales misrepresentations
- Retail theft and compliance with the Retail Theft Acts under various States
- Product liability and vendors endorsements
- Risk Transfer issues for landlords and tenants
- Fraudulent claims, which are handled in conjunction with our firm's Special Investigations Unit
Our attorneys also provide clients with liability prevention techniques and specialized seminars that can be conducted at the client's business location.
Members of the group share information on applicable defenses, changes in law, trial tactics and strategies, and research on issues of the law. Each office has access through our state-of-the-art computer system to a bank of briefs and other materials for the expedient and efficient handling of retail claims from inception to conclusion.
All cases entrusted to us are handled in the most efficient and cost-effective manner in conjunction with the goals of the client. At each of our offices, there is at least one shareholder and one associate who are members of this practice area. Each case referral is either assigned directly to a shareholder or, in lower-exposure matters, an associate whose work would be overseen by a shareholder in the group.
We are associated and active with retail and hospitality committees within organizations such as CLM as well as a founding member of the National Retail & Restaurant Defense Association. Our attorneys are also actively involved in the Pennsylvania Chamber of Business & Industry and the Pennsylvania Retailers Association.
Results
Summary Judgment Secured in Slip-and-Fall Case
We were granted summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case where the plaintiff claimed to have slipped and fell on snow/ice in a parking lot when getting into her car. Our client and one of the co-defendants had property lines next to each other. Based on the accident report, the plaintiff’s testimony and our expert report, we argued that the plaintiff did not fall on our property and, as a result, we owed her no duty. The judge agreed and dismissed all claims against our client.
Summary Judgment Won in a Premises Liability Action
We obtained summary judgment on behalf of two homeowners in a premises liability action. One of the homeowners called his father, the plaintiff, asking him to come to his house because he was having his roof replaced and had concerns about the work being done. The plaintiff arrived at the home and observed nails and other debris strewn about the entire property. Nonetheless, he entered the property to assess the roofing work and took care to avoid stepping on any nails. As he was leaving the property, he stepped on a nail, which went through his foot. The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence against both homeowners and also attempted to assert that, because his son requested that he come to inspect the roofing work, he was a business invitee rather than a licensee. We argued that the plaintiff was a licensee as he was a social guest who was merely providing advice to his son. They further argued that the homeowners owed no duty to the plaintiff as he knew the nails were strewn about the property and he understood the risk involved in walking there. We also argued that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by assumption of risk because as he was aware of the nails on the property and, nonetheless, voluntarily proceeded to walk onto the property. The court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Statutory Employer Immunity Bars Negligence Claim Against Youth Residential Operator
July 20, 2026
In a non-precedential opinion, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania determined the defendant residential operator was a statutory employer of the plaintiff, an employee of a kitchen contractor, and thus, was immune from the plaintiff’s negligence action. While the plaintiff worked in the kitchen of a youth residential institution, he was injured when a grill he was cleaning fell on his arm. The plaintiff was an employee of the food service contractor that was hired by the defendant to provide food services at the property. The defendant leased the property and operated the youth residential institution on the property. The plaintiff filed a negligence lawsuit and, after discovery, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued that it was immune from the plaintiff’s negligence action under the Workers’ Compensation Act since it was a statutory employer. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that the defendant sufficiently occupied the kitchen on the property to satisfy the second factor of the McDonald test. The Commonwealth Court ruled that, with regard to the second factor, an employer’s occupancy or control must be actual but need not be exclusive. The Commonwealth Court also ruled that an employer only needs to prove either occupancy or control, not both. In reviewing the evidence, the Commonwealth Court agreed with the trial court’s ruling that the defendant occupied the property and thus, satisfied the second factor of the McDonald test. The Commonwealth Court held that the defendant was a statutory employer under the Act and was immune from the plaintiff’s negligence action. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s order.
Case Law Alerts
Pennsylvania Court Finds Fact Issues on Visibility of Freestanding Sign’s Legs
July 20, 2026
In a non-precedential opinion, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that when determining whether a freestanding sign was an open and obvious condition, the legs of the sign were to be considered separately and warranted separate analysis. The plaintiff, while walking into the defendant store, tripped and fell on a leg of a freestanding lottery sign that was placed on the sidewalk outside of the store. While the plaintiff admitted she was able to observe the sign prior to the incident, she claimed that she did not notice the legs of the freestanding frame that supported the sign. The plaintiff filed negligence claims against the defendant store and, after discovery, the defendant store filed a motion for summary judgment. In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant store argued that the sign was an open and obvious condition. In her response in opposition, the plaintiff argued that the legs of the sign were not open and obvious, and created a tripping hazard. In support of her opposition, the plaintiff presented expert reports. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and ruled that there were no genuine issues of fact as to whether the sign was open and obvious. The trial court concluded that it did not consider the legs separate from the sign as a matter of law when considering the issue of whether the dangerous condition was open and obvious. Instead, the trial court found the sign with its legs was open and obvious. In support of its ruling, the trial court relied upon the Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s reasoning in Larose v. Berish, 334 A.3d 406 (Pa. Super. 2002). The plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that created genuine issues of material fact as to the open and obvious nature of the sign’s legs. The Superior Court held the trial court erred when it determined that Larose required it to consider the sign and its legs as one to determine whether it was open and obvious. The Superior Court reasoned that Larose does not stand for the proposition that an object resting on another object must be considered as one for purposes of determining whether the condition is open and obvious. Instead, the Superior Court found the circumstances in Larose to be distinguishable and that Larose did not dictate as a matter of law that the legs of the sign created an open and obvious danger. The Superior Court ruled that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant store and reversed the order.
