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Alan C. Nash

Co-Chair, Premises & Retail Liability Practice

Portrait of Alan C. Nash

Alan Carroll “A.C.” Nash is a senior civil defense attorney and business leader whose practice focuses on the defense of insureds, corporations, and public entities in complex, high-exposure litigation. He concentrates on negligent security, wrongful death, product liability, automobile and commercial transportation claims, liquor liability, construction liability and premises liability matters.

A.C. also maintains a substantial public-sector and municipal defense practice, representing municipalities and law enforcement agencies in state and federal civil rights litigation, including claims alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force. His experience in this space includes defending matters throughout Florida in both trial and appellate courts.

A.C. serves as the Casualty Supervisor of the Fort Lauderdale office of Marshall Dennehey, where he oversees the day-to-day operations of the casualty department and leads a large team of attorneys handling complex and catastrophic-loss cases. In this role, he is responsible not only for legal strategy and quality control, but also for client relationships, attorney development, and overall practice performance.

Before joining Marshall Dennehey, A.C. was a trial associate at a Fort Lauderdale–based law enforcement and municipal defense firm with more than 30 years of history. Working closely with firm leadership, he played a key role in defending public entities and law enforcement officers in high-stakes civil rights litigation across Florida.

A.C. earned his juris doctor from Florida State University College of Law in 2007. While in law school, he served as a certified legal intern with the Second Judicial Circuit, trying approximately 40 jury and non-jury criminal cases. He was a member and coach of the Mock Trial Team, served as a student ambassador and traveling recruiter, sat on the Dean’s Cabinet, acted as the Fifth Circuit Governor for the American Bar Association, and received the Distinguished Pro Bono Award upon graduation.

A South Florida native, A.C. earned his undergraduate degree in Public Relations from the University of Florida, graduating early. Prior to law school, he worked in public relations and marketing, including managing state and national accounts for a Miami-based firm and later executing advertising and marketing programs for two Fortune 100 companies. This background continues to inform his approach to client development and litigation strategy.

A.C. is deeply committed to mentorship and community involvement. He mentors students at the elementary, secondary, undergraduate, and law school levels and has served in leadership and advisory roles with multiple professional and civic organizations. 

    • Florida State University College of Law (J.D., 2007)
    • University of Florida (B.S., 2003)
    • Florida, 2007
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2008
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida, 2008
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2008
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 11th Circuit, 2008
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • "Best Mentors Award" by the Daily Business Review (2022)
    • The Florida Bar Leadership Academy, Fellow (2013 - 2014)
    • Florida Legal Elite (2010, 2012)
    • Florida Super Lawyer (2019-2026)
    • Florida Super Lawyer Rising Star (2012-2018)
    • Rated for Civil Litigation by Lead Counsel, a service of Thomson Reuters, 2015
    • "Rising Star" by the Daily Business Review (2014)
    • Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Professionalism Panel (2017-2025)
    • South Florida Legal Guide, Up & Comer (2018-2021)
    • Thomson Reuters Stand-Out Lawyer (2025)
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance
    • DRI - Diversity for Success Seminar and Expo, Expo Chair 2016 - 2018
    • DRI - Diversity for Success Seminar and Expo, Marketing Chair, 2013 - 2015
    • DRI - Diversity Committee, Chair to the Marketing Subcommittee
    • DRI - Diversity Committee, Liaison to the Aviation Law Committee
    • DRI - Retail and Hospitality Seminar, Committee Member 2016 - Present
    • Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel, Member
    • Florida Association of Police Attorneys, 2010
    • The Florida Bar - Student Education/Admissions to The Bar Committee
    • Florida Defense Lawyers Association, Board Member, 2017 - 2019
    • Florida Sheriffs Association, 2020 - present
    • RIMS Broward County Chapter, Board of Directors, 2021
    • Chair, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee "H", 2018 – 2021
    • T.J. Reddick Bar Association, Executive Board, 2012 - 2013
    • From Incident to Outcome, 2026 Florida RIMS Educational Conference, July 30, 2026
    • AI: The Cat 5 Storm Affecting Your Claims and Employees, Florida Broward County RIMS Chapter, April 15, 2026
    • Negligent Security Claims - Premises Under Attack, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, July 25, 2025
    • Florida’s New Civil Procedure and Rules, Florida Tampa Bay RIMS Chapter, May 21, 2025
    • The Yellow Brick Road to Litigation Success – What Happens When Carriers and Defense Counsel Team Up? CLM Annual Conference, Dallas, TX, April 10, 2025
    • Relevant Procedural Rule Changes for Risk Manager, Broward County RIMS Chapter Meeting, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, January 15, 2025
    • DE&I – Your Ally in the War for Talent, Florida RIMS Educational Conference, August 1, 2024
    • New Florida Tort Reform Changes Under HB 837, Tampa Bay RIMS Chapter Meeting, Tampa, FL, October 18, 2023
    • Civil Rights for Uncivil Times, International Association of Claims Professionals (IACP) 2023 Conference, June 22, 2023
    • Claims Inflation in Property & Casualty Litigation, ILG 360º London Annual Conference 2023, March 15, 2023
    • Talkin' Bout My Generations, RIMS - Broward County Chapter Meeting & Presentation, October 19th, 2022
    • Talkin' Bout My Generations, 2022 Florida RIMS Educational Conference, Naples, FL, July 27th, 2022
    • Successful Strategies for Effective Mediation, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, July 20, 2022
    • Roundtable Discussion: Civil Litigation and Nailing On-Campus Interviews, FSU College of Law - Black Law Students Association, November 8, 2021
    • Litigation & Trial Considerations When Representing/Defending Law Enforcement, NAPO’s Annual 2021 Legal Seminar, West Palm Beach, FL, October 4, 2021
    • Anti-Social Practical Strategies Insurers Can Implement – panel member, 2021 DRI-IADC Virtual Roundtable, September 2021
    • Civil Litigation State of Affairs – The Impact of COVID-19 in Florida & What’s Next, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, June 2021
    • Negligent Security: Foreseeable Crime - Believable Risk, ILG Virtual Conference, March 22, 2021
    • 56 Feds are Coming: Strategies Using the Upcoming Florida Summary Judgment Standard, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, January 15, 2021
    • Negligence 101 - A Pennsylvania and Florida Legal Overview, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, December 15, 2020
    • Negligent Tenants Expose Negligent Landlords, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium – Casino Royale, Tampa, FL, September 20, 2018
    • Moderator: In-House Counsel Roundtable, DRI Retail & Hospitality Conference, Chicago, IL, May, 2018
    • Panelist: Broward County Bar Association - Young Lawyer's Section Boot Camp, June 6, 2017
    • Featured Speaker/Panelist: Making The Career Decision That Is Best For You, Atlantic Technical College 2017 College & Career Summit , Ft. Lauderdale, FL, January 26, 2017
    • Defending Negligent Security Claims, RIMKUS' 9th Annual CLE/CE Seminar, October 21, 2016
    • Negligent Security Claims: If the Crime is Foreseeable, the Risk is Believable, RIMS - Central Florida Chapter, November 19, 2015
    • Using Crime Grids in Negligent Security Claims, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium - The Best Defense is a Good Offense, Orlando, FL, September 17, 2014
    • Diversity for Success Seminar, DRI, Moderator, 2013
    • Stand Your Ground Forum, Nova Law School, Moderator, 2012
    • Paralegal Program - Professor of Contracts, Legal Research/Writing and Constitutional Law, Brown Mackie College, 2009 - 2010
    • Fort Lauderdale Community Development Corporation, Vice President, 2012
    • Fort Lauderdale Community Development Corporation, Board Member, 2008 - Present
    • Grant of judgment as a matter of law for the Sheriff's department and individual deputy in an excessive force federal trial involving the shooting death of a suspect.
    • Defense verdict in a federal trial for the Sheriff's department and individual deputy in an excessive force case involving the use of a canine.
    • Grant of dismissal in a federal case involving the alleged interference of a prisoner's rights to access the courts and to free speech.
    • Grant of dismissal in a federal case wherein plaintiff alleged that a private corporation acted under color of law and violated his 8th Amendment Rights.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…The Blitz Is Coming: Pranks, Perception and the Risk of Draft Day

June 1, 2025

In April, the high-stakes world of the NFL Draft took over the airwaves. Millions were made and fumbled away as each round unfolded. Scouting reports were dissected, 40-yard dash times debated, and the patience of each player was tested. Beyond the fanfare stood a cautionary tale for civil defense lawyers. In litigation, as in football, perception, reputation, and outside interference can blindside the best-prepared team.  Shadeur Sanders and his father, Deion, commanded headlines throughout the college football season and into the draft. However, it was Jaxson Ulbrich, son of Falcons defensive coordinator, Jeff Ulbrich, who stole a moment of spotlight both infamously and immaturely. After obtaining a private draft-day phone number, Jaxson prank-called Sanders, whose draft stock had unexpectedly fallen. He claimed that Sanders would be drafted by the Saints but would have to wait. While it was quickly revealed that he had been “trolled,” this event signifies how easily misinformation can spread and how pranks can carry real consequences. The NFL fined Jeff Ulbrich $100,000, and the Falcons organization was fined $250,000.  In civil defense cases, surprises, misinformation, public manipulation, and ambush tactics are commonplace. Plaintiff lawyers, while mostly ethical, can sometimes push the envelope. According to the ABA, almost 300,000 lawyers are publicly disciplined for ethical misconduct each year. Therefore, a video that paints your client in unfavorable light, one that it is selectively edited, like Shannon Sharpe alleges, or one that is outright misleading, may become the order of the day. Once public, the reputational harm spreads faster than the truth can catch up. Headlines follow, juries are tainted, and the reputation of your client can plummet overnight. Insurers then start asking hard questions.  The call to Sanders wasn’t just a joke. It could be actionable. In Florida and many other jurisdictions, the actions of Ulbrich could possibly be considered tortious interference with a current or prospective business relationship. This tort occurs when a third party intentionally disrupts a known business relationship, thereby causing damages. More specifically, the elements of the tort for tortious interference with a business relationship includes: (1) the existence of a business relationship or contract, (2) knowledge of the business relationship or contract on the part of the defendant, (3) an intentional and unjustified interference with the business relationship, and (4) damages. See Howard v. Murray, 184 So. 3d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). An action for tortious interference with a prospective business relationship requires a business relationship evidenced by an actual and identifiable understanding or agreement which, in all probability, would have been completed had the defendant not interfered. See Ferguson Transp., Inc. v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 687 So. 2d 821, 822 (Fla. 1996). Although numerous explanations for his draft slide exist (i.e., his lack of a real agent, combine opt-out, alleged poor interviews, etc.), Sanders could argue that the prank compounded doubt, shifted teams’ perceptions about drafting him, and thereby contributed to his slide. The same dynamic applies in tort litigation. When perception turns, the liability profile of a company can collapse, even without wrongdoing.  In 2005, Anna Ayala alleged that she found a human finger in her chili at a Wendy’s in California. After a month-long investigation, it was determined that the incident was a hoax orchestrated by Ayala. Unfortunately, Wendy’s suffered work cutbacks as business fell as much as 50% in some areas.  In 2020, rumors began on Reddit that Wayfair was allegedly involved in child trafficking. The claims were that their throw pillows and storage cabinets were a front for these nefarious activities. Social media ran with this information, complete with photographs, screen shots, and celebrity statements. The rumors were a hoax.  In 2011, not even the Golden Arches was safe. A photo was captured and spread on social media that provided that, as an insurance measure due, in part, to a string of robberies, certain customers would be required to pay an additional fee of $1.50 per transaction. This, too, was a hoax, and McDonald’s stated: “This is, unfortunately, an example of how rumors can out speed the truth. Over the last 48 hours, we've been tweeting and striving to clarify that this is a hoax.” Nevertheless, the public was slow to believe McDonald’s statement, and the hashtag #SeriouslyMcDonalds trended. The law is catching up to the age of virility and meme culture. However, as the aforementioned warnings demonstrate, hoaxes can have impacts that far outlive the “joke.” It can be a draft-day prospect losing millions or a client losing trust; in all scenarios, narrative controls and perception matters.  Whether it is Sanders waiting for a life-changing call or a business defending its decades of good will, the threats aren’t always head-on. Sometimes, the blitz is coming from your blindside.    Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Legal Update for Florida Civil Litigation

Florida Passes Tort Reform: What You Need to Know

March 27, 2023

On March 24, 2023, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed House Bill 837, “Civil Remedies,” into law. HB 837 contains sweeping tort reform that will uproot the landscape of Florida civil litigation. The changes apply to causes of action accruing after the effective date—March 24, 2023. Prior to the bill becoming law, plaintiffs’ firms, anticipating this monumental change, filed approximately 100,000 lawsuits. These filings represent approximately 77% of the total cases filed since January 1, 2023.[1] Below is a brief summary of the changes and the potential impact the new law brings.    NEW MODIFIED COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STANDARD    HB 837 changes Florida’s standard from “pure” comparative negligence to “modified” comparative negligence. This aligns Florida with a majority of the other states who have already adopted a “modified” comparative negligence standard. This new standard does not apply in medical negligence actions.   Previously, a plaintiff was entitled to recover a percentage of damages proportionate to the degree of fault of the defendant. Under “modified” comparative negligence, if a plaintiff is more negligent than the defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover.    This new standard will likely reduce the number of cases brought in which the plaintiff was the predominant cause of his or her own harm.    TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR GENERAL NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS   HB 837 amends section 95.11, Florida Statutes, which sets forth the statutes of limitations for various causes of action. The bill now reduces the statute of limitations for general negligence from four years to two years.    This may encourage plaintiffs to file suit earlier as plaintiffs and their counsel will prepare their cause of action and evaluate the validity of their claims at an earlier juncture. This will also increase the ability to obtain evidence closer to the time of the alleged incident.    Where liability is contested, plaintiffs may be deterred from filing suit sooner. The two-year statute of limitations could also be used as leverage to effectuate earlier settlement and resolution of claims, especially pre-suit.    ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IN PAST AND FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES    HB 837 changes the evidence that plaintiffs can introduce to establish past and future medical expenses. Previously, with the exception of services paid by Medicare or Medicaid, plaintiffs were permitted to board the full amount of medical bills charged for services rendered. This was without evidence of any adjustments or reductions and was prior to a post-verdict setoff for adjustments by private insurance. If plaintiffs had Medicare or Medicaid, only the amounts actually paid by Medicare or Medicaid were admissible as evidence of past medical expenses.    Now, the evidence offered to prove the amount of damages for past medical bills that have been satisfied is limited to the evidence of the amount actually paid, regardless of the source of payment. For unpaid past medical bills, admissible evidence will depend whether the plaintiff has health care coverage, Medicare, or Medicaid:    •    If plaintiff has health care coverage but obtains treatment under letter of protection or does not submit charges, evidence of amount that health care coverage would have paid to satisfy charges, plus plaintiff’s share of medical expenses, is admissible. Evidence of reasonable amounts that were billed to plaintiff for medically-necessary treatment or services is also admissible.  •    If plaintiff does not have insurance, or has Medicare or Medicaid, evidence of 120 percent of Medicare reimbursement rate in effect is admissible.  •    If there is no applicable Medicare rate, evidence admissible is 170 percent of applicable state Medicaid rate.    Damages that may be recovered may not include any amount in excess of the evidence of medical treatment and services expenses admitted. Further, it cannot exceed the sum of amounts actually paid, amounts necessary to satisfy charges due and owing, and the amounts necessary for reasonable and necessary future medical treatment and services.    For future medical bills, the “usual and customary” amount also depends on whether the plaintiff has health care coverage:    •    If plaintiff has health care coverage other than Medicare or Medicaid, evidence of amount that could be satisfied if charges were submitted, in addition to portion of medical expenses under insurance contract, is admissible.  •    If plaintiff does not have insurance, or has Medicare or Medicaid, evidence of 120 percent of Medicare reimbursement rate in effect is admissible.  •    If there is no applicable Medicare rate, evidence admissible is 170 percent of applicable state Medicaid rate.    LETTERS OF PROTECTION AND REFERRALS MUST BE DISCLOSED    If a plaintiff treats under a letter of protection, the letter of protection must be disclosed, as must all bills for medical expenses, which must be itemized and coded. Whether the plaintiff was referred for treatment under the letter of protection must also be disclosed, along with who referred the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is referred for treatment under a letter of protection by their attorney, disclosure of the referral is permitted, notwithstanding the attorney-client privilege, as the financial relationship between the law firm and the medical provider is relevant to the issue of bias of the testifying medical provider. This new law overturns the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Worley v. Central Florida Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, Inc., 228 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2017).    BAD FAITH – NEW DUTY OF INSUREDS AND IMPACT ON DAMAGES    Now, in every bad faith action in Florida, the insured, claimant, and/or their representative have a duty to act in good faith in providing information, making demands, setting deadlines, and attempting to settle the claim. The trier of fact may consider whether the insured, claimant and/or their representative acted in good faith and may reasonably reduce the amount of damages awarded. Mere negligence remains insufficient to bring a claim for bad faith against an insurer.   BAD FAITH – CHANGES TO 90-DAY PERIOD, ADMISSIBILITY, AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS    No bad faith action can lie if an insurer tenders the lesser of the policy limits or the amount demanded by the plaintiff within 90 days after receiving actual notice of the claim and sufficient evidence supporting the claim. It is not bad faith if the insurer does not tender, and the existence of the 90 days is inadmissible in any action seeking bad faith. Should the insurer not tender, the statute of limitations is extended for an additional 90 days.    BAD FAITH – WHEN INSURER IS NOT LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO PAY POLICY LIMITS FOR MULTIPLE CLAIMS EXCEEDING LIMITS    If multiple claims arising out of a single occurrence exceed the policy limits, the insurer is not liable beyond the policy limits for failure to pay any or all of the policy limits within 90 days if:   •    The insurer files an interpleader to determine rights of claims, and if found in excess of policy limits, claimants are entitled to a prorated share; or  •    The insurer makes full policy limits available at binding arbitration, in which claimants are entitled to a pro rata share of policy limits as determined by the arbitrator, who must also consider comparative fault and the likely outcome of trial. If a claim is resolved by the arbitrator, a general release must be executed by the claimant to the insured party whose claim is resolved.    NEGLIGENT SECURITY – NEW PRESUMPTION AGAINST LIABILITY AND CONSIDERATION OF FAULT OF ALL PARTIES   In a negligent security action against the owner or operator of real property by a person lawfully on the property who was harmed by the criminal act of a third party, the trier of fact is now required to consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the injury or death, including the criminal actor. Moreover, the owner or operator of the property cannot be held negligent for damages to a third party attempting to commit, or engaged in committing, any criminal act on the property.    HB 837 also creates a presumption against negligent security liability for the owner or operator of a “multifamily residential property” if the burden of proof is met to demonstrate “substantial compliance” with crime assessments, crime and safety training for employees, and safety and security measures which include:   •    Security camera system at points of exit and entry that maintains the video retrievable for 30 days;  •    A lighted parking lot from dusk to dawn;  •    Lighting in common areas, porches, walkways, and laundry rooms from dusk to dawn;  •    A deadbolt measuring at least one inch in every door;  •    Locking devices on every window and sliding door;  •    Locked gates at pool fence areas; and  •    A peephole or viewer on door that does not have a window or window next to the door.    CONTINGENCY FEE MULTIPLIER – NEW LODESTAR FEE PRESUMPTION   Previously, Florida case law allowed for courts to consider and award contingency fee multipliers to attorneys’ fees, based on factors which included but were not limited to: the relevant market if contingency fee multipliers were required to obtain competent counsel; whether the attorney mitigated the risk of nonpayment; the amount involved, the results obtained, the type of fee arrangement between the attorney and client; and likelihood of success at the outset of the action.    HB 837 now changes the ability to obtain a contingency fee multiplier by creating a “strong presumption” that the “lodestar” fee, the number of hours which would have reasonably been spent by an attorney and multiplying that number by a reasonable hourly rate, is sufficient and reasonable. This can only be overcome in rare and exceptional circumstances in which evidence has been presented that competent counsel could otherwise not have been retained.    ONE-WAY ATTORNEYS’ FEES – LIMITED APPLICABILITY    Previously, “one-way attorneys’ fees” applied in situations in which an insured prevailed in an action against an insurer. One-way attorneys’ fees in insurance cases now only apply to declaratory judgment actions for the determination of insurance coverage against an insurer after a denial of coverage of a claim, which does not include a defense under a reservation of rights. If a declaratory judgment is granted in favor of the insured against the insurer, the court shall award reasonable attorneys' fees, which are limited to those incurred in the action.    Further, section 768.79, Florida Statutes, also known as the “offer of judgment” or “proposal for judgment” statute, will apply to any civil action involving an insurance contract.   ______________________________________________   [1] Ron Hurtibise, Civil Case Filings Surge Before DeSantis Signed Sweeping Lawsuit Reform Bill, SUN-SENTINEL, (March 24, 2023, 6:55 p.m.), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-bz-case-filing-surge-before-tort-reform-20230324-7ze7uzxslbcndcaaessd4bmgzy-story.html. The material in this law alert has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.