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Analytics & Outcomes

Marshall Dennehey provides cost-effective, intelligent and pragmatic representation. We never lose sight of our client's goals and strive to exceed expectations, from the earliest stages of a lawsuit to its conclusion. We empower our clients to make informed decisions about their exposure, and collaborate with them to develop a resolution strategy that is mindful of their bottom line.

We know the metrics our clients use to measure success and we use those same metrics to guide our performance. We staff matters efficiently; adhere to client guidelines at every step; and tap into the collective wisdom of our 500+ attorneys to get the best possible outcomes for our clients.

Case Closed

When it comes to assignments, we monitor and measure progress in terms of cases closed.

Median Legal Fees

In order to equip clients with reliable forecasting, we capture, analyze and aggregate fees and costs per closed file on the many different types of litigation we handle.

Cycle Time/File Tempo

Effective litigation management requires steady, deliberate speed. We carefully monitor the pace of file handling and track cycle times to enhance and foster efficiencies.

Budget Accuracy

We track actual fees and costs against budget forecasts in order to improve accuracy, provide clients realistic financial expectations and make timely adjustments whenever value changing events occur.

Guideline Compliance

We have developed a sophisticated, guideline-focused system that enables our professionals to consult client specific, constantly refreshed, case handling protocols at any time. This resource is backed up by our pioneering internal audit program that ensures compliance with these guidelines and consistent file handling across each of our 19 offices.

Dispositions

Successful outcomes come in a variety of forms. We track zero loss cases, settlement/indemnity paid, and verdicts in each of the thousands of cases we defend. Combined with legal fees these metrics enable us to assess total cost of defense and allow stakeholders to measure our performance against program benchmarks.

What Makes Marshall Dennehey Different

When Defense Matters

When Defense Matters

In every sense, Marshall Dennehey is a true defense firm. We don’t “dabble” across multiple disciplines of law nor do we bring lawsuits. Rather, our singular focus is defending clients in civil litigation. Particularly in the high-volume and high-stakes arena of insurance defense litigation, we provide our attorneys and legal support teams with best-in-class technologies and innovative resources, all focused on providing high-quality legal representation to our clients.

Forward Thinking

We partner with you and examine all angles to anticipate issues before they become problems. Complex cases are often brought to roundtable, where the firm’s most experienced litigators weigh in on defense approach and strategy – at no added cost to you.

Years In Business

Marshall Dennehey was founded in 1962 by some of the most iconic Philadelphia trial lawyers of their time. Since then, we have purposefully built upon that legacy. For over six decades, we have successfully weathered changes in the insurance industry, never losing sight of our clients' needs in the constantly changing market for legal services.

Non-Origination = Collaborative Culture

Non-Origination = Collaborative Culture

Our unique compensation structure encourages attorneys to cooperate with each other, rather than compete with each other. That’s because we have no attorney origination fees. We’ve never had them, and we never will. This creates a culture of collaboration that we believe is truly unique to our law firm and enables us to match the right attorney, on the right case, in the right office. It also allows for flexibility when clients request specific attorneys to handle their case.

Geographic Footprint

Our 19 offices are strategically located throughout seven states where we represent clients on a daily basis in the local and federal courts and before all types of dispute resolution panels. We are familiar with the judges, opposing counsel and population of potential jurors who will be involved with the outcome of your case, providing you with the ultimate home-court advantage.

Value For Our Clients

Value For Our Clients

Predictable legal spend is critical to our clients’ budgets and planning. For many practice areas and legal services, we offer commonality in pricing across the firm. We also create mutually-beneficial, value-based billing or alternative fee arrangements for larger clients. Analysis of the ratio between Marshall Dennehey attorney fees vs. indemnity costs per file is another indicator of the financial efficiency we bring to your matters. Our internal auditing program, led by former claims managers and senior attorneys, promises quality assurance in file management and compliance with your guidelines.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.