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Privacy

Welcome to the Marshall Dennehey web site hosted at marshalldennehey.com (the "Site"). This Privacy Policy ("Policy") details the information that may be collected by Marshall Dennehey as you use the Site and how that information may be used. By using the Site, you indicate that you, the User, understand and agree to this Policy.

Marshall Dennehey reserves the right to update the Policy at any time by publishing a new version of the Policy to the Site. Your continued usage of the Site after a revised Policy is published will indicate your assent to the revised terms of the Policy.

Personal Information

Our Site collects personal information such as your name, address, email address, phone/fax number and company that you voluntarily provide.We also gather information regarding your preference for which newsletters and/or publications you would like to receive, as well as your preferred delivery method (direct mail or email). Personal information gathered on the Marshall Dennehey Site (marshalldennehey.com) is used only for internal purposes such as marketing, signing up to attend a conference/seminar, and newsletters.

We reserve the right to share this information with certain organizations. We will share only the minimum amount of information required for a requested service. These organizations will make their best efforts to adhere to this policy. However, Marshall Dennehey cannot be held responsible for any breach resulting from actions or policies of these organizations.

Marshall Dennehey will also share this information when necessary to comply with a court order or other legal obligation.

Update, Opt Out, or Delete

Inputting personal information is 100% voluntary and is not required to visit our Site. However, certain services or information, such as newsletters, will not be available to you should you choose not to provide this information.

You may opt out of receiving communications from us at any time by emailing MarketingDepartment@mdwcg.com, or by sending direct mail to:

Marshall Dennehey
Attn: Marketing Department
2000 Market Street, Suite 2300
Philadelphia, PA 19103

You may also update your information or request that your information be deleted by using either of these delivery methods.

Technical Information

Like most other sites, Marshall Dennehey automatically collects certain information when you access our Site. This includes your Internet Protocol (IP) address, geo-location data, what browser you are using, and which pages you visit on our site. Marshall Dennehey only has access to a scrambled, anonymous version of your IP address through third-party software. We do not have access to your actual IP address. This information is used to monitor how well our website is functioning and to make improvements as needed.

Our Site also uses Cookies, which are small text files downloaded by your computer or device that track your preferences, help with log in and help make navigating our Site faster. For more information about Cookies, please visit http://www.allaboutcookies.org/.

Your browser likely has instructions on how to disallow Cookies. Please note that disallowing Cookies will negatively affect your navigation of certain sections of our Site.

Territoriality

Our Site and data are hosted in the United States, and as such are governed by data protection and privacy regulations different from other countries such as the European Union. Therefore, any personal information you voluntarily submit, and any technical information gathered automatically by our Site, will be transferred out of your country and into the United States. By visiting this Site, you are consenting to your personal and technical data being governed by United States law.

Rights Under the GDPR

Visitors to our Site from the European Union have certain rights under the General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR"). These include but are not limited to:

  • Right to access all of the personal information we have about you;
  • Right to request that our firm delete all personal information we have collected when it is no longer needed;
  • Right to withdraw your consent to use your information at any time; and
  • Right to request that decisions about the use of your data not be subject to automated processes.

To exercise these rights, please send an email to MarketingDepartment@mdwcg.com. We will make every effort to respond to your request in a timely manner.

Notice to Minors

Our website is not intended to be accessed by any visitor under the age of 18. If you are under 18 years of age, do not send any personal information to us through this website or any other means.

Security

Marshall Dennehey will take reasonable precautions to safeguard against unauthorized release of or access to personal information entered on the Site. However, subject to any state or federal laws and regulations, Marshall Dennehey cannot guarantee the security of, and hence is not responsible for, any personally identifiable information transmitted via the Internet.

External Links

From time to time, the Site may contain links to other Web sites or resources. Marshall Dennehey is not responsible for the content or privacy policies of these sites, and the presence of these links does not imply endorsement of any products or services provided by the site owners.

Updates to this Policy

Our firm will occasionally update this policy as needed. This Privacy Policy will supersede all previous versions.

DISCLAIMER: Accessing Our Website Does Not Make You a Client.

The information on our website is intended only for general information, not to replace legal advice. Accessing this Site, or providing personal information, does not create an attorney/client relationship with us. If you require legal services, we would be pleased to discuss your needs, or we recommend you contact your local bar association.

Additional Questions or Information

Questions or comments related to this Policy can be directed to MarketingDepartment@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

$19 Million Medical Malpractice Verdict Overturned

In this medical malpractice case, the trial court vacated $10 million of a $19 million verdict in post-trial motions and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the remaining $9 million on appeal.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.

Result

$1.09 Billion Products Liability Verdict Overturned

In this products liability crashworthiness case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a Philadelphia jury verdict of $1.09 billion, the largest verdict ever overturned by a PA appellate court.  The court ordered a new trial based on deficient jury instructions, clarified important aspects of crashworthiness law, and confirmed that so-called standard jury instructions may be incompatible with Pennsylvania law. 

Result

Statutory Employer Immunity Upheld

In this construction accident case that resulted in a $5 million verdict, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the Statutory Employer Doctrine, which immunizes general contractors and other contractors on construction sites when certain elements are satisfied.

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.

graphic announcing our 6 2027 Super Lawyers & Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars