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Privacy

Welcome to the Marshall Dennehey web site hosted at marshalldennehey.com (the "Site"). This Privacy Policy ("Policy") details the information that may be collected by Marshall Dennehey as you use the Site and how that information may be used. By using the Site, you indicate that you, the User, understand and agree to this Policy.

Marshall Dennehey reserves the right to update the Policy at any time by publishing a new version of the Policy to the Site. Your continued usage of the Site after a revised Policy is published will indicate your assent to the revised terms of the Policy.

Personal Information

Our Site collects personal information such as your name, address, email address, phone/fax number and company that you voluntarily provide.We also gather information regarding your preference for which newsletters and/or publications you would like to receive, as well as your preferred delivery method (direct mail or email). Personal information gathered on the Marshall Dennehey Site (marshalldennehey.com) is used only for internal purposes such as marketing, signing up to attend a conference/seminar, and newsletters.

We reserve the right to share this information with certain organizations. We will share only the minimum amount of information required for a requested service. These organizations will make their best efforts to adhere to this policy. However, Marshall Dennehey cannot be held responsible for any breach resulting from actions or policies of these organizations.

Marshall Dennehey will also share this information when necessary to comply with a court order or other legal obligation.

Update, Opt Out, or Delete

Inputting personal information is 100% voluntary and is not required to visit our Site. However, certain services or information, such as newsletters, will not be available to you should you choose not to provide this information.

You may opt out of receiving communications from us at any time by emailing MarketingDepartment@mdwcg.com, or by sending direct mail to:

Marshall Dennehey
Attn: Marketing Department
2000 Market Street, Suite 2300
Philadelphia, PA 19103

You may also update your information or request that your information be deleted by using either of these delivery methods.

Technical Information

Like most other sites, Marshall Dennehey automatically collects certain information when you access our Site. This includes your Internet Protocol (IP) address, geo-location data, what browser you are using, and which pages you visit on our site. Marshall Dennehey only has access to a scrambled, anonymous version of your IP address through third-party software. We do not have access to your actual IP address. This information is used to monitor how well our website is functioning and to make improvements as needed.

Our Site also uses Cookies, which are small text files downloaded by your computer or device that track your preferences, help with log in and help make navigating our Site faster. For more information about Cookies, please visit http://www.allaboutcookies.org/.

Your browser likely has instructions on how to disallow Cookies. Please note that disallowing Cookies will negatively affect your navigation of certain sections of our Site.

Territoriality

Our Site and data are hosted in the United States, and as such are governed by data protection and privacy regulations different from other countries such as the European Union. Therefore, any personal information you voluntarily submit, and any technical information gathered automatically by our Site, will be transferred out of your country and into the United States. By visiting this Site, you are consenting to your personal and technical data being governed by United States law.

Rights Under the GDPR

Visitors to our Site from the European Union have certain rights under the General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR"). These include but are not limited to:

  • Right to access all of the personal information we have about you;
  • Right to request that our firm delete all personal information we have collected when it is no longer needed;
  • Right to withdraw your consent to use your information at any time; and
  • Right to request that decisions about the use of your data not be subject to automated processes.

To exercise these rights, please send an email to MarketingDepartment@mdwcg.com. We will make every effort to respond to your request in a timely manner.

Notice to Minors

Our website is not intended to be accessed by any visitor under the age of 18. If you are under 18 years of age, do not send any personal information to us through this website or any other means.

Security

Marshall Dennehey will take reasonable precautions to safeguard against unauthorized release of or access to personal information entered on the Site. However, subject to any state or federal laws and regulations, Marshall Dennehey cannot guarantee the security of, and hence is not responsible for, any personally identifiable information transmitted via the Internet.

External Links

From time to time, the Site may contain links to other Web sites or resources. Marshall Dennehey is not responsible for the content or privacy policies of these sites, and the presence of these links does not imply endorsement of any products or services provided by the site owners.

Updates to this Policy

Our firm will occasionally update this policy as needed. This Privacy Policy will supersede all previous versions.

DISCLAIMER: Accessing Our Website Does Not Make You a Client.

The information on our website is intended only for general information, not to replace legal advice. Accessing this Site, or providing personal information, does not create an attorney/client relationship with us. If you require legal services, we would be pleased to discuss your needs, or we recommend you contact your local bar association.

Additional Questions or Information

Questions or comments related to this Policy can be directed to MarketingDepartment@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.