Serving our clients' needs in the automobile field is one of the oldest practice areas at Marshall Dennehey. From the inception of our firm, we have serviced the insurance industry by both representing its insureds as well as the carriers directly in the first-party, PIP and third-party auto cases.
Our attorneys represent insurance carriers directly in UM/UIM, PIP, and other first-party automobile issues. In the UM/UIM arena, our unique regional presence allows the carrier to be represented by local counsel who are intimately familiar with the protocols and nuances of each county's local procedures and practices. For those who are familiar with the UM/UIM arena, this local presence and knowledge of affiliated members of the Bar can have a substantial impact on the final result of a claim. The Automobile Liability Practice Group works closely with members of the firm's Insurance Services and Special Investigation Practice Groups. Together, these groups provide practical solutions for all types of claims arising out of the use and operation of automobiles.
The attorneys in our Automobile Liability Practice are well experienced and established in third-party automobile liability cases, including the specific nuances with limited insurance policies, tort restriction statutes, and joint and several liability. They have litigated thousands of automobile liability third party cases, many of which have been taken to verdict.
We are aware of today's focus on securing sound legal services at reasonable fees. Our firm has grown because of our sensitivity in this area. Our trial lawyers take a practical, result-oriented approach to the cases with which they are entrusted. The firm retains competitive rates through task-appropriate delegation, which is consistent with the overall close supervision and client responsiveness required in automobile matters. We are also very willing to discuss, develop and implement alternative billing formats wherever possible.
Results
Delaware County Jury Awards Only $500 Each to Plaintiffs Seeking Over $500,000
Summary Judgment Obtained in a Vehicular Accident Case Involving Disputed Liability
We received summary judgment in a vehicular accident case involving disputed liability. Mr. Thurman was the third vehicle in a three-car collision in which the first vehicle admitted fault and was ticketed. Following the accident, the plaintiffs claimed they were in a fourth vehicle and alleged that Mr. Thurman caused the crash. When the claim was denied—and on the eve of the implementation of tort reform—the plaintiffs filed individual lawsuits against Mr. Thurman alone. We subpoenaed the repair shop that serviced Mr. Thurman’s vehicle and obtained records confirming that there was no front-end damage. When the plaintiffs failed to respond to discovery, we prepared motions for summary judgment in both cases. In response, only one plaintiff submitted an affidavit, while Mr. Thurman provided his own affidavit denying the allegations. We argued the motions, demonstrating that the evidence showed the plaintiffs were not involved in the collision and that Mr. Thurman bore no fault. The court ruled in our favor in both cases. Before the orders could be entered, however, the plaintiffs filed notices of voluntary dismissal with prejudice. Before moving for summary judgment, we had served Proposals for Settlement on the plaintiffs and their counsel. After the dismissals, we filed a motion establishing entitlement to attorney’s fees, and the parties ultimately reached an agreement resolving all fees and costs in both cases.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Triable Issue of Fact Raised Under Insurance Law § 5102(d) Overturns Motion for Summary Judgment
April 1, 2026
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appealed from an order of the Kings County Supreme Court. The order granted the defendant, Salvatore Fasino's, motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing prima facie that the alleged injury to the cervical region of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute a serious injury under the significant limitation of use category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v. Yshua, 59 A.D.3d 614, 874 N.Y.S.2d 180). In opposition, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury to the cervical region of her spine under the significant limitation of use category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Perl v. Meher, 18 N.Y.3d 208, 936 N.Y.S.2d 655, 960 N.E.2d 424). As such, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident.
Case Law Alerts
Claim for Bad Faith Against Insurance Company Dismissed When a Reasonable Basis for Denying Payment Exists
April 1, 2026
On March 15, 2025, Sekle Wisseh was struck and injured by another car while at a red light in Philadelphia. He sought insurance benefits from his carrier, Progressive Direct Insurance Company. Progressive purportedly delayed and denied payment without a reasonable basis. Acting pro se, Wisseh sued Progressive on December 10, 2025, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. Progressive removed the case to federal court, and Wisseh filed an amended complaint, asserting claims for breach of contract, bad faith, abuse of process, and declaratory relief. Progressive moved to dismiss all claims, but the breach of contract claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and Wisseh responded in opposition. The court granted the motion and dismissed the bad faith and abuse of process claims without prejudice and the declaratory relief claim with prejudice. Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute provides a court may award interest, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees if it “finds that the insurer has acted in bad faith toward the insured.” 42 Pa. Stat. & Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8371. Courts have defined “bad faith” as “any frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay proceeds of a policy.” Keefe v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins., 203 F.3d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). To recover on a bad faith claim, a claimant is required to show by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) that the insurer did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy and (2) that the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis in denying the claim.” Rancosky v. Wash. Nat'l Ins., 170 A.3d 364, 377 (Pa. 2017); see also Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins., 691 F.3d 500, 522 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Wisseh alleged Progressive “acted in bad faith by delaying and denying payment with a reasonable basis.” Progressive purportedly continued with that conduct after suit was filed, but those assertions allege no facts about why Progressive lacked a reasonable basis for denying Wisseh benefits and how it did so knowingly or recklessly. As such, the court found the bad faith claim was properly dismissed.
