Serving our clients' needs in the automobile field is one of the oldest practice areas at Marshall Dennehey. From the inception of our firm, we have serviced the insurance industry by both representing its insureds as well as the carriers directly in the first-party, PIP and third-party auto cases.
Our attorneys represent insurance carriers directly in UM/UIM, PIP, and other first-party automobile issues. In the UM/UIM arena, our unique regional presence allows the carrier to be represented by local counsel who are intimately familiar with the protocols and nuances of each county's local procedures and practices. For those who are familiar with the UM/UIM arena, this local presence and knowledge of affiliated members of the Bar can have a substantial impact on the final result of a claim. The Automobile Liability Practice Group works closely with members of the firm's Insurance Services and Special Investigation Practice Groups. Together, these groups provide practical solutions for all types of claims arising out of the use and operation of automobiles.
The attorneys in our Automobile Liability Practice are well experienced and established in third-party automobile liability cases, including the specific nuances with limited insurance policies, tort restriction statutes, and joint and several liability. They have litigated thousands of automobile liability third party cases, many of which have been taken to verdict.
We are aware of today's focus on securing sound legal services at reasonable fees. Our firm has grown because of our sensitivity in this area. Our trial lawyers take a practical, result-oriented approach to the cases with which they are entrusted. The firm retains competitive rates through task-appropriate delegation, which is consistent with the overall close supervision and client responsiveness required in automobile matters. We are also very willing to discuss, develop and implement alternative billing formats wherever possible.
Results
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Appellate Division Dismisses Contribution Claim Against Employer for Lack of Notice
November 3, 2026
In Rosenblatt v. Mora, the Appellate Division addressed whether defendants could pursue a third-party contribution claim against the decedent's employer, Lots O Bagels, based on allegations of negligent training and supervision. The underlying action arose from a fatal collision involving a vehicle and an employee operating an electric scooter while performing deliveries. Rosenblatt v. Mora, 2026 NY Slip Op 04220, 251 A.D.3d 599 (App. Div.). The court held that the third-party complaint failed to state a viable contribution claim and dismissed it. The court explained that a negligent supervision or training claim requires allegations that the employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct that caused the injury and failed to take appropriate action. Because the complaint contained no factual allegations showing the employer had notice of any dangerous or negligent conduct by the employee, or explaining how the employee's scooter operation was negligent, the allegations were conclusory and insufficient. Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's ruling and dismissed the contribution claim against the employer.
Case Law Alerts
Emergency Doctrine Bars Claims in Pedestrian-Vehicle Accident
November 3, 2026
In a personal injury action, the Appellate Division considered whether defendants were entitled to summary judgment in a pedestrian-vehicle collision involving an infant pedestrian who ran onto a highway where pedestrian access was prohibited. Defendants argued that the pedestrian's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident and that the driver acted reasonably when confronted with a sudden emergency. Danielle W. v. Li, 2026 NY Slip Op 04821, 251 A.D.3d 477 (App. Div.) The court agreed and granted summary judgment to the defendants. It held that the infant pedestrian's unlawful entry onto the highway was the sole proximate cause of the collision and that the driver was protected by the emergency doctrine. The evidence showed that when the pedestrian suddenly ran into the roadway, the driver immediately reacted by removing his foot from the accelerator and attempting to change lanes. The court found these actions reasonable under the circumstances and concluded that neither the driver's common-law duty of care nor his statutory duty to exercise due care toward pedestrians was breached. The court therefore dismissed the claims against all defendants.