Automobile Liability

In a personal injury case, the plaintiff alleged that she was injured after falling on a SEPTA bus when it began moving before she was fully seated. An appeal followed and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial courts judgment in favor of SEPTA. Musser v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 354 A.3d 593 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2026).

In this case, the plaintiff claimed that the bus restarted aggressively and asserted the legal theory of liability known as the jerk and jolt doctrine, under which a common carrier, such as SEPTA, may be liable for negligence that causes an injury to a bus passenger who falls because the bus experiences a sudden, unusual, or extraordinary jerk or jolt. SEPTA presented video evidence contradicting Musser's account and testimony from its Chief Training Officer (CTO) that drivers are trained not to wait for passengers to be seated unless requested. The jury attributed 74% fault to Musser and 26% to SEPTA, barring Musser from recovery under Pennsylvania's comparative negligence statute. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from SEPTA’s CTO regarding driver training without proper notice and relevance; that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting plaintiffs cross examination of the CTO regarding Federal Transit Administration (FTA) standards; and that the trial court abused it’s discretion by including a non-standard jury instruction clarifying that a bus driver is not required to wait for passengers to be seated unless asked.

The court reasoned that Musser's opening statement and testimony raised the issue of restarting before she was seated, making SEPTA's training testimony relevant. The brief duration of challenged testimony in context of multi-day trial was insufficient to demonstrate prejudice. The non-standard jury instruction properly clarified that mere restart before seating doesn't satisfy jerk and jolt doctrine, consistent with established precedent.

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections.

This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.