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Product Liability

Marshall Dennehey's litigation attorneys have been actively defending product liability claims for over 40 years. These attorneys provide considerable experience and knowledge on behalf of our product liability clients. In recognition of the group’s capabilities, the practice was ranked Band Two for Pennsylvania Product Liability Litigation in the 2026 and 2025 editions of Chambers USA.

Our product liability attorneys have defended cases alleging defects in manufacture, design, failure to warn and breach of warranty of every imaginable variety. Attorneys in this practice group have represented foreign and domestic manufacturers and act as national coordinating counsel and regional counsel in a number of state and federal courts. Our attorneys have served as advisors to companies offering new or improved products, addressing litigation consequences and advertising.

Members of this litigation group are familiar with product liability cases including:

  • Pharmaceutical products
  • Medical devices
  • Agricultural products
  • Electrical equipment
  • Firearms
  • Sporting goods
  • Recreational products
  • Home appliances
  • Powered equipment
  • Industrial machinery
  • Watercraft
  • Automobile parts
  • Automobiles
  • Railroad and aviation equipment
  • Food products

The attorneys in this practice group are recognized leaders in this area of the law. Our attorneys frequently speak at national, regional and local seminars, and they are published in their field. Moreover, several attorneys have been elected as Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers. Their memberships include: Product Liability Advisory Council, Product Liability Committee of the Defense Research Institute, International Association of Defense Counsel, Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel, the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Trial Lawyers of America.

Through an investment in state-of-the-art computerization and technology, members of this practice group maintain and share current information concerning expert witnesses, the law and the ever-changing landscape of statutory and regulatory requirements. These litigators remain vigilant for rapidly developing changes in the law, medico-legal literature, technology and the latest theories of liability advanced by experienced plaintiffs' attorneys.

Members of this practice group are often called upon to direct and participate in jury research and case evaluations using focus groups. State-of-the-art exhibits are often employed to educate and persuade jurors of the merits of the products they defend.

Attorneys in this practice group are litigators in the truest sense of the word. They have tried to verdict cases of every size and complexity. Yet, they keep a keen eye on the costs associated with this type of litigation. They are poised to work closely with our clients to develop innovative and practical approaches to keep costs and fees as low as possible.

Our firm has long prided itself in providing quality legal services at competitive rates. We can do this, particularly in product liability cases, because of the extensive experience of our attorneys, judicious staffing of cases and a case focus that never diverts from providing our clients with a practical, results-oriented defense.

We welcome the opportunity to work closely with you in defending your company and its products against product liability claims. We clearly understand and respond to the needs of our clients to protect the integrity and reputation of their products, as well as their proprietary interests.

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained in a Premises and Product Liability Case

We won a motion for summary judgment in Schuylkill County, PA, in a premises liability and product liability case. We represented the manufacturer of a concrete railroad crossing that was installed at an intersection in 2005. In 2021, the plaintiff was riding his bike across the crossing when his bike tire allegedly became stuck in a gap in the concrete. There was ample evidence that the railroad was responsible for inspecting and maintaining the crossing while our client did nothing other than supply the prefabricated crossing. We argued the gap that developed in the crossing was not the responsibility of the crossing manufacturer and that the statute of repose barred the lawsuit. The court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer.

Successfully Defended Appeal Sustaining Objections of Improper Venue

We successfully defended the plaintiff’s appeal of a trial court decision sustaining preliminary objections on the grounds of improper venue. This case involved the death of a 19-year-old woman at a university who fell down an 11-story trash chute in an off-campus condominium building. In this mixed negligence and product liability case, we represented two of the multiple defendants, the condominium association and the building management company. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas found that venue was improper in Philadelphia County and ordered that the case be transferred to Centre County. The plaintiff appealed that decision, and the matter was briefed and argued in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The Superior Court, in a precedential decision, affirmed the trial court’s decision and found that there was no abuse of discretion in sustaining the preliminary objections. In support of its decision, the Superior Court found that the plaintiff’s arguments were unsupported by Pennsylvania law. The Superior Court, in finding waiver of an issue, quoted directly from the brief prepared by Kim.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Superior Court Clarifies Crashworthiness Doctrine and Provides Key Jury‑Instruction Guidance

April 1, 2026

In the much-publicized Amagasu case, a jury returned a verdict of nearly a billion dollars to a plaintiff who was paralyzed in a rollover car accident.  On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the award and remanded for a new trial stating that the trial court did not properly charge the jury on crashworthiness principles. Crashworthiness is a subset of products liability cases in which it is alleged that a vehicle possessed a defect that did not cause an accident, but did not offer sufficient protection to the vehicle’s occupant during the accident. Pennsylvania law recognizes that collisions and other accidents are part of the intended use of a motor vehicle, so manufacturers must design and manufacture a product that is “reasonably crashworthy.” For example, if a plaintiff is involved in a head-on collision and the air bags do not deploy, the lack of air bag deployment did not cause the collision, but possibly increased the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries –  that failure to perform may give rise to a product defect claim. In Amagasu, the Superior Court re-affirmed the elements of a crashworthiness claim, which was first recognized in Pennsylvania in 1994, but has not frequently been analyzed since the landmark Tincher case re-defined the product liability cause of action. Amagasu explained that crashworthiness cases involved a “more rigorous” and a “heightened burden of proof” compared to ordinary products liability cases as a trade off for expanding the scope of liability to an alleged defect that did not cause the underlying accident. Specifically, in addition to proving a product defect, the plaintiff must prove that, at the time the vehicle was designed, a safer and more practical design existed. A plaintiff’s burden to prove causation is also heavier in a crashworthiness case, as he or she must distinguish between the “enhanced injury” caused by the defect, and the “non-compensable injuries” he or she would have sustained in the accident anyway. The Superior Court emphasized that these crashworthiness elements “impose a burden of proof far and above that of a typical” products liability case. Amagasu may have a greater impact than simply crashworthiness cases as the billion-dollar verdict was vacated because the trial court did not give proper jury instructions. The trial court had avoided giving instructions that were not included in the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions, which did not provide a specific instruction on crashworthiness. The Suggested Standard Jury Instructions are an excellent resource and guide, but they are not an exhaustive statement of every area of the law. If a legal issue is raised by the evidence, the jury must be given an appropriate instruction, even if one is not included in the SSJI.

Case Law Alerts

In One Fell Swoop, Federal Court Clarifies Pleading Standards for Product Misuse Defense

January 1, 2026

Thomas Donnelly brought suit in Greene County, Pennsylvania, against Defendants, General Electric Company and Joenic Steel, LLC, claiming he was injured while participating in the lift of a specially fabricated expansion joint. The plaintiff’s claims sounded in negligence, strict product liability, and breach of warranty. General Electric properly removed the case to the Western District of Pennsylvania based on diversity jurisdiction. Both defendants raised the affirmative defense of product misuse, pursuant to Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 55 A.3d 1088 (Pa. 2012), which held that “a defendant in a Section 402A action must plead and prove, as an affirmative defense, that the plaintiff acted in a highly reckless manner, if such conduct is asserted.” However, the words used in each defendants’ responsive pleadings were significantly different. In particular, Joenic Steel pled that the “plaintiff may have failed to exercise that degree of care and caution requiring attempting to assist in lifting a section of the expansion joint, and as such, the plaintiff’s injuries and damages were due to the conduct and actions of the plaintiff,” and that the “plaintiff assumed a known risk of harm by engaging in the means, methods and manner by which the expansion joint was being erected, and as such, Joenic Steel, Inc. cannot be found liable to the plaintiff.” Conversely, General Electric pled, among other things, that the “plaintiff’s claims against defendant GE are barred to the extent plaintiff’s conduct was the sole cause of the alleged incident,” and that the allegedly defective condition of the product “may have been the result of misuse, abuse or neglect, or substantial alteration, modification and/or change in the product between the time it left the custody, possession and/or control of defendant GE.” Donnelly moved for summary judgment on both of the defendants’ product misuse defenses. Judge Horan granted the plaintiff’s motion as to Joenic Steel but denied the motion as to General Electric based on the language that each defendant used in pleading the defense. In particular, Judge Horan found that Joenic Steel’s pleading failed to plead either product misuse or highly reckless conduct as mandated under Reott, while General Electric’s pleading stated both terms “misuse” and “sole cause,” thereby properly preserving the defense. Accordingly, the court found that Joenic Steel waived its defense of product misuse, while General Electric was permitted to proceed on the theory. This case highlights that answers to complaints are neither boilerplate nor form documents, and that words matter. It is clear from Joenic Steel’s pleading that it intended to pursue a product misuse defense, but by failing to use the specific words required in Reott, the legitimate and dispositive defense was deemed waived. Pleading requirements, especially in federal court, cannot be taken lightly. Attorneys must take extra care to follow them at all times or risk waiving important defenses for their clients.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.