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Product Liability

Marshall Dennehey's litigation attorneys have been actively defending product liability claims for over 40 years. These attorneys provide considerable experience and knowledge on behalf of our product liability clients. In recognition of the group’s capabilities, the practice was ranked Band Two for Pennsylvania Product Liability Litigation in the 2026 and 2025 editions of Chambers USA.

Our product liability attorneys have defended cases alleging defects in manufacture, design, failure to warn and breach of warranty of every imaginable variety. Attorneys in this practice group have represented foreign and domestic manufacturers and act as national coordinating counsel and regional counsel in a number of state and federal courts. Our attorneys have served as advisors to companies offering new or improved products, addressing litigation consequences and advertising.

Members of this litigation group are familiar with product liability cases including:

  • Pharmaceutical products
  • Medical devices
  • Agricultural products
  • Electrical equipment
  • Firearms
  • Sporting goods
  • Recreational products
  • Home appliances
  • Powered equipment
  • Industrial machinery
  • Watercraft
  • Automobile parts
  • Automobiles
  • Railroad and aviation equipment
  • Food products

The attorneys in this practice group are recognized leaders in this area of the law. Our attorneys frequently speak at national, regional and local seminars, and they are published in their field. Moreover, several attorneys have been elected as Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers. Their memberships include: Product Liability Advisory Council, Product Liability Committee of the Defense Research Institute, International Association of Defense Counsel, Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel, the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Trial Lawyers of America.

Through an investment in state-of-the-art computerization and technology, members of this practice group maintain and share current information concerning expert witnesses, the law and the ever-changing landscape of statutory and regulatory requirements. These litigators remain vigilant for rapidly developing changes in the law, medico-legal literature, technology and the latest theories of liability advanced by experienced plaintiffs' attorneys.

Members of this practice group are often called upon to direct and participate in jury research and case evaluations using focus groups. State-of-the-art exhibits are often employed to educate and persuade jurors of the merits of the products they defend.

Attorneys in this practice group are litigators in the truest sense of the word. They have tried to verdict cases of every size and complexity. Yet, they keep a keen eye on the costs associated with this type of litigation. They are poised to work closely with our clients to develop innovative and practical approaches to keep costs and fees as low as possible.

Our firm has long prided itself in providing quality legal services at competitive rates. We can do this, particularly in product liability cases, because of the extensive experience of our attorneys, judicious staffing of cases and a case focus that never diverts from providing our clients with a practical, results-oriented defense.

We welcome the opportunity to work closely with you in defending your company and its products against product liability claims. We clearly understand and respond to the needs of our clients to protect the integrity and reputation of their products, as well as their proprietary interests.

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained in a Premises and Product Liability Case

We won a motion for summary judgment in Schuylkill County, PA, in a premises liability and product liability case. We represented the manufacturer of a concrete railroad crossing that was installed at an intersection in 2005. In 2021, the plaintiff was riding his bike across the crossing when his bike tire allegedly became stuck in a gap in the concrete. There was ample evidence that the railroad was responsible for inspecting and maintaining the crossing while our client did nothing other than supply the prefabricated crossing. We argued the gap that developed in the crossing was not the responsibility of the crossing manufacturer and that the statute of repose barred the lawsuit. The court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer.

Successfully Defended Appeal Sustaining Objections of Improper Venue

We successfully defended the plaintiff’s appeal of a trial court decision sustaining preliminary objections on the grounds of improper venue. This case involved the death of a 19-year-old woman at a university who fell down an 11-story trash chute in an off-campus condominium building. In this mixed negligence and product liability case, we represented two of the multiple defendants, the condominium association and the building management company. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas found that venue was improper in Philadelphia County and ordered that the case be transferred to Centre County. The plaintiff appealed that decision, and the matter was briefed and argued in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The Superior Court, in a precedential decision, affirmed the trial court’s decision and found that there was no abuse of discretion in sustaining the preliminary objections. In support of its decision, the Superior Court found that the plaintiff’s arguments were unsupported by Pennsylvania law. The Superior Court, in finding waiver of an issue, quoted directly from the brief prepared by Kim.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Superior Court Clarifies Crashworthiness Doctrine and Provides Key Jury‑Instruction Guidance

April 1, 2026

In the much-publicized Amagasu case, a jury returned a verdict of nearly a billion dollars to a plaintiff who was paralyzed in a rollover car accident.  On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the award and remanded for a new trial stating that the trial court did not properly charge the jury on crashworthiness principles. Crashworthiness is a subset of products liability cases in which it is alleged that a vehicle possessed a defect that did not cause an accident, but did not offer sufficient protection to the vehicle’s occupant during the accident. Pennsylvania law recognizes that collisions and other accidents are part of the intended use of a motor vehicle, so manufacturers must design and manufacture a product that is “reasonably crashworthy.” For example, if a plaintiff is involved in a head-on collision and the air bags do not deploy, the lack of air bag deployment did not cause the collision, but possibly increased the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries –  that failure to perform may give rise to a product defect claim. In Amagasu, the Superior Court re-affirmed the elements of a crashworthiness claim, which was first recognized in Pennsylvania in 1994, but has not frequently been analyzed since the landmark Tincher case re-defined the product liability cause of action. Amagasu explained that crashworthiness cases involved a “more rigorous” and a “heightened burden of proof” compared to ordinary products liability cases as a trade off for expanding the scope of liability to an alleged defect that did not cause the underlying accident. Specifically, in addition to proving a product defect, the plaintiff must prove that, at the time the vehicle was designed, a safer and more practical design existed. A plaintiff’s burden to prove causation is also heavier in a crashworthiness case, as he or she must distinguish between the “enhanced injury” caused by the defect, and the “non-compensable injuries” he or she would have sustained in the accident anyway. The Superior Court emphasized that these crashworthiness elements “impose a burden of proof far and above that of a typical” products liability case. Amagasu may have a greater impact than simply crashworthiness cases as the billion-dollar verdict was vacated because the trial court did not give proper jury instructions. The trial court had avoided giving instructions that were not included in the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions, which did not provide a specific instruction on crashworthiness. The Suggested Standard Jury Instructions are an excellent resource and guide, but they are not an exhaustive statement of every area of the law. If a legal issue is raised by the evidence, the jury must be given an appropriate instruction, even if one is not included in the SSJI.

Case Law Alerts

In One Fell Swoop, Federal Court Clarifies Pleading Standards for Product Misuse Defense

January 1, 2026

Thomas Donnelly brought suit in Greene County, Pennsylvania, against Defendants, General Electric Company and Joenic Steel, LLC, claiming he was injured while participating in the lift of a specially fabricated expansion joint. The plaintiff’s claims sounded in negligence, strict product liability, and breach of warranty. General Electric properly removed the case to the Western District of Pennsylvania based on diversity jurisdiction. Both defendants raised the affirmative defense of product misuse, pursuant to Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 55 A.3d 1088 (Pa. 2012), which held that “a defendant in a Section 402A action must plead and prove, as an affirmative defense, that the plaintiff acted in a highly reckless manner, if such conduct is asserted.” However, the words used in each defendants’ responsive pleadings were significantly different. In particular, Joenic Steel pled that the “plaintiff may have failed to exercise that degree of care and caution requiring attempting to assist in lifting a section of the expansion joint, and as such, the plaintiff’s injuries and damages were due to the conduct and actions of the plaintiff,” and that the “plaintiff assumed a known risk of harm by engaging in the means, methods and manner by which the expansion joint was being erected, and as such, Joenic Steel, Inc. cannot be found liable to the plaintiff.” Conversely, General Electric pled, among other things, that the “plaintiff’s claims against defendant GE are barred to the extent plaintiff’s conduct was the sole cause of the alleged incident,” and that the allegedly defective condition of the product “may have been the result of misuse, abuse or neglect, or substantial alteration, modification and/or change in the product between the time it left the custody, possession and/or control of defendant GE.” Donnelly moved for summary judgment on both of the defendants’ product misuse defenses. Judge Horan granted the plaintiff’s motion as to Joenic Steel but denied the motion as to General Electric based on the language that each defendant used in pleading the defense. In particular, Judge Horan found that Joenic Steel’s pleading failed to plead either product misuse or highly reckless conduct as mandated under Reott, while General Electric’s pleading stated both terms “misuse” and “sole cause,” thereby properly preserving the defense. Accordingly, the court found that Joenic Steel waived its defense of product misuse, while General Electric was permitted to proceed on the theory. This case highlights that answers to complaints are neither boilerplate nor form documents, and that words matter. It is clear from Joenic Steel’s pleading that it intended to pursue a product misuse defense, but by failing to use the specific words required in Reott, the legitimate and dispositive defense was deemed waived. Pleading requirements, especially in federal court, cannot be taken lightly. Attorneys must take extra care to follow them at all times or risk waiving important defenses for their clients.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.