Marshall Dennehey has been a pioneer in providing regional defense representation to insurers and self-insured organizations for over 60 years. From offices conveniently located near the state and federal courts throughout Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Florida, Ohio and New York, the attorneys of our Public Entity & Civil Rights Litigation Practice Group have extensive experience successfully representing and defending all manner of public risk claims and litigated disputes involving municipalities, school districts and other public corporations, including their officials and employees.
Public entity liability encompasses a broad range of claims against local governments, including police departments, zoning officers, public works agencies and school districts. Our attorneys commonly defend local governments against claims in the nature of:
- Law enforcement liability for wrongful search and seizure, excessive force, improper vehicular pursuit, false arrest, and malicious prosecution under state law and the federal civil rights statutes;
- Claims against public school districts alleging improper student discipline, inappropriate student contact, bullying and sexual abuse;
- Land use regulation and permit disputes brought under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act and state zoning laws;
- Due process claims under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, First Amendment protected speech claims, discrimination claims and student transportation accidents;
- Employment practices liability claims of all descriptions brought under state and/or federal law, including discrimination claims lodged with the EEOC and the equivalent state administrative investigation agencies;
- State tort claims for personal injuries and property damages brought under the governmental immunity statutes and laws unique to each state;
- Claims against elected officials alleging political, gender or racial discrimination, defamation or violations of rights to freedom of speech, equal protection, due process of law and freedom from retaliation.
Our attorneys regularly collaborate with each other to discuss litigation tactics, case resolution strategies and developments in the law, providing our clients with the assurance they will receive uniformly high-quality representation. We handle every case with a practical, results-oriented approach that balances strong representation with realistic cost containment.
Results
Directed Verdict Obtained in a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination Case
We obtained a directed verdict in a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination case filed against a national trucking company after two days of trial. The plaintiff was a laborer who assisted a truck driver making deliveries to a retail store. The driver admitted to making sexually explicit comments to the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued the comments were made due to his race (African American) and were protected under the LAD. Jillian and Len argued that the comments were offensive to anyone who heard them and had nothing to do with the plaintiff’s race. At trial, the judge agreed that the language used by the truck driver, however offensive it was, could not sustain a cause of action under the LAD as it was not based on a protected category as alleged by the plaintiff. The judge dismissed the case.
Dismissal of Police Officers Secured Via Sanctions Imposed
We had our clients dismissed via sanctions imposed. On Jan. 6, 2011, Charles Sample was arrested by officers of the Philadelphia Police Department’s Narcotics Field Unit. The plaintiff alleged the officers seized $40,000 in cash from his vehicle, falsified a search warrant affidavit, disregarded proper procedures and withheld exculpatory evidence, leading to drug charges. The plaintiff entered a guilty plea for probation to avoid a lengthy prison sentence. On Jan. 6, 2017, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, and the charges were nolle prossed. The plaintiff filed his initial complaint on Jan. 4, 2019, alleging federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims. Due to related litigation involving the Narcotics Field Unit, the case was placed in suspense on March 10, 2020, and restored to the active docket on Nov. 15, 2023. On April 4, 2024, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, asserting six causes of action: § 1983 claims for fabrication of evidence, suppression of evidence, malicious prosecution, civil rights conspiracy, municipal liability (against the City of Philadelphia), and state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and conversion. On Aug. 5, 2025, Judge Gerald J. Pappert of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the individual police officer defendants under FRCP Rule 37(b) for failure to comply with discovery orders, with prejudice. Applying the Poulis factors, the court found the plaintiff personally responsible for nearly two years of non-communication with his counsel, which prejudiced the police officers by delaying trial preparation and demonstrated a history of dilatoriness without reasonable excuse. Lesser sanctions were deemed ineffective due to the plaintiff’s prolonged unresponsiveness, and the merits of his claims could not be evaluated, rendering this factor neutral. The City’s motion to join the police officers’ sanctions motion was denied, as they did not move to compel discovery or demonstrate the plaintiff’s violation of a related court order.
Thought Leadership
Defense Digest
Highly Specific: Supreme Court Reiterates Exacting Standard for Clearly Established Constitutional Rights
June 30, 2026
Key Points: The United States Supreme Court continues to underscore the need for specific precedent to find a constitutional right “clearly established” for the purpose of qualified immunity. To satisfy this standard, courts generally need to identify a prior case where an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Constitution. Clearly established rights cannot rest on broad or generalized propositions; they must be defined with a high degree of specificity. In the past decade, the United States Supreme Court strengthened qualified immunity protections for government actors in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases. Building on its 2015 decision in Mullenix v. Luna, the Supreme Court has increasingly emphasized the demanding nature of the “clearly established” prong. Under this framework, precedent must define constitutional rights with a high degree of specificity, such that every reasonable official is on notice of what conduct is unlawful. In Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. __, 146 S. Ct. 926 (2026), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this exacting standard. The case arose from a January 8, 2015, protest at a Vermont Statehouse, where approximately 200 individuals participated in a nonviolent sit-in. The plaintiff, Shela Linton, was among these protestors. At approximately 8:00 p.m., 29 protestors, including Linton, remained seated on the Statehouse floor with their arms linked. Law enforcement informed them that the Statehouse was closed, instructed them to leave, and warned that refusal would result in arrest for trespassing. When the protestors declined to comply, officers began arresting and removing them individually. Protestors who refused to comply thereafter were lifted and escorted, dragged, or carried out of the Statehouse chamber. After removing sixteen protestors, the defendant, Sergeant Zorn, approached Linton and asked her to stand. Linton refused, remaining seated with her arms interlocked with the other protestors. After several seconds, Sergeant Zorn and a second officer took hold of Linton’s arms and separated her from the group. Sergeant Zorn then placed Linton’s left hand behind her back in a rear wristlock and twisted her arm. As Linton cried in pain, Sergeant Zorn repeatedly asked her to stand. Linton refused to stand and verbally reinforced this refusal. In response, Sergeant Zorn warned Linton that he would ask her one more time to stand up prior to using more pain compliance. Linton again refused to stand, and Sergeant Zorn applied pressure to her wrist and lifted her. Linton screamed, briefly stood, and then fell back to the floor after jerking her arms. Sergeant Zorn and two other officers ultimately carried her out of the building. Linton subsequently brought a Section 1983 claim, alleging Sergeant Zorn used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment to Sergeant Zorn, concluding it was not clearly established that lifting Linton while applying wrist pressure violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The Second Circuit reversed, relying on its decision in Amnesty America v. West Hartford for the proposition that the “gratuitous” use of pain compliance techniques against passively resisting protestors constitutes clearly established excessive force. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Second Circuit contravened the principles of a clearly established right by relying on Amnesty America as dispositive. The Court explained that government officials are shielded by immunity unless existing precedent places the constitutional question “beyond debate,” such that it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official is on notice of what conduct is unlawful. This generally requires a court to identify a prior case where an officer acting under similar circumstances was found to have violated the constitution. Said case must further define the constitutional right with a high degree of specificity. According to the Court, Amnesty America did not meet these requirements. The Supreme Court identified three principal flaws in the Second Circuit’s analysis. First, Amnesty America involved a wide variety of alleged uses of force against passively resisting protestors, ranging from ramming a protestor’s head into the wall to using rear wristlocks to lift protestors up, and did not definitively hold that any of those actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the Amnesty court remanded the case because a reasonable jury could have found either excessive force or reasonable conduct, which is insufficient to define a clearly established right. Second, the conduct in Amnesty America differed in a key respect: there was no indication that officers warned protestors before using force. In contrast, Sergeant Zorn repeatedly warned Linton and gave her an opportunity to comply. The Court reasoned that a reasonable officer could not have interpreted Amnesty America to establish “that using a routine wristlock to move a resistant protester after warning her, without more, violates the Constitution.” Third, the Second Circuit relied on an overly general principle: “that the gratuitous use of pain compliance techniques—such as a rear-wristlock—on a protestor who is passively resisting arrest constitutes excessive force.” The Supreme Court emphasized that such generalizations are insufficient. Even if that principle was established by Anmesty America, it lacked the high degree of specificity necessary to clearly define what conduct is prohibited, particularly because it failed to delineate when force becomes “gratuitous.” Although brief, the Supreme Court’s opinion reinforces the stringent requirements for clearly established law. To overcome qualified immunity, there must be precedent that: (1) squarely governs the specific conduct at issue and places the constitutional question beyond debate; (2) is not materially distinguishable from the facts of the case; and (3) defines the right with a high degree of specificity rather than at a general level. Absent these elements, qualified immunity will shield government officials from liability. Coryn works in our Harrisburg, PA office. He can be reached at (717) 651-3703 or CDHubbert@mdwcg.com.
Defense Digest
PA Supreme Court Narrows Sexual Abuse Exception to Governmental Immunity
June 30, 2026
Key Points: Stronger immunity defense: The ruling provides a clear basis to dismiss negligence claims against insured public entities in adult sexual abuse cases, reducing defense costs and settlement pressure. Risk differentiation by age: Defense strategies can more confidently separate minor-victim claims (higher exposure under the exception) from adult-victim claims (generally immune). Focus remains on prevention: While immunity helps limit financial liability, good training, screening, supervision, and reporting protocols are still essential to reduce incidents and defend against any claims that do proceed. Legislative monitoring needed: The General Assembly could expand the exception in the future. Insurers should track any bills that attempt to broaden liability for adult victims in public settings. Case Overview A recent decision from Pennsylvania’s highest court has important implications for municipalities, prisons, school districts, and the insurance professionals who cover them. On March 26, 2026, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a 2019 exception to governmental immunity for sexual abuse claims applies only when the victim was under 18 years old at the time of the incident. The case, City of Philadelphia v. J.S., 320 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2026), involved serious allegations from an adult inmate who claimed he was sexually assaulted by multiple prison employees shortly after arriving at the Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility in Philadelphia. He sued the City of Philadelphia, arguing the city was negligent in training, screening, and supervising its staff, and in protecting inmates from harm. The central legal question was whether the city could be held liable under the sexual abuse exception added to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) in 2019. Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court answered clearly: No. Since the plaintiff was an adult, the exception did not apply, and the city remained protected by governmental immunity. Understanding Governmental Immunity Pennsylvania law provides broad protection to local governments and public agencies against most negligence lawsuits. This shield, known as governmental immunity, helps protect taxpayer dollars from wide-ranging claims that could deplete public budgets. The legislature has created only a few narrow exceptions where liability is allowed. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b), et seq. In 2019, lawmakers added one such exception for sexual abuse, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(9), which permits claims against a local agency if its negligence contributed to conduct that qualifies as one of several serious sexual offenses. However, the exception specifically refers to offenses listed in a statute (42 Pa.C.S. § 5551(7)) that eliminates the statute of limitations for those crimes only if the victim was a minor. The Supreme Court examined the exact language of the law and concluded that the age requirement is an essential part of the exception, not an optional detail that can be overlooked. Writing for the majority, Justice McCaffery emphasized that governmental immunity is the general rule and exceptions must be interpreted strictly and narrowly. The Court also reviewed the legislative history, noting that the 2019 changes were primarily motivated by high-profile cases involving childhood sexual abuse in institutions. A proposal to remove the age limit did not pass. As a result, even serious allegations involving adult victims do not open the door to negligence claims against the public entity itself. What the Ruling Means in Practice This ruling has broad implications beyond just prisons. It applies to municipalities, counties, school districts, and any other local public agencies covered by the PSTCA. For cities and counties, the decision means that negligence claims arising from alleged sexual abuse of adult residents, employees, or visitors are typically protected by immunity. In school settings, while claims involving the sexual abuse of students who are still minors can proceed if negligence by the district is adequately shown, claims involving adult students, staff members, or visitors are generally barred. This ultimately provides a solid basis for dismissing negligence claims early in litigation, which can help control legal costs and reduce settlement pressure. Individual employees may still face personal liability for intentional or criminal acts, but the public agency and its insurance coverage are largely shielded in these adult-victim scenarios. The Court’s decision aligns with several earlier rulings from both Pennsylvania and federal courts, creating consistent guidance across jurisdictions Looking Ahead Critically, this decision does not mean public entities bear zero responsibility. Public agencies must still investigate serious allegations of sexual abuse thoroughly, report them properly to law enforcement, and support victims where appropriate. Individual wrongdoers can, and should, face criminal charges and personal civil liability. However, for public agencies and the insurance policies that protect them, the ruling significantly limits exposure in a major category of cases. Insurance professionals should immediately review pending claims involving adult plaintiffs and governmental insureds. Early motions to dismiss or preliminary objections based on immunity will likely succeed more often now. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has sent a clear and forceful message: governmental immunity still carries real weight, and the 2019 sexual abuse exception remains narrower than some hoped or feared. For municipalities, counties, schools, prisons, and their insurers, this clarity delivers valuable protection in an area where claims frequently become emotionally charged and financially significant. By preserving the traditional limits on municipal liability, the Court reinforces that any broadening of exposure must come directly from the legislature—not through expansive court interpretations. Connor works in our Philadelphia, PA office. He can be reached at (215) 575-2588 or DCWarner@mdwcg.com.
