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John P. Gonzales

Co-Chair, Public Entity & Civil Rights Litigation Practice Group

JPGonzales@mdwcg.com

Portrait of John P. Gonzales

John is a shareholder in the Philadelphia office of Marshall Dennehey and serves as Co-Chair of the Public Entity & Civil Rights Litigation Practice Group. He practices in the areas of civil rights, municipal liability, school claims and employment law.

John has represented police officers and public officials in state and federal court in all aspects of civil rights litigation including claims involving use of force, wrongful arrest and land use. In addition, John has represented public and private employers in wrongful discharge, employment discrimination and defamation claims from administrative proceedings through trial. John has tried dozens of cases in state and federal courts and argued cases before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

In addition to his trial work, John has presented numerous seminars to police departments, law firms and government agencies in the areas of police practices, civil rights issues and municipal liability. He has consulted with police departments concerning the development of policies and procedures and provided advice and guidance to employers concerning employment-related matters.

John received his juris doctor from Temple University School of Law, where he was a member of the Moot Court Honor Society, and graduated from the University of Scranton with a Bachelor of Arts in history and philosophy and a Master of Arts in history. He is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 1993)
    • University of Scranton
      • B.A., 1989; M.A. 1989
    • Pennsylvania, 1994
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1994
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2000
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2006
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Employment Law – Management (2024-2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2019-2020, 2023-2026)
    • Montgomery County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Workers' Compensation Winter Roundup, Graham Company webinar, December 15, 2020
    • Understanding the Debate with the ADA, FMLA and Workers’ Compensation, Marshall Dennehey webinar, October 27, 2020
    • Mitigating the Risk of Workplace Bullying, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 24, 2019
    • Local Government Immunity in Pennsylvania, Client Seminar, October 2018
    • Deal or No Deal - Improving Your Negotiating Strategy, Philadelphia Law Department, August 2018
    • Legal Updates for Law Enforcement, Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Association's Centennial Training Education Conference, July 14, 2014
    • Managing a Maturing Workforce: The Legal Perspective, Delaware Valley Trust, June 2014
    • Social Media & Cyber Breaches: the Internet's Impact on Your Business, The Graham Company, co-presenter, May 2014
    • Navigating The Bermuda Triangle: The Intersection of Workers' Compensation, FMLA and ADA, Roadmap to Success - Understanding Workers' Compensation, Marshall Dennehey seminar, October 24, 2013
    • Hot Topics in Employment, Marshall Dennehey / AIG Seminar, Philadelphia, PA, October 10, 2013
    • Land Use Litigation and Liability Issues for Local Government, Delaware Founders Insurance Trust, September 2011
    • Land Use Civil Rights and Avoiding Liability video and webinar, Delaware Valley Insurance Trust, 2009
    • Police Liability Seminar, Delaware Valley Insurance Trust, November 2007
    • Law Enforcement Seminar - Use of Force Issues, Dauphin County, 2006
    • Train the Trainers Program, Municipal Police Officer Education and Training Commission, November 2005
    • Use of Force in Pennsylvania, Lorman Education Services, CLE, February 4, 2005
    • Use of Force in Pennsylvania, Lorman Education Services, CLE, February 6, 2004
    • Tort Claims Act, Delaware Valley Insurance Trust, March 2004
    • Civil Rights Liability, Delaware Valley Insurance Trust, March 2004
    • "Pennsylvania's Emergence Code: An Additional Level of Protection for Municipalities and Their Employees Performing Emergency Services," Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, April 2000
    • Co-author, "Sex-Based Shift Assignments: Employers May Use Common Sense," Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 7, 1996
    • Co-author, "Employment Discrimination Claims: Arbitration Under Collective Bargaining Clauses," Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 6, 1996
    • Co-author, "Third Circuit Takes Pennsylvania Beyond 402(A)," Defense Digest, Winter, 1994
    • Defense verdict for local police department in case involving false arrest and malicious prosecution arising out of the misidentification of a suspect in a police lineup.
    • Defense verdict for county employer in case involving Title VII Sex Discrimination in the termination of a county court reporter.
    • Defense verdict for county employer in case involving allegations of sexual harassment and hostile work environment at a county prison.
    • Defense verdict for local police department in case involving allegations of false arrest and excessive force arising out of the arrest of a suspect who allegedly assaulted a police officer during a traffic incident.
    • Successful defense of a local police department in the district court and then on appeal to the Third Circuit in case involving allegations of excessive force in the death of a suspect who was alleged to have died while in custody from compression asphyxia.
    • Successful defense of a local municipality in the district court and then on appeal to the Third Circuit in case involving a land use civil rights claim that a developer's substantive due process rights were violated in the context of zoning and land use decisions by a Board of Supervisors.
    • Defense verdict for county employer in case involving claims of first amendment retaliation by a former deputy chief probation officer.
    • Defense verdict for local police officers accused of wrongfully arresting a husband in a domestic dispute.
    • Defense verdict for township detective accused of racial discrimination and conspiracy by an African American police officer in a failure to hire case.

Results

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Dismissal of Police Officers Secured Via Sanctions Imposed

We had our clients dismissed via sanctions imposed. On Jan. 6, 2011, Charles Sample was arrested by officers of the Philadelphia Police Department’s Narcotics Field Unit. The plaintiff alleged the officers seized $40,000 in cash from his vehicle, falsified a search warrant affidavit, disregarded proper procedures and withheld exculpatory evidence, leading to drug charges. The plaintiff entered a guilty plea for probation to avoid a lengthy prison sentence. On Jan. 6, 2017, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, and the charges were nolle prossed. The plaintiff filed his initial complaint on Jan. 4, 2019, alleging federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims. Due to related litigation involving the Narcotics Field Unit, the case was placed in suspense on March 10, 2020, and restored to the active docket on Nov. 15, 2023. On April 4, 2024, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, asserting six causes of action: § 1983 claims for fabrication of evidence, suppression of evidence, malicious prosecution, civil rights conspiracy, municipal liability (against the City of Philadelphia), and state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and conversion. On Aug. 5, 2025, Judge Gerald J. Pappert of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the individual police officer defendants under FRCP Rule 37(b) for failure to comply with discovery orders, with prejudice. Applying the Poulis factors, the court found the plaintiff personally responsible for nearly two years of non-communication with his counsel, which prejudiced the police officers by delaying trial preparation and demonstrated a history of dilatoriness without reasonable excuse. Lesser sanctions were deemed ineffective due to the plaintiff’s prolonged unresponsiveness, and the merits of his claims could not be evaluated, rendering this factor neutral. The City’s motion to join the police officers’ sanctions motion was denied, as they did not move to compel discovery or demonstrate the plaintiff’s violation of a related court order. 

Summary Judgment Granted in First Amendment Retaliation Claim Case

We were granted summary judgment in the dismissal of a First Amendment retaliation claim. The case was brought against our client, the borough manager, as well as the borough and several other of its employees. The plaintiff worked as a trash man in the Streets Department. With regard to the borough manager, the plaintiff alleged First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a hostile work environment due to racial slurs and discriminatory behavior by coworkers and supervisors. He alleged that he reported these issues to his supervisor and the borough manager, but he felt ignored or silenced. After publicly addressing the alleged racism at a February 2024 Town Council meeting, the plaintiff was terminated a week later following a council vote. The plaintiff filed an EEOC charge and this lawsuit, alleging his termination was retaliatory and discriminatory. We were successful in having the retaliation claims against the borough manager dismissed via summary judgement, but the co-defendants remain active.

News

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Firm Highlights

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

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