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Philadelphia

Located just blocks away from iconic City Hall, Marshall Dennehey is proud to call Philadelphia home. The growth and entrepreneurial spirit of our firm is paralleled by the innovative business spirit of Philadelphia, the epicenter of many life sciences, legal, energy, manufacturing, technology, financial, and biomedical and pharmaceutical enterprises.

The attorneys in our Philadelphia headquarters office represent a vast array of clients in civil litigation across virtually every practice area of the firm. We are leaders in the Philadelphia and Pennsylvania Bar Associations, the Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel, the Lawyers’ Club of Philadelphia, the Insurance Society of Philadelphia and dozens of other regional, statewide and national legal and defense organizations.

We are deeply dedicated to the social, business, and charitable aspects of the Philadelphia metropolitan community and provide annual financial support to the United Way, the Philadelphia Bar Foundation, the Philadelphia Support Center for Child Advocates, and many other regional causes. 

We invite you to visit us in Philadelphia, or in any of our 19 offices, where you will find an inclusive and winning corporate culture–we have been voted a “Best Places to Work” by the Philadelphia Business Journal for 14 consecutive years–and outstanding attorneys devoted to providing you with excellence in legal services.

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Law360

State of Insurance: Q2 Notes From Pennsylvania

July 28, 2026

Case Law Alerts

Attorney‑Client Communications Discoverable Where Plaintiffs Seek Fees as Malpractice Damages, Trial Court Holds

July 21, 2026

Plaintiffs sued Duane Morris, alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty relating to a disputed 2020 settlement agreement in an underlying matter, resulting in subsequent proceedings to enforce the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs are seeking approximately $2.3 million in attorneys’ fees and costs spent defending the subsequent proceedings. A discovery dispute in this matter concerning settlement communications as evidence of proximate cause is currently before the Superior Court—this is the trial court’s opinion holding that the evidence sought was discoverable. Briefly, plaintiffs claim that they did not agree to the settlement in the underlying matter. Duane Morris, on the other hand, asserted that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the settlement agreement and thus, the defense expenses were self-inflicted. Accordingly, Duane Morris filed a motion to compel discovery related to contributory negligence and proximate causation, including communications between the plaintiffs and their subsequent counsel. After a hearing, the court granted the motion, and later denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs then filed an interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs asserted on appeal that the trial court erred in compelling plaintiffs to produce documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine; by determining that there was an “at-issue” waiver of privilege without a showing that the plaintiffs affirmatively asserted their state of mind; and by requiring production despite the lack of statutory exception. In its opinion, the trial court noted that, under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 408, evidence of settlement negotiations is inadmissible for certain purposes (such as to prove the validity or amount of a disputed claim), but could be admitted for another purpose, and does not prevent discovery of otherwise discoverable evidence. The court explained that the plaintiffs needed to establish proximate cause—that, but for the purportedly fraudulent settlement, plaintiffs would ultimately not have incurred the attorney fees associated with that the second action. The court determined that communications between the plaintiffs and their counsel regarding their objectives and their reasons for defending against the subsequent actions may be relevant and discoverable if, for example, they involved a strategic choice not to comply with the settlement agreement. Likewise, the court determined that there was an “at-issue” waiver of attorney-client privilege because those communications were at issue—in order to allow Duane Morris to raise a defense as to proximate cause and damages, discovery on plaintiffs’ reasons for defending against the subsequent lawsuits and the reasonableness of the defense costs incurred by plaintiffs was permissible. The court was persuaded by Duane Morris’s citations to other jurisdictions to support the view that a malpractice plaintiff places communications about causation at issue by seeking to recover subsequent attorneys’ fees. Finally, the plaintiffs/appellants also raised a public policy argument: that the court’s order would mean that clients seeking advice of counsel must be wary about the confidentiality because they may later be found to have unwittingly waived the privilege if they later bring a suit in which those communications are requested in discovery. The court rejected this argument because plaintiffs/appellants introduced the issue of the fees, and therefore should expect that the necessity and extent of the fees and costs would then be at issue.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.