Public Entity & Civil Rights Litigation

We obtained a directed verdict in a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination case filed against a national trucking company after two days of trial. The plaintiff was a laborer who assisted a truck driver making deliveries to a retail store. The driver admitted to making sexually explicit comments to the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued the comments were made due to his race (African American) and were protected under the LAD. Jillian and Len argued that the comments were offensive to anyone who heard them and had nothing to do with the plaintiff’s race. At trial, the judge agreed that the language used by the truck driver, however offensive it was, could not sustain a cause of action under the LAD as it was not based on a protected category as alleged by the plaintiff. The judge dismissed the case.

We had our clients dismissed via sanctions imposed. On Jan. 6, 2011, Charles Sample was arrested by officers of the Philadelphia Police Department’s Narcotics Field Unit. The plaintiff alleged the officers seized $40,000 in cash from his vehicle, falsified a search warrant affidavit, disregarded proper procedures and withheld exculpatory evidence, leading to drug charges. The plaintiff entered a guilty plea for probation to avoid a lengthy prison sentence. On Jan. 6, 2017, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, and the charges were nolle prossed. The plaintiff filed his initial complaint on Jan. 4, 2019, alleging federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims. Due to related litigation involving the Narcotics Field Unit, the case was placed in suspense on March 10, 2020, and restored to the active docket on Nov. 15, 2023. On April 4, 2024, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, asserting six causes of action: § 1983 claims for fabrication of evidence, suppression of evidence, malicious prosecution, civil rights conspiracy, municipal liability (against the City of Philadelphia), and state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and conversion. On Aug. 5, 2025, Judge Gerald J. Pappert of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the individual police officer defendants under FRCP Rule 37(b) for failure to comply with discovery orders, with prejudice. Applying the Poulis factors, the court found the plaintiff personally responsible for nearly two years of non-communication with his counsel, which prejudiced the police officers by delaying trial preparation and demonstrated a history of dilatoriness without reasonable excuse. Lesser sanctions were deemed ineffective due to the plaintiff’s prolonged unresponsiveness, and the merits of his claims could not be evaluated, rendering this factor neutral. The City’s motion to join the police officers’ sanctions motion was denied, as they did not move to compel discovery or demonstrate the plaintiff’s violation of a related court order. 

We successfully convinced the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania to affirm the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County’s grant of our preliminary objections and dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint in mandamus. In its complaint in mandamus to the Court of Common Pleas, the plaintiff argued that our client’s letter denying its plan and application for the development of solar panels was insufficient under the Municipalities Planning Code, thus entitling it to a deemed approval of its plan. We had successfully filed preliminary objections to the complaint on the grounds that the Township’s letter, which identified the plan’s defects with specific reference to provisions of the Municipal Planning Code that had not been satisfied, was sufficient under Section 508 of the Municipal Planning Code. This section requires that, when a municipality denies an application for approval of a development plan, “the decision shall specify the defects found in the application and describe the requirements which have not been met and shall, in each case, cite to the provisions of the statute or ordinance relied upon.” 53 P.S. Section 10508(2). The plaintiff appealed the decision, and we attended oral argument before the Commonwealth Court, following which the court affirmed the decision of the lower court on the same grounds.

We successfully had a defamation matter against an American Legion Post and certain of its members dismissed. After joining the Post, the plaintiff supposedly found unpaid invoices, canceled insurance policies, and non-compliance with Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) and gaming license regulations. He fired the restaurant manager, processed payroll, secured new insurance, and attempted to renew the gaming license at the defendants’ direction. When the plaintiff urged compliance and stated he would cooperate with a potential PLCB investigation, he alleges that the defendants threatened him and accused him of misconduct, such as showing a video of a sexually explicit nature to another Post employee, failing to pay wages/vendors, making threats, removing a laptop, allowing unauthorized payroll access and making unauthorized purchases. He was permanently suspended from the Legion after a formal executive session. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a defamation lawsuit in York County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the various statements regarding his misconduct were false. The case was dismissed after the plaintiff failed to comply with two discovery orders and a subpoena for his counsel’s deposition, prompting Judge Menges to impose sanctions, dismissing the case.

We were granted summary judgment in the dismissal of a First Amendment retaliation claim. The case was brought against our client, the borough manager, as well as the borough and several other of its employees. The plaintiff worked as a trash man in the Streets Department. With regard to the borough manager, the plaintiff alleged First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a hostile work environment due to racial slurs and discriminatory behavior by coworkers and supervisors. He alleged that he reported these issues to his supervisor and the borough manager, but he felt ignored or silenced. After publicly addressing the alleged racism at a February 2024 Town Council meeting, the plaintiff was terminated a week later following a council vote. The plaintiff filed an EEOC charge and this lawsuit, alleging his termination was retaliatory and discriminatory. We were successful in having the retaliation claims against the borough manager dismissed via summary judgement, but the co-defendants remain active.

We achieved summary judgment on behalf of an art store chain in a racial discrimination suit over a caricature drawing of a Black woman and her infant son. She, her father and her father’s girlfriend, all visitors of HersheyPark, sued the owner of the kiosk for race discrimination, retaliation and interference under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, alleging that they were drawn with exaggerated and offensive features rooted in harmful racial stereotypes. The kiosk owner argued that while the caricatures might have been poorly drawn, they were not drawn in any manner intended to be offensive. Judge Bloom determined on summary judgment that no reasonable jury could find in favor of the plaintiffs on all three claims and dismissed the action.

We successfully obtained summary judgment for a county in a lawsuit alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. After being sent for a fitness-for-duty examination, a medical professional determined that the plaintiff was not fit for duty, leading to his termination. The court ruled in favor of the county, granting summary judgment on all claims and dismissing the case with prejudice.

We won dismissal of a charge filed by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC) against our client, a public housing authority. A tenant claimed the housing authority discriminated against him based upon race, disability, sex, and sexual orientation or engaged in retaliation. The OCRC determined there was no discrimination and dismissed the charge against the housing authority.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of several Philadelphia narcotics police officers in a Section 1983 malicious prosecution and fabrication of evidence lawsuit. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the case, with prejudice, finding the record was barren of any fabricated evidence by any of the defendant officers that was ever used in or influenced any criminal proceeding against the plaintiff, the officers possessed probable cause to charge the plaintiff, and the plaintiff tendered no evidence of an underlying constitutional violation.   

We successfully defended an appeal of a trial court decision dismissing a defamation claim against a suburban mayor. The plaintiff, a former police officer, brought actions against a former city mayor and related defendants, asserting defamation, false light and related claims. The plaintiff alleged that statements made during a press conference disparaged him and violated a non-disparagement clause in his separation agreement. The court ruled the defamation and false light claims were correctly barred by the one-year statute of limitations under R.C. 2305.11(A) where the saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), permitted refiling in federal court, but did not toll limitations for subsequent state filings after the federal court dismissal. The appellate court also found the former mayor’s statements, regarding police leaders who allegedly retaliated against her, were deemed truthful and, thus, not defamatory or disparaging.   

We received a favorable decision from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in a First Amendment case. The circuit court affirmed the District of New Jersey’s denial of a preliminary injunction in which the plaintiff claimed that federal and local officials violated her First Amendment rights through censorship and retaliation after she posted comments on Facebook. In a published decision, the Third Circuit agreed with our arguments that the plaintiff lacked standing since she could not demonstrate a substantial risk of future harm specific to our client, the former chief of police of North Hanover, NJ, as well as the other co-defendants.   

We obtained summary judgment in a Section 1983 substantive due process claim involving a Philadelphia police officer. The officer had taken a photo of the plaintiff’s son after he attempted suicide by jumping off a bridge, and the photo was later circulated on social media. The plaintiff alleged that circulation of the photo violated her substantive due process privacy rights, and she also asserted a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. One week before trial began, the Honorable Mark Kearney, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, held, although the plaintiff possessed a viable privacy right, that right was not clearly established at the time of the incident; therefore, the court granted qualified immunity to the officer. Additionally, the court held the plaintiff failed to present competent expert opinion evidence establishing her emotional distress and, therefore, dismissed the state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.   

We obtained a directed verdict in favor of our client in a high-risk defamation lawsuit. We were called to try the case on behalf of the CEO of a local chapter of a well-known national nonprofit after the plaintiff was permitted to amend the complaint to seek punitive damages from the CEO personally. The plaintiff was a volunteer at a camp. A decision was made to separate him from the camp and the organization. The plaintiff alleged that the CEO personally defamed him by alerting other volunteers and committees of the decision. He demanded an eight-figure sum prior to trial. After a six-day trial and several hours of argument at the close of the plaintiff’s case, the court granted our motion for directed verdict, ruling that the evidence presented confirmed that the communications by the CEO were covered by a qualified privilege and that, based on cross examination of the plaintiff and his witnesses, the defense established that there was no malicious conduct by the CEO. 

We won a defense verdict in a seven-day jury trial in the Philadelphia Common Pleas court. The case involved a defamation claim based on an article published in a local community newspaper. The defendants were the local Community Council and the two individuals who wrote and published the article. According to the plaintiff, the article named him and implied he wrote an anonymous letter that threatened legal action, which was seen as contrary to the community’s interest. The demand had been $1.75 million, and the plaintiff was offered $50,000. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.

We obtained a defense verdict in a Title VII/Section 1983 sexual harassment case. This claim was filed against a City in Pennsylvania and was heard in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment by a City official, and that the City failed to take appropriate remedial measures. The jury concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that she was sexually harassed after deliberating for just over an hour.

Jillian won summary judgment in favor of her client, a former suburban mayor, after seven years of protracted litigation, arising out of alleged defamation.  In 2016, Jillian’s client was arrested for domestic violence.  Although the criminal case was ultimately dismissed, the charge significantly tarnished her personal life and career and she lost re-election.  In 2017, the police chief and a lieutenant that led the investigation into the criminal charge left their positions, allegedly forced out by the mayor.  Documents regarding the sealed criminal charges were found in both offices, which spurred an internal investigation and review by an outside prosecutor.  The internal investigation found that there were significant deficiencies in the criminal investigation and found that the officers likely obstructed justice as a result of these deficiencies.  The outside prosecutor found that, although there was probable cause for an arrest, there likely was not enough evidence for a conviction.  Because of the ongoing election, the criminal charges and internal investigation were the subject of several public records requests by the local police union as well as council members. On the eve of releasing the investigation as a public record, the acting chief of police, allegedly at the behest of the mayor, gave a press conference in which he announced the results of the investigation and the possible related criminal charges.  The acting chief of police stated that the press conference was necessary because of the political situation – likely referring to the mayor’s reelection campaign.  The court dismissed the action at summary judgment on both procedural grounds and on the merits finding that none of the comments made in the press conference were false or disparaging.

We won summary judgment for a former suburban mayor after seven years of litigation. As background, in 2016, our client was arrested for domestic violence, but the criminal case was ultimately dismissed for lack of evidence and sealed. In 2017, after the police chief and lieutenant left their positions, the City found documents regarding the sealed charges against the mayor in their offices. This spurred an internal investigation into the police investigation into the mayor, which found that there were significant deficiencies in the criminal investigation. The outside prosecutor found that, although there was probable cause for an arrest, there likely was not enough evidence for a conviction. As a result of the ongoing mayoral campaign at that time, the criminal charges and internal investigation were the subject of several public records requests. On the eve of releasing those public records, the City held a press conference announcing that the former police chief’s and lieutenant’s investigation into our client was improper and possibly criminal. After the press conference, the police chief and lieutenant sued the mayor, the acting police chief, and the City for defamation and related claims. The court dismissed the action at summary judgment on both procedural grounds and on the merits, finding that none of the comments made in the press conference were false or disparaging.

We obtained summary judgment in a First Amendment retaliation claim where the plaintiff, an employee of the Borough, alleged that she was terminated by the president because of her affiliation with the minority of the supervisors. In granting summary judgment, the court found that the statements of one council member cannot constitute a policy of the council, unless she is delegated authority by the entire board. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the individual board member, as she did not have the authority to fire the plaintiff without approval from the majority of the board.

We secured summary judgment on behalf of a school district in Fayette County, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged he sustained a concussion as a result of a fall from a loading dock when making a delivery to a middle school in the school district. He argued that the loading dock was dangerous due to inappropriate depth, causing boxes on his hand truck to strike a wall, thus pushing him off of the loading dock. The court concluded that, because of the plaintiff’s prior uneventful encounters with the loading dock, the plaintiff was aware of the intricacies of the loading dock. Additionally, the court concluded that the plaintiff was an experienced delivery driver who, as indicated, was in the best position to perceive whether conditions were dangerous or not, and was, thus, in the best position to take appropriate precautions for his safety. Therefore, the court held that the defendants had no duty to warn or otherwise act to protect the plaintiff.

We were affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of our client in a high-speed police pursuit case. The plaintiff was severely injured after a brief police pursuit involving the driver, who died as a result of the pursuit. The plaintiff then sued the local municipality for negligence, arguing that the officers caused the wreck by turning a traffic stop into a high-speed chase. Following discovery, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Township, finding that the so-called vehicle exception to municipal liability found in the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act did not apply. The trial court reasoned that pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding in Sellers v. The Township of Abington, 106 A. 3d 679 (Pa. 2014), the defendants did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care because his existence or connection to the driver were unknown to the officers at the time of the pursuit. The Commonwealth Court issued an opinion affirming the trial court and held that the exception to the exception for vehicle liability involving high-speed police pursuits did not apply because the plaintiff was unable to establish the threshold requirement that the defendants owed him a duty of care.

We secured a defense verdict in a Section 1983 malicious prosecution trial in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that our client’s law enforcement officers falsified evidence and testimony in order to maliciously prosecute him for conspiracy for engaging in the illegal sale of narcotics. We successfully contended that the former narcotics detective, who corroborated the plaintiff’s complaint, was lying, and called various members of our client’s narcotics unit to testify about the facts of the investigation.

We achieved a defense jury verdict in a 4th Amendment civil rights trial in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that two officers of our Northeastern Pennsylvania Police Department client used excessive force to transfer him from the police station’s processing room to a holding cell. We argued that the officers’ actions were reasonable under the circumstances because they were brief in duration, used techniques within the officers’ training, caused no injury to the plaintiff, and only occurred after the plaintiff repeatedly refused to walk to the holding cell on his own power. The jury returned a unanimous verdict in our client’s favor after approximately an hour of deliberation. 

We obtained summary judgment in an employment litigation case involving claims of racial and sex-based discrimination. The plaintiff alleged that she experienced a hostile work environment based solely on her race. We were able to prove that there was no evidence to substantiate these claims.

We obtained a defense verdict in a Fourth Amendment civil rights trial before Judge Michael Baylson in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that a public agency violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching and seizing his personal property after his vehicle was impounded. The defense witnesses each testified that the vehicle was never searched by the public agency and that the public agency does not have a policy or custom of searching vehicles once they are impounded, which was an essential element of plaintiff’s constitutional violation claim. After less than 15 minutes of deliberation, the jury unanimously found that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the public agency violated his constitutional rights, granting judgment in favor of the public agency defendant.  

In a unanimous precedential opinion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with our attorneys that a law enforcement officer’s attempted arrest of the plaintiff did not constitute an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Our client was instructed by a neighboring police department to hold a burglary suspect who was subject to a search warrant, but not an arrest warrant. After the officer tried to detain the suspect, he fled, and a fight ensued. While the district court held that the officer’s initial attempt to detain the plaintiff was an unlawful seizure, the Third Circuit accepted our reasoning that no seizure occurred because the plaintiff never submitted to the officer.

We obtained the dismissal of a federal civil rights action alleging that a municipality retaliated against a real estate developer after the sale of a large tract of local property.

We were successful in obtaining a dismissal of our client, a state interscholastic athletic association, by way of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff was a high school wrestler who was not permitted to wrestle due to an alleged violation of the rules concerning hair style and covering requirements. The wrestler had his hair cut by the athletic trainer in order to wrestle. This incident was recorded by a local reporter and went viral. As a result of the incident, most states, including New Jersey, amended their discriminatory laws to specifically identify hair style as a protected category. The plaintiff claimed that his constitutional rights were violated and that he was discriminated against based on his hair style. We were successful in arguing that the plaintiff did not set forth causes of action for negligence, constitutional violations and a violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. 

A unanimous panel of the the Third Circuit affirmed an order of the U.S.E.D. Pa., which had granted a Rule 12 motion to dismiss in favor of a former Assistant District Attorney. The plaintiff had plead guilty to murder and other offenses in 1990 after shooting a man in the back four times. In 1993, the plaintiff filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The crux of his argument being his counsel failed to object when the court incorrectly stated the meaning of life imprisonment. According to the original transcript, the court said, “Life implies 17 ½ to 35 years.” Our client, a former Assistant District Attorney, worked on the opposition to the plaintiff’s PCRA petition and contacted the court stenographer about that line in the transcript. The stenographer admitted the transcripts contained an error and filed a certified copy of the corrected page to reflect that the court said, “Life plus 17 ½ to 35 years.” The PCRA petition was denied. Then, in 2019, the plaintiff obtained a handwritten note by our client which referenced needing a “new and improved version” of the transcript. The plaintiff filed another PCRA petition. The current administration of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office and the plaintiff reached a stipulated agreement to resolve the case. The plaintiff’s 1990 guilty plea was vacated, he re-pleaded to third-degree murder and robbery, and was sentenced to 17 ½ to 35 years’ imprisonment, and was then released for time served.  The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against our client under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that our client’s ex parte communication with the stenographer violated his right to due process and to a jury trial. We moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing our client’s actions were protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity. The District Court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed. Writing for a unanimous panel, the Judge concluded the claims asserted by the plaintiff “lack merit[.]” Affirmance was decided solely on the issue of qualified immunity. The court concluded the claims were “fatally deficient” because: (1) the plaintiff defined his right to due process and jury trial at too high a level of generality; and (2) the plaintiff failed to cite authority establishing that his rights to due process and a jury trial entitled him to protection from our client’s ex parte communication with a court stenographer. Thus, our client was entitled to qualified immunity, as argued by us in the District Court.   

A panel of the the Third Circuit unanimously affirmed an order of the U.S.D.C. for the District of Delaware which granted a Rule 12 motion to dismiss in favor of law enforcement officials. The plaintiff filed suit under Section 1983, seeking damages for the alleged violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights following a traffic stop, for driving under the influence of alcohol, and the lawful seizure of blood alcohol evidence. The officials moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims were barred by the claim accrual rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The district court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit. The plaintiff appealed.  Counsel argued on appeal that the plaintiff was convicted of “reckless driving” and was subject to the “alcohol-related” penalty provision of Delaware’s reckless driving statute. As such, the imposition of the plaintiff’s sentence requires his willful or wanton disregard for safety of others be related to alcohol use. The Third Circuit agreed. In affirming, the court explained, “[c]onsidering that alcohol involvement was the basis for the alcohol-related penalty provision and considering the evidence obtained through the challenged search was integral to establishing the involvement of alcohol, any error in the search would not be harmless.” Because the plaintiff failed to show his sentence has been set aside, the court agreed that the plaintiff cannot bring his claims at this time.  

We obtained summary judgment in favor of a township client. The Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of the township, dismissing with prejudice the plaintiff’s negligence and negligent supervision claims. Counsel argued, and the court agreed, the township was immune from liability pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8541 et. seq.