Public Entity & Civil Rights Litigation

We successfully obtained from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmance of a district court order granting a township’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss. The panel agreed with the appellees and concluded the District Court exercised proper discretion in dismissing the complaint since the plaintiffs failed to assert under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plausible claims of federal constitutional violations.

The plaintiff alleged she had been removed from her position as the Township Building Code Official and demoted to a lesser position in retaliation for testifying before a grand jury investigating allegations of misconduct involving a mixed-use apartment complex being developed within the Township.

We successfully obtained dismissal with prejudice of federal civil rights claims brought against an Assistant District Attorney. The plaintiff alleged he entered an involuntary guilty plea to murder following a defective plea colloquy with a judge, who now sits on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The plaintiff alleged the transcript evidence of the colloquy was improperly altered by our client during his first post-conviction collateral proceeding, thereby resulting in violations of his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. While recognizing the “quite sparing” application of common law immunities in Section 1983 litigation, the court accepted, and adopted, our argument that the Assistant DA was entitled to both absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity for his evaluation of the relied-upon transcript evidence. “Because nothing [Plaintiff] could allege would change this outcome, the Court’s dismissal [was] with prejudice.”

We were granted summary judgment in a case involving a dispute between a religious denomination (our client), and one of its local churches. The client invoked its judicial process, allowing it to assume control of a local church due to declining membership. The pastor of the local church refused to vacate the parsonage. The local church asserted the denomination lacked the authority to assume control over it and argued that it was never actually part of the larger denomination. The issues involved First Amendment case law, which address whether and to what extent the courts can decide ecclesiastical disputes, and whether the religious denomination was a hierarchical church or a congregational church. The court accepted our argument that the local church was part of the denomination, that the denomination was hierarchical and that the First Amendment allowed the court to decide the dispute. The court granted our request to allow the denomination to assume control of the local church. 

Claims were brought against the state police organization and eight individual defendants (current and retired members of the state police). The plaintiff, a female State Trooper, alleged she was retaliated against for raising complaints about how male members of the State Police were treating other female employees and that her supervisors failed to take appropriate actions once her initial complaints were raised. She alleged she was denied promotion and transferred against her wishes in retaliation for making these complaints. The ruling was especially satisfying as the court had ruled on a prior summary judgment motion that a fact issue existed, and we had to convince the new motion judge not to follow the “Law of the Case” Doctrine and to decide the case based on the record presented in this motion. 

We obtained a defense verdict in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a Section 1983 malicious prosecution case. The plaintiff alleged that city narcotics officers planted drugs and stole money from her and then falsely charged her with possession and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. The criminal charges against her were dismissed following a Post Conviction Relief Act hearing. 

In a case that was closely watched by other Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), we obtained a defense verdict after a six-day jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio where we defended a PHA accused of discrimination against disabled persons under the ADA and FHA.  The dispute surrounded the PHA’s failure to apply to the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (VASH) vouchers as requested by a developer. The plaintiff claimed that the PHA arbitrarily, capriciously, intentionally, and based on discriminatory animus blocked funding and financing for 60 units of affordable housing for veterans, most of whom were disabled, which stood in violation of the ADA and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA). For background, the PHA’s administrative plan required it to issue a RFP. The developer argued the PHA should have amended its administrative plan to allow it to choose a developer and that the PHA’s refusal to apply for VASH vouchers on the developer’s behalf was discrimination against disabled persons under the ADA and FHA.  In defense of the allegations we argued: The developer never claimed to be acting on behalf of disabled persons; the only request was for a letter of intent, which the PHA could not submit since it would have violated its Administrative Plan and federal regulations; and the request was not necessary to enable disabled persons equal access since the PHA’s decision had the same effect on non-disabled persons. The jury unanimously agreed that the plaintiff developer failed to prove all the necessary prima facie elements of discrimination and issued a verdict for the defendant Housing Authority.   

During early morning hours, a vehicle was observed by police officers driving straight through a turning lane. The officers attempted a traffic stop, but the driver took off and led police onto an interstate highway. A high-speed pursuit ensued, reaching speeds in excess of 115 mph. The plaintiff was a passenger in the vehicle. Due to the high speed and an upcoming construction zone, officers broke off the chase. The driver attempted to exit the interstate via an off ramp, but turned too fast and crashed. Although the driver died on impact, the plaintiff-passenger was thrown from the rear of the vehicle and wedged under the dashboard. The plaintiff sued several municipalities under a negligence theory. Following discovery, Mark filed motion for summary judgment on behalf of our client, arguing that the plaintiff’s claim was barred and the township was immune from suit pursuant to the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. Following oral argument, the court granted our motion.

The plaintiff, a part-time police officer, alleged that she told her Police Chief that she believed the hiring/promotions of three male police officers to full-time positions were illegal. After that meeting, the plaintiff claimed she was not assigned to higher-paying assignments like the male police officers in the department. She sued the borough and the police chief for First Amendment retaliation under Section 1983, and gender-based discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Following a six-day trial and five hours of deliberation, the jury returned a complete defense verdict on all counts against both defendants.

The plaintiff fell while walking and sued the owners of the property and York City, alleging the City was negligent in failing to maintain the sidewalk and in failing to inspect, correct or repair it. The defense argued that the plaintiff did not establish that York had any actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect, and that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden under the sidewalks exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8541, et seq.

In this civil rights litigation, we obtained summary judgment and the dismissal of all claims against a Pennsylvania City and one of its police officers. The court found that the traffic stop of the plaintiff was proper and did not violate his constitutional rights. The plaintiff filed a federal civil rights action against the police officer and the City, alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because of unlawful search and seizure as well as a malicious prosecution. The plaintiff further alleged that the City was liable for the constitutional violation based upon a failure to train its officers. These claims were based, in part, upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Hicks, which was filed approximately two months before the plaintiff’s arrest. In this civil rights case, the parties agree to forego discovery and instead rely solely upon the record developed in the plaintiff’s state criminal prosecution. After considering the record evidence, the arguments of each side, and the motions and briefs submitted, the District Court issued an opinion finding that the police officer possessed a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, justifying the traffic stop of the plaintiff’s vehicle. Because the court concluded that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights had not been violated, an analysis of qualified immunity was unnecessary. Finally, after finding that the officer did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the court dismissed the Monell claims raised against the City.

We obtained dismissal of two charges filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. The charging party had been removed from two of the employer’s stores. He claimed it was due to discrimination, because of his race and disability (he required a service animal to be with him). The defense submitted a position statement with affidavits of employees and managers, explaining that the employee was removed because he was videoing other customers without their consent and making racially charged comments to employees and customers. 

Our attorneys obtained judgment in favor of a local borough and its employees/agents following numerous rounds of motions to dismiss in the Western District. The plaintiff, a construction contractor, brought suit alleging the borough violated its constitutional civil rights by failing to issue it a grading permit in the time it perceived as reasonable. The matter is more generally described as a land use dispute, involving the plaintiff’s excessive dumping and destruction of a local sewer line, thus jeopardizing the health and safety of the local residents. In support of dismissal, we argued that no substantive due process rights were violated, and that the civil conspiracy claim as to the individual defendants failed as a matter of law. The court agreed and granted the plaintiff leave to amend. Failing to heed our position, the plaintiff filed an additional complaint, to which we again moved to dismiss. The court agreed with our arguments and dismissed the federal claims, with prejudice.

We successfully handled a pension rights action before the Commonwealth Court on behalf of a municipality. A police chief in small municipality alleged that a scrivener’s error in his employment contract erroneously referencing Act 600 entitled him to an Act 600 pension plan upon retirement when his existing pension plan had been organized many years pursuant to Act 15. The police chief had never contributed to an Act 600 pension plan, which would have provided for much higher benefits and for which the municipality had no funds set aside to pay because it had never established an Act 600 plan. The Commonwealth Court held that the police chief’s pension rights existed only under Act 15 because the municipal pension ordinance was established under Act 15, not Act 600. Pennsylvania law requires an ordinance to establish pension rights. Pension rights cannot be conferred only by agreement, without an ordinance. This decision was very important to the municipality we represented, and the opinion affirms well-established law that a municipality cannot contract for benefits if there is no enabling law for the benefits.

Our defense team successfully obtained dismissal of a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) perceived disability claim, alleging COVID-19 to be a disability under this statute. This employment discrimination claim involved a matter of first impression in New Jersey. A former employee filed suit asserting perceived disability discrimination under the NJLAD. The plaintiff alleged he was wrongfully terminated based upon his employer’s perception that he had COVID-19. We filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, asserting the complaint did not set forth a cause of action as COVID-19 is not a recognized disability under the NJLAD. The court granted our motion and agreed that COVID-19 is not a disability under the NJLAD and, therefore, could not be the predicate for a perceived discrimination case. 

Our defense team was successful before the New Jersey Appellate Division. The plaintiff is a former employee of a non-profit agency that provides services to disabled individuals. She filed suit against her former employer and its manager, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. As discovery progressed, thousands of pages of discovery were exchanged, which demonstrated that legitimate, long-standing performance deficiencies were the actual basis for her termination. The defendants filed for summary judgment prior to the end of the discovery period, and the Law Division granted the motion, finding no reason not to grant the immediate dismissal, especially as the plaintiff failed to even respond to the statement of material facts. On appeal to the Appellate Division, the court affirmed the dismissal, rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments that the motion judge engaged in a subjective analysis of the facts and thereby made factual findings on disputed issues, and that the motion judge erred by granting the motion before discovery was complete. The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, with any degree of particularity, that further discovery would supply the missing elements to her cause of action. The court further found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of gender discrimination or workers’ compensation retaliation given the unrebutted facts provided by the defendants. 

The plaintiff filed suit against her employer, a governmental agency, alleging she was subject to discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) based upon her disability and that she was subject to retaliation for filing a previous discrimination suit. She further asserted aiding-and-abetting claims against fellow employees. The case was dismissed via summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division accepted our argument that the failure to move the plaintiff to a position she desired did not constitute an adverse employment action or failure to accommodate as she suffered no adverse effect on her salary or benefits, and did not materially alter her working conditions. Further, the court addressed concerns the plaintiff’s physician had expressed when she sought the accommodation, even though she was not transferred to a position in which she preferred to work, and agreed the claims were properly rejected by the trial Judge.

We won summary judgment for a housing authority in a political subdivision matter in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiff sought over $20 million in damages, alleging the housing authority violated the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act by discriminatorily blocking funding for, and financing of, 60 units of project-based affordable housing for homeless veterans, most of whom are disabled. The court had previously awarded summary judgment to our client on all but one claim, but ruled that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the plaintiff’s “reasonable accommodation” claim under the ADA and FHA. In an unusual turn of events, the court recently held that it had erred in not granting our previously filed summary judgment on all claims. It, therefore, dismissed all claims against the housing authority.

We obtained a defense verdict following a non-jury trial. This case was brought under Pennsylvania’s Sunshine Act, which governs the meetings of Commonwealth public agencies, including school boards. The plaintiffs were residents of a Centre County school district, and they sued the school board and its president, claiming they violated the Act in the manner by which they conducted public meetings. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the board failed to state with sufficient specificity during the open portion of its meetings the reasons why it was convening privately in executive session, and because the board did not allow public comment at, or keep minutes of, its executive session meetings. After trial and post-trial briefing, the court, in a written opinion found for the defendants, concluding the board complied with the Act as it routinely and appropriately announced, in general terms, when it was convening in executive session to discuss contract, personnel and non-litigation legal matters. Finally, the trial court found as matter of law that the board was not required to allow public comment at, or keep minutes of, its work sessions because the work sessions are non-voting meetings at which the board does not “deliberate” or take any “official action,” as those terms are specifically defined by the Act.

This was the first civil case tried in a U.S. District Court in Pennsylvania since the court closures caused by COVID-19. The plaintiff alleged that the police officer used excessive force in arresting her outside of a bar in the City of York. She filed a Section 1983 civil rights lawsuit, alleging she sustained a traumatic brain injury after the officer threw her head against a brick wall, threw her to the ground and then repeatedly punched her in the face. By utilizing video surveillance footage and several liability and damage experts, we were able to convince the jury that the force used by the officer was reasonable and justified by the plaintiff’s resistance. The jury deliberated for less than 30 minutes before rendering its verdict.

We successfully defended a civil rights appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The plaintiff filed a federal civil rights complaint against a police sergeant and a local municipality following his arrest and release. The plaintiff was charged with the attempted murder of his wife, who later recanted her statement to police. After the plaintiff was released from custody, he filed suit, claiming that police failed to conduct an adequate criminal investigation into the charges against him. At the district court, it was found that probable cause existed based on information known to officers at the time of the plaintiff’s arrest. Therefore, our defense motion for summary judgment was granted. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, claiming that the district court failed to weigh the evidence in the light most favorable to him, and ignored relevant evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision finding probable cause.

The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs were the maternal grandparents of two children who were removed from the custody of their parents and placed in foster care. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their substantive and procedural due process rights protected by the 14th Amendment by failing to provide them with custody of the children and notice of court hearings. Addressing an open legal question, the court held that the plaintiffs did not stand in loco parentis to the children and, therefore, did not enjoy 14th Amendment protections. The court dismissed all claims against the county and the individual county employees.

We secured a dismissal of a civil rights action against a Pennsylvania children and youth agency and several of its caseworkers and staff attorneys. ​The plaintiff parents brought their five-month-old baby to the hospital with a spiral fracture mid-shaft on his right humerus. The hospital team collectively concluded that the injury was probably accidental in nature, but a nurse reported the injury to the agency, concerned that it might have been caused by abuse. By law the agency is bound to investigate suspected child abuse and did so. A judge approved the request for a safety plan that required a chaperone to be with the parents and child, even in the home, while the merits of the abuse investigation continued. At the end of the investigation, the judge concluded the injury was accidental, and the safety plan was terminated. The plaintiffs then filed an action, alleging the safety plan violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. The federal district court dismissed the case, concluding the plaintiffs’ allegations of interference with the family unit, even if true, do not rise to the level of “shocking to the conscience” necessary for a due process violation. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the nurse’s report of possible child abuse, in conjunction with other evidence to support suspicion of the same, make the defendants’ actions not “shocking to the conscience,” and so no substantive due process claim was stated. Dismissal was affirmed.

The plaintiffs contracted with a builder to construct a 5,000 sq. ft. home. In accordance with the Uniform Construction Code, the local township contracted with a privately-owned company to serve as a code enforcement and permit officer. The company issued a building permit, inspected the home at several points during construction, and eventually issued a certificate of occupancy. However, the plaintiffs claimed that the home had significant structural and aesthetic defects, and the code enforcement officer failed to conduct proper inspections during the construction process. The plaintiffs sued their builder, the code enforcement officer and the township. The township was alleged to have negligently hired and/or negligently supervised the code enforcement officer. Preliminary objections were filed in response, raising governmental immunity as a clear defense to the negligence claims against the township. Following oral argument, the court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the township from the action, finding there were no plausible claims for negligence based upon application of the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

We obtained an order of Dismissal in favor of a municipality in connection with a lawsuit filed by a worker. ​The worker sustained catastrophic injuries as a result of a mishap on the job which caused him to fall from the roof of a condominium project under construction. This was a multi-party action in which our client, the municipality, issued the permits but failed to carry out the inspections. Notwithstanding, we were able to demonstrate immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, and the court entered the order of dismissal.

The plaintiff’s wife reported to police that the plaintiff tried to kill her by firing a shotgun at her while she slept. Following a thorough investigation and witness interviews, police arrested the plaintiff and charged him with attempted murder. The next day, the wife recanted her story and told police that she was the one who fired a shotgun in the couple’s home in an effort to frame her husband for attempted murder. Police immediately had the plaintiff released from prison. The wife was later charged with, and pleaded guilty to, making false statements to authorities. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the police department and arresting officer, claiming the defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned him and maliciously prosecuted him without probable cause in violation of his 4th and 14th Amendment rights. Following discovery, a motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of the defendants. The court found that the undisputed facts of record clearly showed the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest, and summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants.

We obtained summary judgment in favor of a borough, its police chief, a detective, a lieutenant and a school resource officer in a civil rights lawsuit. ​The plaintiff, a local high school teacher, alleged that no probable cause existed to charge him with witness intimidation, arising from an alleged incident involving a female student who was a victim of institutional sexual assault by another teacher. In its opinion granting summary judgment, the court determined that the Affidavit of Probable Cause, which was the basis for charges against the plaintiff, was supported by the evidence at the time the affidavit was prepared. The court also held that, because no violation of Section 1983 existed, all claims against the individuals and the municipality must be dismissed. Finally, the court ruled that the individual defendants enjoyed qualified immunity because no constitutional violation existed.

We obtained summary judgment in favor of a town and several of its police officers in an excessive force and malicious prosecution case in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff and his family were in Bloomsburg the night before his daughter’s graduation when he got into a fist fight with a bar owner. The owner suffered significant injuries and the plaintiff fled the scene. He was spotted a short time later by one of the defendant officers, pursued and arrested. The plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct, harassment, simple assault and aggravated assault. Following the criminal trial, the plaintiff was found not guilty. He then sued our clients—the town and several officers—for excessive force and malicious prosecution. The plaintiff’s wife also sued, alleging loss of consortium and emotional distress. The wife’s claims were dismissed via a motion to dismiss. Following the close of discovery, motions for summary judgment were filed on behalf of our clients. The court granted our motions, finding the existence of probable cause as a defense to claims for malicious prosecution and wrongful arrest. The court also found that the arresting officer acted reasonably during the pursuit and detention of the plaintiff.

We successfully argued that a plaintiff’s claims against a local police department were precluded by law. First, we pointed out that our client was not an entity that could be sued. Second, we emphasized that the statute of limitations applied to bar the plaintiff’s claims. Finally, we contended our client was immune from liability pursuant to R.C. § 2744.01, even if it could be sued. The plaintiff attempted to argue his case for excessive use of force, malicious prosecution and emotional distress for being arrested after he was fired from his place of employment. The judge ultimately granted our motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims.