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Carolyn Kelly Bogart

Co-Chair, Hospitality & Liquor Liability

Co-Chair, Premises & Retail Liability

Portrait of Carolyn Kelly Bogart

Carolyn, a shareholder in our Casualty Department, has been a practicing attorney since 1996. She focuses her practice on premises liability, defense of liquor liability, construction injury, significant exposure excess insurance claims, contract and general casualty matters, and sports and entertainment litigation. Carolyn’s practice also focuses on the area of retail liability, representing national and local retail clients defending general casualty matters, risk transfer claims, and negligent security matters. As a seasoned litigator Carolyn represents many clients in construction-based litigation involving contractual disputes and subrogation matters. 

Carolyn has extensive experience defending fraternal organizations, schools and universities in matters involving contractual disputes, indemnity, vicarious liability, dram shop and general negligence. She is well versed in NJ immunity laws for schools and fraternal entities. Additionally, Carolyn has experience defending organizations and hotel chains in high-exposure cases involving human trafficking and sexual assault allegations, including matters brought under the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).

Much of Carolyn’s caseload requires interpretation of contractual disputes involving insurance status and coverage disputes. She has extensive experience litigating complex contract and insurance coverage issues arising in construction, landlord and tenant, and other casualty matters. Carolyn has litigated numerous matters to verdict in the state of New Jersey and practices in all counties and federal court venues in the state.

In addition to her law practice, Carolyn provides annual legal updates to various clients ranging from issues dealing with auto liability, premises liability and risk management. She often provides consult to clients regarding liability matters, preparing for future issues to avoid litigation and developing policies and procedures for risk assessment.   

Carolyn is a graduate of The Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. While residing in Washington, D.C., she worked on Capitol Hill as a legislative intern for Congressman James Saxton (Rep. 13th District of New Jersey). After receiving a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science, Carolyn continued her education at Catholic University's Columbus School of Law where she was actively involved in the Families and Law Clinic, Moot Court, and was also employed as a judicial intern for the Honorable Brook Hedge, D.C. Superior Court, Criminal Division.

Upon completion of her juris doctor in 1995, she accepted a position with the New Jersey State Judiciary and became law clerk to the Honorable George L. Seltzer, New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division.

    • The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law (J.D., 1995)
    • Catholic University of America (B.A., 1992)
    • New Jersey, 1996
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1996
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2002
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
      The Martindale-Hubbell rated attorney list is issued by Internet Brands, Inc. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • Commercial Defense Practice in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, Nationwide Insurance Company, Co-Presenter, December 2013
    • “Let It Snow,” Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021
    • “Sidewalk Liability - What You and Your Condo Association Have In Common,” Defense Digest, Vol. 18 No. 4, December 2012
    • Summary Judgment Secured in New Jersey Wrongful Death Case Obtained a summary judgment in a wrongful death case, based on a lack of duty owed by a groom to his wedding guest, and dismissal of cross claims for lack of a viable contract owing indemnity under Azurak. The decedent was a plus-one guest at our client’s wedding, which was held at a multi-building facility in Moorestown, NJ. Specifically, the venue consisted, in part, of a 131-year-old home with a castle-like outward appearance. The home’s design includes an elevated terrace (raised approximately five feet and accessible by stairs) with an unguarded, flat ledge. The plaintiff alleges the decedent was sitting and/or leaning against the ledge when he fell over, sustaining injuries that allegedly resulted in his death a few months after the event. Our client was an employee at the facility. The corporate owners of the property permitted him to use the home for his wedding, at no cost, provided he obtain an event insurance policy. The co-defendants sought indemnification, arguing that the policy evidenced an agreement that our client would provide indemnification to them. It was our position, and the court agreed, that our client owed no duty to warn the decedent as this was an open and obvious condition that the decedent was aware of or by a reasonable use of his faculties would observe. Further, our client and the decedent were both invitees to the property, and it is the co-defendant landowners who had a non-delegable duty to use reasonable care to protect against dangerous conditions. Therefore, the claims raised in the complaint and cross-claims for contribution were dismissed. Further, the court found no breach of contract or enforceable agreement to indemnify; the negligence in this case was on the co-defendant commercial property owners.
    • Summary Judgment Obtained in an Indemnity and Common Law Contribution Case Successfully argued and secured summary judgment in favor of a masonic organization, dismissing third-party claims for indemnity and common law contribution. At issue was a third-party complaint for contractual indemnity and common law contribution over an alleged trip and fall due to a structural condition with a rented property. The masonic organization rented the property for a single use event in support of the organization. The plaintiff claimed to be a guest and initiated suit against the commercial property owner, the third-party plaintiff. In support of the third-party complaint, a rental agreement was produced, which was not for the alleged date of loss. The third-party plaintiff argued the rental agreement disclaimed liability on the part of the property owner and turned the property over to the renter’s charge; therefore, the renter was required to inspect the property and warn its guests of dangerous conditions. The court granted summary judgment for the following reasons. First, the rental agreement could not support contractual indemnity because it was not Azurak compliant as there was no explicit language requiring indemnity. Second, the masonic organization’s duty as a short-term lessee did not require inspection prior to the event, nor was there sufficient factual evidence to overcome the masonic organization’s charitable immunity. 
    • Summary Judgment Secured in a Dram Shop Liability Case Obtained a summary judgment in a challenging dram shop liability case against a large restaurant chain where the demand was $1 million. The plaintiff alleged our client was responsible for overserving the co-defendant driver prior to the subject motor vehicle accident. The court agreed with our arguments that the plaintiff failed to establish a violation of the The New Jersey Dram Shop Act. The plaintiff failed to present an expert report until opposing our motion for summary judgment. The expert report, which was submitted as an exhibit to the plaintiff’s opposition brief, did not extrapolate the defendant’s BAC at the time he left the defendant’s establishment. There was also no eyewitness testimony on the issue. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a jury’s conclusion that the co-defendant driver was visibly intoxicated at the time of service based on police observations at the scene of the accident and a (.17) BAC reading, which was administered approximately one hour and 30 minutes after leaving the restaurant. Distinguishing between prior case law and the subject circumstances, summary judgment was awarded based on the lack of either direct testimony or expert opinion as to the co-defendant’s state of intoxication at the time of service. 
    • Appellate Court Pivots; Motion To Dismiss Granted Obtained a published decision in the New Jersey Appellate Division reversing the denial of a motion to dismiss because of a lack of duty. The plaintiff’s ex-husband drove through the gate at a large, high-rise apartment complex, waited for plaintiff to arrive, and then shot her in the face. Our client was the former management company which ceased its management obligations 17 days before the shooting, when a successor management company took over. The plaintiff argued that our client was negligent based on procedures for securing the lot it put in place when it managed the property. We sought summary judgment, arguing a lack of duty due to the expiration of a management contract. The Law Division judge denied that motion, asserting there were genuine issues of fact and that the jury had to decide whether a duty existed. We persuaded the Appellate Division to grant interlocutory appeal, and then we successfully argued for a reversal. First, the Appellate Division agreed with us that the trial judge erred by holding that the existence of a duty was a jury question and not a question for the court to decide as a matter of law. Second, the Appellate Division held that, since our client no longer had any rights or responsibilities over the security of the premises when the shooting happened, and because there was no indication that the successor management company or the owner of the property could not have changed the procedures which our client had put in place, the former management company owed no duty to the plaintiff and that summary judgment was therefore appropriate.
    • Social Host Act Does Not Apply to Gross Negligence Claims Carolyn was successful in opposing a plaintiff’s appeal against our client, a former fraternity member and social guest. In 2014, the plaintiff was a 20-year-old college student and fraternity member attending a university in New Jersey. After consuming his own alcohol, he fell asleep in a dorm room that was the location of an on-campus party. In the early morning hours, he left the dorm room and proceeded to drive his vehicle, which was unknown to anyone in attendance, as all of the party attendees had either left the party or were asleep when he left. He injured himself in a one-car accident, resulting in a traumatic brain injury and disfigurement claim. In 2016, he filed a lawsuit naming all party attendees and fellow brothers in his fraternity, as well as the university and its employees. Following over 30 depositions, summary judgment was granted to all defendants. The appeal was filed in 2019, and a reported decision issued on March 25, 2021, affirming the underlying Superior Court decision as to our client. The appeal raised questions concerning the scope of the duty owed to an adult not old enough to drink legally, but who nonetheless drank to excess. The appellate panel ruled that the Social Host Liability Act did not apply because it governs liability for third party injuries resulting from the service of alcohol to an of-age adult.
    • Dismissal of Complaint Under New Jersey’s Charitable Immunity Act Marshall Dennehey was successful in the New Jersey Appellate Division, which affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint under New Jersey’s Charitable Immunity Act. The defendant operated a shelter for battered women, their dependent children and the homeless. The plaintiff and her child were residents at the shelter and beneficiaries of its charitable goals when the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice on the shelter’s property. She argued that she was not a beneficiary of the charity because she did administrative tasks and volunteered in the charity’s thrift store. However, the trial court and Appellate Division rejected those arguments, holding that the plaintiff’s presence on the defendant’s property was due to her being a resident beneficiary of the charity, not as a result of any volunteer work she may have performed for the defendant. Thus, because her volunteer activities were incidental to her residency at the shelter, the Charitable Immunity Act applied and the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed.  

Results

Summary Judgment Secured in New Jersey Wrongful Death Case

We won summary judgment in a wrongful death case, based on a lack of duty owed by a groom to his wedding guest, and dismissal of cross claims for lack of a viable contract owing indemnity under Azurak. The decedent was a plus-one guest at our client’s wedding, which was held at a multi-building facility in Moorestown, NJ. Specifically, the venue consisted, in part, of a 131-year-old home with a castle-like outward appearance. The home’s design includes an elevated terrace (raised approximately five feet and accessible by stairs) with an unguarded, flat ledge. The plaintiff alleges the decedent was sitting and/or leaning against the ledge when he fell over, sustaining injuries that allegedly resulted in his death a few months after the event. Our client was an employee at the facility. The corporate owners of the property permitted him to use the home for his wedding, at no cost, provided he obtain an event insurance policy. The co-defendants sought indemnification, arguing that the policy evidenced an agreement that our client would provide indemnification to them. It was our position, and the court agreed, that our client owed no duty to warn the decedent as this was an open and obvious condition that the decedent was aware of or by a reasonable use of his faculties would observe. Further, our client and the decedent were both invitees to the property, and it is the co-defendant landowners who had a non-delegable duty to use reasonable care to protect against dangerous conditions. Therefore, the claims raised in the complaint and cross-claims for contribution were dismissed. Further, the court found no breach of contract or enforceable agreement to indemnify; the negligence in this case was on the co-defendant commercial property owners.

Summary Judgment Obtained in an Indemnity and Common Law Contribution Case

We successfully argued and secured summary judgment in favor of a masonic organization, dismissing third-party claims for indemnity and common law contribution. At issue was a third-party complaint for contractual indemnity and common law contribution over an alleged trip and fall due to a structural condition with a rented property. The masonic organization rented the property for a single use event in support of the organization. The plaintiff claimed to be a guest and initiated suit against the commercial property owner, the third-party plaintiff. In support of the third-party complaint, a rental agreement was produced, which was not for the alleged date of loss. The third-party plaintiff argued the rental agreement disclaimed liability on the part of the property owner and turned the property over to the renter’s charge; therefore, the renter was required to inspect the property and warn its guests of dangerous conditions. The court granted summary judgment for the following reasons. First, the rental agreement could not support contractual indemnity because it was not Azurak compliant as there was no explicit language requiring indemnity. Second, the masonic organization’s duty as a short-term lessee did not require inspection prior to the event, nor was there sufficient factual evidence to overcome the masonic organization’s charitable immunity.   

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Navigating the New Era of Dram Shop Liability: Marshall Dennehey’s Hospitality & Liquor Liability Practice Group Steps Forward

September 1, 2025

Dram shop liability, or liquor liability, is civil liability—typically for bars and restaurants—for personal injuries arising out of service of alcohol to either a minor or a visibly-intoxicated patron. And it is quite the hot topic these days. An article about “dram shop” cases recently graced the front page of The Philadelphia Inquirer; quite a far stretch from what has long been a somewhat overlooked and largely ignored area of personal injury litigation.  Marshall Dennehey has been handling liquor liability claims since the days when the most common question we fielded was, “What is dram shop?” These cases have always had the potential to inflame juries due to the volatile nature of the fact patterns and circumstances surrounding alcohol-related incidents. But now, in the era of the “nuclear verdict,” juries are rendering astronomical verdicts in these cases.  Philadelphia attorney, M. Scott Gemberling, and King of Prussia attorney, Tony Michetti, have been at the forefront of this litigation for the past 40 years. With Tony’s recent retirement, and Scott’s transition to senior counsel at the firm, we have been appointed co-chairs of the firm’s longstanding Hospitality & Liquor Liability Practice Group. While it may seem like a “new era” here we have been learning from and working with Scott and Tony for the past two decades. And while Scott and Tony have tried plenty of liquor liability cases to verdict, their true legacy is a forward-thinking strategy focused on smart, fixed, and speedy investigation of claims, along with an evaluation of early mediation. The hope is to avoid, where possible, the nuclear verdicts that are increasingly splashed across the front pages of newspapers. This is the legacy we intend to carry forward. Drawing on our many years of experience, our team is here to handle any type of accident that accompanies or is related to the service of alcohol. While the classic “dram shop” scenario involves the patron who leaves a bar or restaurant and gets into a motor vehicle accident while intoxicated, that is just one scenario. We have handled cases against bars and restaurants arising out of numerous types of injuries that can occur, including cases involving:  •    Alcohol poisoning •    Bar fights •    Car accidents •    Motorcycle accidents •    Shootings •    Stabbings •    Suicide •    University fraternity/sorority events Additionally, the members of our group routinely present on the topics of safe service of alcohol, as well as risk management best practices, to help avoid and protect against claims and litigation. Whether you are faced with a lawsuit involving alcohol, or whether you are a business looking to avoid such a situation, our Hospitality & Liquor Liability Practice Group is here to help.  Patrick and Carolyn co-chair our Hospitality & Liquor Liability Practice Group. Patrick works in our Pittsburgh, PA office, and Carolyn works in our Mount Laurel, NJ office.   Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest

Let It Snow

December 1, 2021

Key Points:  Supreme Court of New Jersey applies ongoing storm doctrine. Court held that a commercial landowner does not have the absolute duty to keep sidewalks of his property free from snow or ice during an ongoing storm. In the September 2019 edition of Defense Digest, my colleague, Josie Scanlon, Esq., addressed the Storm in Progress Doctrine in her article “Emerging Liability Theory Provides New Defense for Premises Cases – The Ongoing Storm Doctrine.” The article discussed whether a commercial property owner could be held liable as a matter of law for failing to remove accumulated snow or ice until a reasonable time after the storm ends. This New Jersey premises liability law, while well established, did not provide an absolute elimination of liability for commercial property owners. Instead, it focused on whether or not reasonableness was the standard as it applied in the context of a commercial property owner’s removal of snow and ice from an abutting public sidewalk.  However, in June of 2021, in Pareja v. Princeton International Properties, et al., 252 A.3d 1984 (N.J. 2021), the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed a case that had been pending since 2015. The court held that a commercial landowner did not have the absolute duty to keep sidewalks of his property free from snow or ice during an ongoing storm. In Pareja, a pedestrian had brought a personal injury action against a commercial landowner after slipping and falling on an icy sidewalk during an ongoing storm. The matter had been heard in Mercer County, New Jersey, which is half-way between Philadelphia and New York, and known as the “I-95 Corridor.” It is an area often subject to various freeze, thaw and re-freeze cycles during the winter months.  The Superior Court in Mercer County granted summary judgment to the landowner. The pedestrian appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed the findings of the trial court. The landowner petitioned for certification to the Supreme Court, which was granted. The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, although a dissenting opinion was filed. The central issue for the court was the duty of the commercial landowner to clear snow and ice from its property during a storm. For the first time, the court considered adoption of the “ongoing storm” rule rather than the preexisting “reasonableness standard.” The Supreme Court affirmed the standard that a “landowner does not have a duty to remove snow or ice from public walkways until a reasonable time after the cessation of precipitation.”  The plaintiff in Pareja was walking to work in the early morning hours, and he slipped and fell on a commercial-abutting sidewalk. The trial court, although granting summary judgment to the landowner, found that the ongoing storm rule applied and that there was no duty to maintain the sidewalks during an ongoing snow. The Appellate Division reversed this finding, concluding that the landowner had a duty to maintain the sidewalk even when snow was falling. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the standard established in the legal precedent supports the adoption of the ongoing storm rule. In addition to adopting the rule, the Supreme Court also recognized two exceptions that can create a duty: (1) if the owner’s conduct increases the risk; or (2) if the danger is pre-existing. The court recognized in Pareja that the storm was ongoing and held that commercial landowners did not have the absolute duty and impossible burden to keep sidewalks on their property free from snow or ice during an ongoing storm. Based upon the active storm condition, the court ruled that, absent unusual circumstances, commercial landowners’ duty to remove snow and ice hazards arises not during a storm but, rather, within a reasonable time after a storm.  As in many cases, the court clarified that there are some exceptions to the rule. Those unusual circumstances are set forth in the Pareja holding and state that commercial landowners may be liable if their actions “increase” the risk to pedestrians. For instance, engaging in snow and ice removal while the storm is ongoing, thus allowing a thaw and re-freeze situation, could increase the severity of the risk and change the nature of the accumulation on outside surfaces. Additionally, a commercial landowner may be liable when there is a pre-existing risk on the premises before a storm. For instance, pre-existing snow from a previous storm that had never been removed may create an icy base. In conclusion, the Supreme Court has highlighted the nature of the ongoing storm doctrine. Indeed, New Jersey has not received significant snow fall in the past several years but, rather, has received mixtures of snow and ice, creating the I-95 Corridor effect seen on the Weather Channel. The ongoing storm doctrine permits a commercial property owner to wait until the storm has ended, whether it be ice or snow.      *Carolyn is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office. She can be reached at 856.414.6006 or ckbogart@mdwcg.com.   Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.