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Co-Chair, Insurance Services Practice Group

Portrait of Allison L. Krupp

Results

  • Achieved Dismissal of an Appeal of Our Defense Verdict

    We won dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal of a defense verdict. Our client issued a professional liability insurance policy to the plaintiffs. When the plaintiffs were sued for legal malpractice, they notified our client of the suit and asked them to provide counsel to defend the matter. However, the plaintiffs never agreed to counsel proposed by our client. The plaintiffs then proceeded to mediation in the legal malpractice action and settled the matter without notifying our client. As a result, our client denied the plaintiffs’ request for indemnification. The plaintiffs then brought suit against our client for breach of contract and bad faith, alleging they wrongly denied indemnification and failed to provide counsel. The matter went to jury trial from April 8–11, 2024, where we successfully defended our client as the jury returned a defense verdict. The plaintiffs filed post-trial motions and then appealed the decision to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, arguing the trial court erred in allowing the jury to see a copy of the insurance contract during their deliberations. The Superior Court dismissed the appeal and found that the plaintiffs waived their argument by failing to cite relevant legal authority in their appellate brief. The Superior Court also stated in a footnote that, should the court have reached the issue on appeal, it would have found it meritless because the insurance contract was a central piece of evidence to which the plaintiffs did not object during trial.

  • Jury Verdict Received in a Breach of Contract Action

    We secured a jury verdict in a breach of contract/statutory bad faith action that arose under a legal malpractice policy issued to a law firm by our insurance company client. The plaintiffs settled a malpractice claim set forth against them without our client’s knowledge or consent. The insurance company then denied coverage for that claim, and the plaintiffs filed suit. Because the case included a bad faith claim, if the plaintiffs prevailed on both counts, the damages could have been seven figures or more. We took the case to trial before Judge Patrick in Philadelphia County. The jury returned a verdict on the breach of contract claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their damages by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge then dismissed the statutory bad faith claim.

  • Dismissal of Bad Faith UTP and UTPCPL Claims

    We obtained dismissal of both bad faith and Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) claims in a case filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case arose from a UIM claim presented after a motor vehicle accident. In an extensive footnote to the order, the court included a fairly comprehensive overview of the standards for pleading viable bad faith in UTPCPL claims in Pennsylvania. The court did not allow the plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint in order to cure the pleading defects.

  • Summary Judgment for Large Insurance Carrier in a Breach of Contract Case

    The parties had filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The issue for the court was whether the carrier had breached the terms of the policy when it denied the plaintiff’s first-party benefits claim relating to medical bills for PTSD allegedly caused by the underlying accident. The policy defined “bodily injury” as “accidental bodily harm to a person, and that person’s resulting illness, disease or death.” The plaintiff argued that, because she had sustained both physical and mental injuries as a result of the accident, the treatment related to both types of injuries and should be covered. The defense argued that, per the policy and controlling case law, mental injuries are only covered if they “result from” the physical injury. Because the PTSD stemmed from the plaintiff’s fear of driving following the accident—as opposed to mental injuries that resulted directly from the physical injuries—the defense asserted that they are not covered. The court agreed with the defense and found that the language of the policy was clear and unambiguous. It found that the Superior Court’s holding in Zerr v. Erie Ins. Exchange controlled and that the plaintiff had failed to provide evidence that her mental injuries resulted from her bodily injuries. Absent that connection, there was no coverage for the PTSD, regardless of any collateral physical injuries sustained in the accident.

  • Summary Judgment in Class Action Lawsuit On Behalf of Large Insurer

    We obtained summary judgment in a putative class action lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of a large insurer. The case dealt with a letter the insurance carrier would send to their insureds following a motor vehicle accident in which they advised their insureds that they would have a rental vehicle for five days. The named plaintiffs argued the letter misrepresented the policy language and they sued for breach of contract, bad faith, declaratory judgment and equitable relief. Per the insurer’s request, the court agreed to stay class action discovery so that the insurer could file a dispositive motion as to the named plaintiffs, which, if granted, would dispose of the entire putative class action case. In its motion for summary judgment, the insurer argued that the named plaintiffs could not meet their individual burdens of proof since it was undisputed they had a rental vehicle for 23 days and had returned the rental the same day they picked up their newly purchased vehicle. The court agreed and granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety and dismissed the action. The court reasoned, in part, that the named plaintiffs’ alleged damages were speculative and that issuance of the rental letter did not constitute a breach of the policy since the plaintiffs could not show that they were not afforded benefits to which they were entitled.

  • Defense Prevails in Automobile Liability Case.

    We secured the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action filed in federal court against a large insurer. This case arose from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 2015. The plaintiff averred that she had sustained injuries in excess of the tortfeasor’s bodily injury liability limits and sought stacked underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits. While the plaintiff had admittedly signed a rejection of UIM coverage form and a rejection of UIM coverage stacked limits form, she argued that her insurer had altered the statutorily required forms by adding additional language. The plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment complaint against her insurer. We filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on behalf of the defendant, which was granted by the federal court. The court reasoned that the UIM rejection form “specifically complied” with the applicable requirements of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law because the additional language, contained on the same page as the statutorily required rejection language, was “inconsequential.”

  • Successful Defense of Bad Faith Case Against Insurer

    Secured summary judgment in federal court in a bad faith case against a large insurer. ​The case arose from a pedestrian-motor vehicle accident that occurred in 2008 and dealt with the insurer’s handling of the plaintiff’s UIM claim following that accident. The plaintiff was run over by a rollback truck that was being repossessed on behalf of the owner. Because there were conflicting versions of events regarding how the accident occurred, the case went to arbitration on the issue of liability. The arbitrators found that the plaintiff was 33 1/3% causally negligent for his injuries, and the UIM claim later settled. The plaintiff then pursued a statutory bad faith claim, contending the insurer had delayed its investigation of the UIM claim without a reasonable basis and had unreasonably refused to pay the plaintiff UIM benefits. At the close of discovery, the insurer filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the court, and the case was dismissed in its entirety. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.