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Michael A. Packer

Office Managing Attorney

Co-Chair, Insurance Services Practice Group

Portrait of Michael A. Packer

Michael is the firm's supervising attorney for the Insurance Services Practice Group in the state of Florida and a member of the firm's Board of Directors. The group assists insurers in all aspects of a coverage dispute, including responses to civil remedy notices of insurer violations, pre-suit investigations and coverage evaluations, declaratory judgment and bad faith litigation. In particular, Michael defends property insurers throughout Florida in first party coverage matters, where he responds to claims for sinkhole, windstorm, fire, mold, theft, and water losses. Michael's group also conducts examinations under oath and SIU investigations.

In both the state and federal courts, Michael has participated in a number of bench and jury trials through verdict, all of which resulted in either a defense verdict or a verdict which was less than the amount demanded.

In addition, Michael is often asked to serve as coverage and bad faith counsel in third party actions, including monitoring the defense of litigation, as well as trial. As part of this role, Michael is often asked to draft reservation of rights, declinations and prosecute declaratory relief actions.

Michael has substantial experience in alternative dispute resolution, having represented clients in thousands of mediations, neutral evaluations and arbitration proceedings. Michael routinely advises clients on the evaluation and resolution of multi-claimant matters, often times where the injuries and damages exceed the available policy limits.

Over the past ten years, Michael and his group have defended in excess of three hundred sinkhole lawsuits, as well as hundreds of other first party lawsuits. The group has defended a number of cases through trial and appeal, including four sinkhole trials during recent years. In addition, the group represents more than ten statewide insurance carriers in first party property damage lawsuits, including many of the largest insurance carriers in Florida.

Michael routinely speaks at regional and nationwide industry conferences, specifically addressing coverage issues under first party property and third party liability policies. He has also presented a number of seminars on auto negligence, uninsured motorist and bad faith claims. Michael frequently travels around the country to provide in-house claims seminars with claims professionals. In addition, he has lectured on defending first party property damage claims including sinkhole and mold claims, which included review and analysis of claims handling procedures, as well as recommendations for the same. Michael has also written numerous articles for industry publications addressing Florida-specific claim handling issues and insurance companies’ rights and obligations in defending first and third party coverage actions.

In 1994 Michael earned his Bachelor of Arts from the State University of New York at Albany. Subsequently, Michael obtained his juris doctor in 1997 from the University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, Florida, where he graduated cum laude.

Michael is married to Nicole Packer and they live with their three children in Weston, Florida.

    • University of Miami School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1997)
    • State University of New York at Albany (B.A., 1994)
    • Florida, 1997
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 1997
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida, 2007
    • Florida Trend Legal Elite, NOTABLE Managing Partner (2025)
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • South Florida Legal Guide - Top Lawyers in Insurance Litigation Defense (2016, 2017, 2019, 2020, 2021)
    • South Florida Legal Guide – Top Lawyers in Insurance Litigation (2014)
    • South Florida Legal Guide - Top Lawyers (2013 )
    • Florida Trend's Legal Elite - Top Up and Comer (2012)
    • American Bar Association
    • Defense Research Institute, 2013
    • Florida WIND, 2012, 2013
    • The Florida Bar
    • Examinations Under Oath - What Claims Professionals Need to Know to Conduct an Effective EUO, ALM/PropertyCasualty360 Complex Claims Conference, February 26, 2024
    • Investigating a Claim Under a Reservation of Rights - Strategies for Managing Claims that May Not be Covered, Florida Defense Lawyers Association’s Florida Liability Claims Conference, Lake Buena Vista, FL, June 16, 2022 
    • What You Need to Know After you Go – Parts 1 and 2, CLM Claims College School of Property - Level 1 – Coverage, Virtual, 2021
    • Current Issues and Case Law Affecting the Property Claims Arena, CLM Claims College School of Property - Level 3, Virtual, 2021
    • Covid 19: To Be Property Damage or Not to Be Property Damage, CLM, January 2021 
    • Insurance Coverage and Bad-Faith Insurance Issues Under Florida Law, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium - The Best Defense is a Good Offense, Orlando, FL, September 17, 2014
    • Protecting Your Clients' Interest During Settlement, WIND Conference, 2013
    • American Conference Institute Bad Faith Litigation Conference (co-chairperson and lecturer) 2012
    • American Conference Institute Bad Faith Litigation Conference (lecturer) 2011

Results

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Late Notice - Policy Language Controls Burden to Prove Prejudice

October 5, 2026

Despite the fact the insured failed to provide notice to its insurance company until more than 1,000 days after it sustained damage as a result of Hurricane Irma, the Second District Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of the insurer. While the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the insured clearly failed to provide timely notice of the loss, summary judgment was nonetheless reversed as the trial court improperly presumed prejudice to the insurance company without examining the relevant policy language. Further, the trial court failed to properly consider evidence submitted by the plaintiff to overcome the presumed prejudice. The appellate court analyzed the duties after loss, which stated: The relevant provision of Wild Oak Bay's insurance policy, Duties in the Event of Loss or Damage, provides that pursuant to section 627.70132, Florida Statutes (2016), "loss or damage caused by the peril of windstorm or hurricane is not covered unless notice of the claim . . . is provided to [American Coastal] in accordance with the policy conditions, within three (3) years from the date the hurricane made landfall or the windstorm caused damage" and that "[i]n the case of a loss to covered property, [American Coastal] ha[s] no duty to provide coverage under this Policy if the failure to comply with the following [listed] duties is prejudicial to [American Coastal]." (Emphasis added.) The listed duties include that Wild Oak Bay "give [American Coastal] prompt notice of the loss or damage," including a description of the property, and that Wild Oak Bay, "[a]s soon as possible, give [American Coastal] a description of how, when and where the loss or damage occurred." Also included in the list of duties is cooperation in the investigation of the claim. Based on the above language which includes, “if the failure to comply with following listed duties is prejudicial to American Coastal,” the Second DCA agreed with the Fourth DCA’s decision in Perez v. Citizens Property Insurance Company, 345 So. 3d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), which found that identical policy language placed the burden on the insurer to prove prejudice. Id. at 896. This analysis is contrary to the Third DCA analysis of the same policy language, where it found “there is no " `policy language exception' to the presumption of prejudice that arises when an insured fails to promptly notify the insurer of a claim." Arce v. Citizens Property Insurance Co., 388 So. 3d 205, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). The Second DCA relied on the Fourth DCA’s reasoning and concluded that based on the policy language, the burden was on the insurance company to prove it had been prejudiced by the late notice. The Second DCA further certified conflict with the Third DCA’s opinion in Arce. As such, the question of who’s burden it is to prove/disprove prejudice may ultimately be decided by the Florida Supreme Court.

Defense Digest

On the Pulse… Profile of the Insurance Services – Coverage and Bad Faith Litigation Practice Group

June 30, 2026

The Insurance Services – Coverage and Bad Faith Litigation Practice Group delivers comprehensive, end-to-end litigation and advisory services to national and global insurance carriers. While the group is deeply experienced in coverage and bad faith litigation, its capabilities extend well beyond traditional legal defense. Through its broader Insurance Services practice, the firm has built a dynamic suite of innovative, client-focused solutions tailored to the evolving needs of insurers operating in complex and high-risk environments. With attorneys present in jurisdictions spanning from Florida to New York, the practice group approaches each matter with a strategic, solutions-oriented mindset. Its attorneys focus not only on resolving disputes, but on proactively managing risk by developing creative strategies to control exposure, avoid litigation where possible, and transfer risk effectively. In doing so, the group remains mindful of the broader business implications for its clients, including the protection of brand integrity and competitive positioning within the insurance industry. The group’s experience encompasses the full spectrum of insurance products, including commercial, personal property, and casualty policies, professional liability coverage, health and life insurance, and workers’ compensation policies. This breadth allows the team to provide nuanced, industry-specific counsel across a wide array of coverage issues and claims scenarios. Leadership within the practice group reflects both geographic reach and subject-matter depth. Todd Leon, who has offices in Philadelphia and Mount Laurel, serves as the Northeast head, with Allison Krupp of the Camp Hill office serving as vice-chair. Michael Packer, based in Fort Lauderdale, oversees operations in the Southeast, with Danielle Robinson, also of Fort Lauderdale, as the vice chair. Together, they guide a team of approximately 20 attorneys who provide consistent, coordinated legal services across jurisdictions. The Southeast team, in particular, brings a sophisticated understanding of the unique legal and regulatory challenges associated with Florida’s insurance landscape. Across all offices, attorneys are supported by a strong network of associates, paralegals, and professional staff, enabling the group to efficiently manage even the most complex coverage disputes, including first-party property and automobile litigation. The group also benefits from the leadership and insights of Jim Cole, the former group chair, who is now the Director of the firm’s Professional Liability Department. The practice group has a proven track record of successfully representing insurers in both state and federal courts in first-party and bad faith litigation and in providing opinions on coverage issues in jurisdictions around the country. Its attorneys are well-versed in the intricacies of institutional discovery, including corporate designee, apex, and employee depositions, as well as the litigation tactics often employed by plaintiffs to drive settlement pressure. By offering strategic guidance at every stage – both pre-litigation and during active disputes – the group helps clients evaluate coverage positions, mitigate risk, and make informed decisions about resolution or trial. When litigation is unavoidable, the firm’s seasoned trial attorneys are prepared to vigorously defend even the most complex and high-exposure matters. Beyond litigation, the group offers a wide array of services designed to support insurers’ operational and strategic objectives. These include coverage consultation, coordinating counsel services, catastrophe (CAT) operation coverage strategies, and specialized support for first-party property and automobile claims. The team also provides SIU and fraud-related investigation and litigation services, indemnification and risk transfer strategies, and comprehensive bad faith evaluation and defense. Additional offerings include policy language review, representation before administrative and insurance departments, claims practices consultation, and institutional discovery support. The group also works closely with clients to develop best practices, internal guidelines, and customized training and educational programs tailored to the full range of insurance products. With 19 offices across Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Delaware, Florida, Ohio, and Connecticut, and an active presence in neighboring jurisdictions such as Maryland, West Virginia, and Kentucky, the Insurance Services Practice Group is positioned to provide seamless, regional, and national support. Its integrated approach ensures that clients receive not only skilled legal representation but also practical, forward-looking guidance designed to meet the demands of today’s insurance landscape.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.