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Asbestos & Mass Tort Litigation

Since the inception of toxic tort litigation, Marshall Dennehey has been heavily involved in a wide variety of such matters, with a particular focus on the defense of asbestos claims and suits. Beginning in the mid-1970s, we represented Johns Manville Corporation, the largest manufacturer of asbestos products in North America, in all asbestos litigation in eastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey. When the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust was established in the late 1980s, we served as Northeast Region Consulting Counsel for the Trust.

The attorneys in our asbestos litigation practice, residing in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware, have defended a significant number of manufacturers, distributors, contractors and premises owners in thousands of asbestos personal injury claims brought against them. The majority of our attorneys who work in this practice group have in excess of 20 years of experience in toxic tort and mass tort litigation. Our trial team has tried hundreds of these claims to verdict and is the most experienced team in Philadelphia. This extensive trial experience has enabled our clients to secure outstanding results through both trials and settlements.

The attorneys in our New York office represent clients in the New York courts, as well as numerous other jurisdictions throughout the country. Several of the newest members of this practice group serve as national counsel for their clients, serve on the New York Supreme Court's Asbestos Litigation Case Management Committee, and were founding members of the Joint Medical Defense Group, a cooperative group that shares responsibility for preparing medical defenses on common cases. Also, several of these attorneys act as liaison counsel in many of the New York City extremis clusters and are called upon by the court and Special Master to resolve disputes and to enable the extremis cases, which are prepared on a very short schedule, to proceed to trial as efficiently as possible.

An understandable concern of every client in significant environmental and toxic tort cases is the extent of legal fees and costs. Our firm began as an insurance defense firm and, although we have expanded our practice areas considerably, we have never lost our sensitivity to our clients' desire to control legal expenses. This is especially true in the environmental and toxic tort areas where multi-party, complex cases make control of expenses all the more important. We always handle cases with a practical, result-oriented approach, balancing strong representation of our clients with realistic cost containment. In addition to our fees being very competitive, we work with our clients to develop innovative, alternative approaches to normal file handling that result in considerable savings to our clients without sacrificing quality legal representation.

Results

Summary Judgment Granted in Asbestos Case

We were granted summary judgment on behalf of a national truck manufacturer in an asbestos case where the plaintiff claimed his mesothelioma diagnosis was the result of his work on his employer’s trucks. The plaintiff claimed he developed mesothelioma as a result of his alleged exposure to asbestos while working on the trucks and products manufactured by the other defendants. The plaintiff had worked and resided the majority of his life in Mississippi; therefore, Mississippi law was applicable. In granting summary judgment, the court found that any alleged exposure to the manufacturer’s products was de minimis in relation to his other alleged asbestos exposures. The court also found that under the “bare metal” defense, the manufacturer was not liable for third-party manufacturers’ parts, which they did not manufacture or supply, used in conjunction with their trucks.

After Nine-Week Trial, Unanimous Defense Verdict in Asbestos Case Where $40 Million in Damages Had Been Sought

We obtained a unanimous defense verdict after a nine-week trial in Suffolk County, New York, where the plaintiff’s counsel requested that the jury award $40 million in damages. The plaintiff was 51 years old when she was diagnosed with peritoneal mesothelioma, allegedly as a result of being exposed to asbestos-containing joint compound manufactured and sold by our client. The plaintiff, who was 56 at the time of trial, testified that she had little or no knowledge of ever being exposed to asbestos. However, her older sister, who served as the only product identification witness at trial, testified that she recalled that their father used asbestos-containing joint compound on two occasions, approximately 50 years ago, when he repaired their home after a fire in 1970 and when he built a home in Florida around 1975. The plaintiff was five years old during the alleged exposures, and her sister was seven years older. The plaintiff’s sister testified that she had a vivid memory of her father using six different joint compounds during the two projects, including our client’s product. She also testified that the plaintiff was present hundreds of times when their father mixed, applied and sanded the joint compound. At trial, we called an industrial hygienist, a toxicologist and an epidemiologist, who testified that the type of asbestos fiber used in our client’s joint compound did not cause or contribute to her mesothelioma because the fibers are too short and do not cause disease. Our epidemiologist testified that the plaintiff’s mesothelioma developed spontaneously and was not the result of asbestos exposure. We also called a construction expert, who testified that the sister’s testimony regarding the amount of joint compound used and the time the sister was exposed were excessive. The jury deliberated an hour before returning the verdict. Post-trial comments from jurors indicated they did not find the sister to be credible.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Delaware Supreme Court’s Reversal of Trial Court Decision on Zantac Expert Testimony May Carve a Path for Heightened Scrutiny of Experts in Asbestos Litigation

December 1, 2025

Key Points:  Supreme Court held that trial court misinterpreted the plaintiffs’ burden by stating Delaware Rule of Evidcen 702 should be applied with a liberal thrust favoring admission. Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to show by preponderance of the evidence that their experts’ opinions were reliable. Court emphasized that “an expert offering an opinion regarding general causation for a product must opine as to the product itself,” not the toxicity of some individual component. Court observed that there is no consensus in Delaware law as to “threshold dose.” As of September 2022, there were approximately 75,000 pending Zantac (ranitidine) cases in Delaware, coming from more than a dozen national plaintiffs’ firms and with three Delaware firms acting as local counsel. These cases were filed in the Superior Court of Delaware. The plaintiffs in In re: Zantac (Ranitidine) Litig., 2025 WL 1903760 (Del. 2025) alleged that their ingestion of the molecule ranitidine—marketed under the brand name Zantac, in which N-Nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), an alleged carcinogen, may be found—caused the cancer with which they were diagnosed. In November 2023, the defendants moved to exclude the plaintiffs’ general causation experts under Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 (DRE 702), which is modeled after Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (FRE 702), and the principles set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which determine whether expert testimony is admissible. Daubert reiterates the requirements of FRE 702 by stating that expert opinions must be the product of a reliable process measured by things like peer review and general acceptance in the scientific community. Daubert also states that judges should act as gatekeepers to ensure that potential expert opinions are both reliable and relevant before they can be heard by a jury.  The defendants’ principal arguments were that (1) the original lab study was an outlier, conducted under unrealistic conditions, and the results were never duplicated; (2) the plaintiffs’ experts failed to offer threshold-dose opinions; and (3) the plaintiffs’ experts inappropriately focused on toxicity of NDMA itself as opposed to causation associated with ranitidine use. The trial court denied the defendants’ Rule 702 motion, finding that (1) the studies focused on NDMA toxicity were sufficient to establish general causation—ignoring the defendants’ argument that no studies show a connection between ranitidine use and cancer; (2) Delaware law does not “recognize a threshold-dose requirement as part of the general causation analysis”; and (3) Delaware law requires a trial court to apply a “liberal thrust” favoring admissibility of expert testimony. Consistent with this liberal-thrust standard, the court dismissed each of the defendants’ critiques of the plaintiffs’ experts, stating that they went to weight rather than admissibility and, therefore, were jury questions.  The defendants requested that the Superior Court certify its order for an interlocutory appeal. The Superior Court denied certification. However, the Supreme Court of The State of Delaware reviewed and granted the request.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that evidentiary rulings are rarely appropriate for interlocutory review, but it noted that the trial court’s decision raised substantial issues regarding the Daubert standard and mass tort litigation specifically. Further, recognizing the significance of the issues, the Supreme Court elected to hear the case en banc. The appellants raised three claims on appeal:  (1)    The Superior Court applied an unduly lenient standard and wrongly held that all methodological critiques went to weight, not admissibility. Specifically, the appellants argued that an analysis under DRE 702 should not be conducted with a “liberal thrust favoring admission” and that it is a trial court’s duty to ensure that an expert applies his or her methodology reliably; (2)    The Superior Court erred in focusing its general causation analysis on NDMA, rather than ranitidine; and  (3)    The Superior Court erred in holding that the plaintiffs’ experts did not need to identify the threshold dose required to cause the cancers at issue. On July 10, 2025, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on several grounds.  First, the court held that the trial court misinterpreted the plaintiffs’ burden by stating DRE 702 should be applied with a liberal thrust favoring admission. The court stressed that Daubert never created a presumption of admissibility. Instead, they opined that “the proponent of an expert opinion must prove its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence” with no presumption toward admissibility.  After clarifying the burden of proof, the Supreme Court took a deep dive into the underlying studies. The court noted several instances where the plaintiffs’ experts ignored—without explanation—major peer-reviewed epidemiology studies in favor of lower-quality and less-relevant publications. In doing so, the court affirmatively ruled that the plaintiffs failed to show by preponderance of the evidence that their experts’ opinions were reliable.  The Supreme Court also found that the trial court erred by framing the general-causation question on the alleged carcinogenic agent—NDMA—rather than the actual product at issue—ranitidine. The court emphasized that “an expert offering an opinion regarding general causation for a product must opine as to the product itself,” not the toxicity of some individual component. Having held that the plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions were deficient, the court determined that it did not need to reach the separate “threshold dose” question the defendants raised on appeal, but it observed that “there is no consensus in Delaware law as to ‘threshold dose.’” There are several takeaways from the Supreme Court’s ruling that may be relevant to asbestos litigation.  First, with the Delaware Supreme Court clarifying a preponderance-of-the evidence standard (with no presumption of admissibility) over the previously understood “liberal thrust favoring admission,” plaintiffs’ and defense experts are likely to face heightened scrutiny.  Further, it now appears that experts offering causation opinions “must opine as to the product itself,” as opposed to asbestos toxicity generally. Plaintiffs may likely be required to show that exposure to a specific product has a higher rate of developing asbestos disease. This may pose a potentially significant obstacle for plaintiffs when asbestos fibers are encapsulated within a product.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest

Asbestosis Takes the Stand: Raising Awareness of an Abnormally High Verdict for a Typically Low Value Case

June 1, 2024

Key Points: Asbestosis claims are usually considered to be on the lower end of settlements for asbestos law cases.  A verdict of $25 million was returned by a jury in Philadelphia, where the last asbestosis case verdict was $957,000.  Plaintiff’s oxygen dependence likely factored into verdict amount—a factor that should be weighed in future asbestosis claims.  It’s not a secret that many cases don’t go to trial. We have reached an era of practicing law where it’s easier to settle, to negotiate, to compromise, rather than go to trial. Pre-trial settlements and dismissals make life easier on both plaintiff and defense counsel, especially in the world of asbestos, where there can be dozens of defendants.  There are some asbestos cases that go to trial, but those are few and far between, especially in Pennsylvania. While trial dates and conciliations are scheduled, the majority of asbestos cases simply resolve, with all defendants either being dismissed or paying a settlement. (For frame of reference, there have been two asbestos trials in Allegheny County and three asbestos trials in Philadelphia County within the last five years).  Determining the value of a case depends on the disease process itself. For those not involved in asbestos law, there are three main diseases that usually crop up—mesothelioma, lung cancer, and asbestosis. The mesothelioma claims are valued the highest, then lung cancer, and then asbestosis cases. Whether someone was a heavy smoker or not can influence the value of a lung cancer claim. Obviously, there are nuances with every case. Some of these nuances for asbestos cases include the type of job the plaintiff performed, other comorbidities he or she may have had, age, and how long he or she worked at a facility. However, the important context to take away from this scale is that asbestosis claims are near the lower end of the settlement hierarchy.  With that in mind, we turn to the case of Richard Daciw. Mr. Daciw filed suit in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on May 2, 2019. Fifty-five entities were sued in the initial complaint, with an additional defendant added in an amended complaint. Mr. Daciw was 76 years old. He alleged asbestos exposure from serving in the Navy as a fireman and shipfitter from 1965 to 1969; as a maintenance mechanic at Jeffries Processors in Philadelphia from 1969 to 1972; as a pipefitter and welder for Domino Sugar in Philadelphia from 1972 to 1983; as a welder at Allied Chemical for several months in 1983; and, in various maintenance roles at Smith Kline from 1983 to 2004.  Mr. Daciw was diagnosed with asbestosis by a treating pulmonologist in January of 2019. He had shortness of breath and difficulty breathing with activity. He also had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and diabetes. An important medical note for Mr. Daciw was that he had become oxygen dependent due to his breathing troubles.  Mr. Daciw was deposed for several days and provided lengthy testimony about the products he worked with over his career. He identified various brands of gaskets, packing, pumps, valves, turbines, boilers, and cement as the products and equipment that allegedly exposed him to asbestos. Based upon Mr. Daciw’s deposition testimony and his identification of these products, the case proceeded in the usual fashion—dismissals and settlements. However, not all defendants reached one of those resolutions.  John Crane, Inc., was the lone defendant in this instance who took this case to trial. As an asbestosis case, it was a likely thought that the risk should have been minimal. However, the results of trial would prove that the risk was anything but minimal.  Trial began on December 12, 2022, before Judge Ann Butchart. It would end on December 22, 2022, when the jury handed down a $25 million verdict. Richard Daciw, et al. v. John Crane Inc., et al., 2022 WL 18232642 (C.P. Phila. Dec. 19, 2022). Richard Daciw was awarded $15 million in damages, and his wife, Winifred Daciw, was awarded $10 million in a loss of consortium claim. While John Crane, Inc., was the sole defendant trying the case, there were an additional 19 defendants on the verdict sheet. Twelve of these non-party entities were found to have no liability for Mr. Daciw’s disease. John Crane, Inc., was found to be liable for asbestos exposure to Mr. Daciw and his subsequent asbestosis. Seven non-party entities were also found to be liable. The verdict sheet did not include how the $25 million would be apportioned.  The last asbestosis case that went to trial in Philadelphia County had a verdict of $957,000. In fact, the last mesothelioma case that went to trial there had a verdict of about $3.8 million. That is a difference of $21 million for a disease process that is considered by most asbestos attorneys to create higher-value settlements for plaintiffs. While it’s impossible to know the full thought process, it is extremely likely that Mr. Daciw’s physical state—oxygen dependence—induced sympathy from the jury.  With this most recent verdict, the usual approach to asbestosis cases needs to be taken with a grain of salt in Pennsylvania. While yes, the majority of asbestosis cases will probably continue to settle within usual ranges, attorneys and carriers alike need to be aware of the possibility that a push to trial could create a huge payday for a plaintiff, especially one with a health situation similar to Richard Daciw. A complete approach overhaul isn’t necessary, but a little awareness will go a long way when it comes to asbestosis cases.  *Renee works in our Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.

News

106 Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Recognized in the 2027 Editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America

Marshall Dennehey is proud to highlight the firm’s 106 attorneys who have been recognized in the 2027 editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America. Less than 6% of all practicing lawyers in the U.S. were selected by their peers for this recognition. Additionally, four of the firm’s attorneys received the Best Lawyers® 2027 “Lawyer of the Year” awards in their respective practice areas and demographic regions. Since it was first published in 1983, Best Lawyers® has become universally regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence. Best Lawyers lists are compiled based on an exhaustive peer-review evaluation. For more information, please visit https://www.bestlawyers.com/. OUR 2027 LAWYERS OF THE YEAR Harrisburg, PA Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers Compensation Law - Employers Roseland, NJ Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants   OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA Philadelphia, PA Nicholas D. Bowers, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Josh J. T. Byrne, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Jefferey J. Chomko, Insurance Law James H. Cole, Insurance Law John J. Delany III, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Laurianne Falcone, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John P. Gonzales, Employment Law - Management John Hare, Appellate Practice Daniel D. Krebbs, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Michele Punturi, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Bradley D. Remick, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Andrea Cicero Rock, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robin M. Romano, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Daniel J. Ryan, Jr., Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Gary M. Samms, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Christopher N. Santoro, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation -Defendants Josh D. Scheets, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Robert P. Schenk, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robert E. Smith, Insurance Law Robin Snyder, Litigation - Health Care Michael L. Turner, Commercial Litigation; Criminal Defense: White-Collar; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Claire Breaux Ventola, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Melissa Devich Cochran, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants  John F. Deasy, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Daniel W. Deitrick, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Douglas C. LaSota, Litigation - Construction; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Joseph V. Lesinski, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants   Christian D. Marquis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia A. Monahan, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Patrick T. Reilly, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Brett C. Shear, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Teresa O. Sirianni, Education Law; Employment Law – Management; Litigation - Labor and Employment Stuart Sostmann, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Danielle M. Vugrinovich, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Scranton, PA Sarah E. Argo, Litigation - Insurance Michael J. Connolly, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Matthew Keris, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants John T. McGrath, Jr., Insurance Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants William J. McPartland, Insurance Law John R. Nealon, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Victoria Scanlon, Health Care Law; Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Michael A. Sebastian, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Thomas A. Specht, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Suzanne Tighe, Litigation Insurance Harrisburg , PA Casey Alan Coyle, Administrative/Regulatory Law; Appellate Practice; Commercial Litigation Brittany E. Bakshi, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Shannon P. Fellin, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Allison Krupp, Insurance Law John R. Ninosky, Litigation – Insurance; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers King of Prussia, PA  Michael L. Detweiler, Construction Law Joseph L. Hoynoski III, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Gregory J. Kelley, Construction Law, Litigation - Construction Anthony Natale III, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Francis X. Wickersham, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers A. Judd Woytek, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers Erie, PA Patrick M. Carey, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Joel M. Snavely, Health Care Law; Insurance Law New Haven, CT Michael Wrona, Commercial Litigation, Litigation - Bankruptcy  Mount Laurel, NJ David D. Blake, Litigation - Insurance Barbara Davis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lynne Nahmani, Litigation - Health Care John H. Osorio, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John L. Slimm, Legal Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law – Defendants Roseland, NJ Robert T. Evers, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Julia Klubenspies, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard C. Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia M. McDonagh, Appellate Practice Sunny Sparano, Litigation - Construction Randall S. Watts, Health Care Law New York, NY Tonya M. Lindsey, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Tampa, FL Michael Archibald, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lindsay G. McCormick, Litigation – Construction Orlando, FL Thomas F. Brown, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Dante C. Rohr, Commercial Litigation Fort Lauderdale, FL Kimberly Kanoff Berman, Appellate Practice Patrick M. Delong, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Jacksonville, FL  Heather Byrer Carbone, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Linda Wagner Farrell, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Elizabeth B. Ferguson, Litigation - Construction James P. Hanratty, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Wilmington, DE Sarah B. Cole, Litigation - Insurance Benjamin K. Durstein, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Maria R. Granaudo, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants  Keri L. Morris-Johnston, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Cincinnati, OH Timothy B. Schenkel, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David E. Williamson, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Cleveland, OH Vincent E. Cononico, Litigation – Insurance, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Jillian L. Dinehart, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David J. Fagnilli, Insurance Law Jason P. Ferrante, Health Care Law, Litigation - Health Care Andrew H. Isakoff, Transportation Law Leslie M. Jenny, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendant OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS: ONES TO WATCH Jacksonville, FL Sean J. Reeves, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Orlando, FL Carolin A. Pacheco, Insurance Law Mount Laurel Stacey Gorin, Insurance Law Melville, NY Kimberly Gitlin, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Matthew A. Gray, Insurance Law; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Philadelphia, PA Holli K. Archer, Health Care Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law Emily Pritchyk, Commercial Litigation; Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Taylor E. Kosko, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Alana Staniszewski, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Michael D. Winsko, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants; Transportation Law King of Prussia, PA Richard Lechette, Commercial Litigation; Insurance Law, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.