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Aviation & Complex Litigation

During the last three decades, the members of this practice group have, on a regular basis, represented virtually all aspects of the aviation industry including: aircraft manufacturers, suppliers of steel and forgings used in aircraft components, suppliers of aviation ground support equipment, operators, pilots and airport facilities. As set forth below, the matters have involved questions of liability for the major recall of aircraft components, where more than $100 million was at stake, to operators of business jets, to persons injured in hot air balloon rides.

We have also represented commercial operators and pilots in licensing and administration proceedings before the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board.
 
The members of the group are intimately familiar with various aspects of aviation activities and operations. The chair of the group has been a licensed and active instrument-rated pilot for over 30 years. Another member of the group holds his airline transport pilot certificate, along with a gold medallion flight instructor certificate, and was formerly a captain for a regional airline and first officer for Trans World Airlines on the MD-80 aircraft. Two other members have also trained as pilots, with one successfully building and operating his own home-built airplane. Members of the group are active in numerous trade and profession-related associations, including the Aviation Insurance Association and the Lawyer-Pilot's Bar Association.
 
Because of the broad range of activities that occur within the aviation industry, and the often catastrophic results when an aviation activity goes awry, each aviation liability claim often has very unique circumstances and issues. Due to the likelihood of serious damage to or destruction of the product involved, the members of our aviation litigation group are often engaged by the parties or their insurers shortly after an event occurs to assist in structuring the investigation and assembling the team of experts to conduct such testing, accident reconstruction, and failure analysis as may be necessary to determine the cause of the event.
 
The experience gained in years of handling complex aviation and product liability cases has easily translated to the litigation of other commercial disputes where technology and product operation is at issue. The use of techniques such as finite element analysis, scanning electron microscopy, focused ion beam analysis and computerized recreation and depiction of critical events are techniques that easily transfer to and provide a significant advantage in the handling of litigation of numerous disputes that arise, not just in aviation matters but in various commercial settings. It is a combination that brings together the access to and understanding of these technologies and expertise, with the experience of trying to verdict protracted complex legal matters, that enables us to provide effective advocacy to clients who come to us for legal representation.

Representative Cases and Clients

  • We represented a major regional specialty steel company that melted and forged ingots from which aircraft engine components were later made. An engine manufacturer to whom the steel was sold underwent an $80 million recall due to a series of faulty crankshafts and claimed that the crankshafts were defective because of inherent defects in the supplied steel. After a four-week trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, the jury concluded that the evidence proffered by our experts, including extensive testing and sophisticated analysis, established that the steel was not defective in its inherent structure.
  • A major manufacturer of seats used in corporate and commercial jets was sued after the crash of a corporate jet resulted in a brain injury disabling a senior executive. It was alleged that this was due to seat failure from the impact sequence. Through reconstruction of seat components and analysis by biomechanical engineers, which established that the seat could not have failed as alleged by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's expert was discredited in a pre-trial hearing and the case settled favorably for the seat manufacturer.
  • A propeller manufacturer was sued when a propeller failed in flight in a single-engine aircraft requiring an attempted emergency landing in which the pilot and his wife died, and their eight-year-old daughter, who was substantially injured, watched her parents expire post-accident. The propeller manufacturer admitted that it had a defective decal that would lead to corrosion of propeller at the point where failure occurred, but through maintenance experts and metallurgists, we were able to show that the manufacturer had provided specific instructions for removal of the defective decal, which were not followed.
  • We represented a leading forger of commercial transportation parts that had forged crankshafts used in aircraft engines. After several fatal crashes, and other reported crankshaft failures, the aircraft manufacturer initiated a $100 million-plus recall and claimed that the crankshaft defects were the result of forging problems. After a two-month trial in Texas, the jury returned a verdict finding that the forging company did not create any defects in the crankshaft and that the crankshaft defects resulted from design problems.
  • A leading manufacturer of specialty polyurethane materials was sued regarding alleged defective equipment provided by the designer and manufacturer of high speed polyurethane mixing equipment used in association with robotic manufacturing process. After a two-month trial, a federal jury in Philadelphia awarded the polyurethane manufacturer in excess of $12 million against the supplier of the defective mixing equipment.
  • On behalf of a leading manufacturer of airblast equipment, we are acting as personal counsel in advising the manufacturer regarding more than 10,000 lawsuits around the country, interfacing with insurance counsel assigned to represent the client as an insured, and participation in the structuring of the national defense strategy for handling the claims while at the same time administering the coverage issues relating to claims among the various insurers.

The Aviation and Complex Litigation Practice Group of Marshall Dennehey serves clients in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Tampa, Orlando, Jacksonville, Ft. Lauderdale and communities throughout Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Ohio, Florida, New York and Connecticut.

Results

Reversal Obtained in Pennsylvania Superior Court Regarding Denial of Objections to Venue

We obtained a reversal in the Pennsylvania Superior Court of the trial court’s denial of preliminary objections to venue. We successfully moved in the trial court for certification of the ruling pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(b) so that an immediate appeal from the interlocutory ruling could be taken, and we subsequently prevailed on appeal. The litigation arose from a helicopter accident that occurred in Afghanistan. Both plaintiffs, husband and wife, resided in Arizona. Our client is a Delaware corporation located in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, that refurbished the helicopter. The codefendant corporation leased the helicopter to the plaintiff-husband’s employer, which was organized and principally operates in Montana. The plaintiffs’ primary focus in seeking to establish venue was on our client and, in particular, on the fact that it purchased two fabric interiors from a Philadelphia vendor. The Superior Court determined that the business dealings of our client did not constitute actual business conducted in Philadelphia County. It stressed that “doing business with a Philadelphia County company does not amount to doing business in Philadelphia County if the obtained goods, services, or personnel are utilized elsewhere to further the defendant’s business activities.” As to the codefendant, the Superior Court concluded the limited venue evidence pointed to a separate but related corporate entity, and that the evidence failed to show the co-defendant regularly conducts business in Philadelphia County. Because there was no evidence to support the imputation of a separate entity’s contacts with Philadelphia on the co-defendant, venue as to the co-defendant was also improper.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.