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Christopher J. DiCicco

Co-Chair, Aviation and Complex Litigation Practice

Co-Chair, Maritime Litigation Practice

Portrait of Christopher J. DiCicco

Chris is a shareholder in the Casualty Department where he concentrates his practice mostly in the areas of product liability, admiralty and maritime litigation, and aviation litigation. He previously served as Chair of the firm's Executive Committee Advisory Council.

In the area of product liability, Chris primarily defends the manufacturers and distributors of tools, automatic doors, machinery, and other heavy industrial equipment.

As Co-Chair of the Maritime Litigation Practice, Chris handles maritime personal injury defense cases, including recreational boating cases, marine construction cases, cases involving the Jones Act and Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, and maritime product liability matters. He also handles cargo matters, including those involving warehouses and transportation brokers. Other maritime experience includes claims involving allisions, collisions, groundings, shipboard fires, and marine insurance disputes. 

As Co-Chair of the Aviation and Complex Litigation Practice, Chris has experience representing airports in aircraft crash cases, as well as representing a flight training provider and one of its pilots. He also has experience handling matters on behalf of a major airline, including baggage and ticket disputes, and claims involving travel agencies. Through his experiences with these matters, he has gained knowledge about airport operations, flight operations, manufacture of aircraft and engine components, aircraft repair and maintenance, Federal Air Regulations and FAA oversight. Chris is also a member of the Aviation Insurance Association, as well as a member of the Insurance Law Global Aviation Subgroup.     

Chris graduated with honors from Villanova University with a bachelor's degree in Political Science. He obtained his juris doctor from Brooklyn Law School.

Chris has been recognized for the last several years as a New York Metro and New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star.

Chris is admitted to practice in New York, New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and he actively handles litigation in all of those jurisdictions.

    • Brooklyn Law School (J.D., 2011)
    • Villanova University (B.A., cum laude, 2008)
    • New Jersey, 2011
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2011
    • New York, 2012
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2012
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2012
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 2nd Circuit, 2014
    • Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Transportation Law (2023-2024)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2024)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star (2018-2026)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New York Metro Super Lawyer Rising Star (2015-2021)
    • New York Metro Super Lawyer (2024-2025)
    • Aviation Insurance Association
    • Maritime Law Association of the United States
    • Around the World in 45 Minutes, ILG 360º London Annual Conference 2023, March 15, 2023
    • (Not So) Straight Forward and Freight Forward: Claims Handling Under Shipper's Interest Cargo Insurance, AIMU/MICA Seminar “Marine Insurance: A Global Perspective,” New York, June 2018
    • Schoenbaum Longshore & Harbor Workers Compensation Act - Chapter 5, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, March 2018
    • Chapter 3 –Schoenbaum's Admiralty and The General Maritime Law (3-14 through 3-24), Client Seminar, December 16, 2015
    • Chapter 3 –Schoenbaum's Admiralty and The General Maritime Law (3-1 through 3-13), Client Seminar, November 17, 2015
    • Impact of Long Shore and New York Labor Law, the Jones Act and McBride Decision on Punitive Damages Under Maritime Law, Client Seminar, April 2015
    • Brief Overview of New York No-Fault Insurance Law, April 2012
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, 2016-present
    • “Brief Overview of Shipowner’s Limitation of Liability Act – History, Procedure and Recent Trends,” Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2014
    • Successfully obtained summary judgment dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction NY Labor Law case pending in Supreme Court Rockland County. The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client which was a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case seeking contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts.  We argued and the Court agreed, since there was no finding of negligence against our client causing the injuries sustained to plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The Court found that there was no evidence demonstrated that our client caused in whole or in part the injuries plaintiff sustained. The plaintiff and general contractor made  motions to reargue which  were both denied. The parties also filed appeals which are currently pending in the Appellate Division.
    • Obtained summary judgment in a maritime personal injury case in favor of The City of New York and the New York City Economic Development Corp. (NYCEDC). ​The suit was for personal injuries sustained to a dock builder. The City was the owner of the East River Ferry Landing’s Project at a pier on East 34th Street in Manhattan. The NYCEDC acted as The City’s project manager. Suit was brought under the New York State Labor Law Sections 200, 240(1), and 241(6), as well as common law negligence. As to the Labor Law 240(1), the court determined that this section did not apply to the facts as the plaintiff’s alleged injury (caused by the repetitive nature of receiving buckets of epoxy, which were lowered down to him from a barge, and then he carried the buckets across a float stage and poured the epoxy into pile jackets) was only tangentially related to gravity and was not caused by the kind of gravity-related risks that Labor Law 240(1) intended to cover. As to the plaintiff’s Labor Law 200 and common law negligence claims, plaintiff’s counsel conceded during oral argument that there was no basis to proceed with such claims against The City and NYCEDC. Lastly, with respect to the plaintiff’s Labor Law 241(6) claims, the plaintiff did not oppose our motion to dismiss that claim. 
    • Obtained the dismissal for our client by motion as a result of plaintiff's failure to comply with the applicable two-year statute of limitations.  Our client was the owner of the facility at which plaintiff was operating a loaded trailer while in the employ of the lessee of the yard, when the trailer tipped over while plaintiff was moving it from the loading bay to the other side of the yard.  Plaintiff sustained very serious bodily injuries.  In addition to the dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint, we also recovered approximately 50% of our attorney's fees incurred on behalf of our client on our third-party claims against the plaintiff’s employer and lessee of the yard, pursuant to the lease agreement between our client and the lessee of the yard.
    • Obtained the dismissal of plaintiff's cargo claims against our client, a non-vessel operating common carrier, during a bench trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Union County, Special Civil Part, following the successful cross-examination of the plaintiff.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of the owner and property management company of a senior housing complex in a case in which the elevator car doors on one of the elevators in the building struck plaintiff as she was entering the elevator, resulting in personal injuries.  The plaintiff alleged that our clients were negligent in allowing a hazardous condition to exist on the property.  At the conclusion of discovery, we moved for summary judgment on liability, arguing the lack of any evidence of a defect or malfunction with respect to the elevator doors on the incident date, or alternatively, the lack of any actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition, if it even existed in the first place.  The court (Monmouth County Superior Court) agreed, focusing on the lack of notice to the owner and property manager, and granted our motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims and cross-claims against our clients, with prejudice. 
    • Obtained the dismissal of the plaintiff’s personal injury action, which arose from a boating accident that occurred during a regatta that took place in the waters off of Little Egg Harbor in Beach Haven, New Jersey.  At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was sixteen years old.  The lawsuit was not commenced until more than three years after the accident.  We filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint on the basis that it was barred by the three (3) year Uniform Statute of Limitations (46 U.S.C. § 30106 (formerly 46 U.S.C. § App’x 763a)) applicable to all maritime tort actions and was not subject to New Jersey’s infant tolling statute.  The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey agreed and granted our motion dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint.

Results

Claims Dismissed in Marine Construction NY Labor Law Case

Our team successfully obtained summary judgment dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction NY Labor Law case pending in Supreme Court Rockland County. The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client, which was a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case. They sought contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts. We argued, and the court agreed, that since there was no finding of negligence against our client causing the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The court found that there was no evidence demonstrating that our client caused in whole or in part the injuries the plaintiff sustained.

Successful Defense of Marine Construction New York Labor Law Case

Marshall Dennehey successfully obtained summary judgment, dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction New York Labor Law case in the Supreme Court in Rockland County. ​The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client, a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case, all seeking contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts. We argued, and the court agreed, that since there was no finding of negligence against our client in causing the injuries sustained to the plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The court found there was no evidence demonstrating that our client caused, in whole or in part, the injuries the plaintiff sustained. The plaintiff and general contractor filed motions to reargue, which were denied.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

U.S. Supreme Court Held that Choice-of-Law Clauses in Maritime Contracts Are Presumptively Enforceable Under Federal Maritime Law

April 1, 2024

On February 21, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, held that choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, subject to two narrow exceptions: (1) when the chosen law would contravene a controlling federal statute or established federal maritime policy; or (2) when the contracting parties cannot show any reasonable basis for the chosen jurisdiction. The second exception must be applied with “substantial deference to the contracting parties.” Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC, Case No. 22-500, Slip Op. at 10-11 (Feb. 21, 2024). The Court stated that “the uniformity and predictability resulting from choice-of-law provisions are especially important for marine insurance contracts given that marine insurance is ‘an integral of virtually every maritime transaction, and maritime commerce is a vital part of the nation’s economy.’” Id. at 9 (quoting M. Sturley, Restating the Law of Marine Insurance: A Workable Solution to the Wilburn Boat Problem, 29 J. Mar. L. & Com. 41, 45 (1998). This decision is a very favorable and significant result for marine insurers and the principle of maritime uniformity.  Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Case Law Alerts

SCOTUS Grants Certiorari to Hear Marine Insurance Dispute

April 1, 2023

The Supreme Court of the United States recently granted certiorari to decide whether, under federal admiralty law, “a choice of law clause in a maritime contract can be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the ‘strong public policy’ of the state whose law is displaced.” The underlying claim involved damage to a vessel that ran aground, which resulted in the vessel owner filing a coverage claim under its marine insurance policy. The insurer denied coverage and subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to rescind the policy. The vessel owner then filed multiple counterclaims, including extra-contractual claims under Pennsylvania law. The insurer subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings on the Pennsylvania law counterclaims, arguing that the policy’s choice of law provision required the application of New York law, precluding those counterclaims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled in favor of the insurer, and the vessel owner appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that a choice of law provision is unenforceable if it “would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.” The Third Circuit instructed the District Court to consider whether Pennsylvania “has a strong public policy that would be thwarted by applying New York law.” In turn, the insurer filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted, limited to the above-referenced question. The Supreme Court’s decision on this issue may have wide-ranging implications on contract cases going forward, particularly those involving choice-of-law provisions.  Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.