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Christopher J. DiCicco

Co-Chair, Aviation and Complex Litigation Practice

Co-Chair, Maritime Litigation Practice

Portrait of Christopher J. DiCicco

Chris is a shareholder in the Casualty Department where he concentrates his practice mostly in the areas of product liability, admiralty and maritime litigation, and aviation litigation. He previously served as Chair of the firm's Executive Committee Advisory Council.

In the area of product liability, Chris primarily defends the manufacturers and distributors of tools, automatic doors, machinery, and other heavy industrial equipment.

As Co-Chair of the Maritime Litigation Practice, Chris handles maritime personal injury defense cases, including recreational boating cases, marine construction cases, cases involving the Jones Act and Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, and maritime product liability matters. He also handles cargo matters, including those involving warehouses and transportation brokers. Other maritime experience includes claims involving allisions, collisions, groundings, shipboard fires, and marine insurance disputes. 

As Co-Chair of the Aviation and Complex Litigation Practice, Chris has experience representing airports in aircraft crash cases, as well as representing a flight training provider and one of its pilots. He also has experience handling matters on behalf of a major airline, including baggage and ticket disputes, and claims involving travel agencies. Through his experiences with these matters, he has gained knowledge about airport operations, flight operations, manufacture of aircraft and engine components, aircraft repair and maintenance, Federal Air Regulations and FAA oversight. Chris is also a member of the Aviation Insurance Association, as well as a member of the Insurance Law Global Aviation Subgroup.     

Chris graduated with honors from Villanova University with a bachelor's degree in Political Science. He obtained his juris doctor from Brooklyn Law School.

Chris has been recognized for the last several years as a New York Metro and New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star.

Chris is admitted to practice in New York, New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and he actively handles litigation in all of those jurisdictions.

    • Brooklyn Law School (J.D., 2011)
    • Villanova University (B.A., cum laude, 2008)
    • New Jersey, 2011
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2011
    • New York, 2012
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2012
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2012
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 2nd Circuit, 2014
    • Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Transportation Law (2023-2024)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2024)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star (2018-2026)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New York Metro Super Lawyer Rising Star (2015-2021)
    • New York Metro Super Lawyer (2024-2025)
    • Aviation Insurance Association
    • Maritime Law Association of the United States
    • Around the World in 45 Minutes, ILG 360º London Annual Conference 2023, March 15, 2023
    • (Not So) Straight Forward and Freight Forward: Claims Handling Under Shipper's Interest Cargo Insurance, AIMU/MICA Seminar “Marine Insurance: A Global Perspective,” New York, June 2018
    • Schoenbaum Longshore & Harbor Workers Compensation Act - Chapter 5, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, March 2018
    • Chapter 3 –Schoenbaum's Admiralty and The General Maritime Law (3-14 through 3-24), Client Seminar, December 16, 2015
    • Chapter 3 –Schoenbaum's Admiralty and The General Maritime Law (3-1 through 3-13), Client Seminar, November 17, 2015
    • Impact of Long Shore and New York Labor Law, the Jones Act and McBride Decision on Punitive Damages Under Maritime Law, Client Seminar, April 2015
    • Brief Overview of New York No-Fault Insurance Law, April 2012
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, 2016-present
    • “Brief Overview of Shipowner’s Limitation of Liability Act – History, Procedure and Recent Trends,” Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2014
    • Successfully obtained summary judgment dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction NY Labor Law case pending in Supreme Court Rockland County. The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client which was a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case seeking contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts.  We argued and the Court agreed, since there was no finding of negligence against our client causing the injuries sustained to plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The Court found that there was no evidence demonstrated that our client caused in whole or in part the injuries plaintiff sustained. The plaintiff and general contractor made  motions to reargue which  were both denied. The parties also filed appeals which are currently pending in the Appellate Division.
    • Obtained summary judgment in a maritime personal injury case in favor of The City of New York and the New York City Economic Development Corp. (NYCEDC). ​The suit was for personal injuries sustained to a dock builder. The City was the owner of the East River Ferry Landing’s Project at a pier on East 34th Street in Manhattan. The NYCEDC acted as The City’s project manager. Suit was brought under the New York State Labor Law Sections 200, 240(1), and 241(6), as well as common law negligence. As to the Labor Law 240(1), the court determined that this section did not apply to the facts as the plaintiff’s alleged injury (caused by the repetitive nature of receiving buckets of epoxy, which were lowered down to him from a barge, and then he carried the buckets across a float stage and poured the epoxy into pile jackets) was only tangentially related to gravity and was not caused by the kind of gravity-related risks that Labor Law 240(1) intended to cover. As to the plaintiff’s Labor Law 200 and common law negligence claims, plaintiff’s counsel conceded during oral argument that there was no basis to proceed with such claims against The City and NYCEDC. Lastly, with respect to the plaintiff’s Labor Law 241(6) claims, the plaintiff did not oppose our motion to dismiss that claim. 
    • Obtained the dismissal for our client by motion as a result of plaintiff's failure to comply with the applicable two-year statute of limitations.  Our client was the owner of the facility at which plaintiff was operating a loaded trailer while in the employ of the lessee of the yard, when the trailer tipped over while plaintiff was moving it from the loading bay to the other side of the yard.  Plaintiff sustained very serious bodily injuries.  In addition to the dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint, we also recovered approximately 50% of our attorney's fees incurred on behalf of our client on our third-party claims against the plaintiff’s employer and lessee of the yard, pursuant to the lease agreement between our client and the lessee of the yard.
    • Obtained the dismissal of plaintiff's cargo claims against our client, a non-vessel operating common carrier, during a bench trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Union County, Special Civil Part, following the successful cross-examination of the plaintiff.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of the owner and property management company of a senior housing complex in a case in which the elevator car doors on one of the elevators in the building struck plaintiff as she was entering the elevator, resulting in personal injuries.  The plaintiff alleged that our clients were negligent in allowing a hazardous condition to exist on the property.  At the conclusion of discovery, we moved for summary judgment on liability, arguing the lack of any evidence of a defect or malfunction with respect to the elevator doors on the incident date, or alternatively, the lack of any actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition, if it even existed in the first place.  The court (Monmouth County Superior Court) agreed, focusing on the lack of notice to the owner and property manager, and granted our motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims and cross-claims against our clients, with prejudice. 
    • Obtained the dismissal of the plaintiff’s personal injury action, which arose from a boating accident that occurred during a regatta that took place in the waters off of Little Egg Harbor in Beach Haven, New Jersey.  At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was sixteen years old.  The lawsuit was not commenced until more than three years after the accident.  We filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint on the basis that it was barred by the three (3) year Uniform Statute of Limitations (46 U.S.C. § 30106 (formerly 46 U.S.C. § App’x 763a)) applicable to all maritime tort actions and was not subject to New Jersey’s infant tolling statute.  The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey agreed and granted our motion dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint.

Results

Claims Dismissed in Marine Construction NY Labor Law Case

Our team successfully obtained summary judgment dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction NY Labor Law case pending in Supreme Court Rockland County. The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client, which was a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case. They sought contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts. We argued, and the court agreed, that since there was no finding of negligence against our client causing the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The court found that there was no evidence demonstrating that our client caused in whole or in part the injuries the plaintiff sustained.

Successful Defense of Marine Construction New York Labor Law Case

Marshall Dennehey successfully obtained summary judgment, dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction New York Labor Law case in the Supreme Court in Rockland County. ​The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client, a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case, all seeking contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts. We argued, and the court agreed, that since there was no finding of negligence against our client in causing the injuries sustained to the plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The court found there was no evidence demonstrating that our client caused, in whole or in part, the injuries the plaintiff sustained. The plaintiff and general contractor filed motions to reargue, which were denied.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

U.S. Supreme Court Held that Choice-of-Law Clauses in Maritime Contracts Are Presumptively Enforceable Under Federal Maritime Law

April 1, 2024

On February 21, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, held that choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, subject to two narrow exceptions: (1) when the chosen law would contravene a controlling federal statute or established federal maritime policy; or (2) when the contracting parties cannot show any reasonable basis for the chosen jurisdiction. The second exception must be applied with “substantial deference to the contracting parties.” Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC, Case No. 22-500, Slip Op. at 10-11 (Feb. 21, 2024). The Court stated that “the uniformity and predictability resulting from choice-of-law provisions are especially important for marine insurance contracts given that marine insurance is ‘an integral of virtually every maritime transaction, and maritime commerce is a vital part of the nation’s economy.’” Id. at 9 (quoting M. Sturley, Restating the Law of Marine Insurance: A Workable Solution to the Wilburn Boat Problem, 29 J. Mar. L. & Com. 41, 45 (1998). This decision is a very favorable and significant result for marine insurers and the principle of maritime uniformity.  Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Case Law Alerts

SCOTUS Grants Certiorari to Hear Marine Insurance Dispute

April 1, 2023

The Supreme Court of the United States recently granted certiorari to decide whether, under federal admiralty law, “a choice of law clause in a maritime contract can be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the ‘strong public policy’ of the state whose law is displaced.” The underlying claim involved damage to a vessel that ran aground, which resulted in the vessel owner filing a coverage claim under its marine insurance policy. The insurer denied coverage and subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to rescind the policy. The vessel owner then filed multiple counterclaims, including extra-contractual claims under Pennsylvania law. The insurer subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings on the Pennsylvania law counterclaims, arguing that the policy’s choice of law provision required the application of New York law, precluding those counterclaims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled in favor of the insurer, and the vessel owner appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that a choice of law provision is unenforceable if it “would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.” The Third Circuit instructed the District Court to consider whether Pennsylvania “has a strong public policy that would be thwarted by applying New York law.” In turn, the insurer filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted, limited to the above-referenced question. The Supreme Court’s decision on this issue may have wide-ranging implications on contract cases going forward, particularly those involving choice-of-law provisions.  Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.