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Rideshare Liability

Ridesharing platforms have revolutionized modern transportation, connecting riders and drivers instantaneously, through mobile apps. The popularity of these technology services is enormous and continues to grow. However, what happens when an accident occurs? Who bears responsibility?

The answer is: it’s complicated.

When an accident occurs involving an operator using a rideshare app, unique legal issues are often created for the rideshare platform, the drivers, riders and their insurers, and other involved vehicles--all of whom can be parties to litigation. Issues relating to the existence of coverage, the priority of coverage, and available policy limits often arise. Claims against rideshare platforms can involve allegations of both direct and vicarious liability. Brand protection and maintaining the confidentiality of trade secret and proprietary information is essential to the rideshare platform defendant.

The attorneys in Marshall Dennehey’s Rideshare Liability Practice are experienced at addressing the complex issues that emerge when claims arise. We are familiar with the prominent ridesharing apps and are knowledgeable of the data that is available from them. We work with a variety of liability and damages experts who specialize in issues applicable to sharing economy cases.

Our experienced team utilizes a process that allows for the prompt review of cases and strategizing with claims professionals about whether a case should be targeted for early resolution, aggressive discovery or trial. Our pre-suit services for catastrophic accidents include:

  • Scene inspection, accident reconstruction, bio-mechanical accident reconstruction responding to preservation requests
  • Assembling a top expert team to assist with investigations and preservation of evidence
  • Vehicle inspections and data downloads
  • Social media and background investigations of claimants
  • Witness location and interviews, and all other facets of pre-suit accident investigation

Many states have enacted statutes governing requirements and liability for rideshare platforms, and issues involving statutory compliance may arise. Also, rideshare litigation is not limited to automobile negligence cases and uninsured/underinsured motorist claims. Rideshare platforms and their insurers must also be prepared to defend cases involving allegations of sexual assault or other intentional conduct.

We routinely handle cases for some of the nation’s largest ridesharing companies, their independent drivers and insurance carriers. We help navigate every step of the legal process, working closely with clients to execute strategies to protect their interests, manage risk and minimize exposure.

Results

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Summary Judgment Obtained in New York Ridesharing Case

We won summary judgment for an online car sharing platform that connects vehicle owners (hosts) with travelers and locals (guests) seeking to book those vehicles for a fee in New York. The plaintiff alleged that he sustained serious injuries when he was involved in an automobile accident that collided with a vehicle listed on our client’s website. The Bronx County Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of our client, ruling that the defendant demonstrated that it is a peer-to-peer car sharing service; it does not provide rental services; it does not own, maintain or repair any of the vehicles on its platform; it is not responsible for the acts and omissions of the hosts or guests; and there is no agency relationship between defendant and the hosts or guests.

Successfully Defended a National Car-Sharing Company in a Multi-Party Suit

We successfully defended a national car-sharing company, resulting in a dismissal of all claims. The case involved a multi-party suit arising out of a commercial auto accident. Through aggressive pleading, we obtained a dismissal by arguing that both federal and state law provisions prohibited any claims against the car-sharing company.

Thought Leadership

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Case Law Alerts

Florida Appellate Court Affirms Dismissal with Prejudice of a Claim Against Lyft Based on Statutory Immunity

July 20, 2026

Plaintiff, Louise Haddad, sued Lyft for damages after allegedly being assaulted by her Lyft driver. The plaintiff asserted claims for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation against Lyft based on statements from its website which led her to believe the ride would be safe. Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal of her claims with prejudice, finding that they were barred by the broad immunity conferred to Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) under § 631.918, Florida Statutes. To plead an exception to TNC immunity, the plaintiff would have to allege sufficient facts, such as a violation of antitrust laws, bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. Since the plaintiff failed to adequately plead an exception, the court found her claims were barred by Florida’s TNC immunity statute. This case highlights the importance of legislative immunity in defending rideshare cases even at the pleadings stage.

Florida Appellate Court Affords Lyft Broad Immunity Under Section 627.748(18), Florida Statutes (2022), for the Actions of One of its Drivers

May 15, 2026

Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims against transportation network company (TNC), Lyft Florida, Inc., concluding such claims are barred by the plain text of section 627.748(18), Florida Statutes (2022). In Haddad v. Lyft Florida, Inc., 4D2025-017 (Fla. 4th DCA May 13, 2026), a rideshare passenger alleged she was assaulted by her Lyft driver. She sued for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, alleging statements on Lyft’s website led her to believe that her ride would be safe and that she would not suffer personal injuries at the hands of a Lyft driver. Lyft moved to dismiss, contending that section 627.748(18) provided it with immunity against such claims. Subsection 18 provides that “[a] TNC is not liable under general law by reason of owning, operating, or maintaining the digital network accessed by a TNC driver or rider…for harm to persons or property which results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of a motor vehicle operating as a TNC vehicle while the driver is logged on to the digital network” under three circumstances if: (1) there is no negligence under this section or criminal wrongdoing under the federal or Florida criminal code on the part of the TNC; (2) the TNC has fulfilled all of its obligations under this section with respect to the TNC driver; and (3) the TNC is not the owner or bailee of the motor vehicle that caused harm to persons or property. The trial court agreed that subsection 18 provided Lyft with immunity and dismissed the complaint. With the benefit of oral argument, the Fourth District affirmed the dismissal. In doing so, the court concluded that subsection 18’s plain text makes clear that the immunity conferred under section 627.748(18) is much broader than traditional vicarious liability. Thus, the passenger’s claims for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations, which arose out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle operating as a TNC vehicle while the driver was logged on to the network, were barred. It did not matter that the complaint purported to plead negligence by Lyft rather than a traditional vicarious liability theory. The negligent act asserted against the TNC had to relate to a negligent failure to meet the statute’s requirements for rideshare companies. This is a favorable decision for TNC companies. Plaintiffs will need to carefully tailor their allegations to overcome the broad immunity set forth in the statute. Otherwise, their claims will be subject to dismissal out of the gate. TNC companies should look to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaints from the outset. The immunity is not a traditional affirmative defense. Thus, trial courts can rule on the immunity at the motion to dismiss stage.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Result

Statutory Employer Immunity Upheld

In this construction accident case that resulted in a $5 million verdict, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the Statutory Employer Doctrine, which immunizes general contractors and other contractors on construction sites when certain elements are satisfied.

graphic announcing our 6 2027 Super Lawyers & Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Result

$1.09 Billion Products Liability Verdict Overturned

In this products liability crashworthiness case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a Philadelphia jury verdict of $1.09 billion, the largest verdict ever overturned by a PA appellate court.  The court ordered a new trial based on deficient jury instructions, clarified important aspects of crashworthiness law, and confirmed that so-called standard jury instructions may be incompatible with Pennsylvania law. 

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Result

$19 Million Medical Malpractice Verdict Overturned

In this medical malpractice case, the trial court vacated $10 million of a $19 million verdict in post-trial motions and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the remaining $9 million on appeal.

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department