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Thomas F. Brown

Office Managing Attorney

Co-Chair, Rideshare Liability Practice

TFBrown@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Thomas F. Brown

Tom is a member of the Casualty Department and serves as the Managing Attorney of the Orlando office. He devotes his practice to civil litigation defense, advocating for corporations in claims of premises liability, wrongful death and product liability. He has handled hundreds of cases on behalf of a variety of corporations, many involving catastrophic injuries. During his career, he also has handled cases involving employment law, labor law, negligent security, trucking and transportation, motor vehicle accidents, sexual abuse and workers’ compensation. He also has experience handling cases involving allegations of mold resulting in personal injury and/or property damage. As part of his amusement and entertainment practice, Tom represents venues including theme parks, golf courses, water parks and retail stores. Tom is an active member of the International Amusement and Leisure Defense Association (IALDA).

Tom co-chairs the firms Rideshare Liability practice where he represents some of the nation’s leading ridesharing companies, their independent drivers and insurance carriers. In this capacity, he assists in managing the unique legal issues that often arise with rideshare claims, including insurance coverage, direct and vicarious liability and statutory compliance challenges.

Tom began his career at a civil litigation firm in Miami where he worked with one of the presidents of the Florida Bar. In 2006, he moved to Orlando where he joined a statewide defense litigation firm. Tom continues to dedicate his practice to defending corporations in civil litigation here at Marshall Dennehey.

Tom obtained his undergraduate degree from Rollins College where he made Dean’s List and President’s List. In 2001, he graduated cum laude from the University of Miami School of Law. As a law student, he made Dean’s List and earned the Dean’s Certificate of Achievement as well as the CALI Excellence for the Future Award.

Tom is a member of the Florida Bar and is admitted to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

    • University of Miami School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2001)
    • Rollins College (A.B., 1998)
    • Florida, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2008
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2023-2027)
    • Florida Bar - Member, Workers' Compensation Section
    • International Amusement and Leisure Defense Association, Inc. - Member
    • Orange County Bar Association
    • Mock Trial, Trial Run, Tabletop Role Playing – Guilty or Not Guilty?, Bus Industry Safety Council (BISC) Annual Summer Meeting, Orlando, FL, July 22, 2024
    • Sharing Economy: Carshare and Rideshare Litigation, Florida Defense Lawyers Association (FDLA) webinar, February 9, 2023
    • The Complexity of Rideshare Claims, AM Best Insurance Law Podcast, June 2021
    • Defending Catastrophic Injury Claims - How to Stack the Deck in Your Favor, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium – Casino Royale, Tampa, FL, September 20, 2018
    • Legal RoundTable, Amusement Industry Manufacturers & Suppliers International Conference, Orlando, FL, 2015
    • Blitz on Damages: Challenging Medical Bills, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium - The Best Defense is a Good Offense, Orlando, FL, September 17, 2014
    • Analyzing Slip and Fall Claims, Gallagher Bassett Services, April 2014, co-presenter
    • Legal Round Table, IAAPA Convention, 2012
    • Reducing The Risk & Severity of Claims, Athletic Business Conference, 2011
    • Roller Skating Association and International Laser Tag Association Convention, 2011
    • Legal Round Table, IAAPA Convention, 2011
    • Successfully resolved a wrongful death action involving a 14-year-old boy who tragically fell from an attraction at a major entertainment complex in Orlando, FL. Representing the ride's owner/operator, Tom was able to navigate the complexities of a concurrent criminal investigation, a State of Florida administrative review, and widespread international media coverage.
    • Obtained Judgment on the Pleadings on behalf of plaintiff's employer in a matter involving alleged intentional tort where demand was $250,000.
    • Successfully argued a Motion to Dismiss for Fraud on the Court in a matter involving alleged electric shock where demand was over $100,000.
    • Played an active role in the investigation, discovery, and motion phases of a product liability case that settled during deliberations in the second phase of trial where demand to jury was over $500,000,000 but award against client after first phase of trial was less than $50,000.
    • Prepared a successful Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on a negligent hiring and negligent supervision in a matter involving an employee that shot an innocent bystander, and the matter settled shortly thereafter.
    • Obtained defense verdict in workers' compensation case involving alleged permanent total disability.
    • O'Rourke v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 65 So.3d 529 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)
    • Edwards v. Cornelius, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79587 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2012)

Results

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Successfully Resolved Highly-Publicized Wrongful Death Action in Florida

We successfully resolved a wrongful death case involving a 14-year-old boy who fell from an Orlando attraction, navigating a concurrent criminal investigation, state review, and intense media scrutiny on behalf of the ride's owner/operator.

Thought Leadership

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Case Law Alerts

Florida Appellate Court Affirms Dismissal with Prejudice of a Claim Against Lyft Based on Statutory Immunity

July 20, 2026

Plaintiff, Louise Haddad, sued Lyft for damages after allegedly being assaulted by her Lyft driver. The plaintiff asserted claims for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation against Lyft based on statements from its website which led her to believe the ride would be safe. Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal of her claims with prejudice, finding that they were barred by the broad immunity conferred to Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) under § 631.918, Florida Statutes. To plead an exception to TNC immunity, the plaintiff would have to allege sufficient facts, such as a violation of antitrust laws, bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. Since the plaintiff failed to adequately plead an exception, the court found her claims were barred by Florida’s TNC immunity statute. This case highlights the importance of legislative immunity in defending rideshare cases even at the pleadings stage.

Case Law Alerts

Florida Court Affirms Dismissal of Claims Against Lyft, Clarifying TNC Immunity at the Pleading Stage

April 1, 2026

Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court order dismissing a lawsuit against Lyft, arising from a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and vicarious liability against Lyft. The trial court dismissed those claims, and the appellate court entered a per curiam affirmance, citing Florida’s TNC Statute and pleading rule. On appeal, the major point of contention was whether Lyft had to put forth evidence to support its argument for immunity under the TNC statute. Lyft argued no evidence was required, because the trial court concluded they could not be held liable based on the facts alleged in the complaint. While the Third District did not write an opinion, it presumably accepted Lyft’s position. This case suggests that a motion to dismiss can be an appropriate vehicle for rideshare companies to have trial courts determine applicability of TNC immunity.

News

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Firm Highlights

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

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Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.