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Patrick M. DeLong

Co-Chair, Rideshare Litigation Practice

Portrait of Patrick M. DeLong

As a member of the Casualty Department, Patrick represents clients and their insurers in high exposure automobile negligence, uninsured motorist, premises liability, commercial general liability and construction site accident cases involving allegations of wrongful death and catastrophic injuries in both Florida and federal courts.

Patrick focuses a portion of his practice on a recently emerging area of law–the defense of rideshare liability cases. In this capacity, he develops strategies for successfully defending rideshare drivers and their insurers in complex, catastrophic rideshare negligence and uninsured motorist cases throughout the State of Florida.

Additionally, Patrick represents clients in complex construction defect, and building design related claims and suits. He routinely represents and defends real estate developers, general contractors, subcontractors, licensed construction industry professionals, as well as municipalities, in all manner of construction related actions.

Since joining the firm in 2013, Patrick has defended creditors and debt servicers in creditors’ rights, TCPA, FDCPA and FCCPA actions.

In 1990, Patrick earned his Bachelor of Arts degree with Honors from the University of Notre Dame, and remained at the University of Notre Dame for law school where he received is juris doctor in 1993. Patrick is a member of the Bar of the state of Florida. He is admitted to practice before all Florida state circuit and federal district courts, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern and Middle District of Florida, as well as the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

    • Notre Dame Law School (J.D., 1993)
    • University of Notre Dame (B.A., cum laude, 1990)
    • Florida, 1993
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 1994
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida, 2000
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2000
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 11th Circuit, 2010
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2027)
    • ACA International (The Association of Credit and Collection Professionals)
    • NCBA (The National Creditors Bar Association)
    • The Complexity of Rideshare Claims, AM Best Insurance Law Podcast, June 2021
    • Preserving Evidence and Avoiding Spoliation in Florida, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium - The Best Defense is a Good Offense, Orlando, FL, September 17, 2014
    • Won summary judgment in favor of a national real estate developer in a class action case brought in federal court, on behalf of homeowners in a large planned community. Damages in excess of $5 million were sought against the developer, who was accused of fraud, deceptive and unfair trade practices, misleading advertising, unjust enrichment, and negligence. After the summary judgment was affirmed on appeal, four related class action cases and one mass tort case were pending against the real estate developer in state court. Here, the combined alleged damages were in excess of $40 million, but were again favorably resolved.
    • Secured summary judgment in favor of a municipality in a Fair Housing Act case brought by a real estate developer who accused the municipality, its mayor, vice mayor and commissioners of racial discrimination after the commission voted against its proposed development.
    • Secured the dismissal of an FDCPA class action on behalf of a law firm whose practice focused upon mortgage foreclosures.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Our Rideshare Liability Practice Group

March 1, 2023

Meeting the Needs of the Rideshare Revolution In a relatively short timespan, rideshare platforms—like Uber and Lyft—and carshare platforms—like Turo—have transformed the global transportation industry. With the push of a few buttons, users can instantly hail a ride or rent a vehicle virtually anywhere in the world. Unquestionably, the advent of these technology service companies has made travel more convenient and efficient. But it has also spawned a multitude of new legal issues and claims. Legislators and judges have been striving to keep up with the technology, but every legislative or judicial action can create new and complex legal questions. Marshall Dennehey responded to the needs of the industry by forming its Rideshare Liability Practice Group—a dedicated team of experienced defense attorneys who have developed specialized knowledge of legal issues facing this revolutionary industry. Originally launched in 2021, the Rideshare Liability Practice Group is on the cutting edge of defending a wide variety of rideshare claims and peer-to-peer carshare claims. The practice group is comprised of numerous attorneys across the firm’s 19 offices—located in seven different states, including Pennsylvania, Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, New York, Connecticut, and Delaware—who have handled hundreds of claims in the field. The practice group is co-chaired by Thomas F. Brown (Orlando) and Patrick M. Delong (Fort Lauderdale), who cumulatively have over 50 years of insurance defense experience. The attorneys in this practice group have worked with multiple rideshare and carshare platforms. They appreciate the need for understanding the vocabulary of the industry as well as issues of confidentiality and brand protection. Using the wrong terminology could create exposure or liability where it would not otherwise exist. During the course of discovery, a company’s intellectual property and proprietary data might be requested. The attorneys in this group frequently oppose discovery requests that seek proprietary and trade-secret information, and they utilize confidentiality agreements and protective orders to shield confidential information from improper use and widespread disclosure. Appropriate provisions in settlement agreements are also used to protect sensitive information. The Rideshare Liability Practice Group also has extensive experience defending the insurers and users of these platforms, including drivers, vehicle owners, and vehicle renters. They have successfully defended claims involving catastrophic injuries, wrongful death, multiple-vehicle accidents, and multiple claimants. They have staved off aggressive and creative attempts by the plaintiff’s bar to expand liability through causes of action, including: Negligence Vicarious liability Negligent hiring or selection Negligent retention and supervision Product liability Negligent design of the ride-hailing application Negligent maintenance of a shared car Negligent entrustment Bad faith Uninsured and underinsured motorist Defending these cases requires the knowledge and an understanding of applicable federal and state laws and regulations. The laws and regulations of a particular state might govern the level of insurance coverage required during various aspects of the rideshare process. An independent rideshare driver might need his or her own insurance while the rideshare app is off. The rideshare platform might be required to provide a coverage when an independent rideshare driver is using the app, but a different amount of coverage might be required depending on whether the driver has accepted a ride or if the driver is actively transporting a rider. Formulating appropriate defenses to these claims also requires an understanding of the applicable law. For example, Florida trial courts have issued conflicting opinions regarding whether a transportation network application is a product subject to product liability laws or a service outside the scope of such laws. Since the Florida appellate courts have not yet weighed in with a controlling opinion on the issue, a rideshare defense practitioner must possess a cutting-edge awareness of developing discovery trends and legal arguments advanced by the plaintiff’s bar with respect to this issue and must prepare his or her client to successfully defend against them during the discovery and dispositive motion phases of litigation. Another example of evolving legal trends may be found in the carshare arena, where both state and federal law could insulate the vehicle owner from liability. The Graves Amendment is a federal law that bars vicarious liability claims where: The owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and There is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner). Several states have now enacted peer-to-peer carsharing statutes that expressly extend the Graves Amendment to carsharing situations. There are numerous complexities to defending a rideshare or carshare claim, and the attorneys in Marshall Dennehey’s Rideshare Liability Practice Group can be retained to assist at different stages throughout the life of a claim. Before a lawsuit is filed, our rideshare defense attorneys are often asked to assist with accident investigations, preservation of evidence, expert retention, legal research, global settlement conferences, and responding to time-limit demands. Marshall Dennehey’s lawyers have the experience and skill to take cases to trial and are also supported by an exceptional appellate group. In the Marshall Dennehey Rideshare Liability Practice Group, the aim is to always provide outstanding, efficient, and cost-conscious legal services to our clients. *Patrick DeLong is a shareholder in our Fort Lauderdale, Florida, office. He can be reached at 954.832.3953 or pmdelong@mdwcg.com. Tom Brown is a shareholder in our Orlando, Florida, office. He can be reached at 407.420.4392 or tfbrown@mdwcg.com.   Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 1, March 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Defending Ride-Hailing and Car-Sharing Claims

January 1, 2022

The sharing economy has grown exponentially in a short period of time. Rideshare platforms like Uber and Lyft, and car-sharing platforms like Turo, control a significant part of the sharing economy space. Along with this rapid growth came insurance programs for ridesharing and car-sharing platforms, as well as a surge of claims and lawsuits against them, their users, and their insurers.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.