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Consumer Financial Services Litigation

Marshall Dennehey's Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group represents financial institutions, creditors, debt collectors, debt servicers, debt buyers, auto finance companies, student lenders and servicers, telecommunication providers, collection attorneys, mortgage lenders and credit reporting agencies. We are on the front lines representing our clients in claims brought by the increasingly sophisticated consumer plaintiffs’ bars in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Florida and the District of Columbia.

Among the many services our group provides are:

  • Defense of individual and class action lawsuits arising from claims under the FCRA, FDCPA, TCPA, ECOA, EFTA and state consumer statutes.

We offer cost-effective, intelligent and pragmatic representation of our clients. While we aggressively defend claims in litigation, we understand that the most critical component of litigation is an open line of communication with our clients. We never lose sight of our client's goals and strive to meet your expectations with focused attention arising from our extensive knowledge of the law. Our primary focus is to empower you to make informed decisions about your exposures and to develop an appropriate defense strategy.

Our attorneys maintain active memberships in industry-leading organizations and keep abreast of the ever-changing regulatory environment impacting our clients. Because federal and state consumer laws are ever-evolving, you can feel confident that Marshall Dennehey's Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group is on the cutting edge of emerging trends in case law, litigation and defense.

Thought Leadership

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Defense Digest

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Slams Door Shut on Claims Filed Against Home Inspectors

December 1, 2025

Key Points: PA Supreme Court affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. Any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection, regardless of when the problem is discovered. Decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. This article originally appeared in the October 28, 2025, issue of PLUS Blog.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. This means that any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection—regardless of when the problem is discovered.      In Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 2024 WL 80950 (Pa. Super. Jan. 8, 2024), the Superior Court found that Section 7512 of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law (68 Pa.C.S. § 7512) operated as a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations, and thus was not tolled by the discovery rule.  Ms. Gidor’s petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the designation of Section 7512 as a statute of repose, arguing that the statute is ambiguous and places the burden of commencing an action on a plaintiff as opposed to a defendant, raises constitutional issues, and violates legislative intent. In response, Mangus analogized Section 7512 to the Construction Statute of Repose and raised public policy considerations as to the intent of the General Assembly to limit claims against home inspectors.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument that the language was ambiguous and that a statute of repose requires a precipitating event by a defendant. The court unequivocally concluded that Section 7512 is a statute of repose “because it plainly, unambiguously, and without equitable exceptions, requires a plaintiff to commence an action within a specified time period after the occurrence of a definitely established event, regardless of when the claim accrues.” Id. at *13. As set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose ‘is not related to the accrual of any cause of action’ because the injury need not have occurred, much less been discovered.” Id. at *8 (citing Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 981 A.2d 198, 211 (Pa. 2009)). To be sure, the date of accrual and preclusion of the discovery rule is a key distinction between a statute of limitations and statute of repose, and has clear implications for the viability of a litigant’s claim.  This decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. Best practices for home inspectors include: •    Treat the date of report delivery as the critical cutoff for potential litigation. •    Deliver reports promptly to start the one-year clock running. •    Use time-stamped delivery methods—such as email or certified mail—to establish proof of delivery. •    Maintain clear records of both the delivery date and the report itself for an extended period, ensuring documentation is available if a claim is later filed. The litigation process can be lengthy and tedious, particularly in the context of complicated real estate transactions. The Gidor decision will force claimants to expeditiously decide whether to pursue claims, and may limit future litigation to the extent purported defects are latent or undisclosed beyond the one-year statute of repose period. Dana is Chair of our Real Estate E&O Liability Practice Group. She works in our Philadelphia, PA office and can be reached at 215-575-4556 or DAGittleman@mdwcg.com. Danielle is Chair of our Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group. She works in our Pittsburgh, PA office and can be reached at 412-803-1185 or DAGittleman@mdwcg.com.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…In-Step With Our Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group

March 1, 2024

The multitude of federal and state consumer protection laws present challenges for consumer financial services companies seeking to remain compliant with the laws while avoiding claims and lawsuits.  The attorneys in Marshall Dennehey’s Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group understand the challenges financial institutions, creditors, debt collectors, and others face in this very specific field of litigation. Our attorneys defends individual and class action lawsuits arising from claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA); Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA); Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA); state consumer statutes, and more. Additional clients represented include debt servicers, debt buyers, auto finance companies, repossession companies, student lenders and servicers, telecommunication providers, collection attorneys, mortgage lenders, and credit reporting agencies.  Attorneys across our 19 offices are on the front lines representing clients against claims brought by the increasingly sophisticated consumer plaintiffs’ bars in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Connecticut, and the District of Columbia. Primary attorneys handling these matters include Jeremy Zacharias in New Jersey; myself, Aaron Moore, Stephen Keim, and Maureen Fitzgerald in Pennsylvania; Caroline Pacheco, Holly Hamilton, and Joe Hess in Florida; and David Lane in New York.  Members of our practice group maintain active memberships in the Association of Credit and Collection Professionals (ACA International) and the National Creditors Bar Association (NCBA). We often attend and speak at these conferences to keep abreast of the ever-changing regulatory environment impacting our clients.  Marshall Dennehey’s Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group offers cost-effective, intelligent, and pragmatic representation to our clients. While we aggressively defend claims in litigation, we understand that the most critical component of litigation is an open line of communication. We never lose sight of our clients’ goals, and we meet their expectations with focused attention arising from our extensive knowledge of the law. Our principal focus is to empower our clients to make informed decisions and to develop an appropriate defense strategy. We welcome your inquiries about our practice group and how we may help you efficiently resolve your consumer financial services litigation.  *Danielle works in our Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1185 or dmvugrinovich@mdwcg.com.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

Federal Statute Declared Constitutional

In this products liability case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court and upheld the constitutionality of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which resulted in judgment as a matter of law for the defendant manufacturer.

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.

Result

Statutory Employer Immunity Upheld

In this construction accident case that resulted in a $5 million verdict, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the Statutory Employer Doctrine, which immunizes general contractors and other contractors on construction sites when certain elements are satisfied.

Result

$19 Million Medical Malpractice Verdict Overturned

In this medical malpractice case, the trial court vacated $10 million of a $19 million verdict in post-trial motions and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the remaining $9 million on appeal.

Result

$1.09 Billion Products Liability Verdict Overturned

In this products liability crashworthiness case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a Philadelphia jury verdict of $1.09 billion, the largest verdict ever overturned by a PA appellate court.  The court ordered a new trial based on deficient jury instructions, clarified important aspects of crashworthiness law, and confirmed that so-called standard jury instructions may be incompatible with Pennsylvania law. 

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.

graphic announcing our 6 2027 Super Lawyers & Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars