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Danielle M. Vugrinovich

Chair, Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group

Portrait of Danielle M. Vugrinovich

Danielle serves as the chair of the Consumer Financial Services Litigation practice group, litigating Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims brought by debtors against the collectors assigned to recover the debt.  Danielle also defends collectors in suits alleging claims for the violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Telephone Consumer Protection Act. She is frequently called on to speak nationally on topics related to the collection industry. She also dedicates a portion of her practice to mass and toxic torts relating to asbestos exposure.  Danielle’s asbestos practice includes all phases of litigation throughout the life of a case.  She also is experienced in handling premises liability, automobile accident cases, construction and general insurance defense.

Additionally, Danielle practices in the area of employment law relative to public and private entities. She has litigated federal claims brought pursuant to Title VII, the Family Medical Leave Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as pendant state law claims for whistleblower activities and violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Danielle also has experience litigating employment cases at the administrative level before both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. Danielle also defends various professionals when they are sued for matters relating to their employment.   

In 1998, Danielle graduated from Duquesne University with a Bachelor of Arts in psychology. In 2001, she earned her juris doctor from Duquesne University School of Law.

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 2001)
    • Duquesne University (B.A., 1998)
    • Pennsylvania, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2001
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2017
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2022
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants (2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2016)
    • ACA International (The Association of Credit and Collection Professionals)
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • The National Creditors Bar Association (NCBA)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Stop! Gavel Time!:  A Collection and Cross Claim Mock Trial,  National Creditors Bar Association, Fall Convention, Nashville, TN, October 2018
    • We Don't Know Where We Are, But We Are Making Really Good Time:  Keeping Up with Ever Changing Technology and the Conundrums It Presents, National Creditors Bar Association, Spring Convention, Austin, TX, May 2018
    • Solving the "Meaningful Involvement" Puzzle, National Creditors Bar Association, Washington, D.C., Fall Convention, October 2017
    • Recent Litigation Trends and How to Avoid Them, National Association for Retail Collection Attorneys Spring Convention, May 2015
    • Primer on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, June 10, 2014
    • "Reasonable Investigations" under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, ACA International Convention, San Diego, CA, July 2013
    • Primer on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, June 18, 2013
    • Employment Liability in the Cyber Age, Marshall Dennehey / AIG Employment Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, May 2, 2013
    • Primer on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2011
    • The FDCPA: Jerman v. Carlisle and the Impact on the Bona Fide Error Defense, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2010
    • Primer on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2010
    • "Pennsylvania Supreme Court Strengthens Legal Protections for Home Inspectors," PLUS Blog, October 28, 2025
    • “‘Because of an Individual’s Sex’—The Supreme Court of the United States Holds that Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Qualify for Protection Under Title VII,” Defense Digest, January 2021, Vol. 27, No. 1
    • "Best Practices Regarding Stacking Waivers in Pennsylvania," Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers, June 2019
    • "The Need for Clarity in Counseling Customers," Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers, November 16, 2018
    • "Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Are Not Protected Classes under Title VII…Or Are They?," Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2017
    • "No Proof That Firing Was Retaliation for Intent to Promote Black Employee,"SHRM Court Reports, March 4, 2016
    • "Qualified Immunity Not Strictly for Governmental Employees Anymore," Defense Digest, Vol. 18, No. 3, September 2012
    • "The Supreme Court Considers the Privacy Rights of a Public Employee's Communications on an Electronic Device Provided by the Public Employer," Defense Digest, Volume 16, No. 3, September 2010 
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of a Borough, its Chief, a Detective, a Lieutenant and a School Resource Officer, in a civil rights lawsuit alleging that no probable cause existed to charge the Plaintiff, a local high school teacher, with witness intimidation arising from an alleged incident involving a female student in his class who was a victim of institutional sexual assault by another teacher.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of a life insurance agent in a fraud and negligence action. The agent was alleged to have forged certain policy documents in an effort to "churn" the existing policies the plaintiffs possessed into additional policies rather than increase the amount of coverage of the original policies.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of an alleged joint employer in a Family Medical Leave Act and Americans with Disabilities Act case, successfully arguing that the entity did not qualify as a joint employer; thus, it was not subject to liability under either Act.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of a real estate agent for allegedly failing to disclose that the property at issue did not have public sewer system.
    • Summary judgment granted for insurer in a claim for breach of contract and bad faith where the homeowner made a claim for vandalism when his tenant did not finish renovating the leased premises.  The Court held that the damages were not "sudden and accidental" and that the policy exclusions for faulty workmanship and renovations were applicable as a matter of law.
    • Obtained summary judgment in a civil rights case in which the plaintiff alleged a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights claiming excessive use of force was applied during his arrest and detention. 
    • Obtained favorable decision based upon governmental immunity in municipal tort action alleging negligence of the municipal authority's contractor in the connection of the water line to the plaintiff's residence. 
    • Summary judgment granted in a private entity employment case in which the plaintiff alleged gender and age discrimination while employed as a diagnostic imaging marketing representative. 
    • Summary judgment granted in a civil rights case in which the plaintiff alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and claimed that he was subject to racial profiling. 
    • Summary judgment granted in a civil rights case in which the plaintiff alleged the violation of his First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, violation of 1985 and state law claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest/false imprisonment, and conspiracy against a municipality for its police officers' response to a call from his residence. 
    • Summary judgment granted in municipal entity employment case in which the employee alleged she was subjected to race and disability discrimination after she was terminated following a reduction in force. 

Results

Dismissal of Class Action Against a Retailer

Our retail client faced a class action suit alleging claims it charged Pennsylvania state tax on face masks/coverings during the COVID-19 pandemic (when they were not subject to sales tax). The plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf of the putative class alleged claims for violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law and the Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, as well as common law claims for unjust enrichment, fraud and misappropriation/conversion. The plaintiff claimed that face masks and coverings became exempt from Pennsylvania sales tax as of March 6, 2020, when the governor issued a Proclamation of Disaster Emergency. Prior to the Proclamation, non-medical face masks/coverings were subject to sales tax because they were classified as ornamental wear or clothing accessories. The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for any of the causes of action alleged and held that amendment would be futile.

Defense Prevails in Civil Rights Lawsuit.

We obtained summary judgment in favor of a borough, its police chief, a detective, a lieutenant and a school resource officer in a civil rights lawsuit. ​The plaintiff, a local high school teacher, alleged that no probable cause existed to charge him with witness intimidation, arising from an alleged incident involving a female student who was a victim of institutional sexual assault by another teacher. In its opinion granting summary judgment, the court determined that the Affidavit of Probable Cause, which was the basis for charges against the plaintiff, was supported by the evidence at the time the affidavit was prepared. The court also held that, because no violation of Section 1983 existed, all claims against the individuals and the municipality must be dismissed. Finally, the court ruled that the individual defendants enjoyed qualified immunity because no constitutional violation existed.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Slams Door Shut on Claims Filed Against Home Inspectors

December 1, 2025

Key Points: PA Supreme Court affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. Any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection, regardless of when the problem is discovered. Decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. This article originally appeared in the October 28, 2025, issue of PLUS Blog.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. This means that any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection—regardless of when the problem is discovered.      In Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 2024 WL 80950 (Pa. Super. Jan. 8, 2024), the Superior Court found that Section 7512 of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law (68 Pa.C.S. § 7512) operated as a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations, and thus was not tolled by the discovery rule.  Ms. Gidor’s petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the designation of Section 7512 as a statute of repose, arguing that the statute is ambiguous and places the burden of commencing an action on a plaintiff as opposed to a defendant, raises constitutional issues, and violates legislative intent. In response, Mangus analogized Section 7512 to the Construction Statute of Repose and raised public policy considerations as to the intent of the General Assembly to limit claims against home inspectors.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument that the language was ambiguous and that a statute of repose requires a precipitating event by a defendant. The court unequivocally concluded that Section 7512 is a statute of repose “because it plainly, unambiguously, and without equitable exceptions, requires a plaintiff to commence an action within a specified time period after the occurrence of a definitely established event, regardless of when the claim accrues.” Id. at *13. As set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose ‘is not related to the accrual of any cause of action’ because the injury need not have occurred, much less been discovered.” Id. at *8 (citing Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 981 A.2d 198, 211 (Pa. 2009)). To be sure, the date of accrual and preclusion of the discovery rule is a key distinction between a statute of limitations and statute of repose, and has clear implications for the viability of a litigant’s claim.  This decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. Best practices for home inspectors include: •    Treat the date of report delivery as the critical cutoff for potential litigation. •    Deliver reports promptly to start the one-year clock running. •    Use time-stamped delivery methods—such as email or certified mail—to establish proof of delivery. •    Maintain clear records of both the delivery date and the report itself for an extended period, ensuring documentation is available if a claim is later filed. The litigation process can be lengthy and tedious, particularly in the context of complicated real estate transactions. The Gidor decision will force claimants to expeditiously decide whether to pursue claims, and may limit future litigation to the extent purported defects are latent or undisclosed beyond the one-year statute of repose period. Dana is Chair of our Real Estate E&O Liability Practice Group. She works in our Philadelphia, PA office and can be reached at 215-575-4556 or DAGittleman@mdwcg.com. Danielle is Chair of our Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group. She works in our Pittsburgh, PA office and can be reached at 412-803-1185 or DAGittleman@mdwcg.com.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Strengthens Legal Protections for Home Inspectors

November 1, 2025

This article was originally posted by PLUS Blog on October 28, 2025, by plushq. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. This means that any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection—regardless of when the problem is discovered. In Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 2024 WL 80950 (Pa. Super. Jan. 8, 2024), the Superior Court found that Section 7512 of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law (68 Pa. C.S.A. § 7512) operated as a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations, and thus was not tolled by the discovery rule. Ms. Gidor’s petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the designation of Section 7512 as a statute of repose, arguing that the statute is ambiguous and places the burden of commencing an action on a plaintiff as opposed to a defendant, raises constitutional issues, and violates legislative intent. In response, Mangus analogized Section 7512 to the Construction Statute of Repose and raised public policy considerations as to the intent of the General Assembly to limit claims against home inspectors. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument that the language was ambiguous and that a statute of repose requires a precipitating event by a defendant. The court unequivocally concluded that Section 7512 is a statute of repose “because it plainly, unambiguously, and without equitable exceptions, requires a plaintiff to commence an action within a specified time period after the occurrence of a definitely established event, regardless of when the claim accrues.” Id. at *13. As set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose ‘is not related to the accrual of any cause of action’ because the injury need not have occurred, much less been discovered.” Id. at *8 (citing Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 981 A.2d 198, 211 (Pa. 2009)). To be sure, the date of accrual and preclusion of the discovery rule is a key distinction between a statute of limitations and statute of repose and has clear implications for the viability of a litigant’s claim. This decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. Best practices for home inspectors include: Treat the date of report delivery as the critical cutoff for potential litigation. Deliver reports promptly to start the one-year clock running. Use time-stamped delivery methods—such as email or certified mail—to establish proof of delivery. Maintain clear records of both the delivery date and the report itself for an extended period, ensuring documentation is available if a claim is later filed.   Legal Update for Real Estate E&O – November 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.