.

Danielle M. Vugrinovich

Chair, Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group

Portrait of Danielle M. Vugrinovich

Danielle serves as the chair of the Consumer Financial Services Litigation practice group, litigating Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims brought by debtors against the collectors assigned to recover the debt.  Danielle also defends collectors in suits alleging claims for the violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Telephone Consumer Protection Act. She is frequently called on to speak nationally on topics related to the collection industry. She also dedicates a portion of her practice to mass and toxic torts relating to asbestos exposure.  Danielle’s asbestos practice includes all phases of litigation throughout the life of a case.  She also is experienced in handling premises liability, automobile accident cases, construction and general insurance defense.

Additionally, Danielle practices in the area of employment law relative to public and private entities. She has litigated federal claims brought pursuant to Title VII, the Family Medical Leave Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as pendant state law claims for whistleblower activities and violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Danielle also has experience litigating employment cases at the administrative level before both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. Danielle also defends various professionals when they are sued for matters relating to their employment.   

In 1998, Danielle graduated from Duquesne University with a Bachelor of Arts in psychology. In 2001, she earned her juris doctor from Duquesne University School of Law.

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 2001)
    • Duquesne University (B.A., 1998)
    • Pennsylvania, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2001
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2017
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2022
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2016)
    • ACA International (The Association of Credit and Collection Professionals)
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • The National Creditors Bar Association (NCBA)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Stop! Gavel Time!:  A Collection and Cross Claim Mock Trial,  National Creditors Bar Association, Fall Convention, Nashville, TN, October 2018
    • We Don't Know Where We Are, But We Are Making Really Good Time:  Keeping Up with Ever Changing Technology and the Conundrums It Presents, National Creditors Bar Association, Spring Convention, Austin, TX, May 2018
    • Solving the "Meaningful Involvement" Puzzle, National Creditors Bar Association, Washington, D.C., Fall Convention, October 2017
    • Recent Litigation Trends and How to Avoid Them, National Association for Retail Collection Attorneys Spring Convention, May 2015
    • Primer on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, June 10, 2014
    • "Reasonable Investigations" under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, ACA International Convention, San Diego, CA, July 2013
    • Primer on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, June 18, 2013
    • Employment Liability in the Cyber Age, Marshall Dennehey / AIG Employment Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, May 2, 2013
    • Primer on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2011
    • The FDCPA: Jerman v. Carlisle and the Impact on the Bona Fide Error Defense, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2010
    • Primer on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2010
    • "Pennsylvania Supreme Court Strengthens Legal Protections for Home Inspectors," PLUS Blog, October 28, 2025
    • “‘Because of an Individual’s Sex’—The Supreme Court of the United States Holds that Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Qualify for Protection Under Title VII,” Defense Digest, January 2021, Vol. 27, No. 1
    • "Best Practices Regarding Stacking Waivers in Pennsylvania," Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers, June 2019
    • "The Need for Clarity in Counseling Customers," Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers, November 16, 2018
    • "Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Are Not Protected Classes under Title VII…Or Are They?," Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2017
    • "No Proof That Firing Was Retaliation for Intent to Promote Black Employee,"SHRM Court Reports, March 4, 2016
    • "Qualified Immunity Not Strictly for Governmental Employees Anymore," Defense Digest, Vol. 18, No. 3, September 2012
    • "The Supreme Court Considers the Privacy Rights of a Public Employee's Communications on an Electronic Device Provided by the Public Employer," Defense Digest, Volume 16, No. 3, September 2010 
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of a Borough, its Chief, a Detective, a Lieutenant and a School Resource Officer, in a civil rights lawsuit alleging that no probable cause existed to charge the Plaintiff, a local high school teacher, with witness intimidation arising from an alleged incident involving a female student in his class who was a victim of institutional sexual assault by another teacher.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of a life insurance agent in a fraud and negligence action. The agent was alleged to have forged certain policy documents in an effort to "churn" the existing policies the plaintiffs possessed into additional policies rather than increase the amount of coverage of the original policies.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of an alleged joint employer in a Family Medical Leave Act and Americans with Disabilities Act case, successfully arguing that the entity did not qualify as a joint employer; thus, it was not subject to liability under either Act.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of a real estate agent for allegedly failing to disclose that the property at issue did not have public sewer system.
    • Summary judgment granted for insurer in a claim for breach of contract and bad faith where the homeowner made a claim for vandalism when his tenant did not finish renovating the leased premises.  The Court held that the damages were not "sudden and accidental" and that the policy exclusions for faulty workmanship and renovations were applicable as a matter of law.
    • Obtained summary judgment in a civil rights case in which the plaintiff alleged a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights claiming excessive use of force was applied during his arrest and detention. 
    • Obtained favorable decision based upon governmental immunity in municipal tort action alleging negligence of the municipal authority's contractor in the connection of the water line to the plaintiff's residence. 
    • Summary judgment granted in a private entity employment case in which the plaintiff alleged gender and age discrimination while employed as a diagnostic imaging marketing representative. 
    • Summary judgment granted in a civil rights case in which the plaintiff alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and claimed that he was subject to racial profiling. 
    • Summary judgment granted in a civil rights case in which the plaintiff alleged the violation of his First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, violation of 1985 and state law claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest/false imprisonment, and conspiracy against a municipality for its police officers' response to a call from his residence. 
    • Summary judgment granted in municipal entity employment case in which the employee alleged she was subjected to race and disability discrimination after she was terminated following a reduction in force. 

Results

Dismissal of Class Action Against a Retailer

Our retail client faced a class action suit alleging claims it charged Pennsylvania state tax on face masks/coverings during the COVID-19 pandemic (when they were not subject to sales tax). The plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf of the putative class alleged claims for violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law and the Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, as well as common law claims for unjust enrichment, fraud and misappropriation/conversion. The plaintiff claimed that face masks and coverings became exempt from Pennsylvania sales tax as of March 6, 2020, when the governor issued a Proclamation of Disaster Emergency. Prior to the Proclamation, non-medical face masks/coverings were subject to sales tax because they were classified as ornamental wear or clothing accessories. The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for any of the causes of action alleged and held that amendment would be futile.

Defense Prevails in Civil Rights Lawsuit.

We obtained summary judgment in favor of a borough, its police chief, a detective, a lieutenant and a school resource officer in a civil rights lawsuit. ​The plaintiff, a local high school teacher, alleged that no probable cause existed to charge him with witness intimidation, arising from an alleged incident involving a female student who was a victim of institutional sexual assault by another teacher. In its opinion granting summary judgment, the court determined that the Affidavit of Probable Cause, which was the basis for charges against the plaintiff, was supported by the evidence at the time the affidavit was prepared. The court also held that, because no violation of Section 1983 existed, all claims against the individuals and the municipality must be dismissed. Finally, the court ruled that the individual defendants enjoyed qualified immunity because no constitutional violation existed.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Slams Door Shut on Claims Filed Against Home Inspectors

December 1, 2025

Key Points: PA Supreme Court affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. Any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection, regardless of when the problem is discovered. Decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. This article originally appeared in the October 28, 2025, issue of PLUS Blog.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. This means that any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection—regardless of when the problem is discovered.      In Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 2024 WL 80950 (Pa. Super. Jan. 8, 2024), the Superior Court found that Section 7512 of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law (68 Pa.C.S. § 7512) operated as a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations, and thus was not tolled by the discovery rule.  Ms. Gidor’s petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the designation of Section 7512 as a statute of repose, arguing that the statute is ambiguous and places the burden of commencing an action on a plaintiff as opposed to a defendant, raises constitutional issues, and violates legislative intent. In response, Mangus analogized Section 7512 to the Construction Statute of Repose and raised public policy considerations as to the intent of the General Assembly to limit claims against home inspectors.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument that the language was ambiguous and that a statute of repose requires a precipitating event by a defendant. The court unequivocally concluded that Section 7512 is a statute of repose “because it plainly, unambiguously, and without equitable exceptions, requires a plaintiff to commence an action within a specified time period after the occurrence of a definitely established event, regardless of when the claim accrues.” Id. at *13. As set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose ‘is not related to the accrual of any cause of action’ because the injury need not have occurred, much less been discovered.” Id. at *8 (citing Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 981 A.2d 198, 211 (Pa. 2009)). To be sure, the date of accrual and preclusion of the discovery rule is a key distinction between a statute of limitations and statute of repose, and has clear implications for the viability of a litigant’s claim.  This decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. Best practices for home inspectors include: •    Treat the date of report delivery as the critical cutoff for potential litigation. •    Deliver reports promptly to start the one-year clock running. •    Use time-stamped delivery methods—such as email or certified mail—to establish proof of delivery. •    Maintain clear records of both the delivery date and the report itself for an extended period, ensuring documentation is available if a claim is later filed. The litigation process can be lengthy and tedious, particularly in the context of complicated real estate transactions. The Gidor decision will force claimants to expeditiously decide whether to pursue claims, and may limit future litigation to the extent purported defects are latent or undisclosed beyond the one-year statute of repose period. Dana is Chair of our Real Estate E&O Liability Practice Group. She works in our Philadelphia, PA office and can be reached at 215-575-4556 or DAGittleman@mdwcg.com. Danielle is Chair of our Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group. She works in our Pittsburgh, PA office and can be reached at 412-803-1185 or DAGittleman@mdwcg.com.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Strengthens Legal Protections for Home Inspectors

November 1, 2025

This article was originally posted by PLUS Blog on October 28, 2025, by plushq. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. This means that any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection—regardless of when the problem is discovered. In Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 2024 WL 80950 (Pa. Super. Jan. 8, 2024), the Superior Court found that Section 7512 of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law (68 Pa. C.S.A. § 7512) operated as a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations, and thus was not tolled by the discovery rule. Ms. Gidor’s petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the designation of Section 7512 as a statute of repose, arguing that the statute is ambiguous and places the burden of commencing an action on a plaintiff as opposed to a defendant, raises constitutional issues, and violates legislative intent. In response, Mangus analogized Section 7512 to the Construction Statute of Repose and raised public policy considerations as to the intent of the General Assembly to limit claims against home inspectors. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument that the language was ambiguous and that a statute of repose requires a precipitating event by a defendant. The court unequivocally concluded that Section 7512 is a statute of repose “because it plainly, unambiguously, and without equitable exceptions, requires a plaintiff to commence an action within a specified time period after the occurrence of a definitely established event, regardless of when the claim accrues.” Id. at *13. As set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose ‘is not related to the accrual of any cause of action’ because the injury need not have occurred, much less been discovered.” Id. at *8 (citing Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 981 A.2d 198, 211 (Pa. 2009)). To be sure, the date of accrual and preclusion of the discovery rule is a key distinction between a statute of limitations and statute of repose and has clear implications for the viability of a litigant’s claim. This decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. Best practices for home inspectors include: Treat the date of report delivery as the critical cutoff for potential litigation. Deliver reports promptly to start the one-year clock running. Use time-stamped delivery methods—such as email or certified mail—to establish proof of delivery. Maintain clear records of both the delivery date and the report itself for an extended period, ensuring documentation is available if a claim is later filed.   Legal Update for Real Estate E&O – November 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.