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Pittsburgh

The Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania office of Marshall Dennehey, which opened in May of 1993, is now located in the historic Union Trust Building. The office is comprised of civil litigation attorneys practicing in all four of our major law groups covering Casualty and General Liability, Professional Liability, Health Care and Workers' Compensation. The majority of the attorneys have enjoyed a long standing professional relationship in the practice of defense litigation and are natives or long-time residents of the Pittsburgh area.

Pittsburgh is a naturally convenient location in which to quarter a litigation practice serving the Western Pennsylvania counties of Allegheny, Beaver, Butler, Lawrence, Clarion, Armstrong, Jefferson, Indiana, Westmoreland, Fayette, Washington, Greene, Somerset, Bedford, Blair, Cambria and Clearfield. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania is located in Pittsburgh. In addition, Pittsburgh is the seat of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which operates one of the busiest civil dockets in the Commonwealth's court system. A large majority of the workers' compensation claims and civil liability suits filed in the entire Western Pennsylvania region are litigated either in Pittsburgh or within a short drive of our office.

In addition to providing counsel in Western Pennsylvania, a number of attorneys in our Pittsburgh office are admitted to the bar in West Virginia. Here, they represent clients in both the state courts and before the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of West Virginia.

Thought Leadership

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Case Law Alerts

Superior Court Upholds Nonsuit in Slip‑and‑Fall Case Involving Visible Wet‑Floor Warnings

July 20, 2026

In a non-precedential opinion, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the entry of compulsory nonsuit in a slip-and-fall negligence case when evidence of placement of wet floor signs established adequate warnings to business invitees. The plaintiff filed negligence claims against the defendant hotel after she fell on a wet floor in the foyer/vestibule between the hotel lobby and an adjacent parking garage. The evidence included security video footage that showed, prior to the incident, a hotel employee mopping the floor and placing two yellow wet floor signs.  At the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief during a bench trial, the defendant hotel moved for entry of a compulsory suit, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff subsequently appealed and argued that the trial court committed an error of law by usurping the function of the factfinder and resolving disputed issues of material fact.  On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held there was no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court.  The Superior Court reasoned the evidence established that the placement of the yellow wet floor signs were open and obvious.  The Superior Court noted that the plaintiff admitted to seeing the wet-floor sign before taking her second step into the foyer (which was the step during which she fell). The Superior Court ruled “if there is anything settled in the law of negligence in Pennsylvania, it is the duty of a person to look where he is walking and to see that which is obvious.”  The Superior Court further ruled there was no evidence the defendant hotel had knowledge that the wet floor signs were inadequate to warn business invitees of the danger of slippery floor.  The Superior Court held there was no evidence that the defendant hotel breached its duty to the plaintiff and thus, there was no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to assert a prima facie negligence.  The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s entry of compulsory nonsuit against the plaintiff.

Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Court Finds Fact Issues on Visibility of Freestanding Sign’s Legs

July 20, 2026

In a non-precedential opinion, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that when determining whether a freestanding sign was an open and obvious condition, the legs of the sign were to be considered separately and warranted separate analysis. The plaintiff, while walking into the defendant store, tripped and fell on a leg of a freestanding lottery sign that was placed on the sidewalk outside of the store. While the plaintiff admitted she was able to observe the sign prior to the incident, she claimed that she did not notice the legs of the freestanding frame that supported the sign. The plaintiff filed negligence claims against the defendant store and, after discovery, the defendant store filed a motion for summary judgment.  In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant store argued that the sign was an open and obvious condition.  In her response in opposition, the plaintiff argued that the legs of the sign were not open and obvious, and created a tripping hazard. In support of her opposition, the plaintiff presented expert reports. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and ruled that there were no genuine issues of fact as to whether the sign was open and obvious. The trial court concluded that it did not consider the legs separate from the sign as a matter of law when considering the issue of whether the dangerous condition was open and obvious. Instead, the trial court found the sign with its legs was open and obvious. In support of its ruling, the trial court relied upon the Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s reasoning in Larose v. Berish, 334 A.3d 406 (Pa. Super. 2002). The plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that created genuine issues of material fact as to the open and obvious nature of the sign’s legs.  The Superior Court held the trial court erred when it determined that Larose required it to consider the sign and its legs as one to determine whether it was open and obvious.  The Superior Court reasoned that Larose does not stand for the proposition that an object resting on another object must be considered as one for purposes of determining whether the condition is open and obvious.  Instead, the Superior Court found the circumstances in Larose to be distinguishable and that Larose did not dictate as a matter of law that the legs of the sign created an open and obvious danger. The Superior Court ruled that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant store and reversed the order.

Results

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Defense Verdict Obtained After Seven-Day Bench Trial

We received a defense decision after a seven-day bench trial in a product liability action in which the exposure in the case exceeded $30 million. Our client designs, sells and services engineered equipment for the energy industry, including natural gas compression apparatuses for use in transmission pipeline systems. In 2015, the client sold the plaintiff two reciprocating compressor systems to replace outdated equipment at a station located near Downingtown, PA. The compressor systems were designed to inject oil into the gas stream for piston lubrication. This lubricating oil needed to be removed from the gas stream using filtration devices supplied by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed weld debris contained within certain vessels of the compressors migrated downstream upon commissioning and compromised several gas filtration devices. The plaintiff further contended the damaged filtration devices permitted excess lubricating oil into the pipeline, which fouled multiple turbines owned by its downstream customer at a large natural gas-fired power plant, causing significant economic losses. The applicable contract between the plaintiff and our client contained a forum selection clause requiring litigation to take place in Lake County, Indiana. The plaintiff claimed commercial losses of $18 million, plus attorney fees (per contract) in the neighborhood of $4 million. The plaintiff also maintained it was entitled to pre-judgment interest. If successful in establishing liability, this sum would have added another $5 million to $7 million to the damage award, depending on the interest rate employed by the court. Therefore, the pure exposure in the case exceeded $30 million. In response to the plaintiff’s claims, we successfully established that the weld debris incident was a red herring and did not damage the filtration equipment. Material testing of debris from within the filtration devices revealed very little weld debris compared to pipe scale and other naturally occurring components. Through key expert testimony, we established that the plaintiff could not meet its burden of proof because the oil contamination events may have been caused by several factors directly attributable to the plaintiff’s lack of design engineering, inadequate equipment maintenance, equipment failure and inappropriate response to system alarms.

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

We secured a complete defense victory, saving our client over $500,000 in known exposure and likely millions in long-term liability. The workers’ compensation judge granted our termination petition and denied the claimant’s claim petition, finding that the claimant fully recovered and was not entitled to wage loss or medical benefits. Through medical discovery, we uncovered pre-injury treatment that directly contradicted the claimant’s testimony. The judge favored our medical expert, citing no changes on pre- and post-injury MRIs as further evidence undermining the claim.

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Events

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Conference

25th Annual Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Conference

May 28-29, 2026

Hershey, PA

Kacey C. Wiedt, Shannon Fellin, and Perry D. Merlo

Firm Highlights

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

graphic announcing our 6 2027 Super Lawyers & Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

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Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group