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Pittsburgh

The Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania office of Marshall Dennehey, which opened in May of 1993, is now located in the historic Union Trust Building. The office is comprised of civil litigation attorneys practicing in all four of our major law groups covering Casualty and General Liability, Professional Liability, Health Care and Workers' Compensation. The majority of the attorneys have enjoyed a long standing professional relationship in the practice of defense litigation and are natives or long-time residents of the Pittsburgh area.

Pittsburgh is a naturally convenient location in which to quarter a litigation practice serving the Western Pennsylvania counties of Allegheny, Beaver, Butler, Lawrence, Clarion, Armstrong, Jefferson, Indiana, Westmoreland, Fayette, Washington, Greene, Somerset, Bedford, Blair, Cambria and Clearfield. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania is located in Pittsburgh. In addition, Pittsburgh is the seat of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which operates one of the busiest civil dockets in the Commonwealth's court system. A large majority of the workers' compensation claims and civil liability suits filed in the entire Western Pennsylvania region are litigated either in Pittsburgh or within a short drive of our office.

In addition to providing counsel in Western Pennsylvania, a number of attorneys in our Pittsburgh office are admitted to the bar in West Virginia. Here, they represent clients in both the state courts and before the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of West Virginia.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

November 3, 2026

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Case Law Alerts

Superior Court Upholds Nonsuit in Slip‑and‑Fall Case Involving Visible Wet‑Floor Warnings

July 20, 2026

In a non-precedential opinion, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the entry of compulsory nonsuit in a slip-and-fall negligence case when evidence of placement of wet floor signs established adequate warnings to business invitees. The plaintiff filed negligence claims against the defendant hotel after she fell on a wet floor in the foyer/vestibule between the hotel lobby and an adjacent parking garage. The evidence included security video footage that showed, prior to the incident, a hotel employee mopping the floor and placing two yellow wet floor signs.  At the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief during a bench trial, the defendant hotel moved for entry of a compulsory suit, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff subsequently appealed and argued that the trial court committed an error of law by usurping the function of the factfinder and resolving disputed issues of material fact.  On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held there was no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court.  The Superior Court reasoned the evidence established that the placement of the yellow wet floor signs were open and obvious.  The Superior Court noted that the plaintiff admitted to seeing the wet-floor sign before taking her second step into the foyer (which was the step during which she fell). The Superior Court ruled “if there is anything settled in the law of negligence in Pennsylvania, it is the duty of a person to look where he is walking and to see that which is obvious.”  The Superior Court further ruled there was no evidence the defendant hotel had knowledge that the wet floor signs were inadequate to warn business invitees of the danger of slippery floor.  The Superior Court held there was no evidence that the defendant hotel breached its duty to the plaintiff and thus, there was no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to assert a prima facie negligence.  The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s entry of compulsory nonsuit against the plaintiff.

Results

Defense Verdict Obtained After Seven-Day Bench Trial

We received a defense decision after a seven-day bench trial in a product liability action in which the exposure in the case exceeded $30 million. Our client designs, sells and services engineered equipment for the energy industry, including natural gas compression apparatuses for use in transmission pipeline systems. In 2015, the client sold the plaintiff two reciprocating compressor systems to replace outdated equipment at a station located near Downingtown, PA. The compressor systems were designed to inject oil into the gas stream for piston lubrication. This lubricating oil needed to be removed from the gas stream using filtration devices supplied by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed weld debris contained within certain vessels of the compressors migrated downstream upon commissioning and compromised several gas filtration devices. The plaintiff further contended the damaged filtration devices permitted excess lubricating oil into the pipeline, which fouled multiple turbines owned by its downstream customer at a large natural gas-fired power plant, causing significant economic losses. The applicable contract between the plaintiff and our client contained a forum selection clause requiring litigation to take place in Lake County, Indiana. The plaintiff claimed commercial losses of $18 million, plus attorney fees (per contract) in the neighborhood of $4 million. The plaintiff also maintained it was entitled to pre-judgment interest. If successful in establishing liability, this sum would have added another $5 million to $7 million to the damage award, depending on the interest rate employed by the court. Therefore, the pure exposure in the case exceeded $30 million. In response to the plaintiff’s claims, we successfully established that the weld debris incident was a red herring and did not damage the filtration equipment. Material testing of debris from within the filtration devices revealed very little weld debris compared to pipe scale and other naturally occurring components. Through key expert testimony, we established that the plaintiff could not meet its burden of proof because the oil contamination events may have been caused by several factors directly attributable to the plaintiff’s lack of design engineering, inadequate equipment maintenance, equipment failure and inappropriate response to system alarms.

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

We secured a complete defense victory, saving our client over $500,000 in known exposure and likely millions in long-term liability. The workers’ compensation judge granted our termination petition and denied the claimant’s claim petition, finding that the claimant fully recovered and was not entitled to wage loss or medical benefits. Through medical discovery, we uncovered pre-injury treatment that directly contradicted the claimant’s testimony. The judge favored our medical expert, citing no changes on pre- and post-injury MRIs as further evidence undermining the claim.

Events

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.