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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Our Rideshare Liability Practice Group

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 1, March 2023

Meeting the Needs of the Rideshare Revolution

In a relatively short timespan, rideshare platforms—like Uber and Lyft—and carshare platforms—like Turo—have transformed the global transportation industry. With the push of a few buttons, users can instantly hail a ride or rent a vehicle virtually anywhere in the world. Unquestionably, the advent of these technology service companies has made travel more convenient and efficient. But it has also spawned a multitude of new legal issues and claims. Legislators and judges have been striving to keep up with the technology, but every legislative or judicial action can create new and complex legal questions. Marshall Dennehey responded to the needs of the industry by forming its Rideshare Liability Practice Group—a dedicated team of experienced defense attorneys who have developed specialized knowledge of legal issues facing this revolutionary industry.

Originally launched in 2021, the Rideshare Liability Practice Group is on the cutting edge of defending a wide variety of rideshare claims and peer-to-peer carshare claims. The practice group is comprised of numerous attorneys across the firm’s 19 offices—located in seven different states, including Pennsylvania, Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, New York, Connecticut, and Delaware—who have handled hundreds of claims in the field. The practice group is co-chaired by Thomas F. Brown (Orlando) and Patrick M. Delong (Fort Lauderdale), who cumulatively have over 50 years of insurance defense experience.

The attorneys in this practice group have worked with multiple rideshare and carshare platforms. They appreciate the need for understanding the vocabulary of the industry as well as issues of confidentiality and brand protection. Using the wrong terminology could create exposure or liability where it would not otherwise exist. During the course of discovery, a company’s intellectual property and proprietary data might be requested. The attorneys in this group frequently oppose discovery requests that seek proprietary and trade-secret information, and they utilize confidentiality agreements and protective orders to shield confidential information from improper use and widespread disclosure. Appropriate provisions in settlement agreements are also used to protect sensitive information.

The Rideshare Liability Practice Group also has extensive experience defending the insurers and users of these platforms, including drivers, vehicle owners, and vehicle renters. They have successfully defended claims involving catastrophic injuries, wrongful death, multiple-vehicle accidents, and multiple claimants. They have staved off aggressive and creative attempts by the plaintiff’s bar to expand liability through causes of action, including:

  • Negligence
  • Vicarious liability
  • Negligent hiring or selection
  • Negligent retention and supervision
  • Product liability
  • Negligent design of the ride-hailing application
  • Negligent maintenance of a shared car
  • Negligent entrustment
  • Bad faith
  • Uninsured and underinsured motorist

Defending these cases requires the knowledge and an understanding of applicable federal and state laws and regulations. The laws and regulations of a particular state might govern the level of insurance coverage required during various aspects of the rideshare process. An independent rideshare driver might need his or her own insurance while the rideshare app is off. The rideshare platform might be required to provide a coverage when an independent rideshare driver is using the app, but a different amount of coverage might be required depending on whether the driver has accepted a ride or if the driver is actively transporting a rider.

Formulating appropriate defenses to these claims also requires an understanding of the applicable law. For example, Florida trial courts have issued conflicting opinions regarding whether a transportation network application is a product subject to product liability laws or a service outside the scope of such laws. Since the Florida appellate courts have not yet weighed in with a controlling opinion on the issue, a rideshare defense practitioner must possess a cutting-edge awareness of developing discovery trends and legal arguments advanced by the plaintiff’s bar with respect to this issue and must prepare his or her client to successfully defend against them during the discovery and dispositive motion phases of litigation.

Another example of evolving legal trends may be found in the carshare arena, where both state and federal law could insulate the vehicle owner from liability. The Graves Amendment is a federal law that bars vicarious liability claims where:

  • The owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and
  • There is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).

Several states have now enacted peer-to-peer carsharing statutes that expressly extend the Graves Amendment to carsharing situations.

There are numerous complexities to defending a rideshare or carshare claim, and the attorneys in Marshall Dennehey’s Rideshare Liability Practice Group can be retained to assist at different stages throughout the life of a claim. Before a lawsuit is filed, our rideshare defense attorneys are often asked to assist with accident investigations, preservation of evidence, expert retention, legal research, global settlement conferences, and responding to time-limit demands. Marshall Dennehey’s lawyers have the experience and skill to take cases to trial and are also supported by an exceptional appellate group. In the Marshall Dennehey Rideshare Liability Practice Group, the aim is to always provide outstanding, efficient, and cost-conscious legal services to our clients.

*Patrick DeLong is a shareholder in our Fort Lauderdale, Florida, office. He can be reached at 954.832.3953 or pmdelong@mdwcg.com. Tom Brown is a shareholder in our Orlando, Florida, office. He can be reached at 407.420.4392 or tfbrown@mdwcg.com.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 1, March 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.