.

Matthew S. Schorr

Chairman, Board of Directors

Director, Casualty Department

Portrait of Matthew S. Schorr

Matthew serves as the Director of the Casualty Department, Chairman of the firm’s Board of Directors, and a member of Marshall Dennehey’s three-person Executive Committee. This governing body oversees the firm's daily operations and drives the implementation of strategic initiatives for the Am Law 200 firm. As Director of the Casualty Department, the largest of the firm’s four legal divisions, Matthew manages the administrative functions and provides strategic leadership for over 250 attorneys across 19 offices.

An experienced litigator with a broad legal background gained from working at specialized firms in New York and New Jersey, Matthew brings the perspective of having defended individuals, insurance companies, and major corporations in complex litigations within a variety of practice areas.

Matthew joined Marshall Dennehey as a shareholder and co-chair of the maritime litigation practice group in June of 2008. He and his litigation team routinely handle high-exposure cases in the fields of premises liability, product liability, restaurant/bar liability, marine, inland marine, construction accidents, automobile, insurance coverage, condominium/community association law, medical malpractice and subrogation.

Based upon his experience, skill, and effectiveness at trial, Matthew has been certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Civil Trial Attorney, an achievement attained by less than two percent of lawyers in New Jersey. He has 10 published opinions and has argued before the Supreme Court of New Jersey on multiple occasions. Matthew was also one of the first trial attorneys to participate in the pilot program that permitted jurors to question witnesses and was asked to lecture at the ATLA Boardwalk Seminar as the defense speaker on this topic.

In 1991, Matthew began his career at Donovan, Parry, Walsh & Repetto, a New York firm that pioneered maritime and insurance law, where he handled a variety of challenging matters involving Jones Act seaman claims, insurance coverage disputes, hull and cargo liability actions, consumer fraud, premises liability, subrogation, product liability, and various commercial cases. He also achieved the status as a Proctor in Admiralty. In 1996, Matthew joined the well-known medical malpractice defense firm of McDonough, Korn & Eichhorn, which went on to become McDonough, Korn, Eichhorn & Schorr subsequent to his ascension to partnership in 1999. During his 12 years with the firm, he managed and helped the firm develop maritime, insurance, community association law, and casualty practices. He also became a seasoned trial lawyer taking dozens of malpractice and casualty cases to trial with a success rate of approximately 95 percent.

Matthew graduated cum laude from the State University of New York at Albany in 1988 and received his juris doctor from Fordham Law School in 1991, where he was named a Leonard F. Manning Scholar. Matthew is admitted to the bars of New York and New Jersey. 

    • Fordham University School of Law (J.D., 1991)
    • State University of New York at Albany (B.A., cum laude, 1988)
    • New Jersey, 1991
    • New York, 1992
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of New York
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • Pennsylvania, 2021
    • Litigation Management Institute, Graduate 2013 (CLMP)
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer (2011)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Association of Trial Lawyers of America
    • Claims and Litigation Management Alliance (CLM)
    • New Jersey Bar Association
    • New York Bar Association
    • The Maritime Law Association of the United States
    • Trial Attorneys of New Jersey
    • The Lawyers Club of Philadelphia
    • Autonomous Vehicles: The Rise of the Machines - Moderator, ILG Virtual Conference, March 25, 2021
    • Negligent Security: Foreseeable Crime - Believable Risk - Moderator, ILG Virtual Conference, March 22, 2021
    • Impact of Long Shore and New York Labor Law, the Jones Act and McBride Decision on Punitive Damages Under Maritime Law, Navigators Insurance Marine Department, April 2015
    • New Jersey Contractual Indemnity and Additional Insured Issues, Zurich Insurance, April 2015
    • Advanced Trial Strategies, National Business Institute, Newark, NJ, December 2014
    • Know Before You Go, CLM Claims College -  Property School, Faculty, Philadelphia, PA, September 2014
    • Transportation Claims and Recovery, Travelers Insurance, April 2013
    • CLE Seminar: Settlements and Releases, June 5, 2009 
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a two-week trial in Camden County.  Our insured, a stevedore company (responsible for discharging cargo ships), had offloaded telephone pole-sized pillars of solid steel, known as "blooms" from a ship at a marine terminal port and stacked them on the pier.  The plaintiff was a supervisor for the port owner, whose company was responsible for subsequently loading the blooms by forklift onto trucks for delivery to the end-user. 
    • During the truck loading process , the forklift operator and our insured's “checker” (responsible for insuring that the correct inventory was being loaded and shipped) experienced difficulty loading the last of 3 blooms onto a truck.  The plaintiff, as supervisor of the forklift operator, stopped to assist.  While attempting a routine repositioning procedure, the bloom, which weighed approximately 7 tons, inadvertently rolled off the forklift blades, crushing the plaintiff's right leg and necessitating an above-the-knee amputation.
    • The plaintiff alleged that the accident and injury resulted from our client’s negligence with improperly stacking the blooms after discharge, as well as the checker’s involvement during the repositioning procedure. The plaintiff’s demand was $3.5 million. Following a two week trial, and into a second day of deliberations, the jury ultimately concluded that any negligence of our client did not proximately cause the accident, but rather the accident was caused by the conduct of the forklift operator and the plaintiff himself. A defense verdict was returned.
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a 1 month trial where the plaintiff, a 47 year old female periodontist, alleged that she sustained a career-ending injury, resulting in total disability, when she was struck by a deteriorated section of a wood privacy fence at the insured's condominium complex where she lived. The plaintiff underwent anterior & posterior lumbar spinal fusion surgery 3 months after the accident and then sold her practice 3 months later. She had been earning approximately $200,000 annually. The plaintiff rejected a $2 million settlement offer (which had been extended to protect an excess layer) on the last day of trial, holding firm on a $7 million demand. 
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a jury trial in Federal District Court on a Maritime Jones Act Seaman claim.  The plaintiff, a commercial fisherman, suffered a crushed hand injury while lowering clam cages. The defense successfully maintained that the vessel was seaworthy and that the accident was caused by the claimant's own negligence.  
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a jury trial on behalf of two surgeons in a medical malpractice case alleging negligence during a laparoscopic gall bladder removal surgery in which the common bile duct was inadvertently transected. The plaintiff required additional surgery and suffered a difficult post-operative course as well as alleged permanent liver damage. The jury accepted the defense argument that aberrant anatomy led to this accepted complication. 
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a jury trial on behalf of NY Waterway. The plaintiff fell on a ramp while entering a ferry boat, suffering a fractured knee that required surgical repair. The plaintiff alleged that the ramp on which she fell was negligently designed. The defense used as its liability expert Tom Blomquist, US Coast Guard (Ret.). Capt. Blomquist had served as the Commanding Officer of the US Coast Guard Marine Inspection Office, Philadelphia, Pa., and convincingly testified that the ramp was in compliance with all applicable Coast Guard and maritime related regulations. The jury apparently liked or sympathized with the plaintiff as it returned a question during deliberations, asking if it could award monetary damages in the absence of any adverse finding against the defendant. After the judge instructed the jury that it could not, the jury returned its verdict in favor of the defense. 
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a jury trial on behalf of a surgeon in a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff suffered a puncture of the aorta during a laparoscopic gall bladder surgery. The plaintiff was pregnant at the time and the fetus died. The jury accepted the defense argument that inadvertent vascular injury was a rare but recognized complication of the procedure. 
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a jury trial in a premises liability action against a condominium complex.   The plaintiff claimed that she fell on ice on a sidewalk following a snow storm. She suffered a fractured shoulder that required surgical repair.  Matthew was successful not only in obtaining a defense verdict on behalf of the condominium Association as to the plaintiff, but was also successful in pursuing a cross claim for defense and indemnity against the co­defendant snow contractor. The client was awarded all legal costs incurred in having defended the suit, plus interest and fees. 
    • Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Civil Trial Attorney, 2005 
    • Certified Proctor in Admiralty, 1996 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.