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Adam M. Barnes

Portrait of Adam M. Barnes

Adam is a Shareholder in the Casualty Department and, for over 25 years, has concentrated his practice in the defense of companies and individuals in a wide range of general liability civil litigation matters. He routinely defends clients against claims of bodily injuries and property damage involving premises and retail liability, construction injury, property subrogation, automobile liability, trucking and transportation liability, uninsured and underinsured motorist claims, hospitality & liquor liability, and product liability.

Adam has litigated cases throughout Pennsylvania as well as West Virginia and eastern Ohio; tried matters in both state and federal courts; and handled appeals before appellate courts in all three states.

Adam has over 20 years' experience providing counsel and defense of coverage issues involving commercial general liability, auto liability, umbrella/excess liability, and property policies, as well as homeowners and personal auto liability policies.

Adam has defended private businesses against employment law matters involving claims made under Title VII, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Americans with Disabilities Act at the administrative level before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, as well as in Pennsylvania state and federal courts.

Adam has been recognized as a Pennsylvania Super Lawyer since 2019. He has authored materials and presented for the Pennsylvania Bar Institute on a range of topics. He has authored materials and presented at seminars for general liability claim professionals on general liability claims, uninsured/underinsured motorist claims, risk transfer, and insurance coverage issues.

Adam graduated from Indiana University – Bloomington in 1993 (cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa) and earned his law degree from Indiana University School of Law – Bloomington in 1999.

    • Indiana University Maurer School of Law (J.D., 1999)
    • Indiana University-Bloomington (B.A., cum laude, 1993)
    • Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2010
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2001
    • West Virginia, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of West Virginia, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of West Virginia, 2002
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 4th Circuit, 2004
    • Ohio, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio, 2012
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2005
    • Successfully obtained summary judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of an insurer, with the court ruling that there was no duty to defend or indemnify a security company in lawsuits arising from violent attacks at a Philadelphia bar. The court held that claims styled as negligence were barred by a broad assault and battery exclusion, which capped coverage at $250,000—a limit already exhausted—thereby precluding any additional coverage. The Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Mainline Private Security, LLC, 2025 WL 3644242 (E.D.Pa. 2025).
    • Successfully defended a construction contractor client in a Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania action seeking compensatory damages for alleged flood-related property damage arising from an improperly constructed sewage separation line. Obtained dismissal of the claims through Preliminary Objections based on the expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. On appeal, the plaintiff argued the complaint supported a theory of continuous trespass; however, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding the action was untimely and that no continuous trespass claim had been pled. Milan Stefanik Slovak Library and Literary Society a/k/a Milan Stefanik Slovak Society v. Borough of East Vandergrift, et al., 2025 WL 3527288 (Pa. Commwlth. Ct. 2025).
    • Obtained a summary judgment on a first-party commercial property claim where the insured sought coverage for alleged property damage to its warehouse resulting from lessee's failure to clean it as the claim did not involve “accidental physical loss” and furthermore, the alleged damage fell within scope of policy's pollutants exclusion. Vale Vista Associates LP v. Cincinnati Casualty Co., 442 F.Supp.3d 896 (W.D.Pa. 2020) 
    • Obtained a summary judgment regarding the interpretation of an arbitration provision in a commercial auto policy with respect to a claim for underinsured motorist benefits. Rea v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 2014 WL 4198059 (W.D.Pa. 2014) 
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment based on enforcement of the statute of limitations to a claim for damage to residential property. Roberts v. West Virginia American Water Co., 655 S.E.2d 119 (W.Va. 2007) 
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment based on the enforcement of professional liability exclusions contained in the businessowners package policy and personal liability policy in response to attempt to obtain coverage by the insured-attorney for a malicious prosecution claim related to the insured’s filing of a counterclaim based on Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a client against the Estate prosecuting a medical negligence / wrongful death lawsuit. Boggs v. Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corp., 693 S.E.2d 53 (W.Va. 2010) 
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment in favor of real estate agency and realtor arising out of the sale of residential property. Hinerman v. Rodriguez, 2013 WL 2157766 (W.Va. 2013) 
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment in favor of real estate agency and realtor arising out of the sale of residential property in response to a subsequently added claim after the original claim was dismissed by summary judgment and upheld on appeal. Hinerman v. Rodriguez, 2015 WL 3672260 (W.Va. 2015) 
    • Affirming of summary judgment in favor of paving contractor arising out of claim of residential property damage attributed to roadway paving operations as plaintiffs failed to present competent evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact linking to contractor’s operations to the alleged damage. Grant v. Kelly Paving, Inc., 2018 WL 6015816 (W.Va. 2018) 
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment for commercial general liability insurer against claim for defense and coverage by policyholder in response to third-party liability claim associated with the development of commercial retail plaza in southern West Virginia on the grounds the claim was excluded by the contractual liability exclusion as interpreted under Tennessee law. J.A. Street & Associates, Inc. v. BITCO General Insurance Corp., 2019 WL 1949710 (W.Va. 2019)
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment in favor of construction contractor that deposited road construction spoil onto a private residential property at the then-owner’s request, per the then-owner’s specifications; the fill area later slipped, and the current owner sued alleging a breach of the duty of care. The appellate court affirmed that the construction contractor did not assume a duty of care to subsequent purchasers. Grisell v. Shelly & Sands, 2023 WL 7299892 (W.Va. 2023) 
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment in favor of commercial property insurer on the grounds that the insured failed to present competent evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the loss event was due to direct physical loss to a transformer, which was necessary to establish coverage for the claim. Hickory Groves 339, LLC v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 2016 WL 3261018 (Ohio.Ct.App., 4th District 2016)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2019-2025)
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • Defense Trial Counsel of West Virginia
    • Ohio Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • West Virginia Bar Association

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.