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Adam M. Barnes

Portrait of Adam M. Barnes

Adam is a Shareholder in the Casualty Department and, for over 25 years, has concentrated his practice in the defense of companies and individuals in a wide range of general liability civil litigation matters. He routinely defends clients against claims of bodily injuries and property damage involving premises and retail liability, construction injury, property subrogation, automobile liability, trucking and transportation liability, uninsured and underinsured motorist claims, hospitality & liquor liability, and product liability.

Adam has litigated cases throughout Pennsylvania as well as West Virginia and eastern Ohio; tried matters in both state and federal courts; and handled appeals before appellate courts in all three states.

Adam has over 20 years' experience providing counsel and defense of coverage issues involving commercial general liability, auto liability, umbrella/excess liability, and property policies, as well as homeowners and personal auto liability policies.

Adam has defended private businesses against employment law matters involving claims made under Title VII, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Americans with Disabilities Act at the administrative level before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, as well as in Pennsylvania state and federal courts.

Adam has been recognized as a Pennsylvania Super Lawyer since 2019. He has authored materials and presented for the Pennsylvania Bar Institute on a range of topics. He has authored materials and presented at seminars for general liability claim professionals on general liability claims, uninsured/underinsured motorist claims, risk transfer, and insurance coverage issues.

Adam graduated from Indiana University – Bloomington in 1993 (cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa) and earned his law degree from Indiana University School of Law – Bloomington in 1999.

    • Indiana University Maurer School of Law (J.D., 1999)
    • Indiana University-Bloomington (B.A., cum laude, 1993)
    • Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2010
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2001
    • West Virginia, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of West Virginia, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of West Virginia, 2002
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 4th Circuit, 2004
    • Ohio, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio, 2012
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2005
    • Successfully obtained summary judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of an insurer, with the court ruling that there was no duty to defend or indemnify a security company in lawsuits arising from violent attacks at a Philadelphia bar. The court held that claims styled as negligence were barred by a broad assault and battery exclusion, which capped coverage at $250,000—a limit already exhausted—thereby precluding any additional coverage. The Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Mainline Private Security, LLC, 2025 WL 3644242 (E.D.Pa. 2025).
    • Successfully defended a construction contractor client in a Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania action seeking compensatory damages for alleged flood-related property damage arising from an improperly constructed sewage separation line. Obtained dismissal of the claims through Preliminary Objections based on the expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. On appeal, the plaintiff argued the complaint supported a theory of continuous trespass; however, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding the action was untimely and that no continuous trespass claim had been pled. Milan Stefanik Slovak Library and Literary Society a/k/a Milan Stefanik Slovak Society v. Borough of East Vandergrift, et al., 2025 WL 3527288 (Pa. Commwlth. Ct. 2025).
    • Obtained a summary judgment on a first-party commercial property claim where the insured sought coverage for alleged property damage to its warehouse resulting from lessee's failure to clean it as the claim did not involve “accidental physical loss” and furthermore, the alleged damage fell within scope of policy's pollutants exclusion. Vale Vista Associates LP v. Cincinnati Casualty Co., 442 F.Supp.3d 896 (W.D.Pa. 2020) 
    • Obtained a summary judgment regarding the interpretation of an arbitration provision in a commercial auto policy with respect to a claim for underinsured motorist benefits. Rea v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 2014 WL 4198059 (W.D.Pa. 2014) 
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment based on enforcement of the statute of limitations to a claim for damage to residential property. Roberts v. West Virginia American Water Co., 655 S.E.2d 119 (W.Va. 2007) 
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment based on the enforcement of professional liability exclusions contained in the businessowners package policy and personal liability policy in response to attempt to obtain coverage by the insured-attorney for a malicious prosecution claim related to the insured’s filing of a counterclaim based on Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a client against the Estate prosecuting a medical negligence / wrongful death lawsuit. Boggs v. Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corp., 693 S.E.2d 53 (W.Va. 2010) 
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment in favor of real estate agency and realtor arising out of the sale of residential property. Hinerman v. Rodriguez, 2013 WL 2157766 (W.Va. 2013) 
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment in favor of real estate agency and realtor arising out of the sale of residential property in response to a subsequently added claim after the original claim was dismissed by summary judgment and upheld on appeal. Hinerman v. Rodriguez, 2015 WL 3672260 (W.Va. 2015) 
    • Affirming of summary judgment in favor of paving contractor arising out of claim of residential property damage attributed to roadway paving operations as plaintiffs failed to present competent evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact linking to contractor’s operations to the alleged damage. Grant v. Kelly Paving, Inc., 2018 WL 6015816 (W.Va. 2018) 
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment for commercial general liability insurer against claim for defense and coverage by policyholder in response to third-party liability claim associated with the development of commercial retail plaza in southern West Virginia on the grounds the claim was excluded by the contractual liability exclusion as interpreted under Tennessee law. J.A. Street & Associates, Inc. v. BITCO General Insurance Corp., 2019 WL 1949710 (W.Va. 2019)
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment in favor of construction contractor that deposited road construction spoil onto a private residential property at the then-owner’s request, per the then-owner’s specifications; the fill area later slipped, and the current owner sued alleging a breach of the duty of care. The appellate court affirmed that the construction contractor did not assume a duty of care to subsequent purchasers. Grisell v. Shelly & Sands, 2023 WL 7299892 (W.Va. 2023) 
    • Affirming the granting of summary judgment in favor of commercial property insurer on the grounds that the insured failed to present competent evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the loss event was due to direct physical loss to a transformer, which was necessary to establish coverage for the claim. Hickory Groves 339, LLC v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 2016 WL 3261018 (Ohio.Ct.App., 4th District 2016)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2019-2025)
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • Defense Trial Counsel of West Virginia
    • Ohio Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • West Virginia Bar Association

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.