.

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2024 Shareholder Class And Special Counsel Promotions

December 19, 2023

Marshall Dennehey is pleased to announce that 10 attorneys have been elected shareholders of the firm effective January 1, 2024. Additionally, three attorneys have been promoted from associate to special counsel. These new shareholders and special counsel represent the firm's four core departments – Casualty, Professional Liability, Health Care and Workers' Compensation – and come from 8 of the firm's 19 offices.

“This class of newly elected shareholders embodies the traits that make Marshall Dennehey a special place,” said
G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “They are hard working, dedicated, talented lawyers whose exceptional contributions have been pivotal to the success of the firm and our clients. We congratulate them on their well-deserved promotions and look forward to their future achievements as we continue the firm’s growth.” 

Promoted to Shareholder

ORLANDO, FLORIDA
Peggy Smith Bush, Casualty Department (former Special Counsel)
Peggy is an experienced litigator, advocate and counselor who routinely defends corporations, large self-insureds, and public entities in complex litigation involving claims of personal injury and wrongful death. Clients value the strategic thinking and results-oriented litigation skills she brings to matters involving transportation, premises liability, product liability, negligent security, as well as general liability claims. Peggy is a graduate of the University of North Alabama and Barry University School of Law. She is admitted to practice in Florida, the U.S. Court of Appeals 11th Circuit, and before the U.S. Supreme Court.

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
Ryan P. Friel, Professional Liability Department (former Associate)
Ryan defends a variety of clients as a member of both the Securities & Investments Professional Liability and Privacy and Data Security Practice Groups. He represents FINRA member firms, registered representatives, and registered investment advisors in state and federal court as well as in FINRA arbitration and expungement proceedings and a wide range of investigations, examinations, inquiries, and enforcement matters. Ryan also defends clients in privacy-related litigation and technology-related litigation, and conducts regulatory investigations across many industries in matters stemming from data privacy and security incidents. He is a graduate of Fairfield University and Syracuse University College of Law. Ryan is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania.

Benjamin M.H. Goshko, Casualty Department (former Associate)
Ben focuses his practice on construction, trucking/transportation, product liability, and hospitality matters. He defends claims on behalf of construction contractors, product manufacturers, property owners, restaurants, and hotels in litigation involving fire losses, negligence, auto accidents, catastrophic injuries, and wrongful death. Ben is a graduate of Temple University and Temple University Beasley School of Law. He is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. 

Kara A. Pullman, Professional Liability Department (former Special Counsel)
Kara defends employers in claims involving allegations of discrimination based upon age, gender, race, sexual orientation and disability, and also handles retaliation and whistleblower claims in federal and state courts and administrative agencies.  Additionally, she provides counsel to clients regarding employment matters, including ensuring that policies and procedures are legally compliant and up to date. She also defends school districts in cases alleging violations of the IDEA and related federal and state statutes, and has handled numerous special education due process matters. Kara is also experienced in the areas of municipal liability and civil rights and has represented police departments, police officers, and school boards in cases relating to civil rights and discrimination in the state and federal courts. She is a graduate of St. Joseph’s University and Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. She is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. 

PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA
Gregory P. Graham, Professional Liability Department (former Associate)
Greg defends corporations and professionals in commercial, construction, and class action litigation. He also defends attorneys in legal malpractice actions involving civil and family disputes, business transactions in the real estate and oil and gas industries, and commercial litigation. Greg's construction practice includes the representation of owners, contractors, and design professionals from defect and commercial loss claims related to the construction industry. Admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, he is a graduate of Michigan State University and the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.


KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA
Stephen G. Keim, Casualty Department (former Associate)
Stephen represents clients in motor vehicle accidents, premises liability, product liability, business litigation, and professional liability matters. He also has significant experience defending attorneys, real estate brokers and agents, accountants, and architects against professional liability claims. A graduate of Kutztown University of Pennsylvania and the William S. Boyd School of Law, he is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. 

Christin L. Kochel, Professional Liability Department (former Associate)
Christin focuses her practice on insurance coverage matters and civil litigation, with emphasis on automobile liability and uninsured/underinsured motorist claims. She is also experienced in defending premises liability, homeowner's insurance, minor's compromise, and other general liability claims and suits. She is a graduate of Bloomsburg University and Widener University School of Law and is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

ROSELAND, NJ
Heather M. LaBombardi, Health Care Department (former Associate)
Heather concentrates her practice on medical malpractice and health care liability matters. She routinely defends physicians, nurses, health care providers, and medical facilities against medical malpractice claims. She additionally has written several appellate briefs and argued multiple times before the New Jersey Appellate Division. She is a graduate of the University of Miami and earned an M.S. in management from Nova Southeastern University before obtaining her J.D. from Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School. She is admitted to practice in New Jersey and New York. 

Paul W. Lanza, Casualty Department (former Associate)
Paul concentrates his practice primarily on trucking/transportation liability, premises/retail liability, and construction injury litigation. He also handles cases involving condominium/community association law, automobile liability, product liability, and malpractice claims against real estate professionals. He is frequently retained by clients to handle the pre-suit investigation of high-exposure cases involving complex issues of fact and law, including fatal commercial vehicle accidents. Paul is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame and Seton Hall University School of Law. He is admitted to practice in New Jersey and New York.

NEW YORK CITY
Andrew Thebaud, Casualty Department (former Associate)
Andrew represents clients in the fields of construction injury litigation, retail liability, product liability, automobile litigation, commercial trucking litigation and property litigation. His clients include construction companies, maintenance companies, retail stores, and product retailers, among other clients. He also handles a significant amount of retail and premises liability cases. He is a graduate of the University at Albany (SUNY) and the University of Virginia School of Law, and is admitted to practice in New York.

______________________________________________________________________________________________
Associates Promoted to Special Counsel

MOUNT LAUREL
Mari I. Gangadean, Professional Liability Department
Mari defends employers in employment-related claims involving allegations of discrimination based upon age, gender, race, sexual orientation, and disability, as well as retaliation and "whistleblowing" in both federal and state courts. She additionally has extensive experience in insurance coverage and bad faith litigation, as well as defending automobile negligence and uninsured/underinsured motorist claims. A graduate of Mount Holyoke College, she earned her law degree from Temple University School of Law. She is admitted to practice in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

PHILADELPHIA
Angeline C. Panepresso, Casualty Department
Angeline devotes her practice to a variety of litigation matters including premises liability, product liability, automobile liability, and construction liability. She is a graduate of Lehigh University and Widener University School of Law and is admitted to practice in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 

WESTCHESTER
Sanford G. Jacobs, Casualty Department
Sanford has over 30 years of experience in trucking & transportation liability, general liability, premises liability, motor vehicle liability, construction injury litigation, products liability, and toxic torts. His extensive experience includes handling cases from inception through jury trial throughout the New York Metropolitan area, upstate New York, and the state of Florida. He is a graduate of the State University of New York at Oneonta and Western Michigan University Cooley Law School. He is admitted to practice in New York, the District of Columbia, and Florida. 
 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.