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Christin L. Kochel

Portrait of Christin L. Kochel

Christin is a member of the Casualty Department where she defends clients in the areas of amusement, sports, and recreation matters. Christin routinely represents and defends a wide range of clients in this space, including sports and recreation facility owners, coaches, instructors, youth athletic organizations, professional athletes, educational institutions, and college fraternities against various claims and suits brought against them.

Christin also has significant experience handling a wide variety of cases in the areas of insurance defense, coverage matters and civil litigation, with a focus on automobile liability and uninsured/underinsured motorist claims. She has also represented and defended clients in premises liability, homeowner's insurance, minor's compromise, and other general liability claims and suits brought against them.

Throughout her legal career, Christin has litigated cases in almost every county in the eastern portion of Pennsylvania as well as the federal courts. She has also resolved countless cases for her clients via arbitration and mediation.

In 2007, Christin earned her juris doctor from Widener University Delaware Law School. While in law school, Christin was a member of the Moot Court Honor Society and Moe Levine Trial Advocacy Society. In 2004, she graduated cum laude from Bloomsburg University.

Christin is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania as well as the United States District Courts for both the Middle and Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania. She is also a member of the American Bar Association, Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Berks County Bar Association, where she served as the past president of the Young Lawyers Section.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2007)
    • Commonwealth University - Bloomsburg (B.A., cum laude, 2004)
    • New Jersey, 2008
    • Pennsylvania, 2008
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2012
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2015
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2019-2023)
    • American Bar Association
    • Berks County Bar Association, Young Lawyers Division, Past President
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Obtained a successful defense award involving a significant claim. Plaintiff and his wife filed a claim against their insurer for underinsured motorist benefits after Plaintiff was struck as a pedestrian by a drunk driver. Plaintiff sustained several fractures of his body and also claimed neck and back injuries and significant damages, including future medical expenses. The case proceeded to a high/low Binding Arbitration. The Arbitrator awarded the low on the case, showing that Christin and the insurer properly evaluated the claim. 
    • Obtained a favorable defense verdict at a Philadelphia Common Pleas Arbitration. Plaintiff, a healthcare provider, filed suit against the insurance company for unpaid medical bills, punitive damages, interest and attorney’s fees, for treatment it rendered to the insured’s daughter. At the Arbitration, Christin argued that the insurance company properly evaluated the claim based on whether the insured’s daughter was entitled to benefits as it had not been determined that the daughter was residing with her mother at the time of the accident. Therefore, Christin argued that Plaintiff was not entitled to punitive damages, interest and attorney’s fees. The Arbitrators agreed and only awarded the Plaintiff health provider its past medical expenses, which Christin and the insurance company stipulated to. The Plaintiff was not awarded punitive damages, interest or attorney’s fees.
    • Settled a case at Mediation for less than a third of the settlement authority. The case involved a Plaintiff allegedly slipping and falling on a slippery substance in a parking lot in Philadelphia. After Christin obtained favorable defense opinions from both liability and medical experts, Plaintiff significantly reduced the value of her claim and settled the case.
    • Obtained a favorable decision dismissing all claims and cross-claims against her client in a motor vehicle accident case in Philadelphia via a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The plaintiff filed a Complaint on April 1, 2022 alleging several injuries due to a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff sued several defendants, including the rental car company that owned one of the vehicles involved in the accident. Citing to the rental agreement and the policies covering the rental vehicle, Christin argued that the rental driver was not authorized to operate the vehicle as he rented the vehicle under false pretenses, permitted an unauthorized driver to operate the vehicle, and operated the vehicle for hire in violation of the policies. The Court ruled in the rental company’s favor finding there was no coverage under the policies pursuant to Pennsylvania case law and the policy language cited by Christin in the Motion. All claims and cross-claims were dismissed against the rental company. 
    • Obtained a favorable jury trial award in Lehigh County, Pennsylvania in a motor vehicle accident case in which the plaintiff was claiming a low back injury with almost $1 million in claimed past and future damages. Liability was admitted. The jury awarded the plaintiff just $20,000 in future medical expenses and pain and suffering. The plaintiff's counsel tried to have the jury's decision dismissed, but the court denied the request.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in Berks County, Pennsylvania following an underinsured motorist coverage jury trial. Following the motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sustained an injury to her left heel and foot consisting of a fracture that required a plate and screws to be placed in her foot. The plaintiff was requesting a significant amount for past and future pain and suffering and future medical expenses, including a future left foot surgery. The jury returned an award in favor of the plaintiff totaling $28,000. After applying the third-party credit, the jury award was reduced down to $0.
    • Motion for Summary Judgment granted in a Declaratory Judgment action in which the plaintiff was claiming his vehicle damage was covered by his insurance policy. At the time of the loss, the plaintiff did not have collision coverage on his vehicle, only comprehensive coverage. The plaintiff argued that his vehicle was still covered by the comprehensive portion of his auto insurance policy, claiming the vehicle that rolled down a hill and struck his parked vehicle was considered a "falling object." After arguing that Pennsylvania case law and the insurance policy language did not cover the plaintiff's losses, the court agreed and granted the insurance company's Motion for Summary Judgment.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a jury trial in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania in which the plaintiff was claiming a neck and low back injury after being involved in a rear end motor vehicle accident. Liability was admitted. Although the plaintiff had no prior history of neck or back injuries, the jury returned an award in favor of the defesne, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove he sustained an injury that was caused by the accident. The defense expert testified that the plaintiff's MRI films from after the accident showed pre-existing findings that were not caused by the accident. Further, although the jury did not have to reach a decision on the limited tort issue, the jury also found that the plaintiff's injuries did not breach limited tort.
    • Have obtained many favorable decisions granting Motions for Summary Judgment on limited tort throughout Pennsylvania, which decisions have been affirmed on appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

Results

Summary Judgment Secured in a Case Involving a Trampoline Park Injury

We obtained summary judgment in a lawsuit arising from an injury suffered at an indoor trampoline park. During the deposition, the plaintiff admitted that there are inherent risks of engaging in trampoline activities, including the risk of being injured. Under the no-duty rule, a defendant owes no duty of care to warn, protect, or insure against risks which are common, frequent, expected and inherent in an activity. In the motion for summary judgment, it was argued that a trampoline park has no duty to protect patrons from the inherent risks of injury when jumping from a trampoline. The court opined that the no-duty rule was implicated and granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants.

Defense Verdict Obtained in Case Involving Motor Vehicle Accident

We obtained a defense verdict after a bench trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, which found the plaintiff did not meet the definition of an insured entitled to underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. The case arose out of a motor vehicle accident in which the plaintiff was a back seat passenger in a vehicle that was struck by the tortfeasor. After settling his bodily injury claim with the tortfeasor and with the underlying UIM carrier that insured the vehicle he was a passenger in, the plaintiff submitted a UIM claim seeking UIM benefits under his alleged sister’s UIM policy with our client. There was no dispute the plaintiff was living with his “sister” at the time of the accident. Therefore, the only issue was whether the plaintiff could show he was an insured and entitled to coverage by proving he was related to his “sister” by blood, adoption or marriage to meet the definition of a “family member” under the policy. She testified during discovery and at trial that she is not related to the plaintiff by blood, adoption or marriage. As a result of this testimony, the judge found the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof and entered a defense verdict for our client. 

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated

June 30, 2026

Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Thought Leadership

Legal Update for Special Education Law: Recent Positive Outcomes From the Group

Hearing Officer Confirms District Acted Appropriately Under IDEA and Section 504 William J. McPartland (Scranton) obtained a finding in favor of our client, a school district, on all issues following a due process hearing. The parent had filed a due process complaint alleging that the school district had breached its child find duty under the IDEA and Section 504, that the school district had discriminated against the student on the basis of disability in violation of Section 504, and that the school district had denied a free and appropriate public education to the student both by developing inadequate IEPs and via an actionable procedural violation.  Specifically, the student had received a Section 504 evaluation in October 2023, after a number of behavioral infractions culminating in a fight in September 2023, was identified as having anxiety and a sleep disorder, and received appropriate Section 504 accommodations. The student had never previously demonstrated signs of a learning disability, and the parent denied the school district permission to evaluate the student for special education needs in November 2023, and January 2024. The parent granted the district permission to evaluate the student in October 2024, after a private psychologist diagnosed the student with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, possible Oppositional Defiance Disorder, a learning disorder, and anxiety. The school district issued a special education evaluation report in December 2024, finding that the student had an emotional disturbance and other health impairment, and an IEP providing an itinerant level of emotional support, as well as instruction in academics and social skills, was issued in January 2025, and amended in February, March, and April 2025. The student withdrew from the school district in April 2025, to attend a cyber charter school. The hearing officer determined that the school district had not violated its child find duty to the student in violation of either the IDEA or Section 504 where the district developed a Section 504 plan for the student within a month and a half of the parent’s first request for a Section 504 evaluation and where the parent repeatedly denied consent to conduct an IDEA evaluation of the student. The hearing officer noted that the student’s sporadic record of behavioral infractions prior to September 2023, did not suggest that the student had a disability prior to the parent’s initial request for an evaluation. The hearing officer further determined that no evidence had been produced to suggest that the student was discriminated against on the basis of disability in violation of Section 504. Additionally, the hearing officer determined that the IEP offered to the student was substantively adequate and that, to the extent the social and emotional programming offered by the school district was not received by the student, this resulted from the parent’s refusal to accept the same. The hearing officer finally determined that the school district did not commit an actionable procedural violation by delaying development of an IEP for the student where the parent repeatedly denied consent to evaluate the student. Court Dismisses Three of Four Claims Against School District Christopher J. Conrad and Daniel P. McGannon (Harrisburg) achieved a significant early victory on behalf of a school district client in. The team successfully obtained dismissal of three of the four claims asserted in the plaintiff’s amended complaint. The former district superintendent brought multiple claims arising out of his alleged “forced resignation,” including age discrimination under the ADEA, a Section 1983 Equal Protection claim, a Pennsylvania Whistleblower claim, and breach of contract. On behalf of the district, the defense team moved to dismiss the complaint in part, arguing: The plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support a prima facie case of age discrimination. The equal protection claim was barred because the ADEA provides the exclusive federal remedy for age-based employment claims. The breach of contract claim could not stand because the underlying employment agreement had expired prior to the alleged breach. The court agreed, dismissing the ADEA, equal protection, and breach of contract claims in their entirety. As a result, only a single claim under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law remains pending. This outcome substantially narrows the scope of the litigation and positions the client for a more efficient defense moving forward.