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Heather M. LaBombardi

Portrait of Heather M. LaBombardi

As a member of the Health Care Department, Heather concentrates her practice on medical malpractice. She has spent the majority of her legal career defending physicians, nurses, health care providers and medical facilities against medical malpractice claims. Heather is involved in all aspects of a case, from the initial meeting through to the trial.

Heather has written several appellate briefs and argued multiple times before the Appellate Division, most notably in Flood v. Aluri-Vallabhaneni, 431 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 2013). In this case, the Appellate Division recommended that the jury interrogatories for pre-existing injuries in New Jersey were recommended to be withdrawn and re-written in line with the jury interrogatories used in the Flood matter. In addition, Heather has assisted in obtaining numerous defense verdicts on behalf of her clients.       

Heather graduated from the University of Miami in Coral Gables, Florida, with a Bachelor's of Business Degree. She then went on to obtain a Master's Degree in Management with a focus in leadership from Nova Southeastern University, H. Wayne Huizenga School of Business & Entrepreneurship in Fort Lauderdale. Heather then attended Western Michigan University Cooley Law School, where she graduated with Distinction and received her juris doctor in 2008.

    • Cooley Law School (J.D., with distinction, 2008)
    • Nova Southeastern University (M.S., 2006)
      • Management
    • University of Miami (B.B.A., 2004)
    • New Jersey, 2009
    • New York, 2009
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2009
    • District of Columbia, 2010
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2013
    • New Jersey Super Lawyers Rising Star (2016-2023)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
    • American Bar Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
    • New York Bar Association
    • Coniglio v. Marino, A-6060-11T3, 2014 WL 3579655 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 22, 2014)
    • Flood v. Bhanu Aluri-Vallabhaneni, 431 N.J.Super. 365 (App. Div. 2013)
    • Kim v. Ahn, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1944

Results

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Unanimous Defense Verdict in Medical Malpractice Case

We secured a unanimous defense verdict in a three-week medical malpractice trial involving an allegedly botched total knee replacement. Through the testimony of our client and an expert, we were able to establish that all accepted standards of care were met. The jury deliberated for three days before returning its unanimous verdict.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

New Jersey Courts Address Plaintiffs’ Demands to Inspect Electronic Medical Records – Appellate Division Sides with Plaintiffs (with Restrictions)

October 1, 2023

Plaintiffs have increasingly demanded to gain access to the Electronic Medical Records (EMR) of health care providers/facilities, citing Rule 4:18-1, and Rule 4:10-2(a), (g), and (f). This has become a contentious issue in pre-trial discovery as defendants argue that giving plaintiffs unfettered access to EMRs is unduly burdensome in time and expense; it opens up the possibility of HIPAA violations insofar as other patients’ health information may be exposed; and the practice opens providers up to a heightened risk of cyber attacks.  In Lasiw, the plaintiff requested to inspect the EMR of the defendant Hackensack University Medical Center (HUMC), which refused the request, citing that the EMR system was proprietary, it contained protected personal health information of other patients, and that the current EMR format differed from the one that was in effect during the care and treatment at issue. HUMC further asserted that if the court were to order an inspection of the EMR, the plaintiff would need to obtain cyber and criminal acts insurance of no less than $5 million prior to any EMR inspection. The defendants further argued against an inspection of the EMR, claiming that it should be a last resort and allowed only in cases where a plaintiff has shown that “conventional document productions that do not needlessly consume tons of staff [and] are not jeopardizing the security of the system” are insufficient.  The trial court permitted the plaintiff to conduct an on-site inspection of the EMR, and HUMC appealed the decision. On appeal, HUMC argued that the plaintiff should bear the burden of specifying the individual entries of the EMR that were being sought and the defendant would produce the requested metadata subject to potential assertions of privilege. The Appellate Division was unpersuaded by HUMC’s arguments and found that HUMC failed to demonstrate that an EMR inspection would put the overall EMR system at risk of a cyber attack. Further, the plaintiff was not requesting direct access to HUMC’s EMR system as a whole but, instead, was requesting to inspect the patient’s EMR on a screen which was controlled by HUMC’s employees, thus eliminating any potential HIPAA violations. Ultimately, the Appellate Division permitted the plaintiff’s expert to review the EMR subject to the following conditions. The review would be: on-site; conducted with HUMC’s personnel in control of the system and the mouse; limited to four hours; conducted with plaintiff’s counsel present and she could request specific metadata be copied and produced in “reasonably usable form”; conducted in the presence of defense counsel who could raise any objections to particular metadata that appears on-screen (but any objections would be preserved and considered by the Court at a later time); conducted but not recorded; and conducted with confidentiality agreements in place pursuant to N.J.R.E. 530(c)(4) and (5) to ease any other concerns. Since the Appellate Division’s decision in Lasiw, defendants have been faced with increasing discovery demands for EMR information and content. Since the Lasiw decision, plaintiffs have been requesting EMR documentation and EMR inspections in virtually every medical malpractice action, citing their unequivocal right to have their experts inspect the patient’s EMR and the associated metadata. This has become a hot-button issue that all defense attorneys representing hospitals, facilities, and medical practices need to be aware of.      Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Vicarious Liability—Do You Really Need an Affidavit of Merit?

May 6, 2021

If a plaintiff’s fundamental cause of action sounds in professional negligence against a “licensed person,” he or she may not evade the AOM requirement by suing only a public entity, and not the individual “licensed person.” But what about the alleged medical negligence of an unlicensed person?

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.