.

Benjamin M.H. Goshko

Portrait of Benjamin M.H. Goshko

Benjamin provides legal counsel across a wide range of industries including construction, trucking/transportation, product liability, and hospitality. He has successfully defended claims on behalf of construction contractors, product manufacturers, property owners, restaurants, and hotels in litigation involving fire losses, negligence, auto accidents, catastrophic injuries, and wrongful death. Regardless of complexity, Benjamin handles cases through every stage of litigation in state and federal court, from the taking and defending of depositions to trying matters to verdict. He understands the interests of his clients in the practical, prompt, and efficient resolution of claims. 

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Benjamin was an experienced litigator for an defense firm in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, where he represented a broad range of clients in insurance defense and subrogation litigation. He served for many years as an arbiter with the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, as a pro bono PFA volunteer for the Bucks County Court, and as a member of the Inn of Court. 
 
Benjamin graduated from Temple University Beasley School of Law where he served as senior articles editor for the International and Comparative Law Journal. He is licensed to practice law in state and federal courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and before the United States Supreme Court. 
 
Outside of the office, Benjamin is an avid cyclist and history buff.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2009)
    • Temple University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2005)
    • Pennsylvania, 2009
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2012
    • U.S. Supreme Court, 2014
    • New Jersey, 2018
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2021
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2021
    • Insurance Society of Philadelphia
    • Montgomery County Bar Association
    • Montgomery County Inn of Court
    • Obtained summary judgment for his client in this Bucks County matter which alleged that his client and a neighboring property owner were responsible for water and septic intrusions onto Plaintiff’s property. The three properties formed a large triangle between two roads in Perkasie, Pennsylvania and Plaintiff’s complaints against his neighbors went back over seven years. Ben argued the trespass onto Plaintiff’s property was permanent in nature and barred under the statute of limitations and that Plaintiff’s expert's failure to establish the intrusion emanated from his client’s property. 
    • Christian Legal Clinics of Philadelphia

Results

Summary Judgment Secured in a Pennsylvania Breach of Contract Matter

We won summary judgment before the Honorable Anthony Verwey in Chester County, PA. The plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract and violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (PAUTPCPL) against the defendants over the installation of an allegedly defective storm water remediation system. Summary judgment was sought on the grounds that the plaintiff could not prove damages without an expert. The court entered judgment in favor of the defendants, finding the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim could not proceed without expert support and the PAUTPCPL claims failed for lack of demonstrated damages.

Summary Judgment Obtained in a Case Involving a Fungal Infection Allegedly Contracted at a Hotel

We secured summary judgment in Monroe County, Pennsylvania, where the plaintiff filed suit claiming he contracted a fungal infection from staying at the defendant’s hotel. The plaintiff produced an expert microbiologist’s report, in addition to his treating physician’s records, in support of his claims. Summary judgment was sought on the grounds that the plaintiff’s expert was not competent enough to identify a specific fungus from photographs of the hotel room and the treating physician’s records were equivocal as to the cause of the plaintiff’s infection. Judge Arthur Zulick found the plaintiff’s microbiologist’s opinion speculative, as the microbiologist did not conduct an inspection of the hotel, obtain fungal samples or perform any lab testing. The judge further held that the plaintiff’s diagnoses of a fungal infection was not sufficiently supported by his treating doctor’s diagnoses. As a result, Judge Zulick entered judgment in favor of the defendant.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Superior Court Refines Co-Employee Immunity

April 1, 2026

In this matter, the plaintiff was seriously injured while operating a skid steer. The skid steer was owned by the defendant personally, but was loaned to the defendant’s separate business entity, which the plaintiff worked for. The plaintiff filed an uncontested worker’s compensation claim against the business, but then brought suit against defendant-owner for claims related to a lack of maintenance of the skid steer. The defendant-owner sought summary judgement, arguing he was the plaintiff’s ‘co-employee’ and immune from suit pursuant to 77 P.S. § 72. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that for 77 P.S. § 72 to apply, the injury must be caused by negligence that occurred within the co-employee’s course and scope of his employment; indicating while not expressly stated, it is implicit to the statute. In the instant case, the defendant’s personal maintenance of the skid steer occurred outside of the course and scope of the defendant’s operation of his business. Thus, claims related to the maintenance of the skid steer would be separate from those concerning the operation of business, and therefore, not subject to immunity under 77 P.S. § 72.   This holding narrows co-employee immunity for negligence under the Worker’s Compensation Act to only those injuries caused by a co-employee while in the course/scope of their employment. This strengthens opportunities for employee-plaintiffs to file suits against owners who operate multiple entities.

Case Law Alerts

Appearance of Impropriety by Arbitrator Insufficient to Vacate Arbitrator’s Award

October 1, 2025

This York County matter concerned the plaintiff’s claim that Weis Markets was liable for her slip-and-fall and her injuries resulting therefrom. The plaintiff and the defendant agreed to remove the case to binding arbitration after discovery. The written agreement for the arbitration provided for a “hi/low” of $75,000/$750,000 and specified that no ex parte communications with the arbiter would be permitted.  During a lunchbreak at the arbitration, the arbiter privately met with counsel for the defendant and a Weis representative, contrary to the agreement. The arbiter then found in the defendant’s favor. Given the appearance of impropriety by the arbiter in engaging in ex parte communications, the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the award. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion, which was appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court noted that the arbiter’s ex parte meeting, indeed, gave the appearance of impropriety and could cast doubt on the impartiality of the arbitrator. However, the court held that this, by itself, was insufficient to vacate the award under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7341. Instead, the Superior Court held that the plaintiff needed to present specific evidence of fraud, misconduct or corruption by the arbiter (i.e., that something improper occurred during the ex parte meeting). The Superior Court further held that vacating the award was not warranted as the the $75,000 “low” received by the plaintiff was not inequitable given disputed liability or unconscionable since the plaintiff still received some compensation. The impact of this decision is that the party attempting to vacate a binding arbitration award on the lack of neutrality by the arbitrator faces a very high burden of alleging specific conduct that would constitute fraud. In cases like Shannon, where the fraud is claimed to have occurred “behind closed doors,” this would seem to be a near impossible burden to meet.     Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.