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Benjamin M.H. Goshko

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BMGoshko@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Benjamin M.H. Goshko

Benjamin provides legal counsel across a wide range of industries including construction, trucking/transportation, product liability, and hospitality. He has successfully defended claims on behalf of construction contractors, product manufacturers, property owners, restaurants, and hotels in litigation involving fire losses, negligence, auto accidents, catastrophic injuries, and wrongful death. Regardless of complexity, Benjamin handles cases through every stage of litigation in state and federal court, from the taking and defending of depositions to trying matters to verdict. He understands the interests of his clients in the practical, prompt, and efficient resolution of claims. 

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Benjamin was an experienced litigator for an defense firm in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, where he represented a broad range of clients in insurance defense and subrogation litigation. He served for many years as an arbiter with the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, as a pro bono PFA volunteer for the Bucks County Court, and as a member of the Inn of Court. 
 
Benjamin graduated from Temple University Beasley School of Law where he served as senior articles editor for the International and Comparative Law Journal. He is licensed to practice law in state and federal courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and before the United States Supreme Court. 
 
Outside of the office, Benjamin is an avid cyclist and history buff.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2009)
    • Temple University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2005)
    • Pennsylvania, 2009
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2012
    • U.S. Supreme Court, 2014
    • New Jersey, 2018
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2021
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2021
    • Insurance Society of Philadelphia
    • Montgomery County Bar Association
    • Montgomery County Inn of Court
    • Obtained summary judgment for his client in this Bucks County matter which alleged that his client and a neighboring property owner were responsible for water and septic intrusions onto Plaintiff’s property. The three properties formed a large triangle between two roads in Perkasie, Pennsylvania and Plaintiff’s complaints against his neighbors went back over seven years. Ben argued the trespass onto Plaintiff’s property was permanent in nature and barred under the statute of limitations and that Plaintiff’s expert's failure to establish the intrusion emanated from his client’s property. 
    • Christian Legal Clinics of Philadelphia

Results

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Summary Judgment Secured in a Pennsylvania Breach of Contract Matter

We won summary judgment before the Honorable Anthony Verwey in Chester County, PA. The plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract and violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (PAUTPCPL) against the defendants over the installation of an allegedly defective storm water remediation system. Summary judgment was sought on the grounds that the plaintiff could not prove damages without an expert. The court entered judgment in favor of the defendants, finding the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim could not proceed without expert support and the PAUTPCPL claims failed for lack of demonstrated damages.

Summary Judgment Obtained in a Case Involving a Fungal Infection Allegedly Contracted at a Hotel

We secured summary judgment in Monroe County, Pennsylvania, where the plaintiff filed suit claiming he contracted a fungal infection from staying at the defendant’s hotel. The plaintiff produced an expert microbiologist’s report, in addition to his treating physician’s records, in support of his claims. Summary judgment was sought on the grounds that the plaintiff’s expert was not competent enough to identify a specific fungus from photographs of the hotel room and the treating physician’s records were equivocal as to the cause of the plaintiff’s infection. Judge Arthur Zulick found the plaintiff’s microbiologist’s opinion speculative, as the microbiologist did not conduct an inspection of the hotel, obtain fungal samples or perform any lab testing. The judge further held that the plaintiff’s diagnoses of a fungal infection was not sufficiently supported by his treating doctor’s diagnoses. As a result, Judge Zulick entered judgment in favor of the defendant.

Thought Leadership

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Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Superior Court Refines Co-Employee Immunity

April 1, 2026

In this matter, the plaintiff was seriously injured while operating a skid steer. The skid steer was owned by the defendant personally, but was loaned to the defendant’s separate business entity, which the plaintiff worked for. The plaintiff filed an uncontested worker’s compensation claim against the business, but then brought suit against defendant-owner for claims related to a lack of maintenance of the skid steer. The defendant-owner sought summary judgement, arguing he was the plaintiff’s ‘co-employee’ and immune from suit pursuant to 77 P.S. § 72. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that for 77 P.S. § 72 to apply, the injury must be caused by negligence that occurred within the co-employee’s course and scope of his employment; indicating while not expressly stated, it is implicit to the statute. In the instant case, the defendant’s personal maintenance of the skid steer occurred outside of the course and scope of the defendant’s operation of his business. Thus, claims related to the maintenance of the skid steer would be separate from those concerning the operation of business, and therefore, not subject to immunity under 77 P.S. § 72.   This holding narrows co-employee immunity for negligence under the Worker’s Compensation Act to only those injuries caused by a co-employee while in the course/scope of their employment. This strengthens opportunities for employee-plaintiffs to file suits against owners who operate multiple entities.

Case Law Alerts

Appearance of Impropriety by Arbitrator Insufficient to Vacate Arbitrator’s Award

October 1, 2025

This York County matter concerned the plaintiff’s claim that Weis Markets was liable for her slip-and-fall and her injuries resulting therefrom. The plaintiff and the defendant agreed to remove the case to binding arbitration after discovery. The written agreement for the arbitration provided for a “hi/low” of $75,000/$750,000 and specified that no ex parte communications with the arbiter would be permitted.  During a lunchbreak at the arbitration, the arbiter privately met with counsel for the defendant and a Weis representative, contrary to the agreement. The arbiter then found in the defendant’s favor. Given the appearance of impropriety by the arbiter in engaging in ex parte communications, the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the award. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion, which was appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court noted that the arbiter’s ex parte meeting, indeed, gave the appearance of impropriety and could cast doubt on the impartiality of the arbitrator. However, the court held that this, by itself, was insufficient to vacate the award under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7341. Instead, the Superior Court held that the plaintiff needed to present specific evidence of fraud, misconduct or corruption by the arbiter (i.e., that something improper occurred during the ex parte meeting). The Superior Court further held that vacating the award was not warranted as the the $75,000 “low” received by the plaintiff was not inequitable given disputed liability or unconscionable since the plaintiff still received some compensation. The impact of this decision is that the party attempting to vacate a binding arbitration award on the lack of neutrality by the arbitrator faces a very high burden of alleging specific conduct that would constitute fraud. In cases like Shannon, where the fraud is claimed to have occurred “behind closed doors,” this would seem to be a near impossible burden to meet.     Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

News

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Firm Highlights

Ellen C. Bodenmiller Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Tampa Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Ellen C. Bodenmiller Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Tampa Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Result

Statutory Employer Immunity Upheld

In this construction accident case that resulted in a $5 million verdict, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the Statutory Employer Doctrine, which immunizes general contractors and other contractors on construction sites when certain elements are satisfied.

graphic announcing our 6 2027 Super Lawyers & Rising Stars

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Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Result

$1.09 Billion Products Liability Verdict Overturned

In this products liability crashworthiness case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a Philadelphia jury verdict of $1.09 billion, the largest verdict ever overturned by a PA appellate court.  The court ordered a new trial based on deficient jury instructions, clarified important aspects of crashworthiness law, and confirmed that so-called standard jury instructions may be incompatible with Pennsylvania law. 

Result

Federal Statute Declared Constitutional

In this products liability case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court and upheld the constitutionality of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which resulted in judgment as a matter of law for the defendant manufacturer.

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.

Result

$19 Million Medical Malpractice Verdict Overturned

In this medical malpractice case, the trial court vacated $10 million of a $19 million verdict in post-trial motions and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the remaining $9 million on appeal.

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.