.

Benjamin M.H. Goshko

Portrait of Benjamin M.H. Goshko

Benjamin provides legal counsel across a wide range of industries including construction, trucking/transportation, product liability, and hospitality. He has successfully defended claims on behalf of construction contractors, product manufacturers, property owners, restaurants, and hotels in litigation involving fire losses, negligence, auto accidents, catastrophic injuries, and wrongful death. Regardless of complexity, Benjamin handles cases through every stage of litigation in state and federal court, from the taking and defending of depositions to trying matters to verdict. He understands the interests of his clients in the practical, prompt, and efficient resolution of claims. 

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Benjamin was an experienced litigator for an defense firm in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, where he represented a broad range of clients in insurance defense and subrogation litigation. He served for many years as an arbiter with the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, as a pro bono PFA volunteer for the Bucks County Court, and as a member of the Inn of Court. 
 
Benjamin graduated from Temple University Beasley School of Law where he served as senior articles editor for the International and Comparative Law Journal. He is licensed to practice law in state and federal courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and before the United States Supreme Court. 
 
Outside of the office, Benjamin is an avid cyclist and history buff.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2009)
    • Temple University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2005)
    • Pennsylvania, 2009
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2012
    • U.S. Supreme Court, 2014
    • New Jersey, 2018
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2021
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2021
    • Insurance Society of Philadelphia
    • Montgomery County Bar Association
    • Montgomery County Inn of Court
    • Obtained summary judgment for his client in this Bucks County matter which alleged that his client and a neighboring property owner were responsible for water and septic intrusions onto Plaintiff’s property. The three properties formed a large triangle between two roads in Perkasie, Pennsylvania and Plaintiff’s complaints against his neighbors went back over seven years. Ben argued the trespass onto Plaintiff’s property was permanent in nature and barred under the statute of limitations and that Plaintiff’s expert's failure to establish the intrusion emanated from his client’s property. 
    • Christian Legal Clinics of Philadelphia

Results

Summary Judgment Secured in a Pennsylvania Breach of Contract Matter

We won summary judgment before the Honorable Anthony Verwey in Chester County, PA. The plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract and violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (PAUTPCPL) against the defendants over the installation of an allegedly defective storm water remediation system. Summary judgment was sought on the grounds that the plaintiff could not prove damages without an expert. The court entered judgment in favor of the defendants, finding the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim could not proceed without expert support and the PAUTPCPL claims failed for lack of demonstrated damages.

Summary Judgment Obtained in a Case Involving a Fungal Infection Allegedly Contracted at a Hotel

We secured summary judgment in Monroe County, Pennsylvania, where the plaintiff filed suit claiming he contracted a fungal infection from staying at the defendant’s hotel. The plaintiff produced an expert microbiologist’s report, in addition to his treating physician’s records, in support of his claims. Summary judgment was sought on the grounds that the plaintiff’s expert was not competent enough to identify a specific fungus from photographs of the hotel room and the treating physician’s records were equivocal as to the cause of the plaintiff’s infection. Judge Arthur Zulick found the plaintiff’s microbiologist’s opinion speculative, as the microbiologist did not conduct an inspection of the hotel, obtain fungal samples or perform any lab testing. The judge further held that the plaintiff’s diagnoses of a fungal infection was not sufficiently supported by his treating doctor’s diagnoses. As a result, Judge Zulick entered judgment in favor of the defendant.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Superior Court Refines Co-Employee Immunity

April 1, 2026

In this matter, the plaintiff was seriously injured while operating a skid steer. The skid steer was owned by the defendant personally, but was loaned to the defendant’s separate business entity, which the plaintiff worked for. The plaintiff filed an uncontested worker’s compensation claim against the business, but then brought suit against defendant-owner for claims related to a lack of maintenance of the skid steer. The defendant-owner sought summary judgement, arguing he was the plaintiff’s ‘co-employee’ and immune from suit pursuant to 77 P.S. § 72. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that for 77 P.S. § 72 to apply, the injury must be caused by negligence that occurred within the co-employee’s course and scope of his employment; indicating while not expressly stated, it is implicit to the statute. In the instant case, the defendant’s personal maintenance of the skid steer occurred outside of the course and scope of the defendant’s operation of his business. Thus, claims related to the maintenance of the skid steer would be separate from those concerning the operation of business, and therefore, not subject to immunity under 77 P.S. § 72.   This holding narrows co-employee immunity for negligence under the Worker’s Compensation Act to only those injuries caused by a co-employee while in the course/scope of their employment. This strengthens opportunities for employee-plaintiffs to file suits against owners who operate multiple entities.

Case Law Alerts

Appearance of Impropriety by Arbitrator Insufficient to Vacate Arbitrator’s Award

October 1, 2025

This York County matter concerned the plaintiff’s claim that Weis Markets was liable for her slip-and-fall and her injuries resulting therefrom. The plaintiff and the defendant agreed to remove the case to binding arbitration after discovery. The written agreement for the arbitration provided for a “hi/low” of $75,000/$750,000 and specified that no ex parte communications with the arbiter would be permitted.  During a lunchbreak at the arbitration, the arbiter privately met with counsel for the defendant and a Weis representative, contrary to the agreement. The arbiter then found in the defendant’s favor. Given the appearance of impropriety by the arbiter in engaging in ex parte communications, the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the award. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion, which was appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court noted that the arbiter’s ex parte meeting, indeed, gave the appearance of impropriety and could cast doubt on the impartiality of the arbitrator. However, the court held that this, by itself, was insufficient to vacate the award under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7341. Instead, the Superior Court held that the plaintiff needed to present specific evidence of fraud, misconduct or corruption by the arbiter (i.e., that something improper occurred during the ex parte meeting). The Superior Court further held that vacating the award was not warranted as the the $75,000 “low” received by the plaintiff was not inequitable given disputed liability or unconscionable since the plaintiff still received some compensation. The impact of this decision is that the party attempting to vacate a binding arbitration award on the lack of neutrality by the arbitrator faces a very high burden of alleging specific conduct that would constitute fraud. In cases like Shannon, where the fraud is claimed to have occurred “behind closed doors,” this would seem to be a near impossible burden to meet.     Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.