.

Gregory P. Graham

Portrait of Gregory P. Graham

Greg is a member of the Professional Liability Department whose practice focuses on the defense of corporations and professionals in commercial, construction and class action litigation. He also defends attorneys in legal liability actions covering a wide range of malpractice claims including those arising from civil and family disputes, business transactions in the real estate and oil and gas industries, and commercial litigation. 

Greg has substantial experience defending high-value class action cases at both the state and federal level.  In doing so, he prioritizes the development of an early case strategy to defeat class certification in order to minimize his clients’ potential liability and damage exposure. He has successfully defeated class certification in multiple jurisdictions for clients facings claims of invasion of privacy, violations of state and federal electronic communication protection acts, and allegations of improper assessment and conversion of state sales taxes. When certification cannot be avoided, Greg develops an aggressive discovery strategy to minimize class size and damage exposure. He has obtained summary judgment dismissals and favorable settlements in class actions in both state and federal court.  

Greg's construction practice includes the representation of owners, contractors, and design professionals from defect and commercial loss claims related to the construction industry. He has litigated on behalf of clients in matters arising from publicly and privately-funded projects in state and federal court across the country. He also defends construction entities in the natural gas and energy industry facing high-exposure commercial loss and environmental claims. 

Greg has experience litigating on behalf of securities professionals in court and FINRA arbitration. He has successfully assisted financial management companies in responding to administrative investigations brought by state and industry regulatory agencies.  

He is also proficient in matters involving significant E-Discovery and document discovery.  His experience with managing large-scale E-discovery efforts minimizes unnecessary cost while also allowing Marshall Dennehey to provide the best defense possible for its clients in discovery-intensive cases.    

Greg was a 2013 graduate of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. While in law school, Greg was invited to be a visiting research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg, Germany. He was also an Articles Editor for the Journal of Technology Law & Policy and a member of two award-winning moot court teams.  

    • University of Pittsburgh School of Law (J.D., 2013)
    • Michigan State University (B.A., 2007)
    • Pennsylvania, 2013
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Commercial Litigation; Construction Law; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants (2021-2025)
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Litigation – Construction; Professional Malpractice Law (2024-2025)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2020-2022, 2024-2025)
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute (PDI), Co-Chair Professional Liability Committee
    • AI in the Legal Profession, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, September 2024
    • Co-Taught "Business Law," Westminster College, Spring 2015
    • "Don't Reinvent the Wheel: Approaching Gen AI Usage in Litigation,"The Legal Intelligencer, October 10, 2024
    • "Retooling the Client Engagement Letter to Minimize Liability Claim Exposure,"PLUS Blog, March 23, 2023
    • "Demand for Remote Desktop Access and Cloud Computing Services Necessitates a Refined Approach for Civil Litigation Electronic Discovery," Lawyers Journal, November 18, 2022
    • "Supreme Court's Halliburton Ruling May Be Curse in Disguise for Securities Defendants" Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 3, September 2014
    • "Storm Fronts and Filmmaking: Cloud Computing Regulation and the Impact on Independent Filmmakers," University of Pittsburgh School of Law Journal of Technology Law & Policy, Vol. 13, 2012
    • "Lost in a Cloud: Overview of Legal Obstacles to the Growth of Cloud Computing in European Markets," Croatian Journal of Media & Technology, Vol. 18, 2012

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Pennsylvania Superior Court Effectively Expands Statute of Limitations for Legal Malpractice Claims in Pennsylvania

March 1, 2026

After much anticipation, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued its en banc decision in Poteat v. Asteak on December 11, 2025.  In Poteat, the Superior Court sitting en banc confirmed an earlier opinion addressing the question of whether the “gist of the action” doctrine applies to legal malpractice claims. In a disappointing ruling for the defense bar, the court ruled that it does not.  In doing so, it has created uncertainty moving forward as to the defense of legal malpractice actions sounding in breach of contract. Poteat arose from a legal malpractice lawsuit following appellee-attorneys’ provision of legal services to an appellant in a criminal matter. In the legal malpractice action, the trial court granted the appellees’ preliminary objections seeking dismissal of the action via application of the gist of the action doctrine. The appellant set forth a breach of contract claim, arguing that since the breach of contract claim sounded in tort, namely negligence, it should be treated as such by application of the gist of the action doctrine. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence barred the claim. Appellees further argued that the complaint was legally insufficient because it failed to allege a breach of a specific executory promise in the retainer agreement. The plaintiff appealed. The Superior Court’s en banc decision held that hiring an attorney automatically creates an implied contract term that the attorney will provide competent legal services, regardless of whether the contract includes any explicit contractual term promising such. In doing so, the Superior Court has provided authority for plaintiffs in legal malpractice claims to assert the existence and breach of an implied duty that arises from a specific legal contract, without regard to the expressed language of that agreement. In essence, the court eviscerated any gist of the action application to legal malpractice claims and ignored prior precedent which also held that breach of contract claims must be based upon the contract itself, rather than implied terms. Even more problematic for the defense of legal malpractice lawsuits is the fact that this ruling effectively means that all Pennsylvania lawyers’ professional liability claims will be subject to a four-year contract statute of limitations. A negligence claim that an attorney deviated from a professional standard of care that may have been dismissed for falling outside the two-year statute of limitations time period may now be pursued under an alternate breach of contract theory which is subject to a four-year statute. There was a vigorous dissent which was joined by three Superior Court judges. This decision has been appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court given the severity of its potential implications.

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

Invoking the Mandatory Mediation Clause Against Buyers – A Beneficial Strategic Tactic

November 1, 2025

When facing claims, Pennsylvania real estate agents too often view the mandatory mediation paragraph found within the Standard Agreement for the Sale of Real Estate as little more than boilerplate. In practice, however, this clause can be a valuable and strategic tool for the successful defense of claims. Rather than overlooking such a useful tool, real estate agents should consider invoking the mandatory mediation provision to obtain significant advantages in cost management, liability clarity, and settlement posture. The mandatory mediation provision typically contains the following language: Buyer and Seller will submit all disputes or claims that arise from this Agreement, including disputes and claims over deposit monies, to mediation. Mediation will be conducted in accordance with the Rules and Procedures of the Home Sellers/Home Buyers Dispute Resolution System, unless it is not available, in which case Buyer and Seller will mediate according to the terms of the mediation system offered or endorsed by the local Association of Realtors®. Mediation fees, contained in the mediator’s fee schedule, will be divided equally among the parties and will be paid before the mediation conference. This mediation process must be concluded before any party to the dispute may initiate legal proceedings in any courtroom, with the exception of filing a summons if it is necessary to stop any statute of limitations from expiring. Any agreement reached through mediation and signed by the parties will be binding. Any agreement to mediate disputes or claims arising from this Agreement will survive settlement. This section precludes either the buyer or seller from initiating a legal action without first attempting to mediate the dispute. The only exception identified within the provision allows for the filing of a summons to halt the application of any potential statute of limitations.  At first glance, the provision would not appear to be available to agents involved in the transaction; however, the language is clear that all disputes that arise from the agreement are subject to the mandatory mediation requirement. Upon receipt of a pre-suit claim, real estate professionals should consider invoking this provision to bring all claims and involved parties to mediation. Alternatively, if a lawsuit has already been filed, real estate agents should consider the merits of filing a Motion to Stay and to Compel Mediation pursuant to the provision.  There are numerous benefits to do so.  Cost Savings Through Early Resolution Pre-suit mediation offers a controlled, confidential, and relatively inexpensive forum for resolving the dispute while the parties are still evaluating their willingness to engage in the costs of discovery, depositions and motion practice. By invoking the mediation provision promptly after a buyer identifies a pre-suit claim or upon the receipt of a complaint, an agent and their counsel can participate in a structured discussion aimed at resolution without the procedural overhead of court involvement. Even if mediation does not result in a full settlement, narrowing the issues can dramatically reduce later litigation expenses. Insurers can separately consider the benefits of early mediation for their insureds, as it signals proactive risk management and can help avoid unnecessary defense costs. Clarifying Responsibility Through Information Exchange Claims made by the buyer against real estate agents are often defended on the grounds that the seller’s or buyer’s own actions are the cause of the buyer’s damages. Forcing those parties to mediation encourages the early and informal exchange of key documents—inspection reports, disclosure forms, repair records—that can help inform the parties’ assessment of who bears actual responsibility. When the facts are developed cooperatively, rather than through adversarial discovery, the mediation process often highlights that the real estate agent’s role was limited to communication rather than concealment. This can refocus the dispute toward the truly responsible party and may even resolve the matter without further involvement of the agent.  Managing Plaintiff Expectations for Future Negotiations Even if resolution cannot be achieved during the mediation process, a mandatory attempt early in the life of a claim also serves as an effective opportunity to set realistic expectations for a buyer-plaintiff’s potential recovery. Through the mediator’s neutral perspective, plaintiffs often gain a clearer understanding of the legal limits on agent liability, the availability of defenses—such as the reliance on seller representations—and the challenges of proving causation and damages, especially if the buyer waiver or failure to inspect questions are involved. Even if mediation does not fully settle the case, it can temper inflated expectations and create a more productive environment for subsequent negotiations. In short, mediation under the Pennsylvania Standard Agreement is not merely a procedural requirement—it is a strategic defense opportunity. By embracing early mediation, real estate agents can reduce costs, clarify liability and shape the tone of any future dispute toward resolution rather than escalation.  Legal Update for Real Estate E&O – November 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.