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Stephen is a shareholder in the firm’s Casualty Department.  He represents clients in motor vehicle accidents, premises liability, products liability, business litigation and professional liability matters.  He has significant experience defending attorneys, real estate brokers and agents, accountants and architects against professional liability claims.  He also defends financial institutions, debt servicers and buyers, auto finance companies, collection attorneys, student lenders, telecommunication providers, mortgage lenders and credit reporting agencies against claims brought pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and state consumer laws in both state and federal court.   

Stephen graduated from the William S. Boyd School of Law.  Following graduation, he clerked for Judge Abbi Silver, now Nevada Supreme Court Justice, in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada.   After completing his clerkship, Stephen joined an insurance defense firm where he focused his practice on legal malpractice, real estate/broker and director and officer cases.  He is admitted to practice in all state courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey as well as the United States District Courts for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the District of New Jersey.

    • William S. Boyd School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2009)
    • Kutztown University of Pennsylvania (B.S., magna cum laude, 2002)
    • Pennsylvania, 2010
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 9th Circuit, 2015
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2016
    • New Jersey, 2018
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2018
    • NCBA (The National Creditors Bar Association)

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Plaintiff’s Failure to Identify Factual Causation Among Multiple Possible Defects Warrants Summary Judgment

December 1, 2025

Key Points: The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reaffirms a plaintiff’s burden to prove causation.  Where the plaintiff is unable to identify factual causation, or provides multiple theories of causation, a dispositive motion should be considered.  A jury is not permitted to reach a verdict based on speculation or conjecture as to causation.  Where a plaintiff cannot establish the factual cause of an injury, summary judgment may be appropriate. For example, in Mohar v. Shawver et al., 317 A.3d 607 (Pa. Super. 2024), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reaffirmed a plaintiff’s burden to establish a prima facie negligence claim; specifically, the causal connection between the alleged injuries and the alleged negligence. The court affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to identify the specific defect that caused her to fall.  The plaintiff alleged she slipped and fell while attending a house showing. While touring the property, the plaintiff walked up a ramp to a shed in the backyard; she slipped and fell as she turned.  She filed a lawsuit, sounding in negligence, against several defendants, including the property owners and real estate professionals. Notably, during discovery, the plaintiff could not identify what caused her to fall. She testified: “It happened so fast. I was standing and then I wasn’t. I can’t answer that.” Furthermore, she was unable to describe the defective or slippery condition, attributing it to multiple defects, including wet leaves, moss, or the wet wood. Notably, the plaintiff could not rule out the possibility that she may have just lost her balance.  At the conclusion of discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to establish a connection between her alleged injuries and the alleged negligence. While the plaintiff identified multiple potential defects, she failed to identify which, if any, of the alleged defects actually caused her to slip. In granting summary judgment, the trial court relied upon Houston v. Republican Athletic Ass’n, 22 A.2d 715, 716 (Pa. 1941), where the court held that the plaintiff failed to establish the element of causation sufficient to submit the case to a jury as there were multiple theories attributing an accident to a variety of causes for which the defendants could not be held liable. The court also relied on Freund v. Hyman, 103 A.2d 658 (Pa. 1954), where the Supreme Court granted compulsory nonsuit as the testimony did not identify the cause of the fall, and Erb v. Council Rock Sch. Distr., 2009 WL 9097261 (Pa. Cmwlth. Mar. 26, 2009), where the court granted summary judgment after determining that the plaintiff did not produce any evidence that a defective condition was the proximate cause of her fall and injury.  In affirming the trial court’s order granting summary judgment, the Superior Court explained, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the evidence of causation was completely circumstantial and there was no evidence that any of the alleged potential defects actually caused the plaintiff to fall. Furthermore, there was an equal possibility that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries resulted from a trip or stumble without such tripping or stumbling having any connection with the alleged defect. Even though the plaintiff could testify as to where she slid, she failed to make the connection between slipping and the alleged negligence. A jury is not permitted to reach a verdict based on speculation or conjecture as to causation.  The Mohar decision reiterates and underscores the importance of holding a plaintiff to their burden of establishing proximate causation as a prima facie element of a negligence claim. If a plaintiff is unable to identify the cause of an accident, provides vague discovery responses or multiple theories of causation, defense counsel should consider filing a dispositive motion.    Finally, the Mohar decision has been cited in recent orders granting summary judgment, including Regina v. Summit Pointe Property Owners Ass’n, Monroe County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 1172-CV-2020 and Orwig v. Shinn, 323 A.3d 216 (Pa. Super. 2024).  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Recreational Immunity for County Under Landowners' Liability Act

In a recent unpublished decision in Matthew Kuzma, etc. v. Middlesex County Parks Department, et al., the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment in favor of Middlesex County Parks Department, holding that the county was immune from liability under New Jersey's Landowners' Liability Act (LLA), notwithstanding its failure to plead the immunity as an affirmative defense in its answer to the Complaint. The case arose from injuries sustained by fourteen-year-old plaintiff, Matthew Kuzma, while playing basketball at Spring Lake Park in South Plainfield on August 23, 2019. The plaintiff observed a crack in the basketball court before beginning to play but did not consider it dangerous. During the game, his foot became caught in the crack, causing him to fall and suffer a significant ankle injury. The plaintiff alleged that the injury resulted in ongoing physical limitations and deprived him of the opportunity to play collegiate basketball. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendants negligently maintained the basketball court. Although the county did not assert LLA immunity as an affirmative defense in its answers, it later moved for summary judgment on that basis. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the county had waived the defense by failing to plead it. The county maintained that the plaintiff had received sufficient notice of its intent to rely on the LLA through discovery and therefore suffered no unfair surprise or prejudice. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, concluding that the county should be permitted to invoke statutory immunity notwithstanding its failure to formally plead the defense. Relying heavily on the New Jersey Supreme Court's guidance in Arias v. Cnty. of Bergen, holding a county park was subject to the immunity of the LLA, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the county's failure to plead LLA immunity did not preclude reliance on the defense under the circumstances presented. The court determined that the plaintiff had received adequate notice of the immunity claim through discovery and that permitting the defense furthered the public-policy objectives embodied in the LLA. In affirming dismissal, the Appellate Division acknowledged the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury and the general societal interest in maintaining parks and recreational facilities in a safe condition. However, the court emphasized that both the legislature and the New Jersey Supreme Court have expressed a clear policy choice to limit liability for public and private landowners who make recreational property available for public use. The decision reinforces the courts' continuing adherence to the Landowners' Liability Act and the principle that recreational lands and facilities should be broadly protected from liability exposure, even in cases involving significant personal injuries.