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Angeline C. Panepresso

Portrait of Angeline C. Panepresso

Angeline is a member of the firm's Casualty Department and handles cases in both state and federal court. She devotes her practice to a variety of litigation matters including premises liability, product liability, automobile liability and construction liability. She joined Marshall Dennehey as a summer law clerk in 2008 and progressed to work within the firm's Aviation Litigation Practice Group, where she represented aircraft operators and owners, maintenance facilities, and component manufacturers in complex litigation matters.  

Angeline has been recognized as a Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star in the field of Civil Litigation Defense since 2013.

An honors graduate of Lehigh University, she received her juris doctor from Widener University School of Law, graduating cum laude in 2009.  Prior to entering law school, Angeline spent a summer interning at the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office in the Family Violence/ Sexual Assault Unit.  During law school, she interned for the Honorable Thomas J. Reuter, United States Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Angeline is admitted to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and in the state of New Jersey.  She is also a certified arbitrator in Philadelphia.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2009)
    • Lehigh University (B.A., 2006)
    • New Jersey, 2009
    • Pennsylvania, 2009
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2009
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2010
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2022-2025)
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Construction Law (2024-2025)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2013-2019)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • “Pennsylvania Pleading Requirements Clarified for Negligent Hiring and Related Claims: Rideshare Companies Have No Generalized Duty to Investigate Drivers,” Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024
    • “Narrowing the Scope of Medical Expert Qualifications and Testimony under the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence,” Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2015
    • "Catch and Release: A Plaintiff May Expressly Preserve Actionable Claims Against Insurance Agent While Releasing Insurer of Vicarious Liability," Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 3, September 2010
    • Successfully moved for summary judgment in numerous personal injury actions, resulting in determinations of non-liability.
    • Obtained favorable rulings on motions for partial summary judgment, resulting in the dismissal of a variety of claims.
    • Successfully moved for dismissal of a premises liability case brought against the owner of a home abutting a common driveway, totally eliminating liability on behalf of the client.
    • Successfully moved to open and strike a default judgment entered against a roofing company and its owner in a personal injury action.
    • Obtained a voluntarily dismissal of all claims against a client after filing a motion for summary judgment.
    • Obtained defense verdict in favor of client, homeowner, at arbitration where plaintiff alleged personal injuries from falling on the sidewalk outside the client's home.
    • Obtained dismissal of all claims against clients, beverage company and driver, where three (3) plaintiffs had alleged personal injuries as a result of a motor vehicle accident involving the beverage company's tractor-trailer, after first obtaining the order to preclude plaintiffs from presenting  evidence against the beverage company and its driver at trial.
    • Obtained dismissal of all claims against client, beverage company, where a plaintiff hotel owner alleged the client's vending machine caused a fire and resulting property damage at its hotel.
    • Obtained dismissal of third-party complaint and cross-claim against client, equipment manufacturer, where plaintiff's decedent suffered fatal injuries while using equipment on the third-party plaintiff's premises.
    • Obtained dismissal of punitive damages claims against clients in actions involving DUI motor vehicle accidents.
    • Sat second chair for jury trial resulting in a verdict in favor of client, airline, whose commercial airplane sustained significant damage when struck by improperly secured equipment at an airport.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Pennsylvania Pleading Requirements Clarified for Negligent Hiring and Related Claims: Rideshare Companies Have No Generalized Duty to Investigate Drivers

December 1, 2024

Key Points: To successfully plead a claim for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision, a plaintiff must plead specific facts establishing: (1) specific instances of prior misconduct on behalf of an employee; and (2) the employer had knowledge of such specific instances of prior misconduct and still chose to hire, failed to terminate, or declined to supervise the driver, thereby exposing the plaintiff to danger. To successfully plead a claim for negligent entrustment, a plaintiff must plead specific facts establishing that a vehicle owner allowed the driver to operate a vehicle with specific knowledge that the driver intended to, or was likely to, use the vehicle in such a way that would harm another. Rideshare companies have no generalized duty to investigate their drivers. If a rideshare company fails to investigate its driver, the inference is that it has no knowledge of its driver’s qualifications, or lack thereof, for purposes of negligent hiring and related claims. In Henry v. Marcelin, 2024 WL 4293055 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2024), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant, Lyft, a rideshare company, in a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle collision. In doing so, the court clarified the elements necessary to prove the similar, but distinguishable, claims of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and negligent entrustment. The court further held that rideshare companies have no generalized duty to investigate their drivers. The plaintiff in Henry asserted a negligence claim against the defendant driver, as well as claims of vicarious liability and negligent hiring, training, retention, supervision, and entrustment against Lyft. Lyft filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing the plaintiff’s negligent hiring, training, retention, supervision, and entrustment claim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under F.R.C.P. 12(c). The court granted Lyft’s motion, holding the plaintiff failed to allege specific facts establishing any prior misconduct or dangerous propensity on behalf of the defendant driver, let alone that Lyft had knowledge of such misconduct or propensity to support such a claim under Pennsylvania law.  In reaching its holding, the court analyzed the plaintiff’s claim of negligent hiring, training, retention, or supervision separately from the claim of negligent entrustment and came to the same conclusion. The court noted that, for the former claim to proceed under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must allege specific facts establishing that (1) the employee demonstrated a propensity for misconduct or ill fitness for the position and that, (2) nevertheless, the employer chose to hire, failed to train, declined to terminate, or failed to adequately supervise the employee, thereby putting the plaintiff in danger. The court further noted, although the theories of liability for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision are similar, they all have different elements a plaintiff must plausibly allege to proceed; specifically: To prove negligent hiring, the plaintiff must show that Lyft knew or was on notice of its driver’s propensity for misconduct, but nevertheless hired him, thereby exposing the plaintiff to danger.  A negligent retention claim is similar, but requires the plaintiff to show that Lyft negligently declined to terminate its driver after learning of a dangerous propensity.  To prove negligent supervision, the plaintiff must show that Lyft knew or should have known of a need to supervise its driver, but failed to do so, thereby exposing the plaintiff to danger. Although all of these theories share the requirement that the plaintiff must allege the driver’s prior bad acts would put a reasonable employer on notice of his propensity to injure others, the plaintiff could not meet her burden merely by alleging the driver was “dangerous” or had a propensity for misconduct. Rather, the plaintiff had to allege specific examples of prior dangerous behavior and of Lyft’s knowledge of such behavior. The plaintiff’s complaint, however, included only broad allegations that Lyft hired and retained the defendant driver when it knew or should have known by and through his “prior unsafe conduct, and/or substandard driving conduct” that he was “incompetent and/or unfit to drive a motor vehicle.” The complaint alleged no specific instances of prior misconduct or of Lyft’s knowledge of such misconduct when it chose to hire, declined to terminate, and/or failed to adequately supervise its driver. Thus, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s negligent hiring and related claims. Similarly, the court held dismissal was also warranted on the plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim against Lyft, which required her to plead specific facts establishing that Lyft (1) permitted the defendant driver (2) to operate its automobile (3) with knowledge that the driver intended to or was likely to use the automobile in such a way that would harm another. The court again found the plaintiff’s complaint included only conclusory allegations that Lyft knew of the defendant driver’s “prior unsafe conduct” without alleging any specific facts to support such allegations and, thus, could not establish a plausible claim for relief.  Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the court held that the plaintiff’s generalized allegations concerning Lyft’s lack of investigation into its driver’s record did not permit a reasonable inference that Lyft knew its driver was unqualified. Rather, such allegations permitted an inference that Lyft did not know anything about its driver’s qualifications because Lyft did not investigate him.  The court then explicitly rejected the existence of any generalized duty on behalf of a rideshare company to investigate its drivers, reasoning that “under Pennsylvania law, lessors—who are arguably similarly situated to Lyft—do not have a duty to investigate a lessee’s driving records unless they affirmatively assume responsibility from their lessee.” Thus, the court held, because the complaint lacked any factual allegations that Lyft affirmatively assumed responsibility for its driver or had specific knowledge of prior misconduct, Lyft was entitled to dismissal without prejudice of the plaintiff’s negligent hiring and related claims and any claim for negligent entrustment. The District Court’s ruling in Henry provides employers with greater clarity on the elements of the similar, but distinguishable, claims of negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision, and of negligent entrustment. The decision provides a strong argument for a motion to dismiss any such claims—including during the pleadings phase—based on a lack of specific facts or evidence establishing prior misconduct and the defendant employer’s knowledge thereof. The decision also provides defendant employers—and, particularly, rideshare companies—with an argument that it has no generalized duty to investigate its drivers. *Angeline is a member of our Casualty Department. She is a special counsel and works in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.