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Ray C. Freudiger

Portrait of Ray C. Freudiger

Ray Freudiger is a highly experienced litigator, having represented and defended clients in over 100 bench and jury trials in the state and Federal courts of Ohio. He has spent his career defending businesses and public entity clients in a wide variety of professional and general liability claims and suits brought against them. 

As a member of the firm’s Professional Liability Department, Ray has experience defending school districts in a wide array of matters including allegations of wrongful termination and discrimination and has knowledge of Special Education laws needed to appear in due process hearings before independent hearing officers. He also defends employers against allegations of discrimination based on race, gender, ethnicity and/or national origin. He represents these clients before the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, the EEOC, and in the federal and state courts. Ray additionally defends insurance agents and brokers, amusement park operators, real estate brokers & agents, architects, engineers, surveyors and homeowners associations in errors & omissions claims. Since joining the firm, he has had 11 jury trials, 10 of which resulted in a defense verdict and the other verdict substantially less than the pretrial offer. 

Ray has defended clients before administrative agencies such as in the Ohio Division of Real Estate, Ohio Civil Rights Commission, and Department of Urban Development (HUD). He also regularly conducts seminars for real estate brokers and their agents on real estate law issues, as part of their continuing education requirements and to help them to avoid litigation. Prior to attending law school, Ray obtained his property and casualty insurance license, which has served him well in representing clients in insurance coverage and bad faith matters.
 

    • University of Cincinnati College of Law (J.D., 1991)
    • University of Cincinnati (B.B.A., 1982)
    • Ohio, 1991
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Ohio, 1993
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 6th Circuit, 2017
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio, 2018
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2019
    • Cincinnati Bar Association
    • Ohio State Bar Association, Education Law Committee
    • Dayton Bar Association, Civil Trial Practice Committee
    • Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee
    • DRI (Defense Research Institute)
    • Education Law Association
    • An Overview of Commercial Auto Insurance in Pennsylvania & Ohio, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, January 26, 2021
    • Risk Management Best Practices for Engineers, Client Presentation, January 25, 2018
    • Secured a decision from the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed a jury verdict in favor of our client, a housing authority in Ohio.  After written Briefing and oral argument, The Sixth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict in which the Appellant developer failed to prove that the Housing Authority discriminated against it (in violation of ADA and FHA) by refusing to apply to HUD for VASH vouchers on behalf of the developer. The developer failed to prove it asked the housing authority for VASH on behalf of disabled persons, the request was not reasonable, and the request was not necessary to enable disabled persons to enjoy their residents as non-disabled persons could.
    • Secured dismissal on behalf of our client, an insurance agency in Hamilton County, Ohio. The plaintiff entity alleged that it suffered monetary damages by having to pay for claims made against its California employees. It alleged the agency failed to obtain Employment Practices Liability insurance for the company’s California employees. In our Motion to Dismiss, Ray successfully argued that the “economic loss doctrine” barred all claims against the agency. 
    • Successfully argued in Motion for Summary Judgment that Plaintiffs' claims were precluded by law because the general grant of immunity pursuant to R.C. §2744.01 applied to them as a political subdivision and no exception to immunity existed. Plaintiffs, a minor student and parent, filed suit against the school district, school board, supervising teacher, and principal alleging they were negligent when an afterschool science project (through the STEM program) caught fire causing burn injuries to the student. This included the exception that allows for negligence claims when there is a physical defect within or on the grounds of the entity.  Further, the individual employees were also granted immunity because they were acting in their official capacities and thus the same analysis afforded to the school applied to the individuals. The Judge ultimately granted our Motion and dismissed Plaintiffs' claims.  
    • Obtained dismissal of an Ohio insurance agent who was sued by a condominium association.  The allegation was that the insurance agent inappropriately and unlawfully inserted himself into the insurance company’s investigation and tortuously interfered with the contract that resulted in the insurance company paying far less than the $1.3 million in damages alleged by the condominium association.  After taking depositions of the individuals from the condominium association, the insurance company, and defending his client’s deposition, Ray convinced Plaintiff’s attorney to dismiss all claims against the insurance agent.
    • Obtained a summary judgement in a slip and fall matter involving a liquor store, where the plaintiff slipped and fractured her wrist upon stepping into the store on May 18, 2018. Heavy rain that evening allegedly caused water to be blown inside, which Field claimed as the cause of her fall. A wet floor sign was present, but she did not see it. We argued that the rainwater was an open and obvious condition, which under Ohio law, they had no duty to warn against. The court, citing similar cases, agreed, noting that a property owner is generally not liable for injuries from open and obvious conditions like rainwater. As Field failed to establish that the defendants breached their duty of care, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
    • Obtained a summary judgement for a general contractor insured by our client. Plaintiff was working for his employer at a fracking site when he was struck in the head by a hose that came off an above-ground storage tank. He sustained serious and permanent injuries. Plaintiff claimed the general contractor was liable for his injuries because it actively participated on the work site and controlled the unsafe condition which caused his injuries. We moved for summary judgment arguing that the general contractor relinquished complete control over the site to a sub-contractor and, thus, it had no control over any unsafe condition which caused the Plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of our client.
    • Secured significant victory in wrongful death commercial liability action at both trial and appellate court levels in suit involving death of 18-year old woman who was struck and killed by a commercial truck that was backing up an access ramp to deliver product at a grain receiving facility at the same time the woman traversed onto the ramp.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a jury trial where the case involved a rear end car accident. The plaintiff alleged serious and permanent injury, and while our client admitted fault, their contention was that the impact was of a minimal nature. The plaintiff incurred over $69,000 in medical expenses after the accident, and made a settlement demand of $200,000. The plaintiff rejected our nominal offer to settle the case before trial. Through the use of medical expert testimony, the defense contended that plaintiff's treatment was fueled by her subjective complaints, but there was no objective evidence of injury. The jury ruled in favor of the defendant.
    • Obtained a summary judgment on behalf of an insurance agent and the insurance agency. The agent and agency helped a business procure property and liability insurance on its business. A fire loss occurred and the insured discovered that it did not have business interruption coverage. It sued the agent and the agency for negligence, breach of contract and estoppel in failing to procure business interruption coverage for the insured. We convinced the Court that an insurance agent only has a duty to seek coverage which has been requested by the insured. Although the agent reassured the insured the day after the fire that the insured had business interruption coverage, the fact that this statement was incorrect, there is no evidence of any reliance by the insured, any reliance would have been unreasonable and unforeseen and the insured would have know that the agent's statements were incorrect if it had looked at the policy in its possession.
    • Successfully defended EEOC Charge of Discrimination brought against charter school client for alleged disability discrimination and failure to provide reasonable accommodation in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as well of claims of FMLA interference and retaliation, resulting in finding of No Probable Cause in favor of employer.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of insurance agency and insurance agent clients in insurance agent/broker professional liability action involving alleged failure to procure business interruption coverage for insured's start-up restaurant, which subsequently sustained uncovered fire loss.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of one of nation’s largest grocery store chains in significant federal rights action that received considerable media attention venued in federal court in Cincinnati involving unruly patron and patron's right to open carry weapon on private premises.
    • Secured dispositive dismissal on behalf of national insurance carrier in breach of contract and bad faith action involving residential fire that occurred at insureds' residence. In addition, as a result of in-depth investigation and discovery in civil suit, insureds were charged with and pled guilty to crimes of arson and insurance fraud.

Results

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

Summary Judgment Secured in a Design Defect Case

We won summary judgment on behalf of a company that provided software for the overall design of roof trusses in a design defect case. The plaintiff owned the apartment complex being built and hired Turnbull Wahlert to construct the building. 84 Lumber was subcontracted by Turnbull to build and install the roof trusses. 84 Lumber contracted with our client to use its software for the design of the roof trusses and to provide truss connect plate hangers. The building experienced severe water damage allegedly because the roof trusses were not sloped properly and the HVAC units were misplaced on the roof. Damages were estimated at over $1.2 million. 84 Lumber demanded that our client defend and indemnify it against Turnbull’s allegations. The court granted our motion for summary judgment.

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

New Ohio Law Targets Real Estate Wholesaling Practices

May 7, 2026

Effective March 2, 2026, the Ohio Department of Commerce Division of Real Estate and Professional Licensing (REPL) now requires real estate wholesalers to clearly disclose their intention and business model when contracting with a property owner and seller.  This was part of Ohio Senate Bill 155, which passed unanimously in the Ohio Senate in June 2025, and was signed into law by Governor Mike DeWine on December 1, 2025.  Real estate wholesalers serve as intermediaries in property transactions. They enter into a purchase agreement with a seller with no intent to buy the property themselves. Instead, they assign the contract to another buyer or investor at a higher price or charge a fee, typically 5% to 10% of the sale price, to earn a profit. The REPL, in partnership with the Ohio Department of Aging (ODA), and Ohio District 5 Area Agency on Aging in Richland issued a Consumer Alert in March 2025, on wholesalers, citing a rise in unsolicited real estate offers targeting older Ohio homeowners, often offering complex financial arrangements that include hidden risks, leaving older homeowners financially vulnerable. Under this new legislation, real estate wholesalers in Ohio are required to disclose their status to sellers or property owners and clarify that they do not represent the seller in the transaction. The law mandates that this disclosure be made through a clear and conspicuous written statement informing the seller that the individual is acting as a wholesaler. This disclosure must also be separate from the purchase contract or agreement between the parties and must be printed in bold type with a font size of at least 12 points. In the event a wholesaler fails to provide proper notice to the seller, the seller may cancel the purchase contract at any time before the close of escrow without penalty, giving the wholesaler 30 days to return any earnest money or deposits to the seller. Wholesalers who do not clearly disclose their role or properly inform the seller may also face disciplinary action from the Ohio Superintendent of Real Estate. This can include penalties such as suspension or revocation of their real estate license, as well as potential civil liability, monetary damages, and responsibility for attorneys’ fees.

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Ohio Law Does Not Conflict with the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act

April 1, 2025

The Ohio Department of Education and Workforce (DEW) oversees Ohio’s implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), a federal law that entitles children with disabilities to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). In a recent lawsuit, DEW argued that a state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an IDEA claim because the state’s administrate code conflicted with the IDEA and, therefore, was preempted by federal law. State ex rel. Governing Bd. of Warren Cnty. Educational Serv. Ctr. v. Ohio Dept. of Education & Workforce, 2024-Ohio-6061 (12th Dist.). The specific conflict advanced by DEW was that the IDEA complaint procedure applied to any “public agency, while Adm.Code 3301-51-05(K)(5) and (6) is more circumscribed by applying only to a disabled child's ‘school district of residence.’ ” At the trial level, the court disagreed with DEW’s argument, holding that IDEA complaint procedures set forth in 34 C.F.R. 300.152 and 34 C.F.R. 300.153 and those set forth by Adm.Code 3301-51-05(K)(5) and (6) are “virtually identical,” with the exception that the C.F.R. uses the term “public agency” while the Adm.Code uses the term “school district of residence.”  The Twelfth District Court of Appeals agreed that Ohio’s complaint procedures were not in conflict with federal law. The appeal court explained that the IDEA and 34 C.F.R. 300.152 and 300.153 were crafted with general language to accommodate the variations of 50 states’ educational systems. As such, it makes sense that C.F.R. used the broad term “public agency” in the IDEA regulations. Adm.Code 3301-51-05(K)(5) and (6) do not truncate the IDEA or limit its protections; thus, they are not in conflict. In summary, the IDEA does not preempt Ohio’s administrate code regarding the procedure for filing an IDEA claim.    Legal Update for Special Education Law – April 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.