The Insurance Agents and Brokers Defense Practice Group at Marshall Dennehey is nationally recognized for its skillful representation of insurance professionals in complex civil litigation. With decades of collective experience, our attorneys provide sophisticated, results-driven defense to insurance agents, brokers, managing general agents, and other intermediaries facing professional liability claims. We understand the intricate regulatory frameworks, contractual obligations, and industry standards that govern the insurance marketplace, allowing us to craft defenses that reflect both legal prowess and practical business insight.
Our team regularly defends clients in claims alleging negligence, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, failure to procure coverage, and errors in policy placement or renewal. We also handle disputes arising from alleged bad faith, premium miscalculations, claims denial and compliance violations. Whether the matter involves a single claim or a multi-jurisdictional class action, our attorneys have the depth of knowledge and trial experience necessary to protect our clients’ reputations and minimize their exposure.
Beyond litigation, our practice group emphasizes proactive risk management and claim prevention. We partner with insurance agencies and brokerages to conduct internal audits, develop best practices, and deliver training on evolving industry risks, emerging coverage issues, and regulatory developments. This preventative approach reflects our broader commitment to supporting our clients as trusted advisors, not just defenders, throughout the life of their businesses.
At Marshall Dennehy we understand that every claim against an insurance professional carries significant professional and reputational consequences. Our clients rely on us for strategic, efficient, and discreet representation that aligns with their long-term business goals. By combining deep industry knowledge with vigorous advocacy and an unwavering commitment to service, our Insurance Agents and Brokers Defense Practice Group stands at the forefront of protecting the professionals who keep the insurance industry moving.
Results
Philadelphia Commerce Court Grants Summary Judgment, Dismissing $2M Unfair‑Competition and Tortious‑Interference Claims
We obtained summary judgment dismissal, following Oral Argument, in a Philadelphia Commerce Court commercial litigation matter involving allegations of unfair competition and tortious inference with contract and business relationships, brought by one adult day care center against our client, a competing adult day care facility. The plaintiff’s suit stemmed from alleged violation of regulations set forth by the Pennsylvania Department of Aging and its Office of Long-Term Living. The plaintiff’s final demand was $2 million, and no settlement offers were made before the trial court granted summary judgment.
Montgomery County Court Dismisses Lawsuit Against Insurance Broker
We obtained dismissal of our insurance broker client on Motion for Summary Judgment in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania, on the basis of no duty breached, and lack of causation. Claimants asserted a professional negligence theory for allegedly allowing a commercial insurance policy to lapse, failing to notify the policyholder claimant of the lapse or cancellation, and allowing a subsequent gap in coverage to exist after the policy cancelled, when an underlying loss occurred. However, after completed discovery depositions and expert discovery, we successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the policy cancelled because of the policyholder’s own failure to comply with premium audit requirements, rather than any liability or breach of standard of care by the insurance broker.
Thought Leadership
Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers
New York Court Rejects Tolling Argument in Negligent‑Procurement Suit Filed After Coverage Litigation
May 7, 2026
Johnson v. Northeast Agencies, Inc., 242 A.D.3d 414 (1st Dep’t 2025) One of the recurring challenges in professional liability litigation—especially in claims against insurance brokers—is determining exactly when a claim “accrues” for purposes of the statute of limitations. The case of Johnson v. Northeast Agencies, Inc., 242 A.D.3d 414 (1st Dep’t 2025), presented a twist on this familiar issue. It raised the question of when the statute of limitations began to run on a negligent‑procurement claim against an insurance broker. In this case, a claim under a general liability policy was made in March 2018, following the commencement of a personal injury action against the owner of a rental property. A month later, the insurer issued a disclaimer of coverage, explaining that, among other reasons, the property where the injury occurred was not listed as an “insured location” under the policy. Ordinarily, such a disclaimer would start the clock on any negligent‑procurement claim against the broker, but here, despite disclaiming coverage, the insured was not immediately negatively impacted by the coverage disclaimer because the insurer agreed to provide a defense to the insured while the parties litigated the validity of the disclaimer in a separate declaratory judgment action. Eventually, the court in the declaratory judgment action upheld the insurer’s disclaimer, confirming that the property was indeed not an insured location under the policy. Only after that ruling—more than five years after the original disclaimer—did the insured file suit against the broker for negligent failure to procure the requested coverage. However, the statute of limitations for negligent failure to procure claims in New York State is three years. The insured argued that the insurer’s continued defense during the declaratory judgment action effectively masked the significance of the disclaimer and should be treated as tolling the statute of limitations. The insured contended that it was reasonable to wait for the outcome of the coverage litigation before pursuing a claim against the broker, because the insurer’s defense created uncertainty about whether the disclaimer would ultimately stand. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected this argument. The courts held that the claim accrued when the disclaimer letter was issued, because that was the moment the insured was placed on notice of the broker’s alleged negligence. The insurer’s voluntary defense during the declaratory judgment action did not create ambiguity about the disclaimer or delay the accrual of the claim. Going forward, insureds will likely not wait for a final coverage determination before pursuing a negligent‑procurement claim against insurance brokers. Insureds who prefer to wait for the outcome of a coverage dispute will need to secure tolling agreements to avoid losing their claims against brokers due to expired statute of limitations periods.
Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers
Misrepresentations of the Next Degree: Expanding Broker Liability After Penn Outdoor
May 7, 2026
Services v. Harleyville Insurance Co. There has been a noticeable increase in claims against insurance brokers over recent years, with plaintiffs beginning to frame coverage disputes as actions sounding in negligence and negligent misrepresentations. In this ever-shifting world, disputes regarding coverage have devolved into claims that brokers failed to secure, explain, or accurately advise as to coverage. Such claims, requiring no proof of intent, allow insureds facing scrutiny to look beyond the spoken word of brokers and into the text of standard transaction documents. Pennsylvania’s Superior Court’s decision in Penn Outdoor Servs., LLC v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of New Jersey, 323 A.3d 231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024), reargument denied (Sept. 6, 2024), highlights the evolution of the misrepresentation claims against brokers. There, Penn Outdoor Services, LLC subcontracted for snow removal services at an apartment complex it owned with Longford Landscape and Excavation. The contract between Penn and Longford included a hold harmless clause in favor of Penn with respect to the services to be provided by Longford, which specifically stated: Subcontractor agrees to indemnify and save and hold harmless Penn and Penn's clients/customers from and against all claims for damages arising out of the performance of Subcontractor's duties under this Agreement and agrees to, at Subcontractor's expense, defend any suit or action brought against Penn or Penn's clients/customers on account of such claim or damage. Consistent with the parties’ agreement, Longford’s insurance broker, Wharton, Lyon & Lyon provided Penn with a certificate of insurance, naming Penn as an additional insured under Wharton’s insurance policy with Harleysville Insurance Company. Specifically, the subject policy included an endorsement relating to Penn’s coverage as an additional insured, endorsement CG-7524, which provided, If specifically required by the written contract or agreement referenced in Paragraph A above, any coverage provided by this endorsement to an additional insured shall be primary and any other valid and collectible insurance available to the additional insured shall be non-contributory with this insurance. While the contract between Penn and Longford was in effect, a woman was injured in a slip and fall at the complex where Longford provided snow removal services. The woman filed suit and named Penn as a defendant. With the impression it was an additional insured under Longford policy, Penn sought a defense in the matter from Longford and Harleysville; a request that was denied because, as per Harleysville, the coverage provided under Penn’s policy was excess coverage, not primary. After settling the underlying action and incurring extensive legal fees in the course of the same, Penn filed an action against Harleysville and Wharton, including a claim for negligent misrepresentation against Wharton. After a jury verdict was rendered in favor of Penn, Wharton filed a motion for j.n.o.v. arguing that the evidence established that it made no negligent misrepresentation. The trial court disagreed, pointing out that the contract between Penn and Longford required Penn to be named as an additional insured, however, it did not specify that such coverage be primary as required by the applicable endorsement to the Harleysville policy. Wharton’s representative testified that she did not review the complete language of the endorsement in question, thus creating the negligent misrepresentation. By providing the COI naming Penn as an additional insured, Wharton represented that to be the status of insurance extended to Penn. The endorsement of the Harleysville policy provided that “if specially provided” by the contract between the parties, the coverage afforded would be primary, correlating with the text of the COI. The contract in question, however, did not specifically call for the coverage to be primary. Therefore, it was not. While reading like a choose your own adventure novel, Penn Outdoor highlights the need for attention to detail in the issuance of COI’s by brokers. In a world where a broker’s spoken word can get them into hot water, the case casts a light on a new potential pathway to broker liability. While the COI in the present matter contained the necessary buzz words, i.e. “additional insured,” that language alone could not carry the day. Penn Outdoor evidences how critical it is for brokers to choose their words wisely, but also carefully ensures the text of the COI, policy language, and other transaction documents provide the coverage reasonably expected by the insured. By making it ones practice to always reconcile the policy language with the COI, and any applicable contracts, brokers can avoid potential liability in an increasingly litigious world.
