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Results

  • Philadelphia Commerce Court Grants Summary Judgment, Dismissing $2M Unfair‑Competition and Tortious‑Interference Claims

    We obtained summary judgment dismissal, following Oral Argument, in a Philadelphia Commerce Court commercial litigation matter involving allegations of unfair competition and tortious inference with contract and business relationships, brought by one adult day care center against our client, a competing adult day care facility.  The plaintiff’s suit stemmed from alleged violation of regulations set forth by the Pennsylvania Department of Aging and its Office of Long-Term Living. The plaintiff’s final demand was $2 million, and no settlement offers were made before the trial court granted summary judgment.

  • Montgomery County Court Dismisses Lawsuit Against Insurance Broker

    We obtained dismissal of our insurance broker client on Motion for Summary Judgment in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania, on the basis of no duty breached, and lack of causation. Claimants asserted a professional negligence theory for allegedly allowing a commercial insurance policy to lapse, failing to notify the policyholder claimant of the lapse or cancellation, and allowing a subsequent gap in coverage to exist after the policy cancelled, when an underlying loss occurred. However, after completed discovery depositions and expert discovery, we successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the policy cancelled because of the policyholder’s own failure to comply with premium audit requirements, rather than any liability or breach of standard of care by the insurance broker.

  • MD Successfully Defends Low Verdict Against Insurance Broker that Plaintiff Challenged on Appeal

    In a case where an insurance broker faced claims of professional negligence, Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia) successfully defended the plaintiff’s appeal from a verdict obtained by Tim Ventura and Dana Gittleman (Philadelphia). The verdict against our client, an independent insurance broker, was well below the lost value of UIM coverage (i.e., $1 million), which the plaintiff sought to recover based on an alleged breach of the professional standard of care in failing to procure an endorsement for $ 1 million in UIM coverage on the plaintiff’s decedent’s commercial auto policy.  The verdict is notable because, at trial, the client gave unexpected testimony which impacted liability, and when confronted with the client’s new trial testimony, our standard of care expert conceded a breach of the professional standard of care. Still, causation/damages were contested, and it was disputed at trial that the plaintiff’s decedent would have actually received $1 million in coverage. Tim elicited testimony on cross-examination of the plaintiff’s expert to show that there was no evidence establishing the insurer would have provided additional UIM coverage even if the endorsement had been purchased.  Prior to trial the parties entered into a stipulation stating that damages were capped at the value of the lost coverage, $1 million. Plaintiff’s counsel challenged the low verdict on various grounds, focusing on the fact that our expert conceded a breach of a standard of care based on the client’s unexpected trial testimony. He argued that, as a matter of law, the damages amount was the lost value of the coverage and the verdict should be increased to $1 million. The trial court agreed with our arguments, raised in opposition to the plaintiff’s post-trial motions, that the low verdict amount was supported by the record and that the plaintiff’s requests for post-trial relief were otherwise waived for various reasons.  The Superior Court affirmed in a unanimous decision.   

  • Philadelphia Court Dismisses Lawsuit Against Insurance Broker

    We obtained dismissal of our insurance broker client on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on the basis of a statute of limitations defense. Plaintiff alleged a failure to procure insurance that would cover an employee’s death in the course of business operations. We successfully argued that the four-year statute of limitations applicable to breach of contract claims barred plaintiff’s claims based upon several instances of notice of the insurance policy terms and coverages, and a claim determination, all of which preceded the suit inception by more than four years. 

  • Claims against Ohio insurance agent dismissed.

    The agent was sued by a condominium association, that alleged the insurance agent inappropriately and unlawfully inserted himself into the insurance company’s investigation and tortuously interfered with a contract that resulted in the insurance company paying far less than the $1.3 million in damages alleged by the condominium association. After taking depositions of the individuals from the condominium association, the insurance company and defending his client’s deposition, we convinced the plaintiff’s attorney to dismiss all claims against the insurance agent.

  • Defense Verdict for Insurance Producer After One-Week Jury Trial

    We obtained a defense verdict in a one-week trial in Hudson County, New Jersey, in a case where the plaintiff alleged the defendant insurance producer failed to alert the plaintiff of a policy renewal coming up and then failed to advise him that the policy had lapsed, and he had no insurance.  The plaintiff claimed the defendant breached a contract to provide the plaintiff with notices by email and that the defendant breached a duty of care in a claim for professional negligence. Due to the breadth of the insurance policy at issue, the claim against the defendant was for $500,000. At trial, the plaintiff relied upon his testimony that he did not receive the notices or any calls from the defendants regarding the lapse. We argued and established that any potential breach of contract or breach of a professional duty of care was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages because he failed to take any steps to either calendar or diary his insurance renewal deadlines and also failed historically to timely renew his insurance policies in the eight years preceding this loss. After an hour and fourteen minutes of deliberation, the jury agreed with the defense and found that the plaintiff could not establish a proximate cause between the alleged breach of a duty of care and plaintiff’s damages.   

  • Negligence Claims Against Insurance Broker Dismissed

    We successfully defended an insurance broker in a negligence claim. After a tornado damaged his property, the third-party plaintiff rented an excavator that was damaged due to a collision during its operation. Before renting the excavator, the third-party plaintiff contacted our client, an insurance broker, requesting that the agency procure insurance to protect him against loss to the excavator. Our client arranged for third-party plaintiff’s purchase of two policies; however, the specific collision that occurred was not covered under either policy. The insurance company for the rental facility paid for repairs to the excavator and demanded reimbursement from the third-party plaintiff who, in turn, requested our client satisfy the claim. The third-party plaintiff eventually dismissed his claims against our client after we argued: (1) the third-party plaintiff could not satisfy the elements needed to establish a negligence claim; (2) our client made no negligent misrepresentation of fact; and (3) our client did not owe a fiduciary duty to the third-party plaintiff. There were no facts to support a finding that there was negligence just because this specific instance was not covered by the policies in place. An insurer has a duty to read his policies and a failure to do so does not impute negligence. Additionally, there were no misrepresentation of facts and there was no fiduciary duty between the agent and the insured. For there to be a fiduciary duty between an agent and insured, there must be a mutual understanding of such, which was not the case here. 

  • Defense Shuts Down Investigation of Life Insurance Agent

    We effectively shut down a Maryland Insurance Department investigation of a life insurance agent who was the subject of a customer complaint. The complaint alleged the agent oversold life insurance to a couple who contended the amount of insurance was excessive, unsuitable and unnecessary. We were able to demonstrate to the regulators that the agent did a thorough job in explaining the need and purpose for the coverage, and that the couple could afford the coverage and actually drove the decision to purchase the coverage, only changing their mind later, after the client was criticized by a subsequent insurance agent. We also defeated a Certified Financial Planner Board investigation involving the same matter. 

  • Dismissal of Lawsuit Against Insurance Agent

    We successfully argued for the dismissal of an action in Wyoming County on a matter involving the sale by an agent of a number of mutual funds (with IRA retirement funds). In this case, the plaintiff contended the mutual funds were excessive and unsuitable. We convinced the trial court judge that plaintiff’s counsel’s lack of activity for several years on the case, and his failure to respond to long-outstanding discovery, warranted dismissal of the lawsuit.

  • Summary Judgment Win on Behalf of Ohio Insurance Agent and Broker

    The plaintiff, who owns a restaurant, sustained personal injuries in a car accident while on a business errand. He collected the tortfeasor’s liability limits of $100,000, and then filed underinsured motorist claims with his own insurance carrier who had issued the personal auto and commercial auto policies. The underinsured claims were denied by the carrier. There was no UIM coverage under the personal auto policy because the $100,000 UIM limits equaled the liability carrier’s limits. Further, although the plaintiff had $1 million UIM limits on his commercial policy, the Mazda he was driving at the time of the accident was not listed on the commercial policy; rather, it was listed on the personal auto policy. The court granted our motion for summary judgment on several bases: the Statute of Limitations began to run when the Mazda was first put on the personal auto policy, not when the accident occurred; despite the plaintiff’s and the agent’s friendship and long-standing business dealings, there was not a fiduciary relationship between the agent and insured customer; and the agent’s alleged statement to the plaintiff that he was covered in “every single possible way you can think of” did not amount to a misrepresentation of fact. 

  • Federal Court Lawsuit Against Insurance Broker Dismissed

    We obtained dismissal of claims asserted against our insurance broker client for breach of contract and declaratory judgment in connection with a COVID-related business interruption loss. The Court granted our Motion to Dismiss, determining that plaintiff restaurant lacked a viable breach of contract claim against the insurance broker, and thus that the derivative declaratory judgment claim also failed as a matter of law.  The lawsuit arose from pandemic-related, government-mandated business closures and plaintiff’s claim for business interruption losses, which was denied by its insurer.  The allegations against our client pertained to alleged breach of the insurance policy and coverage obligations under the policy, which unequivocally stated that the parties to the insurance policy were plaintiff as policyholder and the insurer – not our insurance broker client.   In the Magistrate Judge’s Opinion, adopted by U.S. Middle District of PA Judge Mariani, the Court concluded that our client was not a party to the insurance policy contract and did not agree to undertake any responsibilities or liabilities for the insurer’s coverage determinations, but merely acted as an agent for a plainly disclosed principal (insurer) and facilitated the contract between the parties thereto.  

  • Lawsuit Against Insurance Broker Dismissed

    In a case where we represented an insurance broker, a Federal District Judge from the Southern District of West Virginia granted our motion to dismiss and dismissed the suit in its entirety. The plaintiff was a women’s fashion and accessory boutique. The suit arose from a dispute over the plaintiff’s insurance coverage for damages it sustained while being ordered to close by West Virginia’s COVID-19-related orders. The insurance carrier filed a motion to dismiss, and, thereafter, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the carrier. The broker filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims plead against it, including bad faith, West Virginia’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty. The court dismissed the counts of bad faith and Unfair Trade Practices Act, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient allegations to support such claims. The court further explained that the plaintiff alleged very few facts specific to the broker and that the allegations plead did not support any unreasonable conduct by the broker, which is required to establish bad faith or deception. For similar reasons, the court held that the plaintiff’s estoppel claim failed. The plaintiff alleged the broker advised that they would have coverage as a result of the COVID-19 orders. The court found that the plaintiff failed to allege how it relied on those representations or how that reliance was detrimental. The alleged representations occurred months after the plaintiff accepted the policy and did not appear to have any impact on the plaintiff’s request for payments from its insurance carrier. Finally, the court explained that the plaintiff failed to identify any West Virginia authority to establish a breach of fiduciary duty against the broker. Regardless, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege that it requested specific coverage before the broker procured the policy.

  • Summary Judgment on Behalf of an Insurance Agent and Broker in the Franklin County Ohio Court of Common Pleas

    The plaintiff, who owned his own restaurant business, sustained personal injuries in a car accident while on a business errand. He collected the tortfeasor’s liability limits of $100,000 and then filed underinsured motorist claims with his own insurance carrier that had issued the personal auto and commercial auto policies. The underinsured claims were denied by the carrier. There was no UIM coverage under the personal auto policy because the $100,000 UIM limits equaled the liability carrier’s limits. Further, although the plaintiff had $1 million in UIM limits on his commercial policy, the Mazda he was driving at the time of the accident was not listed on the commercial policy; rather, it was listed on the personal auto policy. The plaintiff then sued the insurance agent and broker who listed the Mazda on the personal rather than commercial policy. He argued professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. Extensive discovery was conducted, including depositions of insurance standard of care experts for each side. The court granted Ray’s motion for summary judgment on several bases: the statute of limitations began to run when the Mazda was first put on the personal auto policy, not when the motor vehicle accident occurred; despite the plaintiff’s and the agent’s friendship and long-standing business dealings, there was not a fiduciary relationship between the agent and insured customer; and the agent’s alleged statement to the plaintiff that he was covered in “every single possible way you can think of” did not amount to a misrepresentation of fact.    

  • Lawsuit Against West Virginia Insurance Broker Dismissed

    In a case where we represented an insurance broker, a Federal District Judge from the Southern District of West Virginia granted our motion to dismiss and dismissed the suit in its entirety. The plaintiff was a women’s fashion and accessory boutique. The suit arose from a dispute over the plaintiff’s insurance coverage for damages it sustained while being ordered to close by West Virginia’s COVID-19-related orders. The insurance carrier filed a motion to dismiss, and, thereafter, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the carrier. The broker filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims plead against it, including bad faith, West Virginia’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty. The court dismissed the counts of bad faith and Unfair Trade Practices Act, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient allegations to support such claims. The court further explained that the plaintiff alleged very few facts specific to the broker and that the allegations plead did not support any unreasonable conduct by the broker, which is required to establish bad faith or deception. For similar reasons, the court held that the plaintiff’s estoppel claim failed. The plaintiff alleged the broker advised that they would have coverage as a result of the COVID-19 orders. The court found that the plaintiff failed to allege how it relied on those representations or how that reliance was detrimental. The alleged representations occurred months after the plaintiff accepted the policy and did not appear to have any impact on the plaintiff’s request for payments from its insurance carrier. Finally, the court explained that the plaintiff failed to identify any West Virginia authority to establish a breach of fiduciary duty against the broker. Regardless, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege that it requested specific coverage before the broker procured the policy.

  • Successful Defense of Insurance Agency and Agent in Ohio Appellate Court

    We defended an insurance agency and agent in the Twelfth Appellate District of Ohio. The plaintiffs contacted the insurance agent to obtain insurance for two residential properties. The agent obtained the requisite information for the insurance applications from the plaintiffs, including their primary mailing address, a post office box address. The agent advised them that their only insurance option was through the Ohio Fair Plan (OFP), as neither property had been insured in the prior three years. The plaintiffs gave the agent a check for the premium. The agent explained that the OFP would inspect both properties prior to issuing coverage and that coverage would be cancelled if any required repairs were not made. The OFP sent a notice of cancellation to the post office box listed on the insurance application. It also sent a refund check to the agent. The plaintiffs claimed that they never received the notice of cancellation or the refund check. They sued OFP, the agent and insurance agency. After written briefs and oral argument, the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the agent and agency on the grounds that there was no evidence that the agent represented to the plaintiffs that the property had insurance coverage prior to a fire at one of the properties. Further, although the plaintiffs claimed that they never received notice of cancellation, the insurance application indicated that they would be informed directly from the insurer whether or not coverage was going to be provided. Therefore, the agent was not required to inform the plaintiffs of the cancellation. The court also held that the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence the agent fraudulently concealed the refund check from them, even if they did not receive the check.

  • Summary Judgment for Insurance Agency and Agent

    We obtained summary judgment on behalf of an insurance agency and insurance agent in a fraud action. Venued in Cincinnati, the case involved a dispute over the agent’s alleged failure to procure insurance coverage for a residence that sustained extensive, uncovered fire damage. The client had assisted the two homeowners in procuring insurance coverage for their residential properties with the Ohio Fair Plan Underwriting Association, an entity created by the Ohio legislature to provide insurance for property that is not insurable in the normal insurance market. After completing an inspection of the property, Ohio Fair Plan issued a notice that the carrier was cancelling the homeowners’ insurance contract. Ohio Fair Plan also issued a refund check to the homeowners. Sometime thereafter, a fire occurred at the homeowners’ residence. It was later conclusively determined that the homeowners did not have coverage with Ohio Fair Plan for the loss as a result of the cancellation of the contract. The homeowners alleged that they never received the cancellation notice or the refund check from Ohio Fair Plan or their insurance agent. The homeowners filed suit against the insurance agent and his agency, alleging claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment as a result of the homeowners’ purported failure to receive the notice or check prior to the time of the fire, which the homeowners alleged would have enabled them to procure alternative coverage. The defense moved for summary judgment, arguing that the fraudulent misrepresentation claim lacked merit because the insurance agent never misrepresented any fact relating to the homeowners’ insurance coverage and never concealed any material fact from the homeowners. The court agreed and granted summary judgment.

  • Summary Judgment for Insurance Broker in Negligence and Breach of Contract Action

    Obtained summary judgment in Nassau County, New York on behalf of an insurance broker in a negligence and breach of contract action. Our client allegedly failed to procure proper insurance coverage, resulting in uninsured Superstorm Sandy-related losses claimed to be in excess of  $2.3 million.  The court granted summary judgment and dismissal of the complaint, finding that the plaintiffs were unable to support its claims without non-hearsay evidence.

Firm Highlights

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

Thought Leadership

Coverage Determined, Judgment Paid, Bad Faith Survives: Fourth DCA’s Opinion Highlights the Distinction Between Contractual and Extra-Contractual Damages

In Healthy Food Experts, LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 4D2025-0181 (4th DCA June 10, 2026), the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that an insurer’s payment of a judgment in a breach of contract case does not automatically eliminate a later bad faith claim seeking extra-contractual damages. The decision provides guidance on when a first-party bad faith claim may still proceed after a coverage dispute has already been resolved by a judgment. Healthy Food Experts, LLC involved a dispute related to a property damage claim submitted under a commercial insurance policy issued by the insurer following a ceiling collapse at the insured’s restaurant. The insurer denied coverage for the insured’s losses for business personal property and business income, but extended coverage for the food spoilage losses. As a result, the insured filed a breach of contract action and ultimately obtained a jury verdict. The insurer appealed the verdict and, while the appeal was pending, the insured filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) seeking payment for the judgment plus interest. The insurer failed to cure the CRN within the statutory sixty-day cure period, but paid the judgement in full with accrued interest following the appeals court’s per curiam affirmance. Nevertheless, the insured filed a first party bad faith lawsuit claiming to have suffered extra-contractual damages. In response to the bad faith suit, the insurer filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Fridman v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, 185 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 2016) stating that damages were fixed by judgment of the breach of contract suit and the insured could not recover additional damages beyond those already awarded. The insurer also argued that the judgment did not exceed the insured’s policy limits, which was a required element of a first party bad faith claim. The trial court dismissed the bad faith action based on Fridman, concluding the insured could not seek any additional damages.  The insured appealed the court’s ruling to the Fourth DCA arguing the trial court’s order conflicts with Florida law and misapplies Fridman, as a contractual damage determination in the underlying suit establishes the “condition precedent to prosecute a first party bad faith action.” Cingari v. First Protective Ins. Co., 377 So. 3d 1169, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). Further, the insured argued that the only purpose to the binding language in Fridman is to prevent the re-litigating of the same damages, which in this case are the contractual damages. The insured asserted the damages were not the “same” as they were seeking consequential damages from the insurer’s alleged bad faith. The Fourth District emphasized in its ruling that a first party bad faith claim is not ripe for litigation until there has been the following: a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; a determination of the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the required civil remedy notice is filed pursuant to §624.155(3)(a).  Demase v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 239 So. 3d 218, 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) The court concluded that the necessary conditions were satisfied as the jury verdict determined both coverage and the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the insured properly filed a civil remedy notice, so the bad faith claim was ripe for litigation. The Fourth DCA further explained the insured could not seek contractual damages in its bad faith action, which was previously litigated in its breach of contract suit. However, the court determined the insured could seek “extra-contractual damages,” which were not recoverable in the insured’s breach of contract suit, which may include interest, court cost, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the insured. Further, the court held excess judgment is not essential in a first party bad faith claim and the insurer’s late payment of the judgment did not preclude the insured’s bad faith action. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final dismissal order of the bad faith action. This opinion highlights the distinction between contractual and extra-contractual damages. Moreover, this case demonstrates that a judgment does not necessarily end the dispute in a first party property claim as it is could also serve as a prerequisite of a bad faith action. The decision serves as a reminder that insurers may face bad faith exposure notwithstanding the payment of a judgment in an underlying breach of contract action.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.