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Results

  • Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

    Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

  • Summary Judgment Secured in a Design Defect Case

    We won summary judgment on behalf of a company that provided software for the overall design of roof trusses in a design defect case. The plaintiff owned the apartment complex being built and hired Turnbull Wahlert to construct the building. 84 Lumber was subcontracted by Turnbull to build and install the roof trusses. 84 Lumber contracted with our client to use its software for the design of the roof trusses and to provide truss connect plate hangers. The building experienced severe water damage allegedly because the roof trusses were not sloped properly and the HVAC units were misplaced on the roof. Damages were estimated at over $1.2 million. 84 Lumber demanded that our client defend and indemnify it against Turnbull’s allegations. The court granted our motion for summary judgment.

  • Charges Filed by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission Dismissed

    We won dismissal of a charge filed by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC) against our client, a public housing authority. A tenant claimed the housing authority discriminated against him based upon race, disability, sex, and sexual orientation or engaged in retaliation. The OCRC determined there was no discrimination and dismissed the charge against the housing authority.

  • Motion to Enforce Oral Settlement Agreement Affirmed by First District Court of Appeals

    We won a decision from the First District Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision to grant our client’s motion to enforce an oral settlement agreement. We defended a condominium owners association against a lawsuit filed by several unit owners. The parties went to mediation, during which their attorneys agreed on the settlement terms. However, several of the plaintiff unit owners refused to sign the written settlement agreement. We argued at the trial court that the oral agreement should be enforced because memorializing the agreement in writing was not a material term of the parties’ agreement, and that the parties did not intend for the settlement agreement to only be enforceable upon the execution of the writing. Further, all the material terms of the agreement had been agreed on. The First District Court agreed and upheld the decision in favor of the condominium owners’ association.

  • Ohio Retailer Not Liable for Slip and Fall

    We won summary judgment on behalf of a retail store in a slip and fall case in Ohio. The plaintiff alleged serious injuries as a result of slipping and falling on a spill of an oil substance in the parking lot, right outside the front entrance doors. The plaintiff argued that she was pushing a shopping cart and alleged that pushing a shopping cart creates an attendant circumstance that blocked her vision. We successfully argued that the act of pushing a cart does not qualify as an attendant circumstance, as the customer has the ability to see the parking lot ahead of a grocery cart and pushing a cart was a situation the plaintiff regularly encountered. Further, the oil spill was wide in nature and darker in color than the asphalt. It was observable had the plaintiff looked and, therefore, qualified as an open and obvious condition. Summary judgment was granted on behalf of our client. 

  • Claims against Ohio insurance agent dismissed.

    The agent was sued by a condominium association, that alleged the insurance agent inappropriately and unlawfully inserted himself into the insurance company’s investigation and tortuously interfered with a contract that resulted in the insurance company paying far less than the $1.3 million in damages alleged by the condominium association. After taking depositions of the individuals from the condominium association, the insurance company and defending his client’s deposition, we convinced the plaintiff’s attorney to dismiss all claims against the insurance agent.

  • Negligence Claims Against Insurance Broker Dismissed

    We successfully defended an insurance broker in a negligence claim. After a tornado damaged his property, the third-party plaintiff rented an excavator that was damaged due to a collision during its operation. Before renting the excavator, the third-party plaintiff contacted our client, an insurance broker, requesting that the agency procure insurance to protect him against loss to the excavator. Our client arranged for third-party plaintiff’s purchase of two policies; however, the specific collision that occurred was not covered under either policy. The insurance company for the rental facility paid for repairs to the excavator and demanded reimbursement from the third-party plaintiff who, in turn, requested our client satisfy the claim. The third-party plaintiff eventually dismissed his claims against our client after we argued: (1) the third-party plaintiff could not satisfy the elements needed to establish a negligence claim; (2) our client made no negligent misrepresentation of fact; and (3) our client did not owe a fiduciary duty to the third-party plaintiff. There were no facts to support a finding that there was negligence just because this specific instance was not covered by the policies in place. An insurer has a duty to read his policies and a failure to do so does not impute negligence. Additionally, there were no misrepresentation of facts and there was no fiduciary duty between the agent and the insured. For there to be a fiduciary duty between an agent and insured, there must be a mutual understanding of such, which was not the case here. 

  • Successful Defense of Public Housing Authority Accused of Discrimination Against Disabled Persons Under the ADA and FHA.

    In a case that was closely watched by other Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), we obtained a defense verdict after a six-day jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio where we defended a PHA accused of discrimination against disabled persons under the ADA and FHA.  The dispute surrounded the PHA’s failure to apply to the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (VASH) vouchers as requested by a developer. The plaintiff claimed that the PHA arbitrarily, capriciously, intentionally, and based on discriminatory animus blocked funding and financing for 60 units of affordable housing for veterans, most of whom were disabled, which stood in violation of the ADA and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA). For background, the PHA’s administrative plan required it to issue a RFP. The developer argued the PHA should have amended its administrative plan to allow it to choose a developer and that the PHA’s refusal to apply for VASH vouchers on the developer’s behalf was discrimination against disabled persons under the ADA and FHA.  In defense of the allegations we argued: The developer never claimed to be acting on behalf of disabled persons; the only request was for a letter of intent, which the PHA could not submit since it would have violated its Administrative Plan and federal regulations; and the request was not necessary to enable disabled persons equal access since the PHA’s decision had the same effect on non-disabled persons. The jury unanimously agreed that the plaintiff developer failed to prove all the necessary prima facie elements of discrimination and issued a verdict for the defendant Housing Authority.   

  • Dismissal of civil rights charges in Ohio.

    We obtained dismissal of two charges filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. The charging party had been removed from two of the employer’s stores. He claimed it was due to discrimination, because of his race and disability (he required a service animal to be with him). The defense submitted a position statement with affidavits of employees and managers, explaining that the employee was removed because he was videoing other customers without their consent and making racially charged comments to employees and customers. 

  • Summary Judgment Win on Behalf of Ohio Insurance Agent and Broker

    The plaintiff, who owns a restaurant, sustained personal injuries in a car accident while on a business errand. He collected the tortfeasor’s liability limits of $100,000, and then filed underinsured motorist claims with his own insurance carrier who had issued the personal auto and commercial auto policies. The underinsured claims were denied by the carrier. There was no UIM coverage under the personal auto policy because the $100,000 UIM limits equaled the liability carrier’s limits. Further, although the plaintiff had $1 million UIM limits on his commercial policy, the Mazda he was driving at the time of the accident was not listed on the commercial policy; rather, it was listed on the personal auto policy. The court granted our motion for summary judgment on several bases: the Statute of Limitations began to run when the Mazda was first put on the personal auto policy, not when the accident occurred; despite the plaintiff’s and the agent’s friendship and long-standing business dealings, there was not a fiduciary relationship between the agent and insured customer; and the agent’s alleged statement to the plaintiff that he was covered in “every single possible way you can think of” did not amount to a misrepresentation of fact. 

  • Summary Judgment on Behalf of an Insurance Agent and Broker in the Franklin County Ohio Court of Common Pleas

    The plaintiff, who owned his own restaurant business, sustained personal injuries in a car accident while on a business errand. He collected the tortfeasor’s liability limits of $100,000 and then filed underinsured motorist claims with his own insurance carrier that had issued the personal auto and commercial auto policies. The underinsured claims were denied by the carrier. There was no UIM coverage under the personal auto policy because the $100,000 UIM limits equaled the liability carrier’s limits. Further, although the plaintiff had $1 million in UIM limits on his commercial policy, the Mazda he was driving at the time of the accident was not listed on the commercial policy; rather, it was listed on the personal auto policy. The plaintiff then sued the insurance agent and broker who listed the Mazda on the personal rather than commercial policy. He argued professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. Extensive discovery was conducted, including depositions of insurance standard of care experts for each side. The court granted Ray’s motion for summary judgment on several bases: the statute of limitations began to run when the Mazda was first put on the personal auto policy, not when the motor vehicle accident occurred; despite the plaintiff’s and the agent’s friendship and long-standing business dealings, there was not a fiduciary relationship between the agent and insured customer; and the agent’s alleged statement to the plaintiff that he was covered in “every single possible way you can think of” did not amount to a misrepresentation of fact.    

  • Claims dismissed against Ohio housing authority.

    We won summary judgment for a housing authority in a political subdivision matter in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiff sought over $20 million in damages, alleging the housing authority violated the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act by discriminatorily blocking funding for, and financing of, 60 units of project-based affordable housing for homeless veterans, most of whom are disabled. The court had previously awarded summary judgment to our client on all but one claim, but ruled that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the plaintiff’s “reasonable accommodation” claim under the ADA and FHA. In an unusual turn of events, the court recently held that it had erred in not granting our previously filed summary judgment on all claims. It, therefore, dismissed all claims against the housing authority.

  • Injury at Fracking Site Not Fault of Defendant

    We obtained a summary judgment on behalf of a worker who was injured at a fracking site. The injury occurred when a hose came off of an above-ground storage tank and struck him in the head, resulting in sustained serious and permanent injuries. The plaintiff claimed the general contractor was liable for his injuries because it actively participated on the work site and controlled the unsafe condition which caused the injuries. We moved for summary judgment, arguing that the general contractor relinquished complete control over the site to a sub-contractor and, thus, had no control over any unsafe condition which caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of our client.

  • Dismissal of Surveying Company in Professional Negligence Case

    We won dismissal of a professional negligence case against a surveyor filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. ​This action was filed by two title companies that had paid a title insurance claim to a property purchaser and sought subrogation from our client, a surveying company. They alleged that a defective survey was the cause of the title insurance claim. Ohio has a four-year statute of limitations for professional negligence claims against surveyors, and this case was filed more than four years after the allegedly defective survey was completed, rendering it untimely. The plaintiffs attempted to avoid dismissal by captioning their claims as claims for breach of contract, in order to take advantage of a longer limitations period. We argued that, despite how the claims were captioned, they were, in substance, claims for professional negligence and time-barred. The court agreed and dismissed the case.

  • Successful Defense of Insurance Agency and Agent in Ohio Appellate Court

    We defended an insurance agency and agent in the Twelfth Appellate District of Ohio. The plaintiffs contacted the insurance agent to obtain insurance for two residential properties. The agent obtained the requisite information for the insurance applications from the plaintiffs, including their primary mailing address, a post office box address. The agent advised them that their only insurance option was through the Ohio Fair Plan (OFP), as neither property had been insured in the prior three years. The plaintiffs gave the agent a check for the premium. The agent explained that the OFP would inspect both properties prior to issuing coverage and that coverage would be cancelled if any required repairs were not made. The OFP sent a notice of cancellation to the post office box listed on the insurance application. It also sent a refund check to the agent. The plaintiffs claimed that they never received the notice of cancellation or the refund check. They sued OFP, the agent and insurance agency. After written briefs and oral argument, the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the agent and agency on the grounds that there was no evidence that the agent represented to the plaintiffs that the property had insurance coverage prior to a fire at one of the properties. Further, although the plaintiffs claimed that they never received notice of cancellation, the insurance application indicated that they would be informed directly from the insurer whether or not coverage was going to be provided. Therefore, the agent was not required to inform the plaintiffs of the cancellation. The court also held that the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence the agent fraudulently concealed the refund check from them, even if they did not receive the check.

  • Summary Judgment for Insurance Agency and Agent

    We obtained summary judgment on behalf of an insurance agency and insurance agent in a fraud action. Venued in Cincinnati, the case involved a dispute over the agent’s alleged failure to procure insurance coverage for a residence that sustained extensive, uncovered fire damage. The client had assisted the two homeowners in procuring insurance coverage for their residential properties with the Ohio Fair Plan Underwriting Association, an entity created by the Ohio legislature to provide insurance for property that is not insurable in the normal insurance market. After completing an inspection of the property, Ohio Fair Plan issued a notice that the carrier was cancelling the homeowners’ insurance contract. Ohio Fair Plan also issued a refund check to the homeowners. Sometime thereafter, a fire occurred at the homeowners’ residence. It was later conclusively determined that the homeowners did not have coverage with Ohio Fair Plan for the loss as a result of the cancellation of the contract. The homeowners alleged that they never received the cancellation notice or the refund check from Ohio Fair Plan or their insurance agent. The homeowners filed suit against the insurance agent and his agency, alleging claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment as a result of the homeowners’ purported failure to receive the notice or check prior to the time of the fire, which the homeowners alleged would have enabled them to procure alternative coverage. The defense moved for summary judgment, arguing that the fraudulent misrepresentation claim lacked merit because the insurance agent never misrepresented any fact relating to the homeowners’ insurance coverage and never concealed any material fact from the homeowners. The court agreed and granted summary judgment.

  • Claims against police department dismissed.

    We successfully argued that a plaintiff’s claims against a local police department were precluded by law. First, we pointed out that our client was not an entity that could be sued. Second, we emphasized that the statute of limitations applied to bar the plaintiff’s claims. Finally, we contended our client was immune from liability pursuant to R.C. § 2744.01, even if it could be sued. The plaintiff attempted to argue his case for excessive use of force, malicious prosecution and emotional distress for being arrested after he was fired from his place of employment. The judge ultimately granted our motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.