.

Nicholas D. Bowers

Portrait of Nicholas D. Bowers

As a seasoned litigator, Nick has represented companies, schools and professionals across a range of disciplines in relation to civil and commercial disputes. His representative experience includes construction injury, auto and trucking accident cases as well as products and premises liability matters. Nick represents construction firms, industrial clients and others in relation to catastrophic injury claims, both pre-suit and during litigation, as well as pursuant to OSHA investigations and similar governmental inquiries. Additionally, he represents property management companies in personal injury claims by tenants due to mold exposure.

Nick’s practice also encompasses litigation stemming from construction defect and other property loss. In this regard, he regularly handles cases involving claims for alleged defect(s) and damage arising from negligence as well as the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act and Consumer Protection Law. Nick’s experience extends to shipping loss matters, including actions involving the Carmack Amendment.  

Nick’s practice has grown to include the defense of school districts, municipalities and private schools in relation to allegations of abuse. He is cognizant of the complex and sensitive nature of these cases and well-versed in the applicable statutory framework.  

During the course of his career, he has tried cases in a broad range of claims in both Federal and State Courts, obtaining favorable outcomes for clients at trial, arbitration and by way of summary judgment. Since 2017, Nick has been selected by Super Lawyers as a Rising Star in the field of Civil Litigation Defense, a recognition awarded to no more than 2.5 percent of attorneys under the age of 40 in the region.  

Nick also has experience in the area of insurance fraud (“SIU”) litigation. In this role, he handles a wide variety of auto litigation (including BI, UM/UIM and PIP) as well as premises liability matters flagged for suspected fraudulent activity.  

Nick graduated from Loyola University Maryland in 2005. While at Loyola, he was a four-year starter on the NCAA Division One Men’s Tennis Team, serving as captain during his senior year. After Loyola, he was employed on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC at the United States House of Representatives.  In this role, he served as staff for the Committee on Ways and Means, which is the House Committee responsible for formulating bills related to taxation and international trade.

Outside of his practice, Nick enjoys spending time with his family, experiencing the outdoors and riding the highs and lows of Philadelphia sports.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2009)
    • Loyola University Maryland (B.A., 2005)
    • New Jersey, 2009
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2009
    • Pennsylvania, 2013
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2014
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2017-2022)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Loyola University, Philadelphia Alumni Chapter, Board of Directors
    • Pennsylvania First Party Medical Benefits (PIP): An Overview And Strategies For Effective Claims Handling, Marshall Dennehey Virtual Client Presentation, March 5, 2021
    • An Overview of Pennsylvania Law for Auto & Premises Claims, Marshall Dennehey Virtual Client Presentation, February, 2021
    • Accident Prevention and Investigation: Strategies for Risk Mitigation, Client Presentation, April 2017
    • Pennsylvania First-Party Benefits: An Overview.  Client seminar.  Presented August, 2015.
    • SIU and the Third-Party Liability Case: An Overview and Tactics.  CLE Course.  Presented July, 2015.
    • "Bankruptcy Fraud—Tactics for the Effective Use of a Plaintiff’s Bankruptcy Filing in Defending Civil Claims," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 2013
    • "Acupuncture Billing Has PIP Carriers on Pins and Needles," SIU Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 2013
    • "Winning Legal Strategies for Combating A Prickly Problem 'Sticking' New Jersey Carriers," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2013
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, 2012-present
    • Obtained dismissal of clients by Summary Judgment in a Philadelphia premises liability case in which we represented both the landowner and tenant. The plaintiff originally demanded $2 million, later reduced to $800,000. Although our clients were responsible for sidewalk maintenance, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony confirmed she tripped on a smaller portion of an alleged defect which was larger in other areas of the sidewalk. We successfully argued that this portion was de minimis and not actionable under Pennsylvania law. Despite a comprehensive opposition and a Motion for Reconsideration, the Court agreed with our arguments, dismissing all claims against our clients with prejudice.
    • Secured dismissal with prejudice of clients (bar owners) in high value dram shop case involving the unfortunate death of an automobile occupant. Court granted defense motion and found that Plaintiff’s claims were barred as a matter of law.
    • First chair trial counsel in two-week trial at Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in case involving a catastrophically injured Plaintiff and settlement demand of $25 million. The case and trial involved complex issues pertaining to post-Tincher product liability in Pennsylvania as well as successor liability and statutory employer considerations. Resolved on terms favorable to client prior to verdict.
    • Secured dismissal with prejudice in significant property loss/theft case.  Plaintiff alleged that his landlord stole several artifacts and other materials from him while Plaintiff was out of the country.  Plaintiff testified that he filed for bankruptcy and obtained a discharge after the alleged theft.  Plaintiff did not list his claim against my client on his bankruptcy petition and thus Plaintiff forfeited his post-discharge right to this “asset” (claim) per the United State Bankruptcy Code.  Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed case with prejudice when confronted with bankruptcy evidence and legal argument.
    • Secured summary judgment in favor of large oil refinery based on argument that refinery was the owner out of possession and thus had no control over the premises and therefore had no duty of care with respect to the Plaintiff.
    • Obtained defense verdict in Philadelphia premises liability matter.  Plaintiff alleged she slipped and fell on “dirty water” which accumulated in the lobby of Defendant’s premises.  Defense verdict secured based on Plaintiff’s failure to establish that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of alleged dangerous condition.

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Change Is in the Air: A Shift in Pennsylvania Judge’s Role in Jury Selection Effective April 1, 2025

March 1, 2025

Key Points: Effective April 1, 2025, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has amended Pa.R.C.P. 220.3, pertaining to voir dire of jurors.  Amended Rule 220.3(a) now provides: “Judge’s Presence Required. Voir dire of prospective jurors shall be conducted, and the jurors shall be selected, in the presence of a judge, unless the judge’s presence is waived by all parties with the consent of the court.” The right to a trial by jury is a hallmark of the justice system in the United States. Juries consist of eight or twelve individuals from a given geographic area, generally lacking legal training, who are asked to decide facts and render verdicts, often of great consequence to the litigants. While jurors must follow the directions of the court, each juror has broad discretion in deciding, among other things, whether or not to believe a witness, how heavily to weigh competing evidence, and in determining whether they are or are not persuaded by arguments of counsel. In light of this, it is perhaps rightly said that many cases are won or lost during jury selection.  In Pennsylvania, attorney control of jury composition is generally limited to voir dire and peremptory challenges. Traditionally, voir dire procedures in Pennsylvania have varied from county to county—with some counties involving judges in the process more than others. In particular, Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties, for example, generally utilized court officers who controlled the voir dire process in the absence of the judge or court reporter.  Recently, however, a significant change in these procedures was adopted, with an effective date of April 1, 2025. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania amended Pa.R.C.P. 220.3, pertaining to voir dire of jurors, to include amended Rule 220.3(a), which now provides the following: “Judge’s Presence Required. Voir dire of prospective jurors shall be conducted, and the jurors shall be selected, in the presence of a judge, unless the judge’s presence is waived by all parties with the consent of the court.” (Emphasis added.) The adoption of amended Pa.R.C.P. 220.3 was preceded by the case of Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 187 A.3d 1013 (Pa. Super 2018), which involved an Allegheny County trial where jury selection occurred in the presence of a court clerk as opposed to the trial judge. The plaintiff appealed the jury verdict on, among others, the basis that three jurors should have been stricken for cause due to bias, as evidenced in voir dire, which occurred outside of the presence of the trial judge. The appellant argued the court’s decision not to strike was reversible error, while the appellees took the position that the trial court was entitled to the palpable error deference standard announced in McHugh v. Proctor & Gamble, 776 A.2d 266 (Pa. Super. 2001). Thus, no error warranting overturning the verdict occurred. The Trigg court took note of the fact that jury selection took place outside of the presence of the judge thus, depriving the trial court of the opportunity to assess the credibility of the proposed jurors to any extent beyond reading a transcript. Accordingly, per Trigg, the trial judge had no greater insight into the credibility of the proposed jurors—having not viewed the questioning live and, thus, lacked insight into the reactions of the proposed jurors to the questioning, including hesitation, eye movement or other physical manifestations impacting credibility—than the appellate court. Therefore, McHugh deference was not warranted.  The Superior Court overturned the verdict accordingly.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took up the case on appeal from the Superior Court in Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 269 (Pa. 2020). While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the issue in question had been waived due to counsel’s failure to object to the jury selection proceeding in the absence of the judge, the Supreme Court still found the procedure problematic, leading to adoption of amended Pa.R.C.P. 220.3. Amended Rule 220.3 will likely lead to greater uniformity in the jury selection process across counties in Pennsylvania. Unless waived by the parties, voir dire must now occur in the presence of a judge. It is important for practitioners to understand that each party is entitled to have the judge present for voir dire, and this right should not be waived absent an affirmative decision to do so approved by a client.  The Amended Rule may also assist litigants in the preservation of appellate issues, including those relative to a trial court’s decision to strike or decline to strike a juror for cause. The judge will be present along with a court reporter.  *Nick is a member of our Casualty Department. He works in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.