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Nicholas D. Bowers

Portrait of Nicholas D. Bowers

As a seasoned litigator, Nick has represented companies, schools and professionals across a range of disciplines in relation to civil and commercial disputes. His representative experience includes construction injury, auto and trucking accident cases as well as products and premises liability matters. Nick represents construction firms, industrial clients and others in relation to catastrophic injury claims, both pre-suit and during litigation, as well as pursuant to OSHA investigations and similar governmental inquiries. Additionally, he represents property management companies in personal injury claims by tenants due to mold exposure.

Nick’s practice also encompasses litigation stemming from construction defect and other property loss. In this regard, he regularly handles cases involving claims for alleged defect(s) and damage arising from negligence as well as the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act and Consumer Protection Law. Nick’s experience extends to shipping loss matters, including actions involving the Carmack Amendment.  

Nick’s practice has grown to include the defense of school districts, municipalities and private schools in relation to allegations of abuse. He is cognizant of the complex and sensitive nature of these cases and well-versed in the applicable statutory framework.  

During the course of his career, he has tried cases in a broad range of claims in both Federal and State Courts, obtaining favorable outcomes for clients at trial, arbitration and by way of summary judgment. Since 2017, Nick has been selected by Super Lawyers as a Rising Star in the field of Civil Litigation Defense, a recognition awarded to no more than 2.5 percent of attorneys under the age of 40 in the region.  

Nick also has experience in the area of insurance fraud (“SIU”) litigation. In this role, he handles a wide variety of auto litigation (including BI, UM/UIM and PIP) as well as premises liability matters flagged for suspected fraudulent activity.  

Nick graduated from Loyola University Maryland in 2005. While at Loyola, he was a four-year starter on the NCAA Division One Men’s Tennis Team, serving as captain during his senior year. After Loyola, he was employed on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC at the United States House of Representatives.  In this role, he served as staff for the Committee on Ways and Means, which is the House Committee responsible for formulating bills related to taxation and international trade.

Outside of his practice, Nick enjoys spending time with his family, experiencing the outdoors and riding the highs and lows of Philadelphia sports.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2009)
    • Loyola University Maryland (B.A., 2005)
    • New Jersey, 2009
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2009
    • Pennsylvania, 2013
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2014
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2017-2022)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Loyola University, Philadelphia Alumni Chapter, Board of Directors
    • Pennsylvania First Party Medical Benefits (PIP): An Overview And Strategies For Effective Claims Handling, Marshall Dennehey Virtual Client Presentation, March 5, 2021
    • An Overview of Pennsylvania Law for Auto & Premises Claims, Marshall Dennehey Virtual Client Presentation, February, 2021
    • Accident Prevention and Investigation: Strategies for Risk Mitigation, Client Presentation, April 2017
    • Pennsylvania First-Party Benefits: An Overview.  Client seminar.  Presented August, 2015.
    • SIU and the Third-Party Liability Case: An Overview and Tactics.  CLE Course.  Presented July, 2015.
    • "Bankruptcy Fraud—Tactics for the Effective Use of a Plaintiff’s Bankruptcy Filing in Defending Civil Claims," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 2013
    • "Acupuncture Billing Has PIP Carriers on Pins and Needles," SIU Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 2013
    • "Winning Legal Strategies for Combating A Prickly Problem 'Sticking' New Jersey Carriers," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2013
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, 2012-present
    • Obtained dismissal of clients by Summary Judgment in a Philadelphia premises liability case in which we represented both the landowner and tenant. The plaintiff originally demanded $2 million, later reduced to $800,000. Although our clients were responsible for sidewalk maintenance, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony confirmed she tripped on a smaller portion of an alleged defect which was larger in other areas of the sidewalk. We successfully argued that this portion was de minimis and not actionable under Pennsylvania law. Despite a comprehensive opposition and a Motion for Reconsideration, the Court agreed with our arguments, dismissing all claims against our clients with prejudice.
    • Secured dismissal with prejudice of clients (bar owners) in high value dram shop case involving the unfortunate death of an automobile occupant. Court granted defense motion and found that Plaintiff’s claims were barred as a matter of law.
    • First chair trial counsel in two-week trial at Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in case involving a catastrophically injured Plaintiff and settlement demand of $25 million. The case and trial involved complex issues pertaining to post-Tincher product liability in Pennsylvania as well as successor liability and statutory employer considerations. Resolved on terms favorable to client prior to verdict.
    • Secured dismissal with prejudice in significant property loss/theft case.  Plaintiff alleged that his landlord stole several artifacts and other materials from him while Plaintiff was out of the country.  Plaintiff testified that he filed for bankruptcy and obtained a discharge after the alleged theft.  Plaintiff did not list his claim against my client on his bankruptcy petition and thus Plaintiff forfeited his post-discharge right to this “asset” (claim) per the United State Bankruptcy Code.  Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed case with prejudice when confronted with bankruptcy evidence and legal argument.
    • Secured summary judgment in favor of large oil refinery based on argument that refinery was the owner out of possession and thus had no control over the premises and therefore had no duty of care with respect to the Plaintiff.
    • Obtained defense verdict in Philadelphia premises liability matter.  Plaintiff alleged she slipped and fell on “dirty water” which accumulated in the lobby of Defendant’s premises.  Defense verdict secured based on Plaintiff’s failure to establish that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of alleged dangerous condition.

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Change Is in the Air: A Shift in Pennsylvania Judge’s Role in Jury Selection Effective April 1, 2025

March 1, 2025

Key Points: Effective April 1, 2025, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has amended Pa.R.C.P. 220.3, pertaining to voir dire of jurors.  Amended Rule 220.3(a) now provides: “Judge’s Presence Required. Voir dire of prospective jurors shall be conducted, and the jurors shall be selected, in the presence of a judge, unless the judge’s presence is waived by all parties with the consent of the court.” The right to a trial by jury is a hallmark of the justice system in the United States. Juries consist of eight or twelve individuals from a given geographic area, generally lacking legal training, who are asked to decide facts and render verdicts, often of great consequence to the litigants. While jurors must follow the directions of the court, each juror has broad discretion in deciding, among other things, whether or not to believe a witness, how heavily to weigh competing evidence, and in determining whether they are or are not persuaded by arguments of counsel. In light of this, it is perhaps rightly said that many cases are won or lost during jury selection.  In Pennsylvania, attorney control of jury composition is generally limited to voir dire and peremptory challenges. Traditionally, voir dire procedures in Pennsylvania have varied from county to county—with some counties involving judges in the process more than others. In particular, Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties, for example, generally utilized court officers who controlled the voir dire process in the absence of the judge or court reporter.  Recently, however, a significant change in these procedures was adopted, with an effective date of April 1, 2025. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania amended Pa.R.C.P. 220.3, pertaining to voir dire of jurors, to include amended Rule 220.3(a), which now provides the following: “Judge’s Presence Required. Voir dire of prospective jurors shall be conducted, and the jurors shall be selected, in the presence of a judge, unless the judge’s presence is waived by all parties with the consent of the court.” (Emphasis added.) The adoption of amended Pa.R.C.P. 220.3 was preceded by the case of Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 187 A.3d 1013 (Pa. Super 2018), which involved an Allegheny County trial where jury selection occurred in the presence of a court clerk as opposed to the trial judge. The plaintiff appealed the jury verdict on, among others, the basis that three jurors should have been stricken for cause due to bias, as evidenced in voir dire, which occurred outside of the presence of the trial judge. The appellant argued the court’s decision not to strike was reversible error, while the appellees took the position that the trial court was entitled to the palpable error deference standard announced in McHugh v. Proctor & Gamble, 776 A.2d 266 (Pa. Super. 2001). Thus, no error warranting overturning the verdict occurred. The Trigg court took note of the fact that jury selection took place outside of the presence of the judge thus, depriving the trial court of the opportunity to assess the credibility of the proposed jurors to any extent beyond reading a transcript. Accordingly, per Trigg, the trial judge had no greater insight into the credibility of the proposed jurors—having not viewed the questioning live and, thus, lacked insight into the reactions of the proposed jurors to the questioning, including hesitation, eye movement or other physical manifestations impacting credibility—than the appellate court. Therefore, McHugh deference was not warranted.  The Superior Court overturned the verdict accordingly.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took up the case on appeal from the Superior Court in Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 269 (Pa. 2020). While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the issue in question had been waived due to counsel’s failure to object to the jury selection proceeding in the absence of the judge, the Supreme Court still found the procedure problematic, leading to adoption of amended Pa.R.C.P. 220.3. Amended Rule 220.3 will likely lead to greater uniformity in the jury selection process across counties in Pennsylvania. Unless waived by the parties, voir dire must now occur in the presence of a judge. It is important for practitioners to understand that each party is entitled to have the judge present for voir dire, and this right should not be waived absent an affirmative decision to do so approved by a client.  The Amended Rule may also assist litigants in the preservation of appellate issues, including those relative to a trial court’s decision to strike or decline to strike a juror for cause. The judge will be present along with a court reporter.  *Nick is a member of our Casualty Department. He works in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.