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Lisa M. Grubb

Portrait of Lisa M. Grubb

Lisa focuses her practice on the defense of medical malpractice cases, representing hospitals, physicians and long-term care facilities. Her experience also includes defending physicians before the Delaware State Examining Board of Medicine. Lisa has defended physicians in various practices including ophthalmology, wound care, dermatology, PT/chiropractic, and dentistry. She has also represented clients in surgical cases and failure to diagnose cases. In addition, Lisa is experienced in representing veterinarians in professional liability matters from case inception through resolution, including witness preparation, working with experts, and preparing for trial.

Lisa also handles general liability matters including premises liability and motor vehicle accidents as well as defense of commercial trucking cases. Additionally, Lisa assists clients in matters involving insurance coverage, PIP/first party contractual claims and Fraud/Special Investigation. She also has significant experience in products liability and toxic tort litigation.

Lisa graduated from Elon University and received her juris doctor from Widener University School of Law.

She is admitted to practice in Delaware. 

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2005)
    • Elon University (B.A., 2002)
    • Delaware, 2008
    • “The New Superior Court Rule 16.1: The Revamping and Reviving of an Old ‘Favorite’,” Defense Digest, September 2018, Vol. 24, No. 3

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Delaware ‘Meet and Confer’ Rule Requires Human Contact??!

June 1, 2023

Key Points: The Superior Court of Delaware’s “meet and confer” requirement is mandated by the notice provision articulated in Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 37(a). The Rule has long been interpreted by counsel to require only an email or letter to opposing counsel attempting to quash a discovery dispute prior to filing motions and a request for court resolution of same. More recently, the Superior Court of Delaware is trending toward requiring actual in-person and/or telephonic communications amongst counsel in an attempt to resolve discovery disputes before agreeing to intervene to hear and decide such matters on behalf of the litigants. It is unclear whether this new trend is due to more recent docket backlogs and, therefore, temporary or if it will be adopted by other members of the Superior Court of Delaware judiciary. Delaware courts have long recognized the obligation of the parties to a civil action to engage in a meaningful “meet and confer” conference in an attempt to resolve discovery disputes prior to such issues being heard and decided upon by the bench. Historically, the “meet and confer” obligation has been vigorously enforced and adopted by the Delaware Court of Chancery, See Danenberg v. Fitracks, Inc., 58 A.3d 991, 1003 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Delaware lawyers “have a duty to meet and confer in a good faith effort to resolve differences.”), while the Superior Court of Delaware has made only passing reference to the same, without fully defining the obligations of the parties. The primary source of guidance for litigants in the Superior Court is enumerated in the language set forth in Delaware Rule of Civil Procedure for the Superior Court of Delaware, Rule 37, which states, in pertinent part: Rule 37 - Failure to make discovery: Sanctions;  (a) Motion for order compelling discovery. - A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows…”  Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 37(a) (emphasis added). Previously, counsel for a party involved in a discovery dispute were considered to have met their “meet and confer” obligation by simply attempting communication with opposing counsel by letter, email, or other correspondence setting forth the alleged discovery deficiencies. In Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., 2014 WL 4724571, at *1 (Del. Super. Sept. 19, 2014), for example, the Superior Court held that a party’s mere attempt to discuss deposition dates with opposing counsel satisfied their “meet and confer” requirement. However, more recently, the Superior Court seems to be making a case for more substantial communications on the part of the litigants in an effort to resolve discovery disputes on their own as a prerequisite to being heard by the court. In Megen Cummings v. Ronald James Landry, et al., C.A. No. N18C-07-266 ALR (Del. Super. June 28, 2021), the plaintiff filed a motion to compel certain requested documents, as well as more sufficient answers to her formal written discovery demands. In conjunction with her motion, the plaintiff also filed a notice of hearing, scheduling the motion to be presented to the court via oral argument. In a letter opinion, dated June 28, 2021, the court declined to hear oral argument on the plaintiff’s motion and the defendant’s response in opposition thereto, stating: [i]t is plain from the record that the parties have not satisfied their obligation to engage in a meaningful meet and confer before resorting to motion practice. To be clear: a meet and confer does not mean sending an email or a letter. Meeting and conferring requires counsel to communicate by phone or in person. The parties’ written submissions reflect that a candid discussion between counsel may resolve most, if not all, of the outstanding issues. If, after complying with the obligation to meet and confer, there are discovery issues that remain in dispute, the Plaintiff may refile her Motion. At this time, the Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and the hearing scheduled for July 1, 2021, is CANCELLED. Id. The court’s sentiments represent the first time in the history of Superior Court of Delaware jurisprudence where the court specifically outlined that the “meet and confer” obligation requires more than just an email or letter attempt. The court required a communication by phone or in person wherein meaningful discussions must be had.  In reviewing decisions of the Superior Court of Delaware in certain discovery disputes since Cummings, it seems that the holding set forth therein is one that is gaining traction. In De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Spinal Techs., LLC, 2021 WL 3520629, at *7 (Del. Super. Aug. 10, 2021) court declined to hear oral argument on a party’s motion to quash and a motion for protective order until such time as the parties had had the opportunity to “meet and confer” to discuss the scope of certain discovery demands. In Tijanna Richardson v. Stanley Access Technologies, C.A. No. N21C-10-115 AML (Del. Super. March 3, 2022), the court declined to hear oral argument on the sufficiency of a party’s answers and responses to demands for formal written discovery until after such time as the parties could “meet and confer” to discuss same. The court in Legion Partners Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyds London, 2022 WL 289940, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 2022) issued a similar ruling. It held that the issue as to whether or not an award of attorney’s fees was appropriate was not yet ripe because the parties had yet to engage in a meaningful “meet and confer” conference to discuss the potential award. It is evident that the Superior Court bench is trending toward interpreting Rule 37 to require more than a simple written attempt to contact opposing counsel regarding a discovery dispute prior to involving the court. What remains to be seen is whether this required “human contact” will continue as the docket (hopefully) becomes less congested and whether this interpretation will be adopted by other members of the Superior Court.   *Lisa is a shareholder in our Wilmington, Delaware, office. She can be reached at 302.552.4339 or lmgrubb@mdwcg.com.     Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Constructive Notice of Dangerous Intersection Presents Jury Question

In an action arising out of a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff alleged that a dangerous condition at an intersection in Bethel Township contributed to a December 1, 2020 collision between a sedan and a tractor-trailer. Leger claimed the Township negligently placed and maintained a stop sign on Shirksville Road where sight distance was allegedly only 300 feet rather than the required 500 feet, and that the Township had actual or constructive notice of this hazardous condition. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Township, concluding Leger failed to present sufficient evidence of notice. Leger v. Martin, No. 253 C.D. 2025 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 19, 2026). The Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded, holding that actual or constructive notice under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act is generally a question of fact for the jury. The Court found Leger produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue regarding constructive notice, including evidence that the Township was responsible for the roadway and stop sign, regularly inspected and maintained the sign, had replaced it before the accident, and, according to expert testimony, should have recognized the inadequate sight distance through reasonable inspection. The Court further held that evidence of prior similar crashes at the intersection supported an inference of constructive notice, making summary judgment inappropriate because reasonable minds could differ as to whether the dangerous condition was apparent and should have been discovered by the Township.

Thought Leadership

Mental Health Records Shielded from Discovery in Personal Injury Action

In a personal injury action, the plaintiff sought damages for physical injuries allegedly sustained in an April 11, 2024 motor vehicle accident. During her deposition, Plaintiff testified that the accident aggravated preexisting injuries for which she had previously treated at Wilkes-Barre General Hospital and that she also received treatment at Moses Taylor Hospital after the accident. Defendants subpoenaed records from both facilities, excluding mental health and psychiatric records, while Plaintiff objected on the ground that protected mental health information could be disclosed. Moreck v. Karns, No. 2025 CV 1140 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Lackawanna Cnty.), The Court granted Defendants’ motion to overrule Plaintiff’s objections to the subpoenas, except as to records protected by the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA). The Court held that Plaintiff’s medical records from both hospitals were relevant and discoverable because her deposition testimony placed those physical injuries at issue, but that she had not placed her mental health condition at issue and therefore had not waived MHPA confidentiality protections. The Court also granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant Karns to provide overdue discovery responses within twenty days, but denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel against Black Ops, while warning that Black Ops could be bound by its discovery responses and face consequences if it later attempted to rely on contrary information.

Thought Leadership

Punitive Damages Claim Survives in Distracted Driving Case

In a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff alleged he sustained serious injuries, including a left knee injury requiring surgery, when Defendant Snook rear-ended his stopped vehicle in a construction zone on Route 33 in Monroe County. The complaint asserted that Snook, while operating a vehicle owned by the corporate defendants and acting within the scope of his employment, was traveling at an excessive speed, following too closely, and texting while driving, resulting in the collision. Maro v. Snook, No. 1805 CV 2025 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Monroe Cnty.), The Monroe County Court of Common Pleas overruled Defendants’ preliminary objections seeking dismissal of the punitive damages claims and challenging the specificity of the pleadings. The Court held that allegations that Snook was speeding and texting while driving in a construction zone were sufficient to support an inference of reckless indifference to the rights of others, making punitive damages legally viable at the pleading stage. Citing Monroe v. CBH20 LP, the Court noted that recklessness may be averred generally and that Snook’s state of mind must be developed through discovery. The Court also found the complaint adequately pled vicarious liability against the corporate defendants and provided sufficient factual specificity regarding the alleged negligence, statutory violations, and agency relationship to withstand preliminary objections.