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Wilmington

For nearly 20 years, Marshall Dennehey has had a presence in Wilmington, Delaware, proudly serving clients throughout the state in all manner of civil defense litigation.

Our Wilmington attorneys regularly defend businesses, insureds, municipalities and professionals in general casualty, employment and labor, health care and health law, product liability, property litigation, professional liability, workers' compensation, and white-collar criminal matters. Our attorneys are active in local Inns of Court and are members of regional defense groups, including the Defense Research Institute, Trial Attorneys of America, Defense Counsel of Delaware and the Delaware Claims Association.

In addition to Delaware litigation, a number of the office's attorneys are admitted to practice in Maryland and routinely handle matters in the state and federal courts of that state as well.

Like all of the firm's regional offices, the Wilmington office combines the advantages of the personal attention of a small law firm with the advantages that come from the intellectual property and broad-based experience of a large firm.

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    What's Hot in Workers' Comp

    Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Denial of Workers' Compensation Claim Based on Witness Credibility

    September 22, 2026

    The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a Superior Court decision upholding the Industrial Accident Board's denial of a petition for workers' compensation benefits. The Court ruled that the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence, deferring to the Board's findings regarding witness credibility and medical expert testimony. Prince Parker worked for The Borsello Companies, Inc., where his duties included operating a forklift and mixing mortar. He alleged a lumbar spine injury on February 19, 2024 and reported his injury immediately, although the company denied receiving any such report. It was not until ten days later, on February 29, 2024, Parker sent a text message to a project manager stating his work activities were "screwing [his] back up." Parker was advised to contact the company president. There was no evidence he did and continued his normal work activities. In mid-March 2024, Parker was terminated for insubordination. On March 21, 2024, over a month after the alleged work incident, Parker went to the emergency room for back pain.  Emergency room records reflected Parker reported his back pain had been ongoing for over a year, denied any recent trauma, and stated he had not followed up on a prior referral to see a specialist. After the employer denied the claim for benefits, Parker filed a petition with the Board seeking wage loss benefits and payment of outstanding medical bills. The Board heard conflicting medical expert testimony and testimony from the claimant and employer witnesses. The Board, after hearing the testimony, denied Parker's petition, finding that he failed to establish a compensable injury. They did not find Parker’s testimony credible that he suffered a work injury. The Superior Court subsequently affirmed the Board's decision. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed and rejected several challenges raised by Parker. Most importantly, the court emphasized that under Delaware law, the Board has exclusive responsibility for weighing evidence, determining witness credibility, and resolving conflicts in testimony.  The court deferred to the Board's decision to find Parker’s testimony not credible due to his ten-day delay in reporting back pain, his failure to seek immediate medical treatment, and his emergency room statements denying recent trauma.  Since the claimant’s expert relied on the information from Parker, his opinion was discredited. The Board properly found the defense expert’s opinion more persuasive. It is extremely important to ascertain all information related to when the alleged injury occurred, how it occurred and determine if the injured worker is providing the same version of events to the medical providers and the claims handler. Cases turn on credibility and the Board is tasked with making those findings.

    What's Hot in Workers' Comp

    Delaware Superior Court Affirms Denial of Workers' Compensation for Teacher's Spinal Stroke: Work Stress Alone Insufficient Under "Substantial Cause" Standard

    August 13, 2026

    Angelina Johnson, a third-grade teacher, filed a workers' compensation petition seeking benefits for a spinal stroke she suffered on January 6, 2022, while at school preparing for a scheduled performance evaluation. The Industrial Accident Board denied her claim, finding that her work-related stress was not a substantial cause of the stroke. Johnson appealed to the Delaware Superior Court,  On January 6, 2022, Johnson was at school making copies in preparation for a scheduled annual performance evaluation when she suffered a spinal stroke. Johnson had multiple poorly controlled pre-existing medical conditions, including hypertension with readings reaching 187/95 and 170/100, and diabetes with A1C levels between 9.8 and 11.9.  Medical records dating to 2013 documented chronic uncontrolled hypertension and diabetes. Johnson was frequently non-compliant with her blood pressure medication, including during the three weeks before her stroke. With regard to her performance, Johnson had never received an "ineffective" rating and was not on probation or any performance improvement plan. The scheduled evaluation was a routine annual employment activity required of all teachers. The central issue on appeal was whether the Industrial Accident Board correctly applied Delaware's workers' compensation causation standards. Specifically, the court addressed two questions: (1) whether the Board properly applied the "substantial cause" standard from Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing rather than the "but for" standard from Reese v. Home Budget Center, and (2) whether substantial evidence supported the Board's determination that Johnson's work stress was not a substantial cause of her spinal stroke.   The Superior Court affirmed the Industrial Accident Board's decision, holding that the "substantial cause" standard applied because Johnson's scheduled annual teacher evaluation, though stressful, was not an identifiable industrial accident—it was a routine employment activity, not a physical or unexpected event. The court further held that substantial evidence supported the Board's acceptance of the employer's medical expert testimony over Johnson's expert because the employer's expert reviewed a more complete medical history and relied on literature specific to spinal strokes.   The Superior Court held that the Board correctly applied the Duvall "substantial cause" standard rather than the Reese "but for" standard. The court reasoned that Johnson's scheduled annual performance evaluation was a routine employment activity, not an unexpected physical accident. The court next addressed whether substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that Johnson's work stress was not a substantial cause of her stroke.  The court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's decision to accept Dr. Townsend's testimony over Dr. Dogali's.  Dr. Townsend reviewed Johnson's medical records dating back to 2013, which documented a decade-long history of chronic uncontrolled hypertension and diabetes.  He relied on medical literature specific to spinal strokes. In contrast, Dr. Dogali reviewed only post-2022 medical records, relied on studies concerning cerebral strokes rather than spinal strokes, and incorrectly assumed that Johnson's medical conditions were recent developments.

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    Defense Verdict Obtained in Golf Cart Incident

    Defense Verdict Obtained in Golf Cart Incident

    Petition to Terminate Temporary Partial Disability Benefits Granted

    We were successful in having our petition to terminate the ongoing receipt of temporary partial disability benefits granted on the basis that the claimant had voluntarily removed himself from the workforce. The Industrial Accident Board reasoned that the claimant was able to work in a medium-duty job, that jobs were available within his restrictions, the he had conducted a minimal job search since his work release more than a year and a half earlier, and that his description of his daily activities was consistent with a person content with a retirement lifestyle rather than someone who intended to continue to work. Accordingly, he was no longer entitled to wage replacement benefits.

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    Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

    In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

    Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

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    Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

    Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

    Result

    Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

    Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

    Result

    Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

    Thought Leadership

    WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

    In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

    Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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    Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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    Result

    Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

    Thought Leadership

    Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

    In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

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    Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

    Event

    CLM 2026 Focus Conference

    Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed.