Wilmington
For nearly 20 years, Marshall Dennehey has had a presence in Wilmington, Delaware, proudly serving clients throughout the state in all manner of civil defense litigation.
Our Wilmington attorneys regularly defend businesses, insureds, municipalities and professionals in general casualty, employment and labor, health care and health law, product liability, property litigation, professional liability, workers' compensation, and white-collar criminal matters. Our attorneys are active in local Inns of Court and are members of regional defense groups, including the Defense Research Institute, Trial Attorneys of America, Defense Counsel of Delaware and the Delaware Claims Association.
In addition to Delaware litigation, a number of the office's attorneys are admitted to practice in Maryland and routinely handle matters in the state and federal courts of that state as well.
Like all of the firm's regional offices, the Wilmington office combines the advantages of the personal attention of a small law firm with the advantages that come from the intellectual property and broad-based experience of a large firm.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Delaware Court Bars Negligent Procurement and Contract Claims as Time‑Barred Under Three‑Year Limitations Period
July 21, 2026
In the matter of First State Cran Serv. V. L& W Ins., LLC, the Delaware Superior Court applied the three-year statute of limitations to bar claims for negligent procurement and breach of contract against an insurance broker. In this case, the plaintiff claimed that the broker negligently procured an insurance policy that included a policy exclusion which allegedly rendered the policy “worthless for the purpose for which it was intended.” The plaintiff argued that it was unfair to apply the three-year statute of limitations from the date of delivery of the policy, rather than from the date of coverage denial, and that its principal, as a lay person, could not have understood the policy exclusion, including because it was allegedly ambiguous. Applying the rule from Kaufman v. C.L. McCabe & Sons, Inc., the court held that, despite the seeming unfairness of the act-based rather than harm-based rule, that the Supreme Court has clearly required that the statute of limitations on a negligent procurement claim begins to run from the date of delivery of the policy. Addressing plaintiff’s arguments, the court found that the policy exclusion was not shown to be ambiguous, however, even if it was ambiguous, such an ambiguity does not make the coverage denial inherently unknowable. Under one of two interpretations, the exclusion would apply and, thus, was knowable. The court relied on Kaufman in making this holding and applied the same reasoning to the breach of contract claim and dismissed both. First State Crane Serv. v. L&W Ins., LLC, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 262 (June 16, 2026). This decision follows the rule set forth in Kaufman that the statute of limitations in a negligent procurement action against an insurance broker begins to run from the time of delivery of the policy. While the court recognized that other courts have taken a harm-based approach to the statute of limitations issue, this case highlights the act-based approach that the Delaware Supreme Court applies. Although the court was not unsympathetic to the plaintiff’s arguments that the statute of limitations would be unfair, this case also demonstrates that an insured is charged with notice of the policy and its exclusions upon delivery, even when a term of the policy is ambiguous and that a later denial of coverage is not relevant to an assessment of the statute of limitations. Despite plaintiff’s arguments that the exclusion was ambiguous, the court recognized that ambiguity would not relieve the plaintiff from being charged with such knowledge as of the date of delivery because “inherently unknowable” is a higher standard than mere ambiguity. In other words, if a term is subject to two interpretations, one that would include coverage and one that would exclude coverage, the risk of an exclusion of coverage was not “inherently unknowable.” The court also distinguished this from cases where an affirmative misrepresentation or falsehood was present, such as a deed indicating an easement that never existed, because the falsity then was “inherently unknowable.” This case presents a strong defense for an insurance broker against negligent procurement (and breach of contract) claims where the claim is brought more than three years after the policy was delivered, even when ambiguity is alleged. First State Crane Serv. v. L&W Ins., LLC, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 262 (June 16, 2026).
Case Law Alerts
Delaware Superior Court Denies Summary Judgment in Snow and Ice Slip-and-Fall; No Expert Required and Causation May Be Inferred
July 20, 2026
In Mangle v. Inspirit Senior Living Dover Aid II Opco LLC, the Delaware Superior Court denied summary judgment to both a property owner and its snow-removal contractor in a slip-and-fall case arising from snowy and icy conditions in a parking lot. The plaintiff, an outpatient physical therapist working on-site, slipped while walking through a lot covered in snow and alleged that the defendants negligently failed to remediate the condition. The snow-removal contractor argued that it owed no duty because there was no evidence it performed snow and ice removal prior to the fall. The court found a genuine dispute of fact on that issue, noting that while the plaintiff testified no remediation appeared to have occurred, the contractor produced an invoice showing services performed within a timeframe that included the date of the incident. This created triable issues regarding whether the contractor performed, or should have performed, services before the fall and whether any such work was done reasonably. The court also rejected the contractor’s argument that the plaintiff’s claims failed for lack of expert testimony. Relying on Delaware precedent, the court held that expert testimony is not required where the alleged dangerous condition is within the common understanding of a lay juror. The presence of snow and ice—and whether it was reasonably addressed—was deemed the type of condition that a jury could evaluate without expert assistance. With respect to the property owner, the court declined to grant summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s inability to identify the precise cause of her fall. Although the plaintiff could not say definitively whether she slipped on snow or ice, she testified that the area was snow-covered and slippery and that ice likely existed beneath the snow. The court held that this circumstantial evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to infer that a hazardous condition caused the fall. Finally, the court rejected the defendants’ “open and obvious” argument at the summary judgment stage. Because the plaintiff alleged not only a failure to warn, but also a failure to remediate, the court found that the obviousness of the condition went to comparative fault rather than serving as a complete bar to recovery. Accordingly, the case was allowed to proceed to the jury on all issues.
Results
Defense Jury Verdict Obtained Before the Delaware Superior Court
We received a defense jury verdict before the Delaware Superior Court, New Castle County. Although liability was undisputed at trial, damages were disputed. The plaintiff sought damages for head, neck, back and left shoulder injuries. He had $350,000 in future medical bills and $78,000 in past medical bills that he could board. The plaintiff also had a $5 million lost wage claim that we were able to get dismissed prior to trial on a motion in limine.
Petition to Terminate Ongoing Receipt of TPD Benefits Granted on Basis that Claimant Voluntarily Removed Himself from the Workforce
The Industrial Accident Board (IAB) granted our petition to terminate the ongoing receipt of temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits on the basis that the claimant had voluntarily removed himself from the workforce. The claimant was a correction officer who suffered head injuries in an altercation with an inmate. He was out of work for a time and eventually released to return to work on modified duty. His restrictions were permanent and, because they could not be accommodated by his employer, he was placed on TPD. After more than a year with no indication of an attempt to return to the workforce, we challenged his ongoing entitlement to receive TPD. We worked with the employer to obtain documentation regarding the claimant’s job search (or lack thereof), other sources of income (pension, Social Security) and recreational/social activities since he had been separated from employment. In addition, we put forward both medical and vocational expert testimony at the hearing. As a result, the IAB reasoned that the claimant was able to work in a medium-duty job, that jobs were available within his restrictions, the he had conducted a minimal job search since his work release more than a year and a half earlier, and that his description of his daily activities was consistent with a person content with a retirement lifestyle rather than someone who intended to continue to work. Accordingly, he was no longer entitled to wage replacement benefits.
